HISTORICAL REPORT

OF THE

TRANSPORTATION CORPS

IN THE

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

VOLUME VI

JANUARY - FEBRUARY - MARCH

1945

PART I

(OF 3 PARTS)

HISTORICAL REPORT

ON THE

TRANSPORTATION CORPS

IN THE

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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Prepared by

Historical Section, Historical & Technical Information Branch

U.S. Office of the Chief of Transportation

" European Theater of Operations

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VOLUME VI

(In Three Parts)

Covering the Months of January, February, and March 1945

.. .. ..

Periods covered by Previous Volumes on the History of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations:

Volume I covers January 1942 through December 1943.
Volume II covers January 1944 through March 1944.
Volume III covers April 1944 through June 1944.
Volume IV covers July 1944 through September 1944.
Volume V covers October 1944 through December 1944.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

The liberal cooperation of all Transportation Corps Unit Historians in furnishing the basic material used in preparing this consolidated Historical Report is acknowledged with sincere appreciation. The assistance of officers and enlisted men within the various Headquarters Divisions of the Office of the Chief of Transportation is likewise gratefully acknowledged.

This Section is also indebted to the Publications Branch, Office of the Chief of Transportation, for handling the physical production of this volume, and also to the Army Pictorial Service for making photographs available.

Major Charles R. DeArman
Captain Richard B. Cowdery
Captain Foster W. Montgomery

Paris, France
31 August 1945

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PRIME MOVER

MAJOR
GENERAL
FRANK S. ROSS

CHIEF OF
TRANSPORTATION

ETO

I N T R O D U C T I O N

CHAPTER I

From the tactical standpoint, for the Allied Armies in Western Europe, the first quarter of the year 1945 was characterized by: (1) a continuation of the initiative gained at the end of December 1944 in turning the German Ardennes offensive towards another Nazi defeat; (2) the Allied offensive to the Rhine (9 February through 7 March 1945); (3) the crossing of the Rhine; and (4) the beginning of the battle of the Ruhr which was to lead to the collapse of German resistance in the west during the first part of May 1945. The Situation Map on the opposite page shows the relative position of the Allied front line Armies as of 1 January 1945 and 31 March 1945. A brief summary of the outstanding tactical developments* during this period follows:

(1) On 16 December 1944 the Germans had launched their biggest offensive since the beginning of Allied military operations on the Continent, and they had achieved a high degree of surprise. Their main thrusts were along two principal axes into the Ardennes. In the north they were repeatedly thrown back. In the south they also struck heavy resistance but succeeded in cutting off Bastogne; however, they failed to take it. By the end of December, their preoccupation with Bastogne had cost them the initiative in the Ardennes offensive. Unable to break through in the north to Malmedy, stopped at Stavelot, and deprived of the vital communications center of Bastogne, the German drive to the west was failing. Although they continued to pour troops and equipment into battle and fought desperately, the way was blocked and the drive to the northwest was definitely stopped. By 30 December the forces in the north had gone over to the defensive. On 23 January the First U.S. Army drove back into St. Vith and the Germans in the north were back to within a few miles of their start line. On the south the Third U.S.Army reached the Our River and the outer Siegfried Line defenses. By the end of the first week in February the enemy had pulled back into the Siegfried Line defenses.

(2) The battle of the Ardennes was concluded by the end of the first week in February and the Russian offensive in the east had reached such proportions that the Germans went completely to the defensive in the west. The First and Third U. S. Armies were following the enemy out of the Ardennes and keeping them under constant pressure. By 10 February the Germans were forced back to the Roer dams where they destroyed the outlets and flooded the river, which resulted in delays to the Ninth and First U. S. Armies. The Third Army continued its drive into the Siegfried Line. On 23 February the main assault for the Rhine began. By 25 February, Dueren had been captured, the Ruem and Nims Rivers had been forced, and the German line west of the Rhine was about

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* Source of Information-Report, Headquarters, 12th Army Group, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, entitled "Destruction of the German Armies in Western Europe, 6 June 1944-9 May 1945." Details not included here will be found in the Report prepared by 12th Army Group.

to disintegrate. Bitburg was captured on 28 February and Trier fell on 1 March. Muenchen-Gladbach and Euskirchen were captured by 4 March and by the end of the first week in March the Germans were in full retreat and withdrawing their forces across the Rhine.

(3) Cologne fell on 5 March and the First U. S. Army turned south to drive down the Rhine. on 7 March the railway bridge at Remagen was found intact and advantage was taken of the opportunity it afforded to drive across the river and establish the first bridgehead over the Rhine. On the same day resistance on the Third U. S. Army front disintegrated and the 4th U.S. Armoured Division broke through to the banks of the Rhine and Moselle Rivers by 8 March. Although the Germans poured troops to the Remagen area in an effort to contain the American bridgehead, they were forced to give ground gradually. Meanwhile, on 13 March the Third U.S. Army opened the offensive into the Palatinate by driving across the Moselle River into the mountainous terrain of the Hunsrueck. On 18 March Koblenz fell and the following day St. Wendil, in the heart of the Palatinate, was taken. The enemy divisions still in the Siegfried Line along the Saar, facing the Seventh U.S. Army and the First French Army, started a hurried exit as General PATTON's forces started driving down on them from the north. Kaiserlautern fell on 20 March, and Mainz and Worms were taken on 22 March. The following day the Third U.S. Army crossed the Rhine south of Mainz; also, the British and Canadian forces and Ninth U.S. Army, with the aid of an airborne landing, crossed the river in the Wesel area, and the Rhine barrier had been breached from Emmerich to Karlsruhe. The same day the Ninth Army drove across the Rhine in the north and the First Army broke out of the Remagen bridgehead.

(4) On 26 March the First U. S. Army opened its offensive from the Remagen bridgehead, and two days later the First and Third U.S. Armies linked up; together they formed one giant spearhead in the Frankfurt gap pointed at Kassel. The encirclement of the Ruhr required one week. On 1 April the Ruhr pocket was closed at Lippstadt by the meeting of the 2nd U.S. Armored Division, driving east from the Duesseldorf area, and 3rd U.S. Armored Division coming from the south. By 18 April all organized German resistance in the area ceased.

According to Plan OVERLORD, the U. S. Armies were scheduled at the turn of the year, D/ 210, to be along the Marne River at Epernay and adjacent to the British along the Somme*. Actually, they were before the Siegfired Line and were extended much farther to the north and south where in the latter case the Rhine had been reached. The general offensive to capture the Ruhe, which was envisaged for 1 May 1945 (D/330)* actually was under way by 28 February, and the forcing of the Metz gap, timed for March, had taken place at the beginning rather than at the end of the period covered by this report. Railway reconstruction and exploitation of lines was well beyond the limits anticipated.**

This general speed-up as well as the tremendous and large scale efforts required to overcome the enemy's Ardennes offensive, to take advantage of his

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* Post-"Neptune"-Operations, Administrative Appreciation, dated 5 July 1944, 381 (GDP) (SHAEF/1062/7/GDP)-Annexure "A" dated 17 June 1944.

** Map "MY", Railroad Development during period D to D/330, Ibid.

unanticipated weaknesses, to accomplish the Rhine crossing, and to make the final drives that brought on the defeat of the Germans--all of these efforts on the part of the four front line U.S. Armies and the French Army on the Western Front, strained every Transportation Corps facility and installation. The result was the calling for many plans in various phases, for numerous changes at certain stages of development, and extra energies from all TC personnel. The German counter-offensive brought on, in addition, the need for more plans and actions, thus, trucking and railway units were re-routed and had their destinations changed; new reconnaissances of railways, roadways, and depot areas had to be made. In addition, German air activity increased greatly so that rail lines, trains, and convoys enroute were strafed and set on fire, and there were more casualties to personnel and equipment than had heretofore been sustained. To these obstacles were added severe weather conditions--heavy rains and mud, snow and ice, and then the floods that followed heavy rains and thaws.

The manner in which the critical Transportation Corps problems and situations were met during this period are discussed in this volume from the viewpoint of the Office of the Chief of Transportation and its various planning, coordinating, and controlling agencies, as well as from the viewpoint of its various field activities and installations. Chapter II contains a summary of the activities of the headquarters divisions in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, and information on their major problems and solutions. In Chapter III, the activities at each of the major ports are discussed--at Cherbourg, LeHavre, Rouen, Antwerp, Marseille, and Ghent. The information contained in this Chapter shows how at all of these ports, excepting Antwerp, where the damage was not extensive, considerable rehabilitation of the port facilities was accomplished during this period, and how, at the same time, various expedients and concerted efforts were applied in order to meet the increased demands for unloading and moving supplies to forward rail and truck heads. The Military Railway Service and Motor Transport Service on the Continent during this period are discussed in Chapters IV and V, respectively, and the organization and activities of the Transportation Section within each of the Advance, Intermediate, and Base Sections of the Communications Zone are covered in Chapter VI. Copies of supporting documents, grouped in Appendixes, are contained in a separate part of this volume. Information on the various Transportation Corps activities in U.K. Base will be contained in a separate Appendix to be issued at a later date. More detailed information on the activities of individual units attached or assigned to Transportation Corps organizations in the European Theater of Operations during this period are available in the files of the Historical Section, Office of the Chief of Transportation, ETO.

As of the close of the year 1944, the Transportation Corps had a total of 117,647 personnel in the European Theater of Operations, the majority of which were assigned to operations on the Continent. By the end of March 1945, the total amounted to 163, 269 or an increase of approximately 27 percent during the three-month period. Appendix No. 1, this volume, contains a list of these various Transportation Corps units as of 7 April 1945. Volume No. V, Historical Report on the activities of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations during October, November and December 1944, contains a list of the TC units in the Theater as of the close of the year 1944.

CHAPTER II

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION

HEADQUARTERS DIVISIONS.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION HQ COM ZONE . . . . . ETOUSA


Maj. Gen. - FRANK S. ROSS


Brig. Gen. - C. R. GRAY jr.


Brig. Gen. - G. C. STEWART


Col. - D. W. TRAUB


Col. - H. A. MURRILL


Col. - C. Z. CASE


Col. - G. BARTLETT


Col. - R. B. WARREN


Col. - N. A. RYAN


Col. - S. A. DECKER


Col. - M. G. JEWETT


Col. - T. FULLER

It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena: whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood: who strives valiantly: who errs and comes short again and again: who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause: who, at the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement: and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

CHAPTER II
SECTION I
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION

The Organization Chart of the Office of the Chief of Transportation (OCOT) on the opposite page shows the various Divisions and Branches within the organization effective as of 1 April 1945. During the first three months of the year 1945, several overall administrative changes were made as well as certain modifications within the various Divisions and Branches themselves. The latter are brought out in the summaries of OCOT Division activities covered in Sections II through IX of this Chapter. Copies of Assignment Memoranda, Headquarters, Communications Zone ETOUSA, Office of the Chief of Transportation are given in Appendix No. 2, Part I, and these indicate certain official changes within the various Divisions.

Overall Administrative Changes

On 6 February 1945, Assignment Memorandum No. 13, Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, Office of the Chief of Transportation, assigned Brigadier General GEORGE C. STEWART as Deputy Chief of Transportation. General STEWART had assumed these duties on 2 February having previously served as Transportation Officer, Southern Line of Communications, ETOUSA. Prior to this assignment of General STEWART as Deputy Chief of Transportation, Colonel DAVID W. TRAUB had occupied this position alone. Subsequent to the arrival of General STEWART, Colonel TRAUB continued to serve as Deputy Chief of Transportation. However, a division of duties and responsibilities was made and on 12 February 1945, Office Memorandum No. 23, Headquarters, Communications Zone ETOUSA, Office of the Chief of Transportation, was issued on the subject: "Duties and Responsibilities between Deputy Chiefs of Transportation." This memorandum is quoted below:

"1. For the information and guidance of all concerned, division of duties and responsibilities between Deputy Chief of Transportation Brigadier General GEORGE C. STEWART and Deputy Chief of Transportation Colonel DAVID W. TRAUB is as indicated below.

"a. DCOT Brig. Gen. Stewart will have primary responsibility for supervision and direction of the activities of the following Divisions:

"Movements
Military Railway Service
Inland Waterways
Motor Transport Service

"b. DCOT Colonel Traub will have primary responsibility for supervision and direction of the activities of the following Divisions:

"Control and Planning
Administration
Marine Operations
Supply

1 TYPIST

2 SECRETARY

3 DISPATCHER

4 DRIVER

WACs in the TRANSPORTATION CORPS

At the Transportation Corps centers throughout the European Theater of operations WACs are engaged in essential duties to keep the supplies moving forward, of these 200 serve in the office of the Chief of Transportation

5 STATISTICIAN

6 OPERATOR

7 STENOGRAPHER

8 CLERK

O.U.T.L.I.N.E.

SECTION II

CHAPTER II

CONTROL AND PLANNING DIVISION.

* * *

CHAPTER II

SECTION II

CONTROL & PLANNING DIVISION

by Captain Richard B. Cowdery, (FA) TC,
Special Research, Historical Section

I. General

1. Trends in TC Control and Planning for Maximum Use of Facilities in the ETO.

The COT (Chief of Transportation), Major General FRANK S. ROSS, placed a great deal of emphasis on planning, knowing that 'foresight saves trouble'. This efficient officer also believed that one of the chief functions of control was the enforcement of routine. Speaking before the large group of key transportation men assembled in Paris for a two-day series of lectures on the plans for occupying Germany, the General reminded his executives of the difference between the clockwork efficiency of operations in that March of 1945 and the hectic times when they first came to Europe and had to do everything pretty much on the spur of the moment and for the first time. They must keep everyone associated with them programming for the future and scheduling everything into routine. Trouble originated not so much from big, important items as from a host of seemingly unimportant occasions when someone forgot or changed his mind, two things which routine minimized. (1).

Routine, he went on, made less work for everyone. Some overwork planning detail and setting up a regular pattern was always shortly rewarded by having a show running so smoothly all one had to do was check it and look out for its future. (1).

Early in the year the Chief had been talking in the same vein when he reminded the Port and Section Transportation Officers that Transportation was a Service, not a Commodity. What one didn't do one day could never really be made up: was water over the dam forever, especially in war when facilities were always stretched to the utmost and could not take a make-up load in addition to their regular abnormal one. Careful planning and constant drive to make those plans realities were the only thing to make every day count to its full. (2).

These plans, however, he stated at the next monthly conference, must be kept clear and simple: not, as he put it in the picturesque speech he was wont to use with these men he had long led, 'full of a lot of g-damn finesse.' They must remember the fundamental rules of the transportation business and Army procedure; they were about to start, in the crucial month of March, another 'rat race', and they would get through it in the superior manner they had the trying days of supporting the break-through, opening the ports, developing new L's of C (Lines of Communication), if they followed the rules. (3).

[redacted]

One of the main trends of the period under our observation was the continuing change of main L's of C and the perfecting of operations with existent facilities and additional new ones. Le Havre and Rouen were made the personnel receivers par excellence, which meant they must also take in the basic equipment which accompanies organizations. This meant in addition, that a great staging area, equal to the task of housing, feeding, and 'marrying' troops with their equipment, had to be planned and developed. A special motor shuttle-service, meeting each convoy, was set up to assist the railroads in hauling men to their Army areas.

When flying bombs made it apparent that Antwerp could not handle the ammunition planned for it, Seine ports had to shoulder part of that burden, making another adjustment, and a heavy one, because shells made heavy demands: special handling, special sorting, space, and weight, as well as high priority for immediate delivery. An inspecting General asked a port battalion private what he considered the most important item he handled. "Rations, Sir", replied the soldier; "Nobody can live without food". "Ammunition", corrected the wearer of the star, "A man can fight for awhile on an empty stomach, but not with an empty gun."

As it became strategically possible to allot the hard-suffering French civilian population more ship space and railway wagons for their needs, the LeHavre-Rouen combination made still another adjustment. They became the Northern port of entry for French supplies, and their great inland drain, the Seine-Oise- Marne river and canal system, was utilized to carry this new load to centers of consumption and distribution.

The Transportation Corps had taken hold of its share of the ripest plum ever, the huge and excellently-equipped port of Antwerp. Close to the front, this harbor was a great temptation, since everyone wanted their supplies discharged there. Men of experience in the technique of movement, however, had to bend their efforts to curb this desire, for it was not only impossible to handle everything at the Belgian entreport, but also disregardful of the old maxim the shortest land-haul, to ship from Antwerp to the southerly sectors of the front, and wasteful to steam past the Seine ports with goods which would later, though unloaded at Belgian quays, have to be back-hauled to French depots because of limited depot capacities further forward.

Antwerp was superb, but to the map student the rails, canals, and highways leading from it to Brussels, Liege, and further, qualified its miles of docks and movable cranes, There was the problem of developing clearance facilities and planning movements to such a maximum that the enormous appetite of the port for unloading vessels could be fed to build the blood and sinew of goods delivered to the troops rather than to develop an unhealthy corpulence of over-crowded wharves and clogged railways, and barge basins where badly-needed craft waited to move.

These changes were successfully accomplished, even though the German counter-offensive in early January caused considerable difficulties: diverting trucks for troop movement, barges and rail wagons to movable warehouses in the event capture of vital supplies threatened, and causing embargoes on many movements and at many depots.

From the map one can see what a mountain of plans, management, and labor the new developments created. The arteries of circulation changed. Changes went on while the former lines were maintained and new and old alike were controlled and manned. There were countless capillaries from new ports to old depots, old ports to new depots like the Nancy group, depot to depot and ever-changing railheads.

Certain decisions of policy were developed as new situations showed themselves. In mid-January, activities had practically slowed off to nothing in the ports of Morlaix and Dieppe, still under U.S. control. General ROSS stated the U.S. should make a policy of turning such installations completely back to the French for the import of Civil Affairs materials and let them do their own laboring and hauling. (4).

Enough men to do any job was another concern. When, about the same date, the War Department ordered a cut in personnel for the ETO, the transportation share of which was some 28 percent of total strength, the General was very much opposed to the idea and made strong representations to Com Z Headquarters. (5). A little later the pinch came from within the theatre, the Infantry's insatiable appetite requiring more men at the front. Transportation was particularly hard hit, because many of its men were specialists - crane operators, locomotive mechanics, etc. difficult to replace. The historian Wilgus points out in his study of Transportation in World War I that there was always a tendency to think of reinforcing combat units at the expense of service outfits. Here was the same old trouble: with the old conflict of ideas between those who claimed the battle must be waged at any expense and those who clamied it could not be waged without adequate logistical support. The T.C. lost many a man to the Reinforcement Command but was somewhat compensated by being able to draw some bodies from other sources, such as the Anti-Aircraft and Coast Artillery, not too engaged as soon as the defense of the coast was sure and the Luftwaffe became too hard-pressed to do much raiding.

Another item of policy was the subject of embargoes. When depots failed to unload cars, trucks, or barges, the only tool by which the T.C. could win back these much-needed items and restore circulation to congested channels was to embargo the offender-prohibit the consignment or delivery of goods to that place until such time as enough order had been restored to get things again functioning properly.

The view of the Control and Planning Division was that before an embargo could be placed, the chief of the service operating the installation concerned and an officer at the location should be consulted. The COT, however, was not in favor of this, considering it time-consuming and red-tape-winding. At the time of the suggestion, 3 January, only two embargoes had been placed over a comparatively long interval, and they had been found justifiable and effective. (6).

Colonel HUGH A. MURRILL, Chief, Control and Planning Division, did not, although he favored more consultation with the Services, favour Com Z's or the Base Sections' having much say about embargoes. One of the pronounced trends of his activity was to try constantly to divorce technical matters from command decisions. (7). Those who wielded command, however,

still continued to make themselves felt: a late February letter from Com Z Headquarters stressed the fact that too many matters were by-passing command channels--particularly requests for reports. (8).

Another of the Colonel's working theses was that a staff must operate in the real sense of its capacity not conducting actual field doings. Feeling that the office of the A.C. of S. (Asst. Chief of Staff), G-4, had been operative to a degree far in excess of that intended by Army organization, he was always working to get more decision and supervision of technical operations into the OCOT. His main battle had been waged throughout the fall of 1944; this first quarter of 1945 was marked by consolidating gains and applying newly won rights. (9).

On January 26th the DCOT (Deputy Chief of Transportation), Col. DAVID W. TRAUB, announced to the morning staff conference of ACOT's (Asst. Chiefs of Transportation), the various Division heads, that SOLOC (Southern Line of Communications), the command embracing the whole of Southeast France and supporting the Southern Group of Armies, was to be consolidated with and under Com Z Headquarters. This amalgamation actually transpired in February. It's effects and problems are found in many phases of T.C. activities in this Volume and are discussed particularly in Part IV of this Section. (10). The main trend from this new direction was to attempt to put into practice in Northern France an overall allocation of movements facilities. This trial was not very successful for reasons touched upon later in this Section and elaborated upon in Section V this Chapter under Movements Division.

At the same time, the complicated transport situation in Belgium, so important because of Antwerp, the greatest ETO port on the Continent, Ghent, the important new addition of this quarter, and the vast depot systems around Brussels and Liege, impeded operations at ports, on railways, and canals. At January's end, the frozen canals and restive labor made it necessary to draw up and follow through an overall blueprint for the nation's railways, waterways, and highways. (11). This worked exceedingly well. The whys and wherefores of it are taken up under the detailed discussions of Changes (Part I, 4 a), the Supply Movements Program, (Part III, 1d and 3a), and Relations with the Belgians (Part V, 4.).

In the Antwerp strike of 1 February, another policy was demonstrated. The Port Commander asked that extra Port Companies be sent him with which to break the strike, but OCOT refused them on the grounds that strike should be settled through government channels, keeping the T.C. out of local interests. (12).

At first no negro troops had been employed in Belgium. When another strike occurred in mid-month and the idea of sending more port troops to Antwerp was again suggested, Maj. General ROSS stated that he would not (if he had to send any) send only white troops to a place of trouble. White and black had shared alike the privileges and trials of the T.C. and would continue to do so. At the month's end the nomination of a colored Port Company for Ghent showed that this view was to be carried out completely. (13).

In late March an international barge movement was studied. Inland Waterways found it would take approximately 500 barges to set up a channel between

Ghent and Roims. Tying up that many craft in the difficult procedure of crossing boundaries was considered inadvisable. Control and Planning agreed, recommending that QM supplies for Roims could be barged from Rouen. There was no return load from Roims to Ghent, and Belgian craft would be most effectively used in their own country, hauling east to the main northern depots. (14).

The planning for the occupation of Germany had new overall features. SHAEF gave authority, by a letter of 20 March, for the agencies concerned with detailed planning to work directly with the SHAEF planners, by-passing the usual command steps through Com Z. This, Colonel TRAUB commented, would save some duplication of effort and time. (15).

The Chief, Control and Planning, had some interesting things to say about planning in general as real concentrated effort began on post-war prospectuses. It had been his experience in working on OVERLORD, the master plan for the invasion of Northern Europe, that the early months' work, done on high level, consisted mainly of vague discourses over definitions and demarcations of responsibility, and was of little meaning to the men of action who had to plan specific and technical details. He had never read a line of the first three month's work on OVERLORD, and he had found the work on Occupation up to March full of evasive language and duplication. (16). Much of it had been merely hashing over unimportant TO/TE's (Tables of Organization and Equipment). (17).

The matter of Occupation was to be of the utmost interest to the OCOT for the next months. Maj. General ROSS felt that the German philosophy in defeat might well preclude the U.S.'s obtaining any assistance in the vital business of providing transport for troops and rehabilitation. His policy was to plan on using German methods and personnel to the largest extent feasible; but he did not want Germans used in any important positions until it was well known what their affiliations were, a check which would take time and probably deprive T.C. of some of the most technically-competent. He therefore appealed to all concerned to be as sparing of Transportation personnel (American) as possible, since they would be required on hand to do the job in case the conquered people refused to come into line. (18).

The COT did not ask that he be made a general staff officer in the proposed Theater Headquarters for Post-Hostilities conduct of affairs (See Number 2 of Appendix No. 2, Part II, and further details in Part III, 1, b of this Section, Chapter II). He was satisfied with the new interpretation of his powers as a special staff office at Theater level. His loyal assistants, Colonel MURRILL and Brig. General GEORGE C. STEWART, a DCOT after his arrival from SCLOC in Mid-February, argued that he should not be obliged to take orders from the Berlin staff of the US GCC (United States Group Control Council), but he himself was mainly concerned with obtaining the proper amount of authority and assistance to enable him to perform the executive role defined. He might not, said the General with characteristic thoughtfullness, become COT for the Theater in Germany, but he wanted to fix things up so whoever did have that job didn't have two strikes on him at the start!' (19).

2. Changes in Mission, Duties, Responsibilities, and Organization

The new moves described in the foregoing section were not changes in the 'province of the crown', so to speak. Rather, they were aggressive and dutiful demonstrations of the sweeping power and large responsibility vested in this special division, acting as part of the COT's foresight to plan and, as a supplement to his powers of observation, to control, aid, and arouse those responsible for operations.

Organizational changes were few but important. The chart stayed pretty much as shown for the 1st January, but the Division Chief used his assistants for special projects at different times, so that almost all of the officers were familiar with all problems. Routine duties settled to the following:

Chief: Colonel H. A. MURRILL

Deputy Chief: Lt. Colonel G. N. OLSEN
(Concerned especially with Redeployment)

Belgian Branch, Chief: Lt. Colonel L. H. HEUMANN

Statistics: Lt. Col. M.N. DRAKE

Packing & Marking: Lt.Col.H.L.PEYTE

Long-Range Planning: Majors G.K.GRAVELLE & L.F. BOLTON

Monthly Planning and Control: Captains W.C. IDE & G.A. WILKENS

Drafting: Captain G.T. PECK

Intelligence: Lts. J.D. COONEY & J.A. SHYBURGH (20)

For a time it appeared that Occupation plans would not be the concern of this Division, for Colonel THOMAS FULLER, coming from SOLOC with Brigadier General STEWART, was, at the same time he was named Executive to the COT, in early February, placed in charge of Post-Hostilities Planning. (20a). However, his sudden departure, on the 11th March, with Lt. Colonel G. N. OLSEN, Deputy Chief, Control & Planning Division, to visit ports of embarkation (POE) in the homeland, precipitated occupation ground work into it's most logical position, Colonel MURRILL's hands. (21)

Of much assistance to the Division from the time of his assignment, 23 March, Colonel LOUIS G. ZINN, CKLR worked principally on the Supply Movement Program. He was learning the Con Z ropes', having come up from SOLOC, and so was not confined to any fixed position in the office. (22).

The biggest change of the quarter was the shift of the Packing & Marking Branch from Movements Division. The large role which this branch would have in redeployment plans and the amount of contact it was to establish with Armies and the other Services made it advisable to be in the OCOT Division which did the overall planning and was the most frequent liaison agent. (23).

3. Phase Development in Tactical Situation and Effect on Division

The opening days of the year 1945 found the Armies, and in some cases even TC truck-drivers and ATC's, still engaged heavily in holding back Von Rundstedt's blow at the Northern communications, and in gaining back the bulge in the Allied front his divisions had made in the Ardennes. (24).

By January's end, the Yanks were again on the old offensive of battering the Seigfried, which was pretty well breached by mid-February. Best tactical estimation was that no further enemy offensives were possible; but no one could predict exactly when the time would be ripe for the Allies' final dash for Berlin. (25)

As early as the 5th of February the tactical situation served to stir warning of the future's work. The ACOT's assembled heard Major General AOSS detail Control & Planning Division to acquaint the others with the post-hostilities program as it stood, bringing up the two enormous problems of redeployment and occupation. (26)

Plan ECLIPSE was developed by SHAEF as it became apparent that the Reich must be invaded rather than marched into with colors flying, and bands playing. It put a terrific strain on Transportation, for it predicted fast movement over a great river and across a country whose transport facilities had been so reduced as to cause intelligence specialists to study the most common denominator, the supply of Infantry Boots!

When in late February, Generals HODGES' and SIMPSONS' men crossed the Roer and broke onto the Cologne Plain, the tired GI probably did not think of the fact that he was the hero beginning the first scene of the last act in an amazing drama. He precipitated a definite phase, known to the 'high-ups' as ECLIPSE, in which the T.C. had to follow him closely in the hostile land, advancing railheads, laying on more trucks to make up for torn-up rails, and building up stock-piles, both of bridging material to span the river which had been an obstacle since Caesar's time and of the millions of tons the Armies would call for as they pressed on into Hitlerland. (27)

Prior to this time, the plans for emergency movement, a rail-truck-plane team, had been foreseen and drawn-up. From the hectic days of Red Ball and 'wildcat' railroading from Normandy to Paris, valuable lessons had been learned. When the Ardennes counter-attack interrupted the scheme to push through the Rhineland, trains were the more easily diverted and truck companies rushed to emergency jobs by the use of plans already made for a break-through emanating from, rather than directed at, the American Armies. From the mistakes and losses of the Yuletide struggle, new, more detailed plans were

perfected. With the windfall of capturing the Remagen bridge, the moment of decision came even sooner than anticipated; and, when, in the last week of March, three great Armies crossed the Rhine, control took over the plans and papers became deeds.

Eclipse itself dealt with the period from the establishment of Rhine bridgeheads to the final movements of troops into the respective national zones of occupation. It was in two phases, during the first of which ADSEC would be forwarding, through the Regulating Stations long accustomed to their respective Armies, the ammunition, fuel and food to enable 12th Army Group to reduce the Reichswehrin, and capture the mills and mines of, the Saar and Ruhr; to take, with the aid of an attached British Division, Berlin, and to push West in central Germany with the mission of seizing Leipszig and being prepared to take Dresden, should the Russians not already have succeeded in so doing. The First Airborne Army was readied to take the naval Key at Keil, with a Division, and Berlin, with a Corps, should the land forces be long blocked. COMAD was to expedite the moves which would enable Sixth Army Group to take Munich and Nurenburg. (28).

In the second phase, the British 21st Army Group was to occupy Hannover and Kassel, great rail and manufacturing centers, and to take over, as rapidly as possible, all installations in the British zone. 12th Army Group was to absorb the 6th. In addition, the British were to clear the approaches to and take finally the Bremen Port Area, at which time, the U.S. would add another great and final entrepot to it's list. (29).

The administrative additions made by Com Z, Headquarters to the plan, followed the tactical shifts through to a logical outcome. ADSEC and COMAD would establish installations and furnish service personnel for the Eastern and Western Military Districts in Southwest Germany, but they would do so under Army aegis, never extending the authority of Com Z east of the Rhine. A new establishment for the enclave of U.S. controlled territory about Bremen would be furnished and controlled by Com Z. (30).

Another tactical consideration was the demobilization of what might remain of the German field forces. It was estimated that there might be some ten million men to control and supply, first, and then, to discharge by the process of decentralizing units. (31)

If great numbers of trucks were to be placed on L of C hauls, as a part of the XYZ plan, to furnish support across rail-less Germany, ports and depots in Com Z would have to be prepared to do without them, as their executives were warned in early March. (32)

This foreseen scarcity of trucks was a pressure which the planners translated into a concerted effort, during January and February to reduce materially the backlog of supplies in all port areas, but particularly Antwerp. In order that they might clear at the time when the loss of trucks might make it impossible to move incoming tonnages. (33).

Most problems originated with the consumer, the armies, a truth inherent in the fact that Transportation's "raison d'etre" was to serve their needs. If they moved fast or defended themselves against counter-attack they were too

busy to unload carriers, thus robbing the railways of wagons, the highways of trucks, the waterways of barges. Again, their fast movement might mean, as after St. Lo, that they outpaced, first the railways, delayed by the destruction of facilities, and then the trucks, finally strung out so far as to be unable to keep up reasonable turn-around time.

The doings of the men with guns thus posed some big problems to be planned and then steered through. How to build up for the Rhine Crossing? Where would our trains and trucks cross the Rhine? How to support fast-moving armies in a razed land? How to obtain necessary intelligence and establish control in that country? How best to accomplish the demobilization of the enemy and the redeployment of American forces within the theater, or to other theaters, and to the Zone of the Interior? And, as the Armies uncovered the millions of prisoners of war, political prisoners, slave laborers, whom the Nazis had displaced from their native residences, how to handle such a flow? The operations, and therefore the control over them, will be covered in the next Volume; but the answers to the above questions in the form of plans are discussed in subsequent parts of this Section, along with actual operations, to the extent they developed.

4. Summary of Accomplishments of Control and Planning Division

a. Changes

One of the main changes wrought in control by the Supply Movement Program was the centralization of redeployment in OCOT. Thus, minor authorities, unfamiliar with the overall situation and concerned primarily with local pressure were prevented from "throwing wrenches in the works". OCOT now investigated details and reported all well-established failures to comply on the part of the customers, Armies and Supply Services, to G-4, Com Z for appropriate action. (34)

In Belgium, for the first time in the Northern Sector of the ETO, an overall facilities allocation for a nation was attempted and successfully implemented in early February. (35). Details are discussed in Part V of this Section. Belgium, being small, its transport facilities were not complex; therefore, its capacity and needs were both relatively easy to determine.

In France, on the other hand, the attempt to set up overall allocation met with less success, The difference in size between France and Belgium, complicated estimates and control, (36) and transport problems therein tended to be handled on a political, rather than military level -- out of the COT's hands. (37). Finally, the Belgian nationals had with certain exceptions, more of the spirit of cooperation than the Northern French. (38).

Since Brigadier General GEORGE C. STEWART, up from SOLOC, who attempted to apply Allocation of Rail Tonnage (ART) in Com Z proper, was DCOT charged with overseeing Movements Division, details of ART are considered in Section V, this Chapter, under Movements Division. Appropriate here is a discussion of why the thing didn't work.

Whereas SOLOC had one major port, Marseilles, and one single Line of Communications, the Rhine Valley (some diversion via Grenoble was not large enough to change the basic situation) the northern region contained six major

and four minor ports, serving double that number of main railway lines, highways, and canals. It was possible in the South to determine accurately the capacities and probable flow of facilities, but such predeterminations would have been accurate in Northern France only under the most ideal situation. (39)

No such situation existed. The orderly flow of supplies was assured in SOLOC by the existence of the Base Depots in the vicinity of Marseilles. (40) Such a depot assured "adequate depot capacity to receive cargoes from ships without blocking up the ports" (41), because port clearance did not depend on the long rail hauls and the attendant problem of getting empty wagons back to the port. Had the Northern ports had such clearance there would not have occurred repetitions of demands for trains forward to clear the ports and move the whole tonnage to the front. (42).

Base Depots had not been generally established because they were not planned by the AC of S, G-4 and his staff. (41). It was thought that such extensive construction would be required as to be incommensurate with the gains. (40). It would have been extremely difficult to develop the base depot system during the first fifty days, since the lodgement area was small and the resistence so heavy as to demand the crowding ashore of materials into emergency dumps. Then, after the breakthrough at St. Lo, when there was room and enough 'rearness' to set up stable installations, the advance of the Armies was so incredibly rapid as to call for great energy to forward supplies by the fastest possible methods. All of Normandy then became a Base Depot, but by that time too far rear to function economically. However, at that time, and in the later comparative calm of Le Havre, Rouen, Antwerp, Ghent development, the COT consistently sought the installation of a Base, Intermediate, and Forward depot system, without which the most efficient use of transport was impossible. (41).

Multiple capacities and irregular flow of goods meant difficulties in making up bids for the traffic machine. These same factors caused the U. S. Army's actual shipments sometimes to exceed and often to differ from its bids, so that the French railroaders had difficulty in following the system. They were experiencing great difficulty in rehabilitating their machine and showed little facility for improvisation. The demand for movement of civil goods pressed on them, so that sometimes a form of competition existed as to who could get away with shipping, in effect, "what the other would bear"; (39) and (42) and it was only due to constant efforts to keep the overall Supply Movements Program on target and the willingness of the French to cooperate when reprimanded that order was wrung out of what might have been chaos, and the Armies supplied full measure.

b. Improvements in Methods

Proper control of as comprehensive a program as the Supply Movement naturally caused some changes in technique, particularly in the field of reports. After the first receipts indicating the progress of the new scheme, it was stressed by the Chief, Control and Planning Division, that the essential items, to be presented as clearly as possible, were these four: (1) Discharge from ships, (2) Movements from ports, (3) Receipts at depots, (4) Movements out of depots. A five day period, rather than daily, was determined a more valuable basis for reporting. (43).

The basis of this report was the now-familiar "sunburst" chart for the ports, showing the planned tonnage, by class of supply, to be discharged, and to move to key depots. Blanks were provided in which to insert the tonnage actually moved. With this everyone from the COT to the company grade officers of the Port Transportation Officer's staff could check quickly the status of performance. (44).

Improvement in the old average of 20 day turn-around time for barges in Belgium was suggested in a paper covering the whole use of Belgian facilities. Increase in lift would result from: (1) prompt discharge, (2) return hauls with load, rather than empty, and (3) less hauling of bulky Engineer Class IV Supplies, extremely wasteful of barge space. (35).

The numerous other improvements innovated are discussed under the sub-divisions of this Section to which they relate.

c. Tonnages vs. Targets

One's most natural reaction to the question of whether the program was or was not successful is to examine the figures planned, published in the monthly folder, and compare them with the discharge and haul accomplished, neatly arrayed in the monthly charts and tables published by the Statistics Branch, Control and Planning Division, (45) or examine those published by Com Z Headquarters under the Transportation Section, in the Monthly Progress Report turned out there. [redacted] of these figures were actually furnished Com Z by Transportation Corps. (46).

But to do this only would be to disregard the basic nature of the plan as a whole. It was a substitution for temporary, short-term expedients and it was instituted on the logical assumption that, as Colonel HUGH A. MURRILL put it, one should "establish SOP procedures for 80 percent of operational requirements and making adjustments within a 20 percent zone for special requirements". (41). It was not expected that it could cover all movements, as an examination of statistics clearly indicates it did not, nor that it should be 100 percent accomplished. It was a pinnacle toward which to climb, with all-out effort, knowing that the nearer one came to attainment, the more successfully the war could be waged. "Objectives in the program were always set high in the belief that high objectives, even deliberately set above capabilities, result in greater accomplishment than lower objectives set within known capacities." (41). The COT himself told his capable executors assembled that they were not expected to meet the planned tonnages completely. They had splendidly exceeded the program in several instances and done a completely commendable job by reaching high percentages in all others.

The real test, then, is to examine primarily the overall discharge and movement increases. It must be born in mind, throughout this discussion of achievements, that this Section of the Volume on the Control and Planning Division is merely the most convenient place to make overall conclusions. On the one hand, the Control and Planning Division was only one of the eight staff Divisions of OCOT carrying out the ideas and reflecting the energy of Major General LOSS and his brilliant deputies, Colonel TRAUB and Brigadier General STEWART. Control and Planning Division was one of those especially assigned to the former's attention, and to it he gave wholly of his wealth of experience and quiet, powerful drive.

On the other hand, it is remembered that no one in the OCOT moved a pound of QM I out of a hold to a quay and thence, via depots, to the front lines. Any number of plans or any amount of supervision could mean absolutely nothing unless capable officers and men, at ports and in base and advance sections, and with the armies, related the plans to specialized fields of endeavor and carried on the supervision in much greater detail. And all that depended, in turn, completely upon the performers, of various skills, all vital: the stevedore, whose back ached: the harbor technicians whose skill was strained by ever-recurrant emergencies: the truck-drivers and mechanics whose "keep 'em rolling" air must sometimes furnish more staying power than food and sleep could spare: the railroad men whose long tradition of dependable service was kept up despite dangerous track and the confusing operating methods of a foreign land: those who patrolled railways, canals, and the Red Grassards -- the RTO men, the representatives of the TC with its customers, always meeting the unexpected, in the loneliness of a country passing-point as well as the incredible hub-bub of a busy port, a main depot, or a great city terminal.

Within the OCOT the deeds were performed by the "agent" divisions. Control and Planning determined port capacities in cooperation with Marine Operations Division; what could be moved inland, and where, was a question answered principally by Movements Division, garnering same from its five sources of carriage -- the MRS, Inland Waterways Division, MTS, section-controlled TC Trucking, and controlled trucking organic to Army units but travelling across section boundaries.

Proper credit comes to these various agencies in the Chapters of this Volume devoted to their activities but the historian is anxious that the reader not assume this recapitulation of performance under the Control and Planning Division means the whole achievement rests here. It is so placed, however, because no other Division had such an overall mission or maintained contact with so many different phases of the Transportation activities. It is placed here, because, just as plans and control mean nothing without execution, so a host of executors, working each in his own sphere only, and with present problems, would produce chaos and haul less material. Planning and supervision can only be tested by how they turn out in figures and conclusions, so that the achievements and errors of all are the only reflection of those of this key Division.

To answer the question of overall Transportation performance it will be helpful to examine total tonnage movement figures, since change there reflects changes in discharge as well as clearance. From Chart I, (at the opening of this Section) it can be seen that the mass of tonnages moved, remained below the 30,000 ton line from November, when operations might be said to have reached some routine, through December. Through January, the fifst trial of the overall program, the 40,000 line is approached more consistently; and in February and March, not only is it topped, but the 50,000 is for the most part covered, and the 60,000 reached at three peak periods.

Although General ROSS told General LEE the program was a target rather than a guarantee (47), it is significant how consistently tonnages came near to meeting the blueprints. The January Program, even though it was a beginner, was well met. And this was accomplished despite the worst winter weather in forty years -- in the U.K. the previous winter had forced a forty percent drop in operational efficiency -- and the fact that Continent-bound ships were not

1. THE TRAINMAN

2. THE DRIVER

3. THE DIVER

T.C. G.Is MEN OF ACTION

Thousands of . . . . . Enlisted Men stationed in the ETO are engaged in the tremendous task of moving supplies to the armies to do this the . . Transportation Corps utilizes all the transportation facilities available, Highway, Rail Water and the Air. The diversity of the transportation operations on the continent creates a great number of highly . . technical jobs, some of which are shown here. . . . . .

4. THE PILOT

5. AND THE SHOPMAN

6. SOME CONSTRUCT, WHILE

7. OTHERS REPAIR EQUIPMENT

8. MAN BARGES

9. DO EXACTING REPAIRS

10. AND REGULATE MOVEMENTS

in the position envisaged at the time of drawing up the plan. Forward depots were not opened as planned by the Services -- thanks to General VON RUNDSTEDT' little diversion -- and the procurement of empty rail cars rested not so much with the I.C., as it should have, as with SHAEF's overall control, the French and Belgians' practical "possession is nine points the law", and the Armies and other Services, slow at unloading. Despite these factors, two records were broken: 65,000 tons were moved North and East of the Seine on the single day of 28 January (48) and the Northern Ports' discharge tallied over 50,000 tons 25 January, exceeding both the best daily discharge of the combined ports used in World War I -- 27,000 tons, and the target set by the program, the highest ever. * (49).

Targets made from figures sometimes hastily guessed at by the Services were naturally subject to modification when tactical stress prevented the opening or full exploitation of a depot or channel of traffic. Rather than confuse the executors of the program with numerous amendments, such changes as had to be made were usually adjusted in meetings such as the Shipping Allocations Meeting (See Appendix No. 2, Part II, No. 1) or were arranged locally (50) between OCOT and the Section Transportation Officer concerned. These changes were held to a mimimum, but their part in the overall tonnage figures was necessarily large. It is thus that the item "Moved on Cargo Dispatch Advices (CDA's) from OCOT" often made up a deficit existing from lower tonnages than planned in the detailed columns of "Class of Supply by Service, Port to Depot, etc."

Let the following figures, furnished to CofS Z Headquarters by Statistics Branch, Control and Planning Division, speak for the other two months.

DISCHARGE AT PORTS BY CLASSES OF SUPPLY

FEBRUARY 1945

	DAILY AVERAGE		MONTHLY AVERAGE	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
QM I	10,250	8,366	287,000	234,248
QM II & IV	4,250	3,029	119,000	84,812
QM III	1,950	1,614	54,600	45,192
ORD II - VLR	7,850	5,186	219,800	145,208
ORD V	7,000	7,311	196,000	204,708
BOMBS	1,850	666	51,800	18,648
ENG - TC	5,000	5,662	140,000	158,536
SIG - MAD	1,600	1,508	44,800	42,224
CWS	50	698	1,400	19,544
CIVIL AFFAIRS	2,300	1,034	64,400	28,952
MISC	1,100	626	30,800	17,528
TOTAL	43,200	35,700	1,209,600	999,600

* The breakdown of cargo discharge 26 January 1945 was: 48,452 Long Tons General; 1,851 DWT of TBA Equipment; 1,834 DWT of TBA vehicles; 167 DWT Replacement vehicles.

MOVEMENT FROM PORTS BY CLASSES OF SUPPLY

FEBRUARY 1945

	DAILY AVERAGE		MONTHLY TOTAL	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
QM I	13,070	9,061	365,960	253,708
QM II & IV	5,230	4,455	146,440	124,740
QM III	2,255	1,895	63,140	53,060
ORD II - VEH	4,610	5,122	129,080	143,416
ORD V	7,500	7,888	210,000	220,864
BOMBS	1,880	681	52,640	19,068
ENG - TC	7,270	5,999	203,560	167,972
SIG - MED	2,250	1,926	63,000	53,928
CWS	815	661	22,820	18,508
CIVIL AFFAIRS	2,000	650	56,000	18,200
MISC	920	819	25,760	22,932
TOTAL	47,800	39,157	1,338,400	1,096,396

Figures include planned items only, and do not include coal, bulk POL, and TBA Equipment.

MOVEMENT FROM PORTS ON CONTINENT BY CLASS OF SUPPLY

1 - 31 MARCH 1945

	ACTUAL	PLANNED ESTIMATE
All Classes Excl. Coal & Bulk POL	1,678,699	1,781,900
QM I	380,096	399,640
QM II - IV	109,522	153,800
QM III (Pkg)	94,220	26,660
ORD II -- IV - VEH	309,617	297,900
ORD V	316,059	334,700
BOMBS	31,849	22,010
ENG - TC	241,709	232,700
SIG - MED	59,299	35,922
CWS	27,005	21,508
CIVIL AFFAIRS	85,487	147,945
MISC	23,806	59,115

	MOVEMENT FROM PORTS DAILY AVERAGE TOTAL 1-31 MARCH				BACKLOG AT PORTS ON HAND		ACTUAL CHANGE DURING MARCH
	Planned Estimate	Actual	Planned Estimate	Actual	28 Feb.	31 Mar.	
TOTAL	59,800	56,305	1,781,900	1,678,669	286,186	291,627	5,441
QM I	13,240	12,744	399,640	380,096	72,512	77,631	5,119
QM II - IV	5,050	3,623	153,800	109,522	24,960	48,985	24,025
QM III (Pkg)	860	3,223	26,660	94,220	5,812	14,027	8,215
ORD II-IV VLR	10,275	10,400	297,900	309,617	45,928	43,822	2,106
ORD V	11,200	10,640	334,700	316,059	26,018	19,207	-6,811
BOMBS	710	1,027	22,010	31,849	623	3,187	2,564
ENG -TC	7,700	8,035	232,700	241,709	61,553	37,016	-24,537
SIG - MED	2,912	1,975	85,922	59,299	19,109	7,687	-11,422
C.W.S	718	891	21,508	27,005	403	3,024	2,621
CIVIL AFFAIRS	4,970	2,979	147,945	85,487	12,679	24,890	12,211
MISC	2,165	768	59,115	23,806	16,585	12,151	-4,438

Planned estimates are form the March Port Operations and Supply Movement Plan.

Figures include only those items included in March Port Operations and Supply Movement Plan, and exclude coal, bulk POL, and TBA Equipment. (51).

The period 1 - 15 March is starred for noting that the greatest single obstacle to complete accomplishment of plan was the general shortage of ship bottoms for this theater. The whys and effects of this question are discussed in the parts of this Section which deal more specifically with the Movements Program.

In closing this sub-section, one is reminded that total achievement is an amalgamation of every days' seemingly insignificant, successful battle to move men and tonnage and move them with increasing efficiency. These struggles of various dimensions appear constantly through the rest of this Section of the Volume, and the only real answer to the question, "What was achieved?" lies in the final impression of the whole. Lest the detail be too heavy and one "miss the forest for the trees", it might be well to throw a general light over the scene to bring out these inescapable conclusions. The comparatively untried Transportation Corps, the newest of the Army Services of Supply, performed its mission of "furnishing the necessary transportation" for the greatest force the United States had ever placed in the field, furnished with the most complicated impedimenta of modern warfare, fighting a powerful and brilliant enemy who had left potential allies almost prostrate, destroying their wealth facilities for production and communication, and their morale. Though the opening of the year was harrassed by the enemy's most successful offensive of the campaign, and the close of the third month began, on the part of the United States Armies, one of the most rapid and far-flung advances known to military history, the period lent itself, for the most part to somewhat static operations, most favorable to the development of service installations and facilities.

The Corps did not fail to take advantage of such a condition. Backlogs were dug into, forward stockpiles were made mountainous. With the terrible press of emergency for a moment allieviated there was no sitting back but rather a much-needed drive to put transportation on a business basis, scheduling details, evaluating methods, and facilities, introducing the characteristic American efficiency which saves time, money, and lives.

Former plans along this line were implemented and supervised. New plans were made to cover the handwriting on the wall which read: "cross the Rhine be ready to rush across Germany, occupy it to an extent far greater than America has ever done anywhere, redomicile its millions of prisoners and slaves, and dispatch your own troops to other battles and to their homeland". Men learned too well the dullness and fatigue of repetitive and arduous tasks Nerves and brains gave more service than that for which designed as they were constantly confronted with the necessity for new decisions, bearing the weight of great responsability, and old troubles recurring. As a new service the T.C. had not only to do its job but also to convince higher headcourters and older firmly-rooted service and Armies' organizations that its way of doing things might be more productive than theirs and to secure their cooperation, happily excellent most of the time and constantly improving.

History has already termed this war a "war of movement". It's successfull waging must then be attributed to a fair extent to the men for whom movement itself was the primary concern.

II. Operations of the Division.

1. Relations with Outside Military Agencies.

a. The services of Supply.

The most frequent contacts "outside the family" made by the T.C. were with the organizations which furnished the goods, or patients, to be hauled their amount and rate of flow, as well as much of the labor for handling and sorting, then and the installations for receiving and storing them. In some cases, that of the Quartermaster Truck Companies particularly, they also controlled some of the facilities for transportation itself.

The depot problem was paramount. March plans had to be somewhat midified because of the failure to materialize of service plans for the opening of the vast Nancy depot area. The program laid on had to be altered, no shipping being permitted to that destination until confirmation of preparedness by a telegraph or teletype message (TWX). (52).

In the turbulent last days of March, the Chief of the Division, explaining to field men the progress and future of the program pointed out the fact that the depot system had been inadequate for months. (53).

Of the three primary physical needs of man, the QMC provided food and clothing -a big job in any man's language- and the field portion of shelter in the way of tentage and bedding. Add to these items, hundreds of other housekeeping requirements of a modern army and you had a formidable list. The period started off with a meeting in Channel Base Section to speed up the unloading of rations at the Lille depots, freeing some barges for Antwerp clearance and the large movements of badly-needed coal out of Mons and Charleroi. (54).

The situation becoming aggravating, the Chief of the Division visited Belgium -one of many "on the spot" studies which he was in the habit of conducting- and reported on the 10th January, by a telephone call to Major General ROSS, that the quartermaster idea for the Lille depot, 2,400 tons daily reception, was badly below the minimum 4,000 tons stated as a desideratum by Major General LORD, Chief of Staff, Com Z, in a directive drawn up

for Lt. General LEE's consideration. The Colonel also gave the COT a bird's eye-view of the existent, inadequate facilitites.

More on QM depots was presented at the morning conference of Division Chiefs in Colonel Traub's office 16 January. Antwerp discharge would have to be increased, if the large number of vessels scheduled to be discharging that month was to be met. The main problem was clearance, including reduction of backlog. The bottleneck here was reception capacity of depots an increase of which would allow corresponding ups in number of empty cars available and trains loaded. Control and Planning Division cited a number of depots which, though open, were not, in its opinion, being used to capacity. It was strongly urged that the office of the A.C. of S. G-4, Com Z, direct the Services to increase reception to the figures recommended by this Division ant that an OCOT representative be sent to Antwerp to rearrange clearance schedules along these lines (55),

Toward the end of the period, we find the representative of the Quartermaster being reminded that early use of the proposed Luxembourg depot area would cut down handling on the way to the front and increase the efficiency of rail car uses. Ships' cargos were still being consigned to Nancy depots, already quite far to the rear, (56).

The heaviest goods (with the exception of ammunition), and certainly the bulkiest, were controlled by the Engineers. Though this made for frequent clashes, the overall feeling between them and the TC was mutual admiration. Both were operative as well as goods-furnishing services. Only by the record breaking rail,road and bridge construction across the whole of France, done by these most essential of modern warriors had the Transportation men been able to follow the Armies as well as they did.

But the Corps of Engineers was probably the worst violator of the rules of good depot procedure. The mid-January tie up at Antwerp, referred to above in discussing Quartermaster problems, had its Engineers angle too. From Colonel HURRILL's Study it was disclosed that the nearby depots were not assigned their capacity of Class VI Supplies (57).

This Belgian situation continued by fits and starts. Just about Lincoln's birthday, things came to such a pass that the Commanding General LEE, of Com Z, himself visited the sore spot, finding, among other things, that Engineers car unloading at Brussels was impossibly low. (58)

In a mid-March ship allocations meeting an important depot discussion was occasioned by the proposed cargo disposition of one Engineer ship. It was desirable that a cargo go, at least, to areas near one major port, and when a cargo appertained to one service it had been expected of that organization to consign its materials in this manner, That this experience was being radically unhonored was indicated by the following proposed disposition of NY 607's cargo.

390	tons	to depot	E525,	Aachen
457	"	"	E514m	Liege
882	"	"	E513,	Libramont
187	"	"	E511,	Laon
347	"	"		, Lieres
212	"	"	E508,	Paris
X	"	"	E519,	Burssels

The natural question for the TC was: Why so many depots and why such scattered destinations as Liege, Laon, Paris ? The Engineer Officer explained that he agreed their depot system was poor, but that, being based on a physical distribution of special personnel for handling different commodities it was "just that way". The service he said was already embarrassed and would be more so. They were attempting to arrange for a central dump for pierced-steel planking, one of their sharpest problems. The Chief, Control and Planning, thought it drawing the line too finely to maintain different depots for Engineers Class II and IV supplies. And to lighten the air which had become embarrassingly heavy for the Engineer Officer, asked what action had been taken on Major General ROSS, the COT's, jocular proposition about the Belgian island depot. Wearied with the problems of heavy Class IV goods forwhich there didn't seem sometimes to be a demand appropriate to the supply the General had proposed a large dump be set on an island, this material be barged to it, the barges sent elsewhere, and no built to the island.

One last Engineer difficulty was their desire to use the Port of Rouen bridge for more of their ships than had been planned (59)

The situation provoked another searching at the close of the period. This same Engineer Officer was again queried by the Colonel, provoked by an inefficient division of the ship's consignment of pierced-steel planking. The Engineer representative retorted that he was merely an agent, carrying out the desires of the Stock Control Division. These gentlemen, according to the Chief Control and Planning, seemed less concerned with adequate placement of stocks than with "balancing their books. (60)

The Ordnance gave the heaviest load with its millions of tons of ammunitions. This tonnage had high priority in the nature of things. As an operative service, their maintainance of vehicles and control of huge, tank-transporter trucks, made their relations with TC very close.

At a mid-March ship allocations meeting, the most frequent source of discussion with the Services, further depot trouble was uncovered by the assignment of an ammunition ship to Le Havre-Rouen, Transportation Corps Officers asked the Ordnance representative why four ships there were all discharging for the same depot, O-609. This was a strain on the lines between port and depot and could not but breed congestion. The reply was that depot was in short supply, while O-611, the depot for which a normal amount of cargo had originally been planned, was in a bad state of overcrowding.

Ordnance Officers then confronted the OCOT with a 'fait accompli'- Claiming that the conditions at depot O-657 and others would not support eleven ships at Antwerp, as formerly hoped, they proposed, as dire necessity, a split of vehicle ships thus: 9 Antwerp, 5 Cherbourg, 3 Le Havre-Rouen Although this was not what the OCOT desired as most efficient placement, it was accepted, since the ships, as discussed, fitted fairly into such a pattern (61).

As has been already shown, the problems of depots was inextricably bound with that of allocation of ships to ports. Dealing with the Ordnance in this field, Control & Planning asked, in early February, that some consideration be given to establishing a vehicle assembly plant at Ghent, or at least setting up barge or transporter-truck service from there to the Ford Plant at Antwerp. Ghent was limited in its reception to light-draft vessels, of which vehicle ships formed the greater part.

Ordnance already had plants at Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Antwerp so did not feel favorably inclined.

At an early February meeting, the Ordnance representatives, one of whom specialized in ammunition and the other in vehicles, expressed concern over the fact that seven more ammunition ships than called for in the program were scheduled from the States. They had approached the Office of the A.C. of S, G-4, on this subject, an act which embarrassed the Control & Planning Division, already tackling the issues as one pertaining to its field. These ships were afterwards satisfactorily spread out over a period of time. (62).

With the Office of the Chief Surgeon, the OCOT had the vital coordination of evacuating casualties, as well as arranging commitments for the movement of high priority medical supplies. This Service furnished one of the many examples of profitable "swapping" by which many hurdles were overcome. The meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph revealed that the Medical Corps had some unprogramed tonnage, ordinarily an embarrassing item to both owner and transporter. Transportation, however, had on its hands a lack of tonnage for a Western port, resulting from a cancellation further back along the line. The peg fit the hole; the addition made up the deficiency, and all was smooth. (62)

Allocation did not always run as smoothly with the QMC, since so many more tons were under consideration. To the QMC Captain's carefully considered "We have a special favor to ask on this next ship" Colonel HURRILL joshed "That won't embarrass you". The favour was that a certain sheet-steel load be consigned directly from the port to factories in the Paris area rather than to a depot. With the promise that QM personnel at the port would do the sorting and the documentation and not mix loads of different consignees, Control & Planning, receiving a nod from the Movements Division's representatives, gave the O,K,

A coffee ship was the occasion for a reminder that many depots and one port were not a happy combination. Antwerp had ship-space, and the Chief, Control & Planning, felt the bulk of this Army "sine quod non" should be discharged forward where the front line men would be first receivers, But such a decision had to mean a back-haul from the Belgian port to points as far rear as Rennes, in Brittany. (62).

An orange ship meant the same inefficient use of land transport, The oranges must go everywhere; one ship could only load them at the port. There was the additional difficulty of providing reefer (refrigerated) rail cars and truck vans for this perishable commodity. This was often a disheartening task, because many of the vitamin-filled, home-reminding spheres of fruit arrived spoiled or so nearly so as to reach that state before they could be handed out in the mess-line, Nevertheless, every effort was made and much success attained in getting this resistance- and-morale-building item to the GI's. (62)

At the meeting following the one in which the coffee ship was discussed, the shoe was on the other foot, QM Officers reminded that this ship had been in the Scheldt three days, In view of a coffee shortage in the theater, they requested that special efforts be made to expedite berthing. (63)

Skipping to late March, one finds the QM Representative plugging for a large consignment of rations to a rear depot. Control & Planning objected to this particular decision/ because the ship could better discharge at Antwerp, her other cargo destination (orders again:) being varied, than at Cherbourg or Le Havre. Why, asked, the Colonel, should the Service insist on this particular depot; why, indeed deposit a large stock of rations so far rear? The Service spokesman replied that this depot/ "181, could take one tonnage lot per convoy. The ship under discussion, Hampton Roads 129 - designated by Port of Embarkation (POE) and a number for security purposes was small and the most likely in this convoy for discharge of this depot's tonnage, There were still many troops in Normandy and around Paris. the Colonel was reminded.

After a little more exchange of pro and conn the vessel was allocated to Antwerp. It was agreed that an attempt would be made to change the depot address on the non-perishable items, avoiding heavy-hauling. (64).

At the meeting referred to in the above paragraphs the Engineers wanted most of their cargo in Le Havre/ despite the insistence of Marine Operations Division officers that the port was congested and would be more so when French Civil Imports and all kinds of personnel evacuation got fully under way. The application of the Henry Clay attitude, however, left both parties shaking their heads pessimistically, but somewhat satisfied.(64).

Actual movement is as difficult to divorce from allocation and depots as those two subjects are from each other. But some division is essential in so large a subject. One now runs into the Air Corps, and heavily. The infant giant of this war, this Corps had an independence founded upon its tremendous prestige, and its newness made its Supply personnel take advantage of that independance in much unconventional procedure. Whereas the older Services had from the Transportation point of view, too detailed ideas on how their goods should be moved, the Air people had too few. The story was current that one of their representatives had approached a Transportation Officer at Le Havre with the request : "There are a lot of engines in that building over there we want moved up to the front somewhere."

To get down to cases in early February the Engineers/ spokesman for the Air Corps so far as Engineers material for that organization were concerned/ were asked to get the Air people to cut out a great deal of double-hauling and too-long holding of cars. The principle offense was their practice of consigning steel matting for air-strips, to Paris yards, there to be reconsigned to sites involving delay, This might also involve back-hauling, as most of the stuff was discharged at Antwerp, while most of the strips were then being constructed east of that port. The Control & Planning suggestion was that Antwerp's yards were a planning to the point where definite destinations could be known in advance of cargo arrivals. (16)

Late in March a cargo of bombs to be allocated brought up the new Air Corps type procedure in regard to depot designation and route of movement. Their Supply people had made a sweeping commitment: simply that 2/3 of all bombs were to be sent to depots supporting the Twelfth Army Group and the rest to the 6th. TC took advantage of this arrangement to divide the bombs' ships between Ghent (principally for Northern depots* and Le Havre as conditions of rail lines and harbor facilities dictated.(17).

Much of the difficulties experienced with the Engineers over the disposition of pierced steel planking were attributable to the Air Corp's inability to give destinations. The planking was desired at construction sites but the location of these was often not decided until the rail cars had undergone several reconsignments and days of delayed unloading. (18)

The Engineers suggested on their own part, that many of their moves, set up to go with the supply program, had to be altered to suit the emergency needs of ports. Granting the truth of this, caused by such unpredictables as rail car shortages and depot embargoes, the Control and Planning spokesman countered that moves could be better planned if the Corps of Engineers would signify in advance notices what their cargo actually was. Their advice was by tons of class of supply and might cover innocently some difficult items Colonel MURRILL's favorite of these was what he described as "a handy little package for any transportation man: two bulldozers in a crate." (19)

The failure to meet the March Movement Program, reflected in a decrease of 2000 less tons moved daily North and East of the Seine than in February was ascribed principally to the depot system "inadequate for months" and gradually growing worse. (20)

With the Signal Corps, Transportation kept the closest relationships Major General ROSS wisely knew the great importance of multiple and rapid communication to the success of moving men and supplies, as his use of radio in the Normandy days, his later development of a most elaborate courier system, and his insistance on detailed communication plans for operations all showed. The COT knew his men know what to do. With him it was a question of letting them know when they had to do it. Hence his emphasis on foreseeing troubles making detailed plans, and communicating information, forward and rear, with clarity and dispatch. (21).

In connection with this Service, TC plans for occupation took cognizance of the plan to give the Chief Signal Officer responsibility for main communications in Austria regardless of what nation had administrative control there. And at an early planning conference Major General ROSS ordered that high-powered radios, functioning as those in the break through days, be obtained as soon as possible. Twelve (12) were available and one of these must certainly be earmarked for Berlin. (22)

b. G-4, Com Z.

As the Commanding General's Staff officer for Supply, the G-4 had the field of transportation in his domain, or, as his charge; despite the very special position of Transportation, most of the correspondence to Lt. General LEE read and continued to read "thru G-4".

During the last quarter of 1944, we saw how the OCOT gradually won from G-4 and the Services certain controls which it considered essential, The quarter under discussion saw the fruits of his victory in increased tonnages and smoother operations. The office of the G-4 came to be less like a demanding ruler and more like an understanding parent to whom the OCOT could look for arbitration of difficulties and support of its needs

For example, one finds the Control and Planning Division - still the main point of contact with G-4 for the OCOT - asking, early in the period, that that office send teletypes to all depots to ascertain how they desired

tonnages to arrive at depots. The chief hitch in the newly-implemented Supply Movement Program seemed to be the irregularity of traffic flow. (1)

Again, on the 12th January, confusion arose in ship movement from the United Kingdom (UK). Their cargoes were not tying in with the Movements Program on the Continent; and G-4 was requested to direct Chiefs of Services to designate depot destinations for each requisition drawn in UK Base. (2).

All still did not run like the course of true love. That same day, a letter from the AC of S, G-4 to the OCT enclosed some complex forms for the daily report of the overall movements picture, To the OCOT's Control and Planning Division, compliance would have entailed additional personnel and an appreciable burden of work. It was pointed out that much of the data requested was already furnished by regular OCOT reports and that the five-day period had been found a much more useful index of operations that the daily in several subjects. Also, a memorandum pointed out that several of the subjects on which cover was requested had been specifically designated previously as not the responsibility of the Transportation Corps. It had no control, and therefore, no record of local supply issues within Base Sections deliveries by ADSEC trucks to Armies, or Army trucks to Armies. Certain motor moves direct from depots in the Base and Intermediate Sections to ADSEC and Armies, crossing Section and/or Army boundaries, were under the control of OCOT; but they were the exception rather than the rule and the sought for reports did not segregate them. Certainly, any data on issues and movements within Sections should be provided by Section Commanders, The new forms were not used.

Toward the end of the quarter one tardy example arose of the old bugaboo: command tampering in technical matters, The discharge of bombs at Le Havre was not going according to schedule (1.200 tons daily). The usual shortage of rail cars for clearance was further complicated by certain instructions on details peculiar to port and marshalling operations which G-4 had ventured to impose . DCOT, Colonel TRAUB instructed Control & Planning to report and negotiate on the situation. (4)

By the 19th, the matter had been ironed out, and bomb discharge was satisfactory to the OCOT. (5).

The office of the A.C. of S, G-4 expressed itself as well-pleased with the overall supply Movement Program. While its spokesman felt that January, being the first month of the effort, had been hampered by understandable kinks and was not a true index, February, despite the inability of the Services to get new depot areas in full swing as planned, had shown many benefits; and March promised new highs in the logistics sphere. (6).

The G-4 Colonel reminded that his office based its survey of the program's capacity on Advance, Base and Intermediate Sections Commanders' estimates of depot capacities; His principal interest was whether the TC field agents there assembled, in their practical, at-hand, experience with the depots in their regions agreed with these estimates. For example, he had heard for the first time, at this conference that one ADSEC depot was programmed to receive 250 tons daily and was actually full to overflowing and not shipping correspondingly. (6)

Pointing out that the port clearance for January had exceeded depot capacity and had somehow had to be averaged into February movements, he reiterated a point which was also paramount with Colonel HURRILL, the Chief, Control and Planning, OCOT. The ETO was an optimistic theater; every part of it felt they could do more than ordinary standards and dictates indicated they could. The G-4 knew their demands on Transportation were sometimes in excess of stated capabilities, calculated by experts who knew their business. But the tactical forces made demands on Supply greater than were thought possible to fulfill. G-4 could only deploy these excesses to the various Services it coordinated. What mattered, the officer summarized simply and powerfully, was that they knew in their department, that Transportation, though it howled mightily, could and would "furnish the necessary". (74).

c. The POE's and the War Department.

All high policy came from War Department, Washington, especially with regard to shipping. And, the receipt of goods in the ETO was largely dependent upon what, how, and when some were sailed from the POE's in the U.S. Relations with these two agencies are therefore considered together in this section.

If the shortage of shipping was anyone's fault, it was primarily that of the American people's "splendid isolation" in pre-war years, when the nation neglected to build a merchant marine in any way adequate to wartime needs. The antidote, superhuman construction on superior designs, was magnificently applied but still could not satisfy the need.

Shortage was felt early in this quarter. In mid-January, the presence of only fifty six ships in Antwerp was accentuated by a cable from the War Department, stressing the shortage of shipping and invoking every economy in turn-around time. (1).

(1) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900 15 January 1945.

Much more serious was the March situation, when, on the 13th, the Chief, Control and Planning Division, informed the morning caucus at 52 Champs Elysees that lack of ships was 'in a fair way of' sabotaging the March program. The target was 213 vessels; to date only 66 had been discharged. That particular morning there were only 38 working in the whole theater. The Services would be pinched: of a scheduled 40 ration ships, 16 of which should have been finished, only 7 had had their cargoes delivered to the Quartermaster. Colonel TRAUB, DCOT charged with Marine activities, could only suggest sending a statement of this difficult predicament to the War Department to accentuate the next regular report. (2)

(2) Ibid, 13 March 1945.

More discussion of this subject, as well as others which touch upon U.S. relations, appears, where it complements, in the sections covering Shipping Allocation and the Supply Movement Program.

At March 12th's meeting with the Services' representatives the first item on the agenda was the consideration of the ship position.

Colonel HURRILL pointed to wall graphs which portrayed ships working, in port being discharged, against the number planned from day to day, and to bar graphs which showed the number of ships, by type loading, allocated as compared to total planned, for each port. From these it was clear that a general, acute shortage of QM I ships existed. Antwerp, particularly, had, suffered a slump in discharge figures, as was readily seen from the bar chart comparing actual with planned discharge. (3)

(3) Notes on shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 12 March 1945.

Other ports had also felt the general ship shortage. This shortage was not further discussed at this meeting, but some other discussion of it might be desirable at this time. It was caused partly by some freezing in American ports and in part by the resumption on a large scale of German submarine activity. For the freezing, remedial measures should have been foreseen; but it was exceptional in February 1945. From a certain point of view this shortage of ships was not a serious difficulty, since there was enough backlog at ports and depots fully to employ all land transport agencies and to keep the armies well-supplied. But the technical ability of longshoremen was wasted and eventually the interruption in flow from factories in America to ETO ports might make itself felt. (4)

(4) Interview with Captain Bishorfoush, Administrative Assistant, to COT, OCOT Paris, 1000 Hours, 14 March 1945.

While the general picture was of shortage, there were particular instances of surfeits, equally taxing to Control and planning. In the Shipping Allocation Meeting of 8 February a glance at the charts focussed on that one which indicated a top heaviness of ammunition ships; the U.S. had sailed twenty-six ships, fourteen over and above the twelve designated by forecasts. (5) By cutting corners with Marine Operations and Movements Divisions, and the Ordnance, by negotiating with G-4 and the war Department, by urging efforts beyond the expected and exercising even more careful supervision, this hurdle was overlept.

(5) Notes on shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400, 8 February 1945.

The irksome business of sorting commodities at the ports was partly the result of the POE's not block-loading ships. To the American loading ports the most efficient method of stowage was spread-loading, putting cargo aboard as it arrived on the wharves and mixing it to use up all space. To the European, receiving end , this was the least desirable, since it meant split shipments to varied depots, jumbled up discharge into proper rail cars or trucks, and a mess to hunt through when some special cargo was needed by a service at a port. The War Department tended to be on the side of the POE's, because their system was the more economical of ship space.

In January the ports had been so plagued with sorting jobs that a special point of the matter was made at the Monthly Supply Movement Conference. Although Colonel HURRILL stated that more cooperation was to be asked of the Supply Services, by lessening their demands for special consignments and increasing the personnel available to aid in a search when one

had been authorized by OCOT, he attributed most of the trouble to the POE's failure to block-load. (6).

(6) Notes on monthly Supply Moves Conference, OCOT, Paris, 1000, 29 January 1945.

On the other hand, there were cases when the TC desired some mixing to make full use of a whole ship, particularly deck load. Because of War Department restrictions, however, insisting that ammunition ships carry only ammunition, vehicles which might have ridden the decks of these, crowded other vessels. (7)

(7) Ibid, Note 5, but for 2 February 1945.

Though block and commodity-loading were not adhered to as much as desired by ETO, they were generally in effect. It was with consternation then, that a telephone call was received from Washington on the opening day of March suggesting their discontinuance. Control and Planning immediately stated that the depot system could not operate with any efficiency if cargoes were not at all grouped by type and assumed that the OCOT would oppose such an action as strongly as possible. (8)

(8) Minutes of daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, I March 1945.

Protests had not availed much by the end of the quarter. New York, Colonel MURRILL reminded the port officers assembled in the conference room overlooking down town Paris, was still insistent on loading according to receipt and spreading cargo. They would have to face new confusions in April.

(9) Ibid, note 6, but 28 March 1945.

Although communications flowed fairly smoothly and good understanding was reached on most subjects, the distance between the Pentagon and 52 Champs Elysees could not help but make for some misunderstanding. For example, by misinterpreting a statement of General SOMERVELL's the War Department had concluded that vehicle ships for March must be discharged at Marseilles. Hence a cable of the latter part of February asking for advice on clearing a number of vehicle-laden steamers, ready to sail, but destined for a port unable to receive them, Control and planning quickly contacted G-4, Com Z to set the home stations straight on this misconception, asking for decision on the General allocation of these vehicles between Antwerp and Cherbourg, which ports had been designated to receive in greater numbers. Discharge there would save the long haul or road march from the Mediterranean port to the Northern Front for which most of the trucks were marked. (10)

(10) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, COT, Paris, 0900, 20 February 1945.

d. SHAEF

So high and mighty was the Supreme Headquarters that OCOT had little contact with it, its directives being passed down through Com Z Headquarters and the G-4 office. However, "a cat may look at a king" and so we find the head of Control and Planning Division's Belgian Branch making a just criticism that was undoubtably shared by many transportation men. On his visit to Paris in late March the Lt. Colonel, in conversation with the Ghent Port Transportation Officer, described the General dilema in the North. The French kept Belgian railcars and French civilians diverted to civil hauling many U.S.-owned

cars. SHAEF's answer to TC complaints of no empties for port clearance was to demand decreases in turn-around time, while at the same time giving the other car to the nationalities, crying from a persuasively higher level, and allocating more cars to these governments. (1)

(1) Notes on conversation with Chief, Belgian Branch, Control & Planning Division OCOT, Paris, I630, 23 March I945.

On the other hand, SHAEF was most anxious to hear the T.C.'s ideas on Transportation in Occupied Germany. Devious channels of Communication were waived, and Lt. Colonel E.A. NORDSTRUM, of the G-4 Movements Division, was a frequent visitor at OCOT during March. Details of the first formal conference SHAEF-sponsored, are found in the Appendix, No 2, part II, No 2.

At a later meeting, it was disclosed that SHAFF had set the I8th of April as the deadline for nomination of personnel to be concerned with occupation. (2)

(2) Notes on Planning Conference for Occupation of Germany, OCOT, Paris, 1400. 2I March I945. II30-24March I945.

By the 24th Lt. Colonel NORDSTRUM was leaving, with Lt. SHYBURGH who had replaced Captain COONEY as practical head of Intelligence Branch, Control and Planning Division, for a tour of recently-captured German rail control points, to ascertain what records remained and to interview rail authorities to determine how much control they might be trusted to exercise or how much information they might divulge. At Major General ROSS's command, they were accompanied by a technical expert from the MRS. (3).

(3) Ibid, for II30, 24 March I945.

e. The Armies and Headquarters, Com Z.

" The customer is always right" was especially the case with the Armies: to move food, equipment, gas, and ammunition to the combat troops was the end toward which all striving and sacrifice was dedicated, Had this incentive not been enough, there was the ever-present power and prestige of the Army and Army Group Commanders.

But the Armies were, next to the French, the greatest "car-hoarders". With empties at a premium, they followed their time-honored habit of profering "rolling warehouses" Indeed, on occasion they might be so behind on unloading or have so little account of their wagons that a particular shipment for which they were making constant inquiries would be found standing at one of their railheads. Every Supply Movements Conference had some reference to this old fault, and the Belgian Branch. Chief's discussion of the causes for congestion at Ghent and Antwerp in late March nominated this prominently. (1)

(I) Conversation with Chief, Belgian Branch, Control & Planning Division, OCOT Paris, I630, 27 March I945.

Occupation plans were much concerned with Armies, for the Theater Commander's Headquarters would be of both tactical and service nature, and the Military districts would be commanded, and largely staffed by the Armies. (for other details see No 2 of Appendix No2 Part II) In the second of the conferences for occupation planning, held in Colonel MURRILL's office on the I6th of March, it was pointed out that the COT's position in Germany would be different from the other Chiefs of Services. While the Army Commanders had been used to the receipt, classification, and distribution of most supplies, as conducted by their G-4's and while they had become familiar with such Service problems as maintaining signal communications and vehicles, theyey had never been called upon to run railway or canal systems or long Line of Communication motor hauls. These were specialist jobs, for which the transport sections with Armies were certainly qualified but which they had not been called, upon, by the nature of combat and the system of dividing the theater into Combat and Communication Zones, to do to any great extent. It was for this reason that the COT desired strong transportation organization in the Occupied Zone, with as much control of TC troops and of methods as possible in his specialists' hands. (2).

(2) Notes on Occupation Planning Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0930, I6 March I945

In estimating personnel which would be required, a large allottment was planned for the staffs of the Military districts. These officers and men would function principally as had the transport sections of the Advance, Intermediate, and Base Sections; the ADSEC and COMAD crowd, being most accustomed, by their proximity, to Army ways, would fill these places. (2).

During the period of transition from tactical operations against a resisting enemy to settled zones and activities of occupation, personnel was planned to follow closely the advancing Armies, getting the German transport system under way as rapidly as possible. Colonel WHITTLE, the Transportation Officer for I2th Army group, explained how his commander divided this period into phases: First Army would take the Ruhr and end up controlling the Rhineland Province from Coblentz. When the British or possibly the French (French share on occupation was not then known, only rumored at Army levels) were ready to assume responsibility that battle-scarred unit, would be redeployed. (For this and following references, see map of Germany, Chapter I) . The Third Army was to end up holding Bavaria, with Headquarters at Munich, organizing and conducting the Occupation of the Eastern District. Lt. General SIMPSON's Ninth would take the North line, taking Berlin and holding around Munster until the British took over for occupation, after which it would be shifted to another Theater. The Fifteenth would be launched from the Ruhr vicinity to hold Berlin, relieving the Ninth and taking up American commitments there, as well as in the Bremen Enclave, while a portion was destined to clean out German pockets long by-passed in Western and South Western France. Finally the Army of the South, the U.S. Seventh, was to take South Western Germany and occupy it from Stuttgart. (2)

(2) Ibid

Teams of movement and TRS specialists were to be attached to armies in order to take over transport agencies as soon as possible after capture. This personnel would stay in the Region it first took, rather than going on with the Army of affiliation, thus insuring uniformity of

technical operations despite changes in command. As ADSEC and ZONAD furnished this personnel, reinforcements were to be sent from the OCOT and other Base Sections.

It was agreed by all concerned that the Transportation Sections in the Military Districts and sub-Districts would work most efficiently if established as a separate staff section, rather than as a division of G-4. Along the same line, it was put forth that G-5 trucking specialists attached to Occupational Army Staffs should be under the Transportation Officer rather than the G-5. (2). Finally, it was stressed that the efficient German transport system should be operated as nearly as possible as it had been, using the same headquarters and Control Points, technical methods, and all key men who could be proved non-Nazi, thus keeping the waste of change to a minimum and giving the Krauts no chance to say: Things are not going right because you've changed the system". Although the Seventh Army had expressed the thought that no enlargement of its Transportation section would be necessary, TC desired to arrange same in order to present a uniform plan, applicable to all Armies, since the others were definitely in need but might argue otherwise if exceptions were made in any case. (2)

(2) Ibid

The Army Group TC Officers, were at the Conference to orient occupation officers and were particularly active answering questions during the open forum which closed the session. They announced then that the Army Group was working on the details for their plan which would be published by the 27th of March and would agree substantially with the pertinent points brought out by the conference. (3).

(3) Notes on orientation Course for German Occupation, 1400, 21 March 1945.

Matters of general importance which hit a mean between G-4 and SHAEF went to the direction of the Commanding General, Com Z. Again matters of personnel or tactical plans, requiring command decision were frequently referred to the offices of the G-3, while relations with the civil needs were at times the occasion for contacting G-5, Com Z.

As an example of COM Z contact, we find control and Planning directed, 28th February, to furnish Control Section, ComZ with a map showing complete routes by sea and inland carriers for the daily movement of mail. There was a special effort on to move mail in record time. (4)

(4) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, 28 February 1945.

Again, the last day of March, COM Z, Planning the re-nationalization of freed Allied personnel, asked for information on the use of either Le Havre or Antwerp for evacuating personnel from the Metz-Nancy area to the U.K. The OCOT Divisions concerned met with Control and Planning and arrived at an assenting decision which the latter conveyed to the Hotel Majestic, home of Com Z, Headquarters.

f. Advance, Intermediate, and Base Sections

Their relations with sections were good, but still haunted by the old truth: " No man can serve two masters" TC activities there were technically advised and supervised by the OCOT, but any individual ideas of the sections' Commanders generally had priority, since the Transportation Officer was, first and foremost, a staff officer of the section. Fortunately, the two masters usually had somewhat the same ideas, or upon directive from their mutual superior, Com Z Headquarters, saw fit to see eye-to-eye.

The covering letter which made each monthly Supply Program law, was in essence an order from Lt. General LEE Commanding the Section Commanders to do all in their power to implement the program. And it went into some detail in stating explicity that certain features of schedules, discharge and loading would be followed as prescribed by TC. (1).

(1) See monthly Supply Programs for January, February, March 1945.

Details of TC activities within the Advance, Intermediate, and Base Sections are contained in chapter VI of this volume. One might note here as examples of Control and Planning's connection with them, such instances as the start of a new tactical plan by G-4, Com Z, in early March, by which the equivalent, of 120 truck companies were alerted for displacement. The total number of companies required was not anticipated to interfere with static operations in the Base Section, short intra-section moves, port clearance to close-in depots or intransit storage areas, and depot operations. Control & Planning suggested, however, that a representative of the OCOT visit the sections to ascertain the absolute minimum of companies with which they could be expected to exist should operations in Germany drain the pipe to essentials. (2)

(2) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, 2 March 1945 - 14 March 1945.

In mid-March, it was discovered that Normandy Base Section was submitting to G-4, Com Z, reports covering the same material on the Supply Movement Program as was covered by 5-day reports to the OCOT. It was felt this duplication might lead to mis-information and confusion as well as being wasteful, Brigadier General STEWART, DCOT, investigated the matter and made now time and personnel saving arrangements. (3)

(3) Ibid for 14 March 1945.

2. Coordination with Other Divisions of the OCOT

One of control and planning's most important functions continued to be acting as the staff, coordinator of the various Divisions for the OCOT and his two deputies. On the organization chart shown at the opening of chapter II, it will be seen that an auxillary line extends from control and planning to all the divisions. This was the same kind of line that one knows goes from the G-3 plans, operations, and training section of most Army organizations to all other staff sections and extends actually far down into the various units of the command. It was particularly true in Transportation that running any one job was a pretty big handfull: railroad and canal systems or truck and steamship lines which served half a continent were giant enterprises. The COT could and did keep the overall point of view, with the assistance of an operative and administrative DCOT; but he could not foreso

operate, supervise, and check such a giant enterprise without able and specialized assistance; and he detailed most foreseeing and checking of the overall picture to Control and Planning.

Major General ROSS was always stressing coordination. He had distributed in the OCOT an amusing but pointed little reminder in the form of a picture sheet, similar to a page from a newspaper comic. Two mules were shown tied together by a short rope, each pulling against the other to reach piles of hay in opposite corners of their enclosure, and getting no place. After putting their heads together, however, they were seen enjoying together first one pile, then the other.

The COT demanded that completed staff work be presented for his approval or suggestions; a Division presenting a plan or decision minus necessary additions or concurrence from other interested offices would find themselves in hot water. (1)

(1) Magazine release, Technical Information Section, T/5 Ross, "Profile on Major General ROSS" 2 March 1945.

In this connection, the General took occasion, at the first of the year to re-stress coordination, especially between the four operating Divisions. To aid in this, a daily reading file was instituted to be maintained by the Administrative Division from the contributions of each Division, OCOT, and kept in the war Room where maps, charts, graphs, photographs gave good cover of the background against which the drama in the problems and activities of the Divisions was unfolded. (2)

(2) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, 6 January 1945, 12 January and 31 January 1945.

a. Movements Division

This Division had the most to do, in its overall capacity, with providing data for and then carrying out the Supply Movement Program. Its statistical records section bore the brunt of reporting on the progress of implementation, rendering daily reports and special 5-day checks, from which Control and Planning compiled its trouble-spotting charts and graphs, by which all ACOT's and the COT could see how actual tons compared to targets in each place and field of activity . (3)

(3) Ibid, for 12 January 1945.

At the end of January, Control and Planning stated that the ~~com~~ crucial need for empty rail cars at ports was such that a drive should be initiated to release them everywhere. At Movements' suggestion, this was enforced by the sending of a teleprint message to all concerned which denied authority to reconsign a wagon at a depot unless it was absolutely essential to take care of the depot's obligations under the Movements Program. (4).

(4) Ibid for 31 January 1945.

In the heavy rush of plans, for emergency German movement, Occupation, and Redeployment which poured down in mid-March, Control and Planning found itself facing several deadlines between the 15th and 22nd.



1. EMBARKING TROOPS

2. DEBARKING P.O.Ws

3. LOADING CARGO

4 AND VEHICLES

There is no other army unit which performs the great variety of projects handled by army transportation corps ports Each days activity reveals surprise and novelty

SOUTHAMPTON 14th PORT

5 ... RAIL STOCK

6 AND TANKERS

7 ASSEMBLING NEW CRAFT



8 SALVAGING THE OLD

It was too much for a quantity of personnel set up for normal forecasting and both Movements and Administrative Divisions were asked to lend reinforcements. (5)

(5) Minutes of Daily Staff, Conf. OCOT, Paris 13 March 1945.

b. Marine Operations Division.

Ship Allocation, the real key to successful dis-charge, clearance, and economical movements to depots, was of the most signal importance (1). In this endeavor Control and Planning leaned heavily on this Division. For it kept ships status and prepared the reports of each port's shipping position, which were the largest factors in the decision as to which destinations TC would secure the Services assent. Its representatives at the meetings made technical recommendations concerning crane facilities, depths of water, facility of navigation generally. (2). In one instance the voice of the Officer from Ports and Water Branch saved what might have been an embarrassing situation. Quick summary of advantages gained by putting certain cargo into Ghent had convinced the Services representatives that a certain Victory Ship should make for that port; and the next vessel on the list was already under discussion, when the Chairman was reminded that this craft was a few feet too broad of beam to negotiate the controlling locks at Terneuzen, on the Scheldt. The Colonel's remark as he ran his pencil through the word "Ghent" was something about being glad they caught that one! (3)

(I) Interview, Chief Control and Planning Division, OCOT, Paris, late January 1945.
(2) Interview, Lt UPTON, Intelligence and Diversion Branch, Marine Operation Division, OCOT, Paris, 1500, 10 March 1945.
(3) Notes on Shipping Allocations, Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400, 16 Feb 1945.

Finally the division executed the decisions of the meeting through its liaison with the navigational controllers, U.S. Navy and British Admiralty (2). At Mid-March meeting Marine Operations' representative informed that with the plans for increased reception of vehicles at Northern Ports, there had been an interesting attempt at convoy-diversion. A convoy for the Mediterranean was shorn of a few ships before they cleared Hampton Roads; seven more, which had sailed, were turned north after making Gibraltar. The rest were not equipped for sailing in Northern waters. (4).

(4) Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 0400 13 March 1945.

The February shipping program from the U.K. was more or less Marine Operations' "Baby," as the Army terminology ran; but Control and Planning gave its opinion that most efficient operation would be achieved by using ships with light ballast, saving loading time on the Continent, and keeping them on permanent runs, thus developing routine and the advantages of familiarity in navigation, discharge, and quay clearance. (5)

(5) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, 8 February 1945.

c. Motor Transport Service

The complicated and splendid plan "XYZ", covering the support of a fast moving invasion of Germany, was based principally on trucks. For the number of equivalents required, estimates of turn-around, all operating details, Control and Planning worked constantly with Colonel ROSS B, WARREN's men. This plan is discussed in detail under MTS in Chapter V, this Volume.

For the Occupation plans, the MTS Officers were on hand at the ACOT's conference presided over by Colonel MURRILL in late March, when block estimates of personnel and equipment needs were hewn. There was much discussion of truck and sedan needs in the Berlin District, starting off with a recommendation, of five truck companies and three passenger car companies. This was cut by careful considerations to two heavy light truck companies and two car companies. The car companies, it was thought, could be supplemented by civilian sedans, requisitioned from the beaten enemy. Sedan were held an important factor, since it was anticipated that Berlin would be much in the spotlight and " visiting firemen", as American slang described all officials on business in a locality but not native to it, would be a glut on the market. (1)

(1) Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, 1400 24 March 1945.

d. Military Railway Service

While Movements Division handled the business end of railroading and canal movement expediting, and was thus more directly involved in the control of these operations than was Control and Planning, much planning required coordination between the offices of Brigadier General CARL R. GRAY JR and Colonel MURRILL. The advancement of railheads in "XYZ" and the choice of Rhine bridge sites and through routes in Berlin are cases in point.

In early January the French declared their intention to divert some locomotives from Le Havre, claiming there was not enough traffic there, DCOT, Colonel TRAUB knew there was business there and wondered whether the port was not developing enough backlog to warrant making up trains from it or if the backlog were simply not being touched. Control and Planning had reason to believe there was mismanagment and desired that MRS and Movements investigate. (1)

(1) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, 5 January 1945. 6 January 1945.

The next day Brigadier General CLARENCE L. BURPEE, Commanding the 2nd MRS, gave his point of view as surprise that extra power and personnel for which he had arranged were not being used. All divisions concerned were then instructed to go into the Port's operations carefully. (2) Results of Movements investigations are detailed in Section V, this chapter, under Movements Division.

(2) Ibid, 6 January 1945.

e. Inland Waterways Division.

More and more emphasis was placed during this period on movements by barge. Though canals are expensive in time of war, wasteful of time and the most fragile of communications because of locks and bridges, (1) they were nevertheless, an essential part, rather than a mere auxilliary of, the continental transport system. As such the liberating-invading forces must make full use of them, especially in the light of the wholesale destruction of railway facilities with which the Germans had cursed large portions of France. (2)

(1) Interview with Lt COONEY, Intelligence Branch, Control and Planning Division, OCOT, Paris, 1700, 16 March 1945.

(2) Remarks by Chief, Control and Planning Division, in Shipping Allocation Meeting OCOT, Paris, 1945.

Overall planning of Belgian transportation entailed work between Control and Planning and Inland Waterways Division. There was also the question of how the new Inland Ports, in which the long barges took the place of Liberty Ships, would be organized. On the 6th January 70,414 tons of cargo lay supinely on motionless barges in Antwerp because of depot embargoes. A release for 3,000 tons daily to Petite Isle, Brussels, was forthcoming that day, and the soon-expected opening of the Albert Canal would clean up the situation in time. But, Control and Planning argued, the canal ports receiving this cargo should be manned by TC personnel to keep discharge under technical control and release the craft for quick turnaround. It was the Base Section view, however, that this job was one for the services whose goods were aboard, and shortage of Transportation men argued for this. It was decided that what personnel TC could spare would be used to supervise the services' unloading operations. (3)

(3) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900 6 January 1945, 12 January 1945.

Matters did not ~~~~ progress apace. In mid-February, one finds the Control and Planning Division stressing the need for immediate action on the organization of barge terminals. Inland Waterways' Major WAYNE SMITH replied that a careful study was being conducted on which a full report would soon be forthcoming. Further discussion of this matter is contained in this Chapter under Section VIII on Inland Waterways. (4)

(4) Ibid, 12 February 1945.

III. Summary of Various Activities Under Control and Planning Division.

1. Planning Branch

Most of the offices in the Division were concerned to some extent with planning. The future and blueprints for it were more exclusively the province, however, of Majors G.K. GRAVELLE and L.J. BOLTON, on the long-range material, and of Captains G.A. WILKINS and W.C. IDE on the monthly program. In line with Colonel MURRELL's promise that supervision of activities should be exercised by the same agents who planned them, and vice-versa, the

whole Division was concerned with Control . For purposes of examination only, we divide the work into planning and control phases.

a. Redeployment

Difficult as this job was to plan and as it was to be to accomplish, the very nature of it made it the least arduous of burdens. It was highly satisfying to realize that the end was in sight and that troops and equipment moved out of the theater meant the day would surely come when the Home-and-peace-loving Americans could return to families, scenes, and ways of life long-missed and much desired.

As was the case with the subject of Occupation, redeployment projects were late getting under way. The reason was the same, lack of specific directives from above. Major Ports and the Marine Operations Division had always contained out movements sections, and these, knowing that they would one day be called upon to shoulder great burdens, had developed some ideas and practical experience. Most personnel had taken part in planning and executing OVERLORD, learning many lessons. But the movement of four Armies, their basic equipment, and the heavy stockpiles which had been built up to supply them, the thousands of miles to the Pacific and as rapidly as possible posed great problems. Preliminary survey and the drafting of new directions to supplement existing Overseas Movement SOPs started in the last quarter of 1944. Then on 11 March a deputation including two field officers from the OCOT visited Washington and the East and West coast ports of embarkation in the U.S. to study methods and to ascertain what sort of packing and stowage was desired from Europe. The initial planning conference came the 20th April, when Colonel GOODWIN, War Department, visiting this theater in regard to the development of SPOR (Supply procedure Overseas Redeployment) asked the OCOT to make suggestions and approve details.

To highlight the problems: How many days would be required and what documents were required for each of the various phases, preparation at and shipping from depots, movement to ports, development of stowage plans, and actual loading. Where would the Services locate the collecting points for heavy equipment and that in excess of MEE, (Minimum Essential Equipment) so that Transportation could be efficiently laid on, avoiding backhauling with each wagon a precious item? The OCOT pressed for certain assurances. It was felt essential that the Port Commanders should be informed adequately in advance and in sufficient detail of all requirements, so that stowage plans could be developed , ships allocated and staging areas made receptive to troops. For successful operation, the Port Commander, and he alone, should be able to call troops and supplies forward from their stations. Again, TC wanted an overall program regulating outbound movement and port reception just as the existant monthly Program did clearance and shipment to Armies. Finally, the fullest possible use must be made of organic motor transport, considering the shortage of wagons, and the difficulty of obtaining passenger coaches.

On the 5th of February, Major General ROSS notified Control and Planning at the morning conference that they were to take necessary steps to acquaint Division heads of the then-existent post-victory program for the European Theater . The responsibilities of the COT had not yet been clearly

defined, but as soon as a decision could be reached personnel would be earmarked and schooled for this mission. As the situation stood, there would be a large sphere of activity, requiring great numbers of men, consisting of the area of Europe outside occupied Germany, handling embarkation and redeployment processes. (1).

(1) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, 5 February 1945, 10 March 1945, 6 November 1945.

Lt. Colonel G N OLSEN, Deputy Chief, Control and Planning, had been keeping abreast of redeployment plans development by the War Department and Communication Zone Headquarters. It was therefore natural that he should be one of the two EC Officers briefed by all Divisions of OCOT for departure to Washington to present the views of the Theater and to receive instruction for Operations on this side Atlantic, The reports with which he and the OCOT Executive, Colonel THOMAS FULLER, went armed dealt with the anticipated problems: requirements for specially trained personnel for personnel experienced in packing and marking, the possible exchange of personnel from NYPOE, preferred stowage methods, etc. A meeting at Com Z Headquarters on the night of 5 March had set down their mission. (2). They left behind them in their rush, a thick and rather disorganized file from which Colonel MURRILL later had some difficulty in extracting essentials. (2).

(2) Ibid, 6 March 1945.
(3) Notes on Conference in Office of Chief, Control and Planning, OCOT, Paris, 1000, 16 March 1945.

(1). Personnel

Certain personnel whose function was completed in the European Theater were on their way as early as December 1944. They were handled as ordinary out-movements, for which provision had been made in the program by which German prisonners, special leave, and reclassified casuals were returned to the Zone of the Interior.

By the 10th of the first month of the year many OCOT minds were on the subject of redeployment, Brigadier General STEWART asked whether any concurrence had been given to the use of Nancy as a staging area. Colonel MURRILL replied that such concurrence had not been given but that the location would be highly desirable. (4).

(4) Ibid, Note 2 but for 10 March 1945.

In the last shipping Allocation Meeting of March, it was passed about that a huge assembly area was starting construction in the region about Reims for the processing of personnel to be redeployed. (5)

(5) Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting , OCOT, Paris, 1400, 31 March 1945.

Ports were a big concern. Antwerp could not be counted on for any large-scale out-movement of personnel, because the bends of the Scheldt estuary would not pass large transports (6).

(6)Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, II30, 24 March I945.

At the supply Movements Conference which closed the quarter, Colonel MURRILL stated that embarkation of men at Marseilles, Le Havre, and Antwerp, the three ports nominated for redeployment would have to be expedited above then-existent estimates when the flow really got underway. Political pressure from American families to "get the boys home" would spur every activity. (7)

(7) Notes on Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, I000 20 March I945.

It was not thought at that time, he added, that the 'Queen' ships which had accounted for so many thousands brought into the theater, would be available for returning them to their native land. (7). The estimate of flow then as given out by G-I Com Z, was for 50,000 men in the first month following German surrender and I50,000 in each of the ensuing... (6)

(2). Equipment

No rate had yet been given for equipment. The job would be complicated, it was realized, because the troops indirectly sent to the Pacific via the U.S. would shed their equipment, much of which would go directly to the Orient. Troops sailing directly from Marseilles, via the Suez and the Indian Ocean, would be separated from their organizational equipment in many cases; and the time-lag between fast transports and slow cargo vessels carrying TBA (Table Basic Allowance) loads was great.. (1).

(I) Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, II30, 24 March 45

This equipment presented a great task in packing and marking. Lt Colonel PHYFE, Chief of Branch, reminded an assemblage of port and section transportation officers that packing would have to include cleaning, application of rust preventive, and other technical processes. It was planned that as units went through an assembly area they would process their equipment through production lines with technical assistance. MEE was to be entirely the responsibility of the unit, and large portions of other material would have to be taken care of by owning units during the first two months of reverse movement. (2).

(2) Remarks by Chief, Packing and Marking Branch, Control and Planning Division at Monthly Supply Movements Conference, 20 March I945, I000 hrs. OCOT, Paris.

There were to be fourteen mobile packing squads, made up of one Officer and I9EMen some of which would be at the Assembly Area, while the others were assigned to ports and Com Z sections. EC was responsible for the training of these squads and the supervision of their activities, and civilian experts were being sent from the States to assist in training. One thousand key individuals from various units would go through a school at Nanterre, near Paris, in the next four or five months, as would selected Officers from Ports, chosen to supervise packing and marking there. (2)

(3). Supplies

This supervision and schooling applied to general supplies as well as to unit equipment. The civilian specialists were to instruct Service Personnel at depots and the port officers assigned were to supervise all packed items loaded. (2).

Antwerp and Marseilles would share supply evacuation, Le Havre being devoted principally to personnel. It was affirmed in late March that Antwerp would definitely be the main out-loading point. (1)

The complexities of getting up the flow of goods from depots and service collecting points to ports and of planning stowage and sailing of convoys were items over which sweat would pour in the next quarter.

b. Occupation of Germany

As working on redeployment gave a sort of optimism, conversely the plans for occupation depressed their workers. Home seemed even further away when one studied the many positions which would have to be filled, for God - only - knew how long, if the Germans were to be ruled and the fruits of victory realized.

Although there was much preliminary work on planning conducted by various high level agencies, the OCOT was not formally brought into the deliberations until the 26th February, when a General conference was held in Paris under the auspices of SHAEF. (see Appendix No 2. Plans for the TC in Germany, 26 February 1945), After another setback by the press of current problems, the subject was again put under the hammer on the 6th March and firmed enough to be presented, on March 20 th and 21st, to an orientation course in Paris for the officers ultimately to be involved. The problems were difficult; there were the high-level considerations, such as whether the COT would be completely in charge of transport, both policies and execution, or, at theater level, the executive of the U.S. Group Control council. Other knots to unloose were of General interest within the transport field. Would G-5 or TC Control trucking? Finally there were a multitude of technical details, such as the number of officers needed to man one of the city offices of the German Railway Control. A thorough briefing of the COT on March 24th, followed by his participation in a SHAEF meeting, and a " shirt sleeve" attack on details by his ACOT's gave more or less permanent pattern to plans and the list of what type and number of units, as well as what key individuals, would accomplish them. Recommendations for SHAEF's final consideration were submitted by the end of the month, and a troop basis-size and number of units by 10 April 1945.

The main issues on which a stand was taken were: First, that the TC must assume the Germans would be uncommunicative and uncooperative and that personnel adequate to carry on all operations must be provided. Technical Intelligence men followed the Armies closely, interviewing German railroad executives and examining captured documents. Teams of Movement and MRS specialists were attached to Armies in order to take over transport agencies as soon as possible after capture.

It was stressed that the efficient German transport system should be operated as nearly as possible as it had been, using the same

headquarters and control points, technical methods, and all key men who could be proved non-Nazi, thus keeping the waste of change to a minimum.

Inland Waterways experts, though assured by higher Headquarters that no use would be demanded of German water transport until at least four months after military defeat, went ahead to secure information and make plans

All planning was based fundamentally on a series of high-level agreements, promulgated by the European Advisory Commission, an Organization in London headed by the U.S. and Soviet Ambassadors to the court of St James and a high British figure. Their working bases were that not much German control would be available after surrender and that Allied Control should be predominantly military, rather than civil, in nature. The second of the documents was "Protocol of Zones", while the third, "Control Machinery" set up the Group Control Council and defined broad spheres of activities. (I)

(I) From remarks by Colonel JEFFERSON, USGCC, at Orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1400 , 21 March 1945.

A series of directives was issued from SHAEF on the overall aspects of the subject for the U.S. sphere. There was a 15th January letter on Administrative Organization during the period of Combined Control, the dissolution of SHAEF being anticipated at the time when the Armies would have moved into their permanent occupation positions. By this paper certain major differences in Control were established. The Com Z would not extend east of the Rhine, with the possible exception of an area around the Weser Ports to be known as the Bremen Enclave and to be an American island in the British sphere. Troops from Advance Sections, reinforced other Com Z personnel, would perform administrative duties in the Military Districts into which the U.S. Zone was to be divided, but they would be commanded not be Com Z Headquarters but by the Armies under the Army Group. (2)

(2) Ltr. SHAEF Memo 23I/i/GPD-2, Subj:"US Administrative Organization for Occupation of Germany during period of Combined Control", I5 January 1945.

It was also dictated that the Military District Headquarters would take over the reins when an Army's tactical rear boundary cleared a district's planned forward boundary and that the Army Group must staff all installations necessary for control which it uncovered, regardless of in what nations zone they might lie. In the North-west, the area generally allotted to Great Britain, that country's Army would furnish observers in the capacity of under studies until such time as they were prepared to take over completely.(2)

There followed on the I8th an "Interim Directive" , the interim being the period between the end of operations based on Plan ECLIPSE and those envisioned under general occupation procedure. Control would emanate from SHAEF, with plans being submitted by Army Group and Communications Zone Headquarters . (3)

(3) Ltr. SHAEF, GCT, 387.4-6/ PHP, Subj:"Interim Directive", I8 January 1945.

These plans, with embellishments, began to flower in another

SHAEF letter of 9 February , on, U,S, Transport Organization within Germany during the Quadripartite Period. The change from "Tri-partite" to designate the number of nations concerned reflected the general assumption, not yet firm, that France would have a zone of occupation. (4)

(4) Ltr, AG SHAEF, Subject; US Transport Organization within Germany During Quadripartite Period, 9 February 1945.

To return to more earthly levels, we find Major General ROSS directing Control and Planning, at the same time in early February that he mentioned orientation on redeployment plans, to acquaint the Divisions with occupation needs. Operating plans must be made and personnel scheduled to work for the area of occupied Germany and Austria - there would be Communication Zone-type jobs under the Army Commanders and Control Council in Berlin, which would have no essential military responsibility and would be concerned only with overall transportation policy and the rehabilitation of German civilian Transportation. (5).

(5) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, G 900 5 February 1945.

We have seen how Lt. Colonel NORDSTRUM of SHAEF, G-4 Movements and training steered the first deliberations of the TC planners and planned a London meeting for the 12th March. So far as the TC was concerned, this event never transpired, for Colonel FULLER, who had been charged with the Organization of detailed planning, was sent on another mission to the U.S. and necessarily left matters in a somewhat confused state. Anxious to get on with solidifying details, Lt Colonel NORDSTRUM called at the Office of the Chief, Control and Planning Division, on a morning of the following week. Colonel HURRILL assured him that the matter was now receiving his personnel attention and would be simply drawn-up and implemented as soon as the air cleared of extraneous matters. He felt that the trouble lay in the fact that no one had been empowered with sufficient authority to take hold of the problem and say "This is how it will be solved" Lt Colonel NORDSTRUM stated that such authority was finally, through necessity coming into being . (6)

(6) Notes on Conference for German Occupation, Office of Chief, Control and Planning Division, OCOT, Paris, 0930, 16 March 1945.

Among the distinguished group of speakers for the orientation of selected TC officers for German Occupation, held in mid-March, Brigadier General STEWART, welcoming the conferees for Major ROSS, who was of necessity out of town, stated the purpose of the two-day program was to make clear the picture of problems to be faced and the means at hand for solving them. He emphasized the point that many difficulties in any operation could be laid to the lack of complete information in the hands of field agents. (7)

(7) Notes on Orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 0930 20 March 1945.

The next distinguee was Major General C. S. NAPIER, Chief, Movements and Transport for SHAEF, This fine British Officer stressed the advantages which had accrued from American-British cooperation in SHAEF

and appealed for a continuation of this spirit when combined command was terminated. This, he felt especially important in Transportation since it was a unity by nature. Although some problems would pertain to Americans alone, many would require solution by four, rather than only two countries. The whole job of transport in Germany would be a difficult enough one even if only one nation, deciding everything itself, were to perform it. The four would have each to exercise great understanding of each other's points of view. (6). This job added to military troubles the complexities of caring for civil and semi-military needs. In many ways work would increase with the pealing of victory Bells. The General asked sincerely that there be no relaxation of effort after that date. (8)

(8) Ibid.

SHAEF, he said, had tried to lay wise policy, looking out for some of the rocks that lay in uncharted waters ahead, but many mutual works, such as the detailed arrangement of the U.S.L. of C (Line of Communication) from Bremen to Kassel still remained. This line crossed the main East-West line and split the proposed British Zone. (8),

A Colonel of SHAEF, G-4, plans, took the floor, explaining the backdrop, at high level, for the transportation scene. Politically , all work was at the time subject to agreements pending with the newly-invited French, who, it appeared would take up a zone consisting of the Saar regions and the Southern banks of the Rhine. The City of Berlin would be divided into U.S. British, Russian, and French Zones, but overall control of it would be pooled in a quadrupartitite Kommandaturat. For the whole of Germany supreme power would rest with the joint Chiefs of Staffs on an International Level, but, for all practical purposes with the [redacted] Control Council, headed by the highest military commanders in each zone the Theater Commanding General on the U.S. scheme (probably General EISENHOWER). The General nature of duties for this bestarred group would be to ensure uniformity of action in all cases which cut across Zone lines and to effect agreement on important policies. They would control generally what might be left of German Central control agencies, such as the Ministry of Transport, and specifically, Greater Berlin. (8),

This small Control Council was to have under it and advising it a Control Commission, the U.S. portion of which was to be the USGCC already previously mentioned. The Military Districts were seen as static commands under the Theater Commander. Run by the CG's of the Armies, they would be responsible for final military activities disposition of POW's and mopping up scattered resistance, as well as the duties of Military Government. (8). While four of these districts had been originally foreseen on a basis of control by Corps Commanders, the number had been lowered to three at General OMAR BRADLEY's reminder that the corps is not set up as an administrative unit and this number was reduced, by the 27th March to two. (9). Military Districts of German boundaries were based on civil districts.(8)

(9) Interview with Colonel S.A. DECKER, ACOT, Administration OCOT , Paris, I330, 27 March 1945.

As the advancing combat uncovered German ministries, a plan called GOLDCUP, provided that teams of specialists, some of whom would be

Transportation men, would be flown in to seize documents and personnel in an attempt to keep as much German method as possible in the madness of capitulation by a government which knew itself doomed to punishment and destruction. (8)

To conclude his remarks the Lt Colonel reminded that TC must provide personnel for an international organization similar to BELMOT (Belgian Movements Organization for transport) for control of traffic on the Rhine (8).

The next speaker was a Colonel from SHAEF, G-4 Plans, who described the developments in SHAEF planning previously detailed by documents. He pointed out that the second part of plan ECLIPSE (discussed in Part I 3 of this section),, dealing with the readjustment of troop positions, would not be effective until the German High Command had signed the surrender document or the Major portion of the Reichswehr's, Field Forces were out of action. (10).

(10) Notes on orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 0930 20 March 1945.

Planning directive "Y" was in the mill and would be out within a week. It would cover the preparation of troop lists and the physical extent of the U.S. Zone. It would be more specific than anything previous on the obligations of the COT, who was charged with supervision of ports and the custody and disposition of much captured materiel. The supervision of military and labor transport needs was also placed with his office. (10). The Colonel declared as policy that extensive use of German labor was planned , but that American troops must be on hand in sufficient numbers to perform all tasks, should the conquered people be completely uncooperative. TC must answer the question as to whether or not German service units were desired in lots, organized under their existent T/O & E's (Tables of Organization and Equipment) or as individual specialists and basics. Furthermore, TC must prepare for much officer overstrenghh, because the main job would be supervision, since much labor would be performed by German basics. (10)

The speaker apologized for some of the rather elemental terminology of an early SHAFF paper (II), but stated that many of the highups were not as familiar with Transportation as one might think they should be; and it had been felt necessary to "sell" them on some ideas. (II)

(II) Letter, AG, SHAEF subject:" US Transport Organization within Germany during Quadrupartite Period", 9 February 1945.

Headquarters of the theater was slated to be Frankfort-on-the-Main, a barge communications center, while Headquarters, Military District, West, would take Stuttgart, and the East, Munich-the Bavarian capital. Pending French plans would not alter the American Zone very much." In answer to a question asking for a redifinition of local, as opposed to, long-distance trucking, the Colonel gave the SHAFF dictate that local meant all trucking by the organic transportation of Corps and Armies, plus civil affair trucking by Military District staffs. (10)

Taking all this in, and adding ingredients of its own desiring, TC, with Control and Planning its principal agent, made sweeping recommendations to SHAEF in an overall paper at the month's end.' (12).

(12) Letter, Major General ROSS, COT, Com Z, to Major General CRAWFORD, G-4, Division, SHAEF, subject: " Occupation and Theater Planning for Period Following Termination of Combined Command-OCOT" 30 March 1945.

To touch definitely on actual operational planning, one discovers that by mid-February, Control and Planning had assembled and worked on a complete set of maps. From these further plans would be developed covering marshalling areas, transfer points and allocation of equipment. Supply Division reported that at the time sufficient cranes were present for these operations. (13).

(13) Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0930 21 February 1945.

The question of Organization came up for real investigation in an informal conference occasioned by SHAEF's Lt Colonel NORDSTRUM's visit to Colonel MURRILL's office on the morning of 16 March. It was brought out that the latest directive made the COT responsible for pertinent activities in both Com Z (outside Germany) and in Occupied Germany. The Commanding General, Com Z would be a deputy of the Theater Com Z and as such could not have a COT but only a Transportation Officer. Colonel MURRILL, batting hard for his boss and technical as opposed to theoretical Transportation control, felt that the COT should also be the head of the Transportation Division of the USGCC, keeping policy and execution in one set of brains, as the British planned to do. German transport functioned as a unity, disregarding provincial borders, under the Ministry of Transport; it should not be divided between Control at Berlin and that at Frankfort. The SHAEF representative reminded that Brigadier General J.A. APPELTON, Director General, Military Railways, SHAEF, had already been nominated for the post . To have a Major General working for a Brigadier, practically the case since USGCC would lay down policy and do all coordinating at international level, went quite against the grain with Colonel MURRILL (14); and Brigadier General STEWART. (15). As it was, the USGCC would be predominately political in composition; and it would be best to have as much rank as possible represented among the military, who would have to fight for their point of view. (14)

(14) Notes on conference for German Occupation, OFFICE of Chief , Control and Planning Division, OCOT, Paris, 1000 16 March 1945.

(15) Notes on conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1130, 24 March 1945.

Colonel MURRILL drew an apt parallel between the USGCC and the board of directors of an American railway system. With leadership from the Theater Commander, the Chairman of the Board, so to speak, the transport division would set wages, allocate rolling stock, set up procedures for car turnaround, and make civil rate scales. Brigadier General APPELTON would make these decisions with no kind of reporting to Major General ROSS, who would be akin to the president of the railway, carrying out the decisions of the board and originating only operating policy. (14)

If this were unavoidably the case, the Chief, Control and Planning felt that there must be at least a sizeable liaison staff in Berlin acting for the COT in Frankfurt. Since the country's transport system would be poorly run if one broke it into three or four entirely independent systems, each run by a different occupying nation, it would also be essential that liaison staffs be set up [redacted] for Russian, and [redacted] British coordination. All in attendance at the conference felt that these international liaison sections should be set up from Berlin by Brigadier General [redacted], but the U.S. Officers of SHAEF doing the high planning had pared down liaison staff to a small Berlin Group. It appeared that TC would have to furnish the personnel to supervise interchange of rail cars at Zone borders: USGCC had only eight officers, the Armies' Transportation Staffs were already overburdened, and their other transportation experts were buried in combat division work. (14).

Lt Colonel NORDSTRUM mentioned that Colonel BRISBANE, SHAEF, who had been charged with the Planning for Transport Division USGCC, had been an attorney specializing in Transportation problems and was an excellent man for the job. His staff was capable but cursed with insufficient rank. They would be moving to the Paris area at the months' end. (14).

The conference ended with detailed arranging for the orientation course to be given selected TC officers the 20th and 21st of March. This 'school' was limited to two days in order to assure the attendance of the best officers, too busy with their present duties to spare more time. A previous course of orientation and instruction on Disarmament given in England, had lasted two weeks and had not attracted top flight personnel. Some slight-of-hand by the Control and Planning, Chief, altered the proposed agenda so that the organization of transportation as it existed in Germany would be presented before that proposed by the TC; and the discussion of British and American plans would follow directly upon each other. (15).

(16) Ibid note 14

As a final spur, Lt Colonel NORDSTRUM reminded the Control and Planning men and the Army Group Transportation Officer that British planning was well ahead of U.S. in this field of Occupation. (16).

The problem of personnel was always uppermost. During the course of the meeting discussed above, Colonel MURRILL had touched upon providing a liaison staff for the supervision of coal movements from the Ruhr, a British domain, with emphasis, on getting empty railcars back for loading. However, the SHAEF member felt the empties should be the concern of the German railway men. (122)

Earlier at the first big planning meeting, it was agreed that the OCOT should have the assistance of the transport Division, US Group Control Council, in selecting and training staff and operating personnel for the planning and execution of its duties. Although the OCOT had not felt it should be called upon to provide or train personnel for the

Transport Division, Control Council, it was prepared to c armark appropriate officers, whom it felt could be found among skilled transport men at present with SHAEF Mobilization Division, with Army Group, and even with Corps, and Divisions, TC personnel for lower echelons of the operating establishment under the OCOT were to come mainly from ADSEC and CONAD.

If the Army Groups were to be charged with staffing the military Districts' Transportation Sections, analogous in operation to those of the existent Base, Intermediate, and Advance Sections of Com Z, both OCOT and Army group representatives were agreed that Army Group and Armies would need more TC personnel and that transport problems should be handled by an independent special staff section, rather than by a division of the G-4 Section. At the time, the Army Groups staffs had only a small increment of TC officers working under the A.C. of S, G-4. Only two armies, the third and seventh, had independent transport sections, and these had never been officially staffed by War Department order.

The civil affairs representative stated that 63 officers would be furnished by European Civil Affairs Divisions, These men, with G-5 training and motor transport experience, would be sifted out to various staff levels to advise on local trucking and to act as liaison-directors to the German organization utilized. (17)

(17) Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1400, 26 January 1945.

When the division heads conferred to tackle directly the job of detailing key officers, Colonel HURRILL asked for really good men, saying: " A few men who know the ropes are worth a big bunch who don't. And the COT said there should be no trouble, as TC had really experienced people like Colonel TAYLOR of CBS (Channel Base Section) who had pioneered with two Base sections. (18)

(18) Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1130, 24 March 1945.

In the afternoon session, the Chief, Control and Planning gave some General estimates: District Transportation Offices, the equivalents of the present Section Transportation Offices, would need approximately 30 Officers and 75 EM's, working in two main sections Movements and Operations, and Administrative. This number was based on the calculated number of RTO installations which was in turn based on size and number of cities rather than the old size of territory norm. (19)

(19) Ibid, but 1330

The last big conference of this period saw the TC leaders warned that the number of TC officers needed would double or triple after the German surrender. The Berlin Headquarters would be fairly large and have a State Department tinge with Interstate Commerce Committee . Type personnel: Men with legal experience or general military transport experience gained during the present war. TC might have to augment this USGCC bunch, though the procurement of that personnel did not rest with the OCOT at that time. (20).

(20) Notes on Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, 1000, 20 March 1945.

(2) Ports.

At the SHAEF called conference of late February it was brought out that the SHAEF directive had excluded the OCOT from the field of ocean shipping, but there was some question in the minds of the committee as to where lines of demarcation would be drawn and whether the OCOT would not eventually be involved. What, for example, was the description of coast-wise shipping? Some German ships sailing to Northern Norway or Scotland made a voyage and were of a size characteristic of trans-oceanic vessels. Would they be considered coastal, and would coastal not be included under ocean? (1) As early as the 8th February, Bremen and Bremerhaven were definitely on the agenda. A TWX of that date to COMNAVEU (Commander Naval forces in Europe (US) from Lt General JOHN C.H. LEE, Commanding General, Com Z, ETO, stated that it was not planned to use the great Weser Port before six months after its capture. U.S. Army would aid British in rehabilitation, with a view to taking over operations completely when the flow of supplies should begin in earnest.

Control and Planning considered Bremen no problem. In March two times as much tonnage as the Weser Ports would ever be called upon to accept was being cleared through Cherbourg alone. There were good quayside facilities in Bremenhaven, which might be captured intact. Base depots were planned and should assure no repetition of earlier difficulties in that respect. (2)

(1) Notes on conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris 1400, 26 February 1945.

At the time of this conference the OCOT had much say in the allocation of vessels to ports. Would a new arrangement stop this necessary control?

Two ship representatives present could not supply the answers to these questions. All that was known was that policy in this respect would be determined at high political levels and no organozation comparable to the Shipping Control Commission, then dictating operations, had yet been established. A pool would be formed of all German-controlled ships, upon capture, and distribution made between the "Big Three". Purely trans-oceanic shipping would be handled individually by the several nations. It was decided to seek further information on this subject. (2).

(2) Notes on operation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 0930, 21 March 1945.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(3) Ibid, but I430.

Actual personnel for the Bremen Enclave was disclosed three days later by the Chief, Control and Planning, and the ACOT's. If, Colonel SAMUEL A. DECKER of Administration, explained, a division, a major port was to be required, the squeeze would be tight, for there was only one free and it was slated for redeployment to the Pacific. The Colonel suggested making two minor ports of the one unit available: but Colonel BARTLETT, ACOT, Marine Operations, said one major port could handle both Bremen and Bremerhaven although some 40 miles apart on the Weser. Colonel EDWARD H CONNOR Jr, Commanding the I7th Major Port, then at Ghent, would send first reconnaissance and rehabilitation parties at such times as the ports were captured and direction would be necessary. (4).

(4) Notes on Conference, for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, I330,24 March I945.

Getting down to actual troop bases, Control and Planning presented estimates for approval by Marine Operations. In addition to one Headquarters, Major Port, there were planned: one regulating Group, to take care of port Movements and Clearance; a number of harbor Craft Companies, totaling I,308 officers and men; 25 port companies; 2 port Marine Maintenance Companies; 5 Headquarters, Port Battalions; and I2 QM (TC) Truck Companies, for port clearance to Base Depots. The ACOT, Marine Operations, agreed adding that at least one of the oport Battalion Headquarters must be white, to ensure good documentation. Movements Division raised the question of how the number of truck companies had been decided. Colonel MURRILL stated that since it was not yet definitely known where the depots would be located, two round trips daily were all that could be counted on for the trucks. (4)

In another three days it had been decided that the functions of Port Commander and District Transportation Officer would be combined in Colonel CONNOR's position in the Enclave. (5).

(5) Interview with Colonel S.A. DECKER, ACOT, Administrative, OCOT, Paris I330 27 March I945.

Toward the end of March, the USGCC had detailed control of Ocean shipping to the Navy with instructions to coordinate with TC. (6).

(6) Remarks by Colonel JEFFERSON, USGCC, at Orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, I430 2I March I945 .

(3) Railroads

The "iron trail" would certainly be TC's main concern in Germany. No matter how badly the lines might be demolished, with capture repairs would begin and extensive use would be made of the system, for its organization and efficiency and use all pointed toward its principal role in the Reich's transportation.

Colonel BRISBINE, SHAEF planner, gave some time to the problem in the first conference between TC and USGCC personnel. He expressed suspicion of the sanguine British expectations on locomotives. The status was this: 20,000 in Germany originally, 8,000 manufactured during hostilities, 4000 borrowed from occupied countries, 40,000 total, minus 10,000 depreciation allowances

British Authorities were planning to remove 15,000 engines from Germany. The conferees agreed that this would be dangerous to successful operations even if it were possible, which would be unlikely.

The physical sphere of operations, motor and canal as well as railroad, was described by the SHAEF handbook.

Within the boundaries of 1937 Germany, and in Austria, the OCOT was to control the existing transport agencies through the Germans. In all other territory taken from the Germans, the control would be direct, using of course the Phase develppnent system.

The SHAEF chairman reminded the meeting that the OCOT would have to increase rate making and other activities of a more commercial nature that the MRS had heretofore included. Colonel TRAUB stated that the OCOT was prepared to expand its activities somewhat in this direction but that it was hoped SHAEF would, in its policy-making province, set up overall considerations. (1).

(I) Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1430, 26 February 1945.

A most important task of the Control and Planning Division was to find out just what composed the German war system; its control and operating organization, its physical plant and personnel. These were the tools for the job. By extensive research, constantly liaisoning with the G-2's of SHAFF and Com Z and with the Office of the Chief, Engineer, Com Z, as well as the reconnaissance elements of the MRS, the Intelligence Branch, directed by Lt . (Later Captain) JD COONEY, but actually run by Lt JA. SHYBOURGH turned out the necessary information, mapping it and giving it to the Drafting Branch to illustrate graphically.

German railways were under a Director General, who was, at the same time, Minister of Transport. His field had been infiltrated by a Military tinge typical of the Nazification of all government activities. The Armament and War Production Office had its representative in the Inspector General of roads, and there were many special Military Committees for integration of means. (2)

(2) Lecture by Lt. SHYBOURGH at Orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1430 20 March 1945.

To understand the German Control, it is necessary to examine a basic difference between U.S. German organization. In Germany, all the heads of technical activities were civilian specialists, men who had spent their lives studying and working out such problems as the transportation of

goods and men. Directly under these men, acting as their executives or deputies were strictly military or Nazi party men, who learned transportation as they went along, but whose military background enabled them to advise their superior on the military side of things, to carry out his decisions in the approved military manner, and to keep a watchful eye on any 'civilian' slackness or 'Non-Nazi' thinking. (2).

In American Military Transportation, the OCOT, had established generally the opposite, although there were exceptions. Policy here was to put an Army man at the head, assuring military thinking and procedures, while his second-in-command was the uniformed civilian expert at the job, advising him on the time-tested methods of "getting things rolling".

A thorough description of the main points on control and layout of German rails is given in Appendix No2, Part II, No3 and No4 has a summary of miles of line the U.S. expected to operate, while No.5 contains a detailed account of greater Berlin facilities.

Further detail presented by Lt. SHYBOURGH, showed that three times as many tons of manufactured products were hauled than agricultural. Again three times as much forest products went "by the cars" than did animal products. In a good pre-war year, 1938, the average freight haul was 107 miles. Of the seven main arteries of goods 'flow in that year only one was in the proposed American Zone to any extent: that between the Leipzig anf Frankfurt-on-main areas,. The Americans would be shipping over the Ruhr-Berlin artery, but the control of this would rest in British and Russian hands. The war had cancelled some heavy movement from and to the ports and reserved the flow generally, overloading channels to and from South Central Europe. This overloading had shifted some tonnage, customarily railroad, to the canals. Overall moves were heaviest in November and lightest in January, and August might be taken as an average. . (2)

The continued use of Antwerp, until Bremen could become the port for all German consignments would require much U.S. shipping over British-held lines through Cologne. Likewise, the stuff to and from Marseilles would have to be coordinated at Mannheim, Saarbruken, or some vicinital point. This meant more difficulties, more liaison. (3)

(3) Remarks by Chief, Control & Planning, at Orientation Course for German Occupation OCOT, Paris, 1430, 21 March 1945.

Greatest single concern would be the movement of coal of the Ruhr, the British, short at home, planned to cancel their exports to the Continent; the French would be using all that the Saar could produce and demanding more, while the Russians would probably devote that of the Silesian mines to their own uses. Other European needs and those of both British and American zones of Germany would come from the German version of Western Pennsylvania. (3). The British had offered to attach sixty officers to the American Armies in that region; they would "get in on the ground floor" and be prepared to team with U.S. liaison when the British occupiers took over their Zone. (3).

(4) Ibid.

The MRS, which would be operating and supervising German operations was an activity exempted, because of a specialist nature, from several clauses on overall control procedure. A special SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) was being prepared to define carefully just what its obligations and prerogatives would be. However, since the Com Z was charged with supplying the Military Districts over Main Lines of Communications, it was assumed that MRS would be principally a Com Z activity. (5).

(5) Notes on Open Forum at Orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1430, 21 March 1945.

(2). Motor Transport

Control and Planning's findings on the German organization and use of trucking are summarized in Appendix NO 2, Part II, No 6. Additional information and the G-5 point of view, over which some controversy had risen and more would stew, (see Appendix No 2, Part II, No 2), were presented in the mid-March session. (1)

The G-5 people thought most motor movement would be local and within the provinces of the Commanding Generals', Military Districts. There were concentrations of industry at Nurnberg, Munich, Stuttgart, and Mannheim, but bulk truck movements for the factories would be limited to special and emergency runs. This long-level operation would make the German Local Traffic Expediter (EDL) the Chief point of contact, Under these men had been organized transport pools for each activity-Industry, Agriculture, Wholesale Trade, etc- which G-5 thought were practical and should be continued. (1)

(1) From remarks by Captain CLAY, Economics Division, G-5, SHAEF, at Orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT , Paris, 0930, 20 March 1945.

It was pointed out that long-distance trucking control was not neatly vested in the one German Organization, National Trucking Association (RKB). The local czars mentioned above as EDL's issued permits which controlled the procurement of tires and fuel as well as repairs honored by the decision of still another group, under the Economic Department, known as ration officers. It would be some time before all this cross-Control and local prerogative could be straightened out to put command on the high German level with which TC would find it practical to work. The RKB's were, at the time only assisting the KVV's (Commissioners for local Transport). When they came into their own they would be the logical agency for MTS Control, but when that time would be , was difficult to surmise. While it was coming local people would have to take complete census of all vehicles, including horse-drawn (an important element) and, be they transport or police personnel, keep careful check on all motor hauls. Every German vehicle would have to be provided with a bi-lingual sheet (for which the forms were already being printed), stamped by an office familiar to U.S. personnel. (1).

All these items were detailed in a Technical Manual for Road Transport, by SHAEF, Sixty G-5 officers were ear-marked, twenty to accompany the armies tactically and take over newly-captured installations, while

the other forty would come in later to perform ordinary occupational duties. In addition to these, others would augment the Army Commanding General's Special Staffs. G-5 personnel, conversant with Civil doings in Agriculture, Industry, etc. knew the truck requirements and methods and should, the G-5 man concluded, have a great deal to do with Motor Transport. (3)

(3) Ibid.

Berlin posed a special problem. One tenth of all commercial trucks registered in the Reich were licensed there, totalling about 36,000 (4) The special needs of a high Headquarters would have to be considered, with special attention to sedans for the Rank and celebrities. The Chief, Control and Planning Division, recommended looking into the manner inwhich Transportation Section, Seine Section, had organized a pool of civilian vehicles to serve the various Headquarters in Paris . (5)

(4) Folder, Control & Planning, OCOT, Com Z , subj:"Transportation Organization Berlin District, as recommended by COT " P4 " April 1945.

(5) Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1330, 24 March 45

(5). Inland Waterways

While waterborne tonnage in Germany had been only 7 percent of the total, and the main system, the Rhine, was expected to be so shot up and obstructed as to be unusable for six months after capture, the barges of the Reich were, as were those of all European countries, an important part of transportation. Berlin was served by three waterways, the Rhine had long been a great carrier, and the Danube was the life-blood of Central European circulation.

In the waterways of [illegible] South Germany, the American sphere of influence, at least one-half of the barge traffice originated. The largest barges in Europe, great 3,000 tonners, came as far up-Rhine as Strasbourg and 1200 tons craft made Basel, at the Swiss border. Likewise, on the river Main the 3000 tonners reached Frankfurt and reloaded to 1200 tonners for cargo as far as Wurzburg. In 1939, the Rhine fleet alone consisted of 18000 vessels and 1100 self-propelled barges. Over 200 million tons had been water-borne in 1944. July was the peak month. (1)

(1) From remarks by Lt, SHYBOURGH, Intelligence Branch, Control & Planning Division, OCOT, at Orientation Course for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1330 20 March 1945.

Further details on Inland Waterways control and operations are given in Appendix No 2 Part II, No. 7

There would be an increased need for Inland Waterways men at the control points located in the U.S. Zone and port companies to unload or supervise unloading at the Inland Ports. Tentative organization for the District Transportation Offices sub-divided the Operations Division into water, Rail, Truck and Air Branches. The Frankfurt OCOT would have a Water Division, along with Rail, Highway, Air Liaison, and Baggage Divisions. Some personnel schooled in canal problems might have to be furnished the USGCC at Berlin and others to liaison with the British on the lower, and French on the upper, Rhine reaches, as well as with the Soviet controllers of the middle Danube.(2)

(2) Notes on conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, 1330, 24 March 1945.

To conclude this study of occupational planning it might be well to examine the proposals for Headquarters staffs in General. There should be, Control and Planning felt, six liaison staff offices: one, for the USGCC, three for occupying nations one for Ruhr coal, and one for the Northern Line of Communications via Cologne. At Frankfurt, OCOT Mainz operations par has been described above. Passage was made a special division because TC had suffered the headaches of being pressured for officers' and units' personal effects ever since, in the early days in England the trunk lockers of both Generals EISENHOWER and CLARK had been lost for a time. The other part of the office was to consist of Administration (including Supply and Statistics), Planning and Policy, Division, and a high-powered MRS top-side. (2)

The COT would probably split his time between Berlin and Frankfurt, but his headquarters would be with the Theater Commander at the latter city. Brigadier General STEWART, DCOT, was thought of for the COT's deputy for COM Z, in Paris. (2)

Getting down to the Military Districts, there was under discussion designation of type units. For the Western District, eight Regulating Groups were thought sufficient. Colonel HURRILL favored the use of non-T/O (table of organization) units to give freedom for adjustments the Armies did not have on hand the exact makeup for Military District staffs and would probably make some demands. Administrative Division asked that regular T/O units be used as much as possible, since they were much simpler to administrate trative.

Colonel DECHER, ACOT, Administration, reminded that the armies would want to use their own personnel as much as possible; regulating Groups and Stations then assigned Seventh Army were earmarked for Western District just as the Transportation Officer was for the job of District Transportation Officer. Likewise, for the Eastern District. (3)

(3) Ibid

The two main military Districts would be subdivided into Regions for Administrative purposes. These regional or sub-district Headquarters would have 25 officers, 50 enlisted men, plus RTC increments.

Something has already been said of Berlin's needs. Colonel E. A. EVERTSBURG, who was known to be competent to put on an efficient and "showy" performance, was designated District Transportation Officer and would have a Headquarters Staff of 16 officers, 1 Warrant Officer, 27 enlisted men and three interpreters, with a chance of getting more of these last since the Chief, Control and Planning, felt more would be necessary. (3)

For a further breakdown of personnel requirements, one is referred to Section V of this Chapter devoted to the Movements Division.

NOTE: To make for less-interrupted reading of the text, the footnotes forward will be found documented in a separate "Index to Numbered References", Appendix 2, Part II, (beginning with No. 140).

c. Plans for Support of Emergency Tactical Movement into Germany. On the IIth February, the Chief, Control and Planning Division, conferred with Major General ROSS and Brigadier General STEWART on the need for special facilities in the event of the Armies' making another grand slam and running over Germany at great speed. (I40) The emphasis of the plan must be on motor transport, and the MTS (Motor Transport Service) name "XYZ" was put on it; but the railroad was still the backbone of land transportation. Although the terrific bombardment of German rail facilities made reliance on motor and air transport paramount, the 2-8-0's and Diesels still had to haul the majority of goods to the banks of the Rhine, and the XYZ plan hinged on the advancement of railheads to keep truck turn-around down to reasonable efficiency.

There were great difficulties to overcome in providing the build up for the Rhine crossing. RTO's would have to reconnoitre and establish control close behind the heavy fighting. Their stations would be often under fire or damaged by pilotless aircraft. The Rhine province people were very sullenly hostile and uncooperative, having been given to think the american advances were merely temporary. Furthermore, the German operating personnel was withdrawing with their Armies, leaving to the MTS the necessity of providing all technicians except some shop personnel.

Proposed rail routes to cross the Rhine and run to Berlin and South had been drawn up in early February. (I4I)

The XYZ plan was for the last and greatest Motor Transport Service (MTS) line of communication haul on the continent before the cessation of hostilities with Germany. It was planned and organized to give the necessary motor transport support to the U.S. Armies in their rapid advance east of the Rhine. Previous operation of such long-haul routes as the Red Ball, the White Ball and the ABC provided valuable experience tables for the XYZ Motor Transport Operation.

A three-phase system was set up to meet three stages of tonnage requirements. Demands of the Armies were to determine which phase would be used Under plan "X" 8000 tons per day would be moved on a two-day turn-around or I6000 tons on a one-day turn-around: Plan "Y" was for I0,000 tons and 20,000 tons respectively, and Plan "Z" WAS FOR I2,000 and 24,000 tons respectively on the same basis. Associated with these plans, the undertaking became known as the XYZ Operation. As of 30 March I945, 9000 tons on a one-day turn-round basis were hauled daily to the four U.S. Armies in Germany, with an additional 3000 tons of bulk POL. This figure was above the daily average of the Red Ball operation and also exceeded the daily average for the ABC Route.(I42)

Planning was well under way when on February 28th, TC asked G-3 Com Z, to reconsider their requests for truck companies to support plan ECLIPSE (details of which are given in part I, 3 of this section) Their existent plan was based upon 650 tons per division and Major General ROSS felt this was far too high. Control and Planning plan gave two possible tonnages- 650 and 400, the lesser of which won out (I43)

The vital thing was equipment. In a discussion of cargo nets for trucks, which might very well come in handy, Control and planning reminded that it had been found in Normandy operations that if the truck haul was long it was better to take the nets out of the vehicles and stow them on platforms. Every effort would be made to have adequate equipment on hand if called for (I44).

Intelligence Branch had, even before the Ardennes counter-offensive, drawn up some proposed rail and highway paths into the Reich, with a special emphasis on by-passing the Ruhr, where the congestion of traffic and the possibility of "Last-ditch" defense stood against Line of Communications operations. From the then-held border positions, two alternates one northerly, the other further south were drawn east to Wesel, a good site for crossing the Rhine. Another line ran from the front to the rail center of Cologne. Around the Ruhr on the North and South the lines from Wesel and Cologne, respectively, met at Hannover, where two alternates proceeded to Berlin one via Stendahl and the other by way of Magdeburg. From the southerly frontier, alternates ran, the one via Wennerman, the other along the main line into Kassel and thence, via Halle, to the Capitol(I45) Firmed XYZ, as presented 2 March, put the emphasis on the Wesel-Munster-Hannoyer channel, the upper of the suggested Northern routes and in the south the main, more southerly line, Metz-Kaiserlautern-Mannheim, and Northeast toward Kassel won precedence. (I46)

For trucks, the routes were heavied on the early maps as follows: In the North generally the same as the rail to the Rhine, thence the main highway to Munster, with a feeder into the Ruhr-Berlin Autobahn; from Munster east there were three alternatives to the vicinity of Minden, while from there in a choice was given between the old main road (No65) and the Autobahn-Hannover, Braunschweig, Magdeburg, to Berlin (I45)

For truckers there was proposed an additional, somewhat central route from Cologne, via Paderborn, to Braunschweig, where the Northern Roads were joined. The Southern axes, similar to that for the rails, but possesed of more alternative stretches, came up through Kassel to the Autobahn and Nr I00 at Halle, following these pavements on into the Under der Linden. (I45)

Around the Lst of January I945, additional details were furnished for the near-Rhine motor moves. A map showing highways leading from Venlo, on the Dutch border, to Munster and Rhine crossings between Wesel and Emmerich down stream gave another northern route, Wesel to Appelhausen, with numerous feeders from the east bank of the Rhine. (I47)

Early February saw an overall improving of the choices for Highways in the Southern Sector. Three axes were mapped, rather than the two of December. The Northern most ran; Thionville, France-Trier, Germany-Koblentz, Kassel with several capillaries including the Autobahn, Limberg-Wiesbaden connecting to parallel routes and making for a variety of alternatives; from Kassel the selection was the same to Berlin as on the former map. A central path led from Metz to Mainz (with an alternate notth via Thier and Bingen-on-Rhine) through Frankfurt to Kassel, while the 'low road'

took out from Nancy and, passing through Saarbruken, divided into two choices toward Mannheim. One-half the upper alternate was autobahn). From this Rhine city, the way turned North and Northeast, offering either autobahn or Nr 3 to Kassel (I43)

The early March revisions laid emphasis on the northern most routes of the North roads: Wesel-Munster-Lurbeck Bielfield-Minden. In the South, from origin Saarbrucken, two paths were chosen to Giessen, in the province of Hesse. The upper bridged the Rhine at Maintz, the lower between Worms and Mannheim. (I46)

This second March plan was submitted in response to com Z's planning Directive Series 'H' and included an annex of carfully-detailed bridge information. It assumed a vigorous advancement of railheads to the Rhine and a railway bridge within a minimum of four weeks after capture of site. The last bridge builder on the offensive had been Julius Caesar, whose pile-bridge not required to support tanks and locomotives-had been pushed across in two weeks. The successive turn-arounds are shown in No 8 of the appendix No 2 Part II, along with specific truck requirements, rail marshalling and storage facilities, tonnage estimates, and both a report of existent truck availability and that forecast for the I5 th April. It will be noticed that special emphasis was put on three factors. First, that a large proportion of the truck companies were IO-ton, requiring certain minimum road qualifications and giving less flexibility at forward dumps. It was discovered at the March Supply Movements Conference that the Armies did not favor this type of equipment. Secondary roads in Germany were incapable of handling them and their inflexibility at discharge points near the front had been a hindrance during the Bastogne operations. However, by the month's end the capture of good roads, in luding autobahns, made their extensive use perfectly feasible.

In the second place, Control and Planning urged that Base Sections be well-informed as to what units must be counted on to become part of the operation, and that they keep these units alerted to move on twenty-four hour notice. So detailed and careful were the MTS'S plans in this respect that copies of movement order were in file for each unit nominated and were simply fed to the teletypists at OCOT when mounting tonnage called for more vehicles. All went like clockwork in this respect.

Finally, every attempt was made to prevent repetition of Red Ball difficulties caused by not following the assistant driver system. There shortage had meant strain on the single chauffeur and a lack of essential Lst Echelon Maintenance. Extra personnel was made available for XYZ and the driver system effected generally. (I49)

It was essential that port backlogs be very low against the time when trucks would leave the wharves for the German forests. This was accomplished during January and February, so that mighty Antwerp got its backlog down to less than I½ day's discharge. (I50)

Before the first quarter of the year ended, it was possible to check actuality with plan in some cases. The plan gave 365 truck companies as available; 230 was the highest figure used in March and April. Maximum

tonnage was forecast for April 15th, whereas it actually occurred on the 28th March, when over 6,000 tons were hauled. The speedup was caused mainly by the windfall of capturing the Remagen bridge intact in early March, enabling forces to be on the move over the great river ahead of the time foreseen. Reichswehr resistance after the Major crossings at the month's end was weaker than had been thought probable. (149) Full comparision is made for the History of the next quarter of 1945.

By the 9th of March, G-4, Com Z, had put the stamp of approval on XYZ and directed TC to take whatever steps were necessary to accomplish it. Already five truck companies had been diverted from the ADC run out of Antwerp to the uses of ADSEC (advance Section, Com Z.).

The Chief, Control and Planning, reminded ADSEC representatives, in mid-March, that the required number of trucks could be provided whether the Armies raced or plodded. If they advanced rapidly, putting ever-greater distance between themselves and railheads it meant little resistance, less expenditure of ammunition, and hence less trucks to haul less tonnage. On the other hand, should they encounter heavy resistance from fixed defenses, the gigantic tonnages of ammunition which would have to be hauled forward would be offset by the shortness of the movement from railheads to Army dumps. (151)

A special angle of Emergency movement plans was the "sky-train" an armada of cargo planes carrying gasoline to General PATTON's tanks. Every one was making sure there would be no repetion of the pause before Metz which had postponed the penetration of the Seigfried Line. TC had to coordinate the ground facilities dovetailing into this move and relay to the Air Force tonnage requirements and destinations. By March 27th this movement was going strong. (152)

To the field men assembled in the rear headquarters calm of the OCOT BUILDING ON THE Champs, Colonel MURRILL said it was odd to be discussing the orderly flow of supplies on that 28th day of March, when two Armies were 100 miles across the Rhine and moving like juggernauts. The estimates for XYZ extended geographically to the Weser River, but the men with guns indicated they would soon be over that mark. Latest thought was that the number of truck companies needed would top 200. (153), and that figure was soon exceeded. (10) The 'X' phase of XYZ had become fully effective that very day.

Meanwhile the Base Sections were getting short on trucks, but, remarked the Colonel, he had seen some "fine teams" of horses, and some French "charcoal-burners" long given up for dead, working at the U.S. operated. (153)

Par 03.

By the next day, the Colonel could report to the rank-laden morning staff conference that 735 Truck Companies had been put on XYZ and demands were mounting. Shortage in Base sections, he stated, would not be adverse if all movements could be confined to essential supplies for the present operations and shipments from the U.K. could be limited to a similar category. It was decided to request G-4 Com Z to issue orders through command channels to this effect. (154) This was done, and

the regular Movement Program thus fairly accomplished.

Strangely enough the Channels of Information between the Armies and OCOT were such that misconceptions which might have been dangerous existed but were fortunately dispelled in time. We have seen above how MTS did not know how the Armies felt about 10 ton truck and trailer units. It became apparent in later March that a vice-versa existed: The armies did not realize that XYZ was a tactical support project; they had conceived of it as designed for later occupational L-Of- C maintenance. This was obvious from the fact that they were trying to borrow truck companies from ADSEC and COMAD to extend their motor hauls from Z truckheads, as though the Advance Sections had no intention of advancing same transfer points. (I55)

d. Planning the Supply Movement Program.

(I) General.

The supply Movement Program System as conceived and begun under Control and Planning during December 1944 had come to stay by January 1945, and it was the main event in the Control and Planning show no matter what added attractions might be taking place. Captains IDE and WILKINS were hammering away at it, under Colonel MURRILL's watchful eye, all the time; and the whole office became a beehive for the days, and nights, immediately preceding the big conference at the end of each month, when the complete program must be in the hands of those to whom it was to be explained and who would put it into effect during the 30 days following. If any division between the planning of the program and its control could be made, planning fell more to Captain WILKINS and control to Captain IDE; but in reality both capable officers worked in both fields.

As 1945 opened, the Transportation Corps was confronted with a mountain of material to be moved to multitudinous destinations. The Armies were before and attacking the formidable Siegfried Line and needed the Liege-Verdun depots well stocked for the push. Besides the heavy tonnages being shipped exU.S. there was a large commitment of clearing U.K. stock piles by the cross-channel coaster program, plus the necessity of reducing big backlogs at ports and at rear installations in Normandy and along the line of the Seine. The TC was confronted with the necessity of planning, controlling and implementing an overall program to accomplish this movement with limited facilities, for the waterways were frozen thick and the Railways short both power and wagons in a manner more akin to business efficiency than the series of emergency measures which necessity of combat had hitherto forced.

With the publication of the first overall program on I January 1945 , under directive from the Commanding General, Communications Zone, See Appendix No 2 Part II No IO) major problems in Control and Planning were set right, Ships were allocated to ports by the TC. in consultation with the Services rather than by the Services themselves or G4 , assuring two essentials; First, that demands on ports were turned to their capacities, and secondly, that the land haul was held to a minimum and back-hauling, so time-consuming and wagon-wasting, was substantially reduced. A minimum number of main supply

C H A R T S

SUPPLY MOVEMENT PROGRAMS

JANUARY

Chart I - Port Operations & Supply Movement Program

Chart II- Transportation Forecast- Main Supply Lines

Chart III-POL Movements

Chart IV- Incoming Personnel Move- Ment

Chart V - Outgoing Personnel Move- Ment

channels between ports and depots, or intermediate and advance sections, were set up to maintain the greatest possible regularity in shipments and aid wagon, truck, and barge turn-around. Base Section Commanders were directed to see that car loading and scheduling details at ports, and similar efficiency factors at depots, were carried out with dispatch under Transportation Corps supervision. Toward the end of each month, a conference was held in Paris at which the program was explained, against the background of the tactical and overall supply situation and forecast, to Port and Section Transportation Officers. and their practical comments and suggestions were heard. Despite wagon shortages caused by lack of French cooperation, misestimates by depots of their own unloading capacities, and 'the old Army game' of regarding railway cars as 'rolling warehouses' & despite pilotless aircraft at Antwerp and Liege, which meant hauling vast quantities of ammunition from Le Havre and Cherbourg, despite the length of the Line of Communications from Marseilles and the shortage of ships which came to pass in late February, even despite the barrier of the Rhine, the foresight and drive which created the plan and controlled its working combined with the astuteness and energy of its executors and soldiers put the program over and moved , in February and March, tonnages hitherto beyond conception.

The principal advocate for an overall plan was its maker, Colonel HUGH A HURRILL. Having held an important position in a U.S. corporation which planned the movement of its products from its factories to its warehouses and advised channels thence to wholesalers, he was eminently qualified, considering also his military experience in the War Department, to survey the situation make recommendations, and follow through with plans and the supervision of their execution. There follow some of his observations on the program.

"It had become apparent that the theoretical statements of depot capacity were unattainable in performance. Depots, in most cases, did not have adequate siding capacity nor team tracks to carry on a two-way movement in and out daily.

"It became necessary to establish a program that would insure an even flow of rail wagons and trucks to the depot to keep it working at capacity each day and at the same time avoided delays and accumulation of rolling stock or trucks at the depot. The plan for the monthly Supply Movement Program developed by the Chief of Transportation provided for:

a. Allocation of shipping to ports within the capacity of the port.

b. Allocation of shipping to ports to move supplies in to Continental depots with minimum requirement for land transport.

c. A regulated and even flow of supplies in and out of depots within the capabilities of the depots

d. The establishment of daily target figures for ports, depots, railways, inland waterways, and motor transport services so that all concerned had an opportunity to adjust personnel and equipment for the accomplishment of the daily target.

" In brief the Supply Movement Program provided a clear working blue print

for the month's operation.

" It was published on the 25th of the preceding month in order to permit sufficient time for implementation.

" The provision of a clear blueprint establishing daily objectives and checks on performance immediately resulted in improved performance." (I56)

We have seen how vital to the program was the allocation of shipping, Well in advance of each convoy from the U.S., the representatives of the various Chiefs of Services met at the OCOT with representatives of the Movements and Marine Operations Division of that office to determine to which port each ship would be sent to discharge. The chairman was the Chief of the Control and Planning Division. The scene was the War room, where maps emphasized routes and easily-read charts and graphs indicated conditions at each port and inland depot.

The Service bidders were equipped with information covering the breakdown, by commodity and type, of the bulk class-of-supply tonnage figures they had previously communicated to the OCOT. They carried also in their folders, the particular depots to which it was desired these goods be consigned as well as possible alternates. Finally they were informed as to what port was preferred for each ship carrying their cargo. All their requests were based on the Monthly Supply Movement Program in which regular channels from ports to depots, depots to railheads, had been established, and average tonnages for these channels outlined.

The Officers of the OCOT had studied the Cargo Disposal Instructions (CDI'S), or briefs of same ,considered the capabilities of the ports and depots and their situation with regard to meeting the targets set by the program. They also had ideas as to how many vessels should make what ports and where particular cargos should be discharged in to insure most efficient land hauls. The Chief, Control and Planning, arbitrated what ~~few~~ few disputes arose, requesting in some cases, that the Services representatives take back to their particular offices considerations for changing cargo [redacted] dispositions to depots or proposed ports for certain ships. These meetings had also the unofficial, but very desirable, capacity of "clearing the air" on general questions which rose between the TC and other services. (I57)

More detail on the conduct of these meetings is given in No, I of the Appendix No 2 Part II, for this section. No 15 of these Appendix indicates the detailed procedure set up for this sphere of activity.

With the publication of the program for January, Colonel MURRILL announced by a letter its purpose and scope. (See NO 9 Appendix 2 Part II.) The Commanding General, Communications Zone's ,directive, explaining the overall plan and giving the necessary command impetus to assure every attempt at implementation. appears as No IO this appendix, while those following are:

No II —— Covering the revisions of I3 January

No I2 —— Covering the February Program.

No I3 —— Covering the March Program.

No I4 —— Covering the Amendments of 6 March.

The program was not issued as a directive from on high, without review. Not only was there discussion of it by the directors who would have to carry it out; but also the Divisions at OCOT were told by Colonel TRAUB, DCOT to review the plan for February carefully and submit their opinion as to whether or not the program could be met or reasonably expected to be met. Attention was invited to the fact that, so far as discharge alone was concerned, a total daily tonnage figure of 50.000 tons would be necessary each and every day of the month. This figure included all types of General Cargo, both commodity-loaded vessels or UK-loaded, including coasters, refrigerator ships, organizational equipment, and coal. (I58).

Summarizing the requirements, for February at the 29th January conference, Colonel MURRILL stated that there had been 300,000 men moved in during January and they had to allow for at least that number in the forthcoming month. The trains of soldiers were counted each as 400 tons and thus fitted into the Supply Movements Picture. It was planned to discharge 40.000 tons daily, to clear from the ports 40.000 tons, and to ship from intermediat depots to forward depots and railheads 30.000 tons. He apologized to the Port men for bothering them with telegrams and teleprints calling for special action or special shipments or for extra activity to reach targets in certain periods. These "shots in the arm', he said , were given out of necessity and not simply to remind them of the existance of a headquarters over them.(I59).

With that independence of spirit and freedom of expression so characteristic of the American, and so healthy in any organization, one of the Port officers replied that the wire messages from Paris had little meanning; if they could discharge the ship they did, if not ——. The Chief, Control and Planning, replied evenly that since these special requests and orders generally got results it was immaterial whether or not they were well-regarded. (I59).

An Officer of high-rank was heard to remark to a small-group that the field man could not help but become tongue-tied when he entered the halls of the mightly at the OCOT building. (I60). If this was true in some instances, it was not characteristic of the Monthly Meeting. In some cases, objections from the executors were "pooh-pooed" or suavely but firmly overruled. At most times, explanations were carefully made of policy and procedure and assurances given of investigation and action on some particularly difficult problems plaguing somebody's RTO's. In any event, free intercourse could not help but make mutual understanding of the varied problems of, so to speak, Rome and the provinces.

There were constantly new tonnages to be handled and thus incorporated in the planning. The big settlement of Belgian affairs in early February brought to the attention of Control and Planning that 3/4 of the coal being mined in liberated Europe originated in the Com Z area and posed movement problems

for which allowances must be made. (I61).

The job of handling these "added atfractions" to the tonnage list come to a head in late February when Major General ROSS paid an inspection visit to Normandy Base Section and received comments which might have emanated from any of the field agencies, They wanted th have allowance in the program for: I. TBA ships, 2, Coal,3French rearmament and civil imports. Despite the fact they were losing operating personnel to the Infantry demands and to non-transport activities like guard duty over POW's (Prisoners of War) and Lines of Communication, they were constantly obliged to handel new classes of material for which time and space had not been made in the program. In asmuch as this program pretty well filled up the hours of the day, they petitioned some amendments. (I62)

The different Port Commanders were unloading tremendous amounts of TE equipment, mail, and various other unprogramned items. The General desired that these be included to the extent feasible and that they certainly appear in the OCOT report to Control Section, Com Z, ETO, so that some credit would be given for their handling(I62) Both inclusions were immediately accomplished. The planned movement of personnel is shown, with other main charts illustrating the program, in the booklets of charts, the one for January appearing at the beginning of this sub-section and the others in the chart group under Appendix No 2 Part II.

French rearmament and Civil Aid was a big thing in itself. As late as 5 July I944 high-level planning did not contemplate any more rearmament than for I40,000 in battalion-size units. However, by the 25th January I945 it had been settled that American-British efforts, with the U.S. tacking the heavier role in committments, would supply several hundred thousand French troops. This was to be accomplished mainly by furnishing raw materials for French Manufacture, but also by some shipment of finished goods.(I63)

It was pointed out at the same instance that America had already furnished equipment of the French Armored Division, with the Northern Army group, and for the French Army in the South. Also we were providing their basic rations. Furthermore, although the De Gaulle Government had only recently complained that they were not receiving the allocation of ships contemplated, the allocation was being increased. Finally, we planned to increase our purchases of French manufactures for the supply of our own troops. (I64). This purchase would range from such highly-essential items as tires and web equipment to such trappings of the vast modern American Army, as coca-cola, which the Yanks had taught the Icelanders to make and began in February to introduce in quantity to French workers. (I65).

The American prediction that French civil discharge could not begin until well into February was correct; The two Liberty ships of initial supplies arrived in a convoy of I7 February. Canadian tugs had been allotted as required power for barges, but the river was rampant from the February thaw, and movement to Paris could not begin until the 24th (I66)

Special arrangements were made for the discharge of these French-Laden ships. Their berths at Le Havre were designated before the arrival of the convoy. Since the French possessed no facilities for discharge except

from quayside, the civil supply program took up more berths than a similar military tonnage. The French representative attending the Shipping Allocation Meeting at which their liberties were assigned to the Seine Ports, requested they be given special attention concerning docking, since many officials and members ofthe press would be present for the auspicious occasion, and it was hoped they would not be kept waiting too long he had evidently been tipped off as to what delay sometimes attended a vessel between its arrival 'in pasture' as the anchorage of Le Havre was called, and the dropping of its gangway at the quay. The Chief, Control and Planning Division, OCOT who was chairman of these conferences, promised, in good fellowship, that all regard possible would be paid these ships if the French would promise a band to play as they came alongside. (I67)

It was planned merely to lighten these vessels at Le Havre and sail them up to Rouen for the Discharge of the Major portion of the cargo; therefore it was essential that lightening be achieved rapidly to enable the ships to make the clearing tide and that provisions be made for transporting that part of the cargo discharged destined for Rouen and South of Rouen to the barges at Rouen. Happily, this concern had already been provided, for the civil authorities having secured a number of Landing Craft Tank (LCT's) to lie alongside and receive discharge simultaneously with the quays. These Craft would then proceed to Rouen for off-loading into barges.(I68)

An observer of the discharge noted that the LCT's were not originally used, but that barges were substitutes and towed through the Tancarville Canal. (I69)

The initial cargo consisted principally of 400 motor cycles, 80 trucks and 100 tractors. The civil power discharged and cleared the tonnages, via barge to a depot, in the vicinity of Gonville, but its ultimate depot was at Le Mans, whence distribution would be accomplished. (I70).

This program was to be expanded for the month of March. Eight vessels, some to discharge at Marseilles, (I68), where the civil needs had been allotted both rail and barge facilities for clearance (I69) were scheduled, requiring probably three berths per each convoy arriving, Delicate readjustments in allocation policy for military goods were described as firm providing the French plans went as expected - an indication that these French plans were of much importance to the whole Movement Program.(I68)

The Monthly conference at the end of February touched on most achievements and problems. The Chairman, Colonel MURRILL, stated that the total tonnage delivered East of the Seine had increased (See Chart I at beginning of Control and Planning Section). In August there had been only one train daily to Paris; now it was a veritable Chicago of railway activity, and St-Lazare station was in a class with Grand Central Terminal. Total tonnage growth had been from 27,000 tons daily in December to32,000 in January and already, for the first 22 days of February, over 42,500 tons had been the daily average. (I71)

Now, with the approach of the final offensive, every effort would have to be bent toward relieving the overworked rail system and, at the same time, ridgidly conserving trucks for emergency motor Lines of Communication. Brigadier General STEWART was working out a plan for making empty rail cars more quickly available to ports in greater numbers, but it was feared the problem would never be licked until the French could be persuaded to stay within a civil movements program which was itself within our whole program. (171) This never did transpire; The French are people of habit, and their time-honored practices did not fit our expedients. They are also an individualistic bunch and dislike overall programs. Moreover, the half of France where there were no U.S. installations continued to move freight and passengers to and from the American-infiltrated part as though there were no extra demands there, which made for greater confusion. The problem of cars increased with the expansion of the rearmament and civil imports program, which the U.S. authirities were charged with continually increasing, so that the more the shoe pinched the more one had to walk in it. For March, 18 Civil Affairs' ships were planned, and the South-bound French tonnage on the Seine alone was 5,000 tons daily (171).

March posed lots of hard work; 59,000 tons were to move every day from ports inland to the depots and 43,000 from depots to troops. The new depot area being set up around Metz-Nancy-Luneville would have to be stocked... and the French were clamoring for the building up of their rearmament depot area, scheduled for Lyon. The state of the Northern roads meant a big move of crushed stone, if our trucking was to be supported, and food and raw materials must be delivered to the French if the nation was to keep body and soul together. (171).

Discussing movement channels broadly, the Colonel referred to the colored chart in the program folder which showed inbound port movement. (Chart I in the booklet, Charts: Supply Movement Program, March, in the Chart Section of Appendix No 2 Part II). Main depot areas were shown as circles divided into segments the color of which corresponded to the color of a given port, thus indicating what proportion of receipts each area had from each port. Verdun, the most-centrally located depot area in regard to all ports, received more from Antwerp than from Cherbourg or Marseilles, because of strict adherance to the law of "shortest" possible land-Haul" Its Cherbourg tonnage was, however, greater than that from le Havre-Rouen, in defiance of the law, because these latter ports specialized in particular products. One would ask why such a large wedge of Mons-Charleroi circle should be Cherbourg green: Le Havre, Rouen, Ghent, and Antwerp were all closer ports. The reason lay in the fact that a new arrangement had been made to lighten some ships at Cherbourg to the 23½ ft draft required to enter Ghent. This Belgian port was admirably close to the Northern front and unhindered by buzz-bombs. Since most Ghent-destined vessels were commodity-loaded, it was advisable to have the destination of the cargo be that for the majority of the tons aboard. This was why a certain amount of material for Mons-Charleroi's vast deposit found itself on the quays of Cherbourg and had to be carried across Northern France by rail.

The Cherbourg lightening deal had been worked out at a shipping allocations meeting. In the fall of 1944, there had been some planning

to discharge into coasters at Cherbourg and run a coaster trade to the Channel ports nearer the Armies. This had fallen though because the lift required from the U.K. to the Continent had more than consumed the short supply of coaster vessels.

Circumstances had dictated later that ships from the U.S. with Ghent allocation lighten at Le Havre. Reviewing this practice, it was found that much ship time could be saved by using Cherbourg, no longer under the press of business which it had earlier felt. Vessels were putting into the Solent, the Southampton roadstead, then making in convoy for Le Havre Upon lightening there they had to resail to the Solent and from thence in another convoy to Ghent, there being no convoying directly between the mouth of the Seine and that Scheldt port. By dropping off at Cherbourg to lighten then proceeding, via the Solent but by-passing, Le Havre, to Ghent, the cross-channel round-trip was knocked out. (172)

What of the land movement, though? Would the long rail haul from the Cotentin port to Eastern depots be too disproportionate? Like school boys at Algebra, Colonel HURRILL and gray-haired, Colonel CASE, ACOT, Movements worked with scratch-pad and pencil to discover that, while a few hauls from Cherbourg made a disproportionate rise in total ton-miles, the overall view favored the saving in ship-time (172)

Such had been the improvements in Transportation in the Theater that Supply could not longer be considered a limiting factor on operations. (171)

Explaining how the OCOT, Movements, kept constant check on depot capacity by daily reference to the complete cover provided by a series of charts and reports, Colonel HURRILL reminded that what tripped TC up in regard to depots was the time-lag between the beginning of congestion and the time when car shortage really showed itself. All concerned must make every effort toforesee trouble.

Going into supply demands, it was pointed out that Class I and V, the vital Supplies, were set up as credits and called forward to Armies by requisitions from regulating stations. Class II and IV, on the other hand, were set up on a IO-day program to Armies. This method caused the COMAD Transportation Officer to ask what was proposed for SOLOC Control. There were no T.C. Regulating Stations there to requisition I and V. (171) . It was decided to assign stations to seventh U.S. and first French Army, keeping within the existent smooth-operating SOLOC system to the greatest extent possible.

By March end, many depots were 90 percent full; some of these wanted to change from rail to truck and barge receipt in order to use extra unloading facilities. ALL this, despite the fact that G-4 had been assuring TC for 2½ months that additional depots would soon be prepared, and none were. A new SOP (No. 7) on the whole method of handling supplies was in the mill, finally insisting on the chain of base, intermediate, and forward depots which should always have been in force. The Base depots would be near ports, receiving ship discharge immediately, keeping the vessels working constantly, the ports free of congestion, and obviating the existent burden of forwarding whole convoy lots over the lines of Communication to the front.

They would hold 50 percent of imports. Of the other 50 percent sent forward, 30 percent would be held in intermediate, or filler , depots, the existent rear installations. Their requisitions on the Base Depots would be based on stated Army requirements for a given period, thus assuring that only what was needed used the crowded Lines of Communication. Tapering off still further, the system left 20 percent to stock forward, or issue depots, whose supplies were based on actual requisitions of the Armies, geared to a IO-day cycle. Certain key depots would be strategically located and carry the entire stock of certain items the nature of which required central stockage. This would save balling up the whole trans port system to get a car of something special, only in stock at some remote rear installation. (I73 I74).

These plans were highly desirable from the TC point of view, so long as the impetus of movement was forward. It would be poor, if, in an effort, to keep the stocks looking good on reports, the services insisted on cross-hauling between depots of the same category or failed to designate cargo for the depots nearest the best port for the ship involved. The Chief, Control and Planning was always speaking against "over-sorting" consigning cars to a depot where their contents would merely be unloaded, rearranged slight ly, reloaded and sent on, sometimes to another depot athwart the main lines of Communication or even to the rear of the original. (I75).

Main criticism of the program was that it tried to see too far ahead. The Services did not know how to anticipate demands for a whole month and so had to make frequent alterations to their original bids. Tactical changes of situation, decisions of the French and Belgians, events occuring in other theaters and the Zone of Interior, all caused unforeseen changes in the flow of supplies and the facilities for movement. Since the supply demands were based on IO-day programs, a bi-monthly plan was favored by many. and the rather wholesale amendments to the program which appeared quite frequently in the early part of the month pointed to this as expedient. (I76).

Granting the validity of criticism, it must still be obvious that the manner in which the actual tonnages approached the targets shows that the sights were not set impossibly high. And the definite increases in tons moved, an increase favorably disproportionate to the increase in movement facilities, stand as proof of advantages gained. Critics of the planning have insisted that things would probably have progressed better with less interference from higher echelon. There is no answer to this without the aid of a past-reading crystal ball, but it is obvious that things were not going as well without efficiency men laying hold as they did after programming was effected; so that one can only assume this would have continually been the case.

(2) Ports.

Much has already been said of ports, but we may examine here some further details of their role in the Movements Program.

In a letter of 27 December, Colonel HURRILL reminded G-4 Com Z, that tonnage was tied in knots at the 4 Major ports and asked for a decision on the full use of Ghent to reduce the ammunition and vehicle burden on Cherbourg and Le Havre and the coaster rush on the latter and its partner, Rouen (I77).

A follow-up on the third day of the new year asked again that an OK be given on Ghent. This port must be used if Le Havre-Rouen were to be freed of some tonnage and thus enabled to accept 7200 extra combat personnel as desired by Com Z. TC's estimates for daily tonnage were:

6400 Le Havre.

6600 Rouen or, if possible, Ghent (178)

Ghent was pressed into service by the last week in January and performed with yeomanlike ability.

In mid-January port congestion became such that a cable was prepared requesting a cut-back of ten ships against the number planned for February. (179) However, going into the problem with Marine Operations Division, and presenting it to a Com Z meeting the 31st, it was found better to divert these vessels to the Mediterranean, planning also twenty for diversion in March Colonel Fuller, executive OCOT, who was much involved in Control and Planning work at the time, was asked by Colonel TRAUB to explore this possibility and advise how many troops would be needed for the Job if only port clearance would be required at Mediterranean ports and how many would be necessary to haul the cargoes directly to the Northern Area of the Communication Zone. Colonel FULLER's estimate for twenty ships was as follows; for port clearance only-twelve truck companies, two truck battalion headquarters, one truck group headquarters, one traffic regulating Group; if necessary to haul North one Railway Operating Battalion 55 locomotives, 5000 rail cars. These demands were based on 3000 tons daily. (180).

The February program featured the reduction of port backlogs at a rate of about 4700 tons per day, in an attempt to restore a liquid condition. It again attacked the problem of diversified movement channels, limiting further the number of depots to which a particular port had to ship. Port men were informed that the OCOT was making every effort to get Com Z Headquarters to expedite barge unloading at Liege and Brussels, so that Antwerp's discharge would not be adversely affected. It was estimated that port to depot movement alone, for all ports, would require 43,000 rail wagons. (181).

In answer to a criticism of the Planning raised by one of the Port officers, the Chief, Control and Planning stated that it had never been suggested that whole trainloads should be loaded at shipside to run directly to army dumps. By scheduling discharge to suit clearance to certain destinations, he meant designating certain tracks of the mashalling areas for the constant spotting of rail cars which would ordinarily be shunted to a quay at which goods for a particular destination would customarily be discharged. (181) If a certain amount of QM rations were discharged every day or every week for Verdun depots, why grab cars from anywhere-cars which might be earmarked for another load-- and haul them without plan(possibly tying up movement by cross-hauling or backhauling in the port area) to any quay which happened to have a ration ship with Verdun stuff alongside, and haul them back to the yards without rhyme or reason to tracks which might not be best for makeup of a South-bound train? Was it not more sensible to make up a daily pattern and follow it as closely as circumstances would permit? It had been proven so at Cherbourg in the late fall of '44' (182).

This port's efficiency, however, had caused it to exceed its program in January, an action which, when done without due consideration of all installations needs—a decision only possible at OCOT— was almost as grave an error as falling too short of target. For the additional discharge had not been, could not be, allowed for in rail car allottments. A shortage of empties followed as surely as sun does rain, with the result that large amounts of ammunition had to be dumped on the ground in and near the port area without proper provisions for the welfare of the goods of of the men who worked in the vicinity of it. (I83)

The Antwerp Transportation Officer complained that he could'nt clear PX (Post Exchange) supplies with flat cars". He had been receiving consistently only 3/4 the number of cars he requested from the railway services and this number was aften made up of types unsuitable for the particular loads he had planned to load on them, (I82).Car shortages have been discussed previously Wrong-type cars stemmed from several springs. For one: the Belgians and French 'borrowed' extensively the cars in greatest demand, since their demands were similar and their scruples rather less well-defined. The Armies preferred bo cars and covered gondolas to flats for 'holding' Loads' for a little while' in the event they were undecided as to disposition or thought it likely a move of dumps would shortly transpire. And the railroad people sometimes found it more convenient to fill quotas by whole trains, easily spotted in the yards, than to effect proper distribution of types by arduous switching.

While explaining that this situation would be investigated and effective remedies applied, Colonel HURRILL advised that each man could only do his job to the best of his ability not worrying about the failure of others in the line to do so, but turning the heat on them if their shortcomings should mar his performance. He warned against counting on someone else to fail. (I82)

In allocating ships to ports the biggest job was to fit differently-consigned elements of one craft's cargo into the Movement Program of that port which best suited the entire discharge. In this respect the program had shortcomings, since it confined moves to certain defined Lines of Communication. To stock certain depots in South Belgian the Engineers were constrained to discharge the goods in Antwerp only. Movement then meant, because of the ruin occasioned by Von Rundstedt's daring push in the Ardennes, a long detour through the eastern portion of the country. A request to accept Antwerp as the port for some materials which were required at Paris installations brought the reply that no movement of Engineer supplies was scheduled in the program between those points.

By rigidly adhering to the planned distribution of ships to ports a rail haul of ammunition from Cherbourg clear through Paris to the East was occasioned. Movements Division would have preferred, in Ghent or Antwerp, certain vehicle ships which were assigned to Cherbourg as scheduled in the program. (I83).

But it will be remembered that the makers of the plan admitted it must be subject to alterations and amendments. And at the same meeting in which Colonel CASE, ACOT, Movements, expressed the desire tabled above, he

also stated that the program was not not too rigid.(I83)

Frequently ship's manifests were confused and commodity breakdown for class III supplies by the Services was not made available, making it difficult for TC to know what had to be moved in cases where a choice must be made between length of haul and advantage of port space. Another source of confusion was the mixing up of main ship destinations between the U.K. Northern Europe, and the Mediterranean.(I83). Both these catches were gradually smoothed out.

Allocation was always conducted with an eye to future plans. At the I6th February meeting most of the ammunition ships were marked for Cherbourg lightening and final discharge at Ghent, since that was the decided policy for March, and it was safe to assume that some of the February ships would still be working in the next month. By lining will in with the program, abrupt changes in the efficiency of routine were avoided. If the ships were allocated to ports unable to receive them in the following month and then chanced to 'run'-over'(fail to discharge because of late arrival or port congestion). There would be considerable confusion and last minute inefficiency in changing the CDI's (cargo Dispatch Information) and diverting either them or the planned use of some port facilities. (I84).

Control and Planning did not hesitate to go into technical details of operation when these were such as to require their attention. Arrangements were instigated in mid-February with the WSA (war Shipping Administration) to have ships for Rouen discharge most of their fuel and water into tankers at Le Havre, saving 750 tons of actual cargo lightening and allowing them to clear for up-river with greater dispatch and more Rouen Cargo. The Port Commander at le Havre was instructed to establish definite priority of berths for ships lightening to make the bi-monthly high tide for Rouen. If necessary he must put partially-discharged Le Havre ships back out to anchorage to make room, a practice to which the Navy took no fancy, since it made them more work, but which the Chief, Control and Planning, said he would fight for if necessary, so vital was it that Rouen ships not miss the tide and leave the stevadores and railway men empty-handed. (I84).

Rouen bid fair to become a great vehicle receiver at this time.A certain Brigadier General stated he thought all vehicles coming to Northern Europe could be assembled there, on which some Ordnance Officers commented, "yes, he thinks that " To them it was not a simplified problem, and they were worried because this same officer had ordered assembly units from Cherbourg to Rouen, even though vehicle ships were still slated for the Normandy port. The mental picture of boxed trucks lying on the Cherbourg wharves with no Ordnance personnel on hand to uncrate, assemble, or drive them was unpleasant to both Ordnance and TC. Fortunately the Cherbourg plant was kept open a while longer. It was agreed that the generalities with which Generals sometimes made sweeping decisions over lunch plates and coffee caused some heavy headaches among their staffs when they got down to brass tacks about them. (I84)

Ordnance and Control and Planning were well agreed that vehicles for the Northern Armies should be unloaded at Rouen or Antwerp rather than to try to spare these ports by discharging the trucks and tanks at Marseille

and crowding trains or highways up the single line of Communications to Dijon and cross-cutting the main West-East lines further North . (184).

On the 26th it was figured that the number of ships left over from February and impinging on the March discharge would be approximately 8[illegible]. This was not a bad figure, considering the fact that the Theater was working 300 ships in a month. (185).

The March program planned 311 ships, of which 213 were for Northern ports and 73 were vehicle carriers. Total tonnage movement, exclusive of coal and POL, would be 1,670,000 tons. Le Havre and Rouen together would get 40 ammunition ships, while 18 were chalked up for the Cherbourg-Ghent arrangment, facilitated by the improvement of locks to allow 24 feet draft or an average 5,000 ton burthen. (186).

The influence of the POE's had made itself felt and there would be few commodity-loaded vessels except those with rations, Ordnance, vehicles, and packaged POL.

The Shipping position was getting short, there being only 53 ships working as opposed to 240 at the end of January. The pacific needs became greater as American drives there advanced the bases and the build-up for strong offensive action called for more and more supplies. The ETO would have to cut ships' working time to a minimum, an art in which it had made great strides since the June days off the beaches when some ships had been 21 days unloading.

Minor changes from February included scheduling ten vehicle ships for the new assembly plant at Rouen and less diversion of vehicle ships from Marseilles to Antwerp, in order to fill the Ford plant's capacity and save land movement. There was otherwise little change for Marseilles.

Antwerp was booked for 129 ships, a fitting climax to it transportation officer's plea in early January that 85 was the limit of its ability and a tribute as well to his hard work in making it take more; two of these ships were of a new category; GPA's (General Purchasing Agent's), laden with sheet steel and raw cottom from which French and Belgian fabricators would fashion goods for American Army use.

Ghent would be full of coasters, Hog islanders, Liberties, from the U.K.; and in addition would have U.S. ships via Cherbourg from which 2000 tons of ammunition per day were to be unloaded. There had been some talk of a change in ammunition loading regulations which would permit heavier tonnages. If the ships were heavier, however, there would be less of them, so the change would bring few complications (186).

Into Cherbourg would come a new load--wheat for the Civil Affairs program. Another very vital separate category--bulk POL--was effected favorably by the completion of a new pipeline forward to Chalons and destined to extend to Mainz, on the Rhine, when capture of the land to lay it in should have been accomplished.

Forsighted men were already asking whether DUKW's whould be used on the Rhine, to which the answer of the planners and, later the executors

was yes. (186).

By early March one quarter of the dockage facilities at Le Havre were allotted to the French for civil and Military imports. Clearance in the American operated remainder had picked up due to the increased use of German POW's more efficient and ambitmous generally than the French civilians employed. (187).

As March closed, the Month's work and that in store for the ports in April could be reviewed. This April program was considered difficult but feasible. Rouen would have to clear four to five additional trains per day and Ghent seven. The allocations had been designed towards shutting down Cherbourg and easing up on Le Havre, adding more to Rouen and to make maximum use of Antwerp and Ghent, nearest the front, . With the lessening of pilotless aircraft attacks on Antwerp it was thought the Scheldt quays might take some bomb unloading, if the other ports found theirs full. (188)

Ghent had done well on its new ammunition assignment. Antwerp had reached the all-time high for a European port, 30,000 tons per day. All ports except Marseilles, with its base Depot, still had backlogs to clear. There would be less TDA and personnel to Le Havre-Rouen, but Rouen would take an increase in coasters from the U.K. an average of 6000 tons daily. The remainder of the coaster trade would go to Ghent.

The system of obtaining U.K. tonnage allottment had never been satisfactory. The Services had shipped in excess of bids, with the result that the ports had been obliged to handle some unneeded goods. Now, however, the Services were promising exact lists of tonnages, times, and destinations. (188).

The port Officers were advised to get to civil affairs goods out and on the way rapidly they were needed by the Europeans and took up a lot of room. If this and all the other hundred things on a Port Commanders' list were done, the 177 ships, 76 for Marseilles, the remainder for the North would be well within capabilities.(188).

On the last day of March, the allocators of ships noted pessimistically that the convoy upon which they were deliberating was the last of those generally commodity-loaded, The number of ships for April would be 203 counting run-overs from the windy month. It was noted that Ghent, the comparative new-comer, must be spared from too many ex-U.S. ships; it looked as though it would be chock-full of U.K. loaded vessels. (189).

(3) Railroads.

It is impossible to separate completely the agencies of Inland transport from the ports and the agencies of Control. Already we have found that discharge of ships hinged on clearance of port areas, and railway cars had a great deal to do with clearance. Many items which might will have been presented in this sub-section have appeared heretofore and will appear later in the section on the Movements Division.

While the allowance of 400 tons for a troop train was not actually shown in the program, allowance was made for it when the program was being made up. (190) Troop trains could do their bit toward making the targets difficult of attainment.

The Chief, Control and Planning's early February visit to Belgian convinced him that three factors contributed mainly to the poor turnaround time on rail cars there. There was congestion of lines due first to loaded cars backing up at depots and yards, so that tracks and sidings designed to facilitate operation of trains were used instead for storage. Congestion was due also to a general shortage of locomotives and crews. Secondly, the reason cars backed up was because the switching facilities at depots were inadequate; and thirdy, the services were not unloading the cars promptly at depots. These points were brought out in the overall plan for Belgian transport and definite steps taken to iron them out. (I91).

It was possible, in late February, to make greater use of Rouen in the March program, because, Colonel HURRILL pointed out, rail was available on both sides of the Seine, the East bank's leading directly to Northern French and Belgian depots while the West side tracks gave quick access to Paris, or via Le Manoir bridge, the regions East. (I92).

Careful car-spotting, loading, and moving schedules, which had speeded port clearance, needed to be applied to out-movement at depots also. There would be less reconsignment of cars to bewilder the RTO's and French and GI railroaders, at depots for Com Z Headquarters had granted the OCOT's request to forbid the reconsignment of more than IO cars daily at any depot without the specific authority of the Transportation Officer. The request had been supported by certain reports drawn up by a Colonel, of the MRS, showing the mile-consuming peregrinations of some reconsigned and re-reconsigned cars which finally ended up again at the depot to which they had been in the first place. The ten-car limit did not apply however to cars reconsigned directly to a forward depot for the Armies, since getting stuff to the troops was the TC's chief aim. (I92).

In one of the informal chats which accompany the stretching of cramped muscles and the lighting of cigarettes after a big conference, the Chief, Belgian Branch, Control and Planning, Lt Colonel HEUMAN, was warned by the Ghent Transportation Officer that that port's April commitments could not be met if the present car conditions continued. Depots had been unable to unload and so were embargoed, with the result that loaded cars destined for them were filling up yards and sidings . This so congested lines that it was difficult to shunt and pass what cars were empty. He requested that cars be stored at stations and yards well away from the city. G-4 Com Z was howling about the steadily-increasing backlog at the port; but there would be little purpose to loading it on cars which the Services could not unload at depots.(I93).

At the period's end an optimistic note was sounded for later programs. So rapid was the advance into Germany that many rail lines were being found in comparatively good condition. (I94).

(4) Motor Transport.

The main discussion of planning the use of trucks has occured in treating the XYZ plan. More appears under the Section V on movements Division, in this chapter, and in Chapter V on MTS.

The Belgian Transport paper by control and Planning contained some

truck notes. In calculating total availability British and .U.S. vehicles must be kept separate: they were of different capacities and differently operated. The proposal to use trucks, returning empty from a haul, to carry coal was not looked upon favorably since the ports to which they would be returning were not main coal users and any diversion would result in shortage of trucks for port clearance or depot operations. Coal was too heavy to be efficiently handled any large distance by truck.

Less the brevity of this sub-section mislead the reader into regarding Motor Transport as relatively unimportant, his attention is directed to the number of truck hauls designated on charts III, IV, and V of the Charts for January Program(see sub section III d and on Charts II III and IV of the February and March programs (in appendix No 2 part II). as well as to the breakdown by agencies of movement in the programs themselves.(in all OCTC files).

(5) Inland Waterways.

As with rail and truck, Movement planning coverage of Inland Waterway planning at this point is only brief.

In December 1944, the conditions in Paris especially, and in the French cities generally, had reached the state where it was imperative that some civil supplies, in addition to U.S. Military Civil Affairs allocations, must be handled by the transport System, even at the expense of Military movements.

It was planned to discharge 3000 tons at the Seine Ports, 1,000 of which was to be consumed locally and the remaining 2000 to go by barge up the Seine. This was to begin in mid-January, but it was the .U.S. opinion that it would not be feasible until mid-February, (I95) and the prediction was correct. The Inland Waterways Division responded to this extra burden of cargo with an assent hinged on the proviso that the canal would have to be free of ice and flood-water and additional power allocated in the form of either tugs or sea-mules. The sea-mule, by way of comment, is a multi-piece assembled, flat craft, with at least two ponton units and two propulsion units - Marine gasoline engines and propellers. (I96).

With the opening of the year, this plan had full approval at OCOT, providing the Seine-floated tonnage moved after the U.S. marked 3000 tons daily, had been cleared. It was felt this arrangement would assist in obtaining adequate tugs and barges for river operations (I97), the French being more willing to untie a few when some of their work would be for the thining of their own stomachs.

To the North, in Belgium, the situation was unhappy. The Ardennes caused embargo on barge moves was still in effect and there was an accumulation of around 33000 tons of cargo at Antwerp. (I97) Targets would never be met this way.

On January 3, Control and Planning reported, however, that arrangements had been made with 2I Army Group to use Petite Isle, Brussels, for

the receipt of Engineer Supplies. Arrangements for unloading at Lille would be completed that day. (198).

The waterways part of the program was carried out sporadically, for several reasons, shown below; but it came into its own in this period , and a very important own that was.

The Germans and the Allied Strategic Air Forces did a proper job of smashing key locks and bridges along the rivers and canals of France and the low Countries. With railway wagons difficult to import and needed by the liberated countries which Germany had robbed so ruthlessly, and with Motor Transport, gasoline, and tires at such premiums, the Transportation Corps, and the Corps of Engineers had to work round the clock at cleanning channels for the tugs and barges.

Unfortunately, Mother Nature, which in time of war never behaves in a way at all becoming the maternal instinct, was particularly unkind in 1944 and early '45. As soon as the transportation men, working with the Engineers and the French canal organizations began to get boats moving, exceptional heavy fall rains so filled the rivers that one could not navigate beneath the brid ges. This interruption was followed by a shortage of barges. "When it rains it pours", the old saying goes; the next move on the canals was postponed by their freezing thick, the winter being the most severe in years. On the great Albert Canal in Belgium, the powerful sea-mules, another new development of the transporters, broke the ice and moved some heavy freight, but this was not feasible everywhere. As a last downpour before the rainbow, the thaw which follows a freeze as inevitably as the spring the winter again filled the arches of the many bridges and precluded any motion except the torrent of rushing waters. It was the 24th of February before the waterways came into their own. They had been used in the interim to ease the strain on the rail ways, which despite the difficulties of winter operations had moved the bulk of the tonnage. With the coming of spring, the planning and work of the water minded came to fruit in long streams of heavily-laden craft plying the liquid ways and byways.

Having named Captain WILKINS as principal support, to Colonel MURRILL in the supply movements planning discussed above, it is well, before we leave him, to give credit for another of his well-informed tasks. He it was who coordinated the make-up of the monthly Transportation Section, of the Communication Zone Progress Report .

Receiving information from Captain H. KUPFERMAN, of statistics Branch, Control and Planning, from MTS's Status Branch, and from Inland Water ways Division and MRS, he spent the first part of each month consolidating the tables and graphs which demonstrated to the theater and the War Department the work done by TC.

2 Statistics Branch.

To make possible comparison with past performance and to keep constant check on performance compared to plan-essentials for Control and Planning this branch lead by the experienced Lt. Col H.N. DRAKE kept constantly busy. Its figures served not only Control and Planning, but the whole TC and, by inclusion in the Progress Report and other unpublished records called for by the Control Division, Com Z.

Some items in the field of figures have already been brought out, especially in the sub-Section on planning the Monthly program. Others will appear in th sub-section on control; and the Appendices are heavy with the actual tables and graphs published by this essential office.

As an example of how this branch's work tied in with daily doings at OCOT, we find Major General ROSS asking in mid-January, whether the figures received on barges included the number moved for a stated period. He was assured that Statistics Branch was being furnished these figures by Inland Waterways and was recording and compiling them. (199)

In addition to furnishing the data for the War Room charts on shipping, figures were also compiled and kept current for other control charts, samples of which appeared in the January program in order that field agents might copy them for use at their own installations. They were for 5-day periods, a better time-interval to indicate trends than daily would be. All were Tonnage vs Targets. One showed port clearance to depots, another depot clearance, another the complicated POL Movement, and still another coal. (200) In the War Room there were additional wall charts on the position of depots by services, actual as against planned unloading by class of supply; and under the glass top of the conference table were special graphs depicting specialities such as; number of tons discharged per day, number of vehicles, railroad ton-miles moved, motor line of Communication hauls, tonnages, etc..The Drafting Branch, of course, made the Charts; but it was Statistics job to furnish the necessary information.

(3) Control Branch.

a. Supply Movements Program

Anayone who had helped make a plan assisted in the control of its execution, but to Captain IDE fell the lion's share of what Colonel MURRILL delegated in the way of controlling the monthly program.

From the reports which the Captain supervised, Colonel TRAUB noted, 18 January two weak points in the operation of the supply plan: 1 The barge loadings at Antwerp; 2 The rail Movement out of Le Havre. Inland Waterways stated that only Ordnance supplies had been loaded on barges at Antwerp the previous day. There were six Engineer ships there. A further check would be made on this. Military Railways reported that the French at Le Havre sent all of their mechanics to the scene of the accident at St Valery and were therefore unable to operate the freight trains out of that port. Colonel Traub further noted that, for the first 17 days of January, the average daily discharge was 23,693 tons per day -- or the loss of about one ship per day against the target figure. However, there were eight ships discharged in the U.K. leaving a net loss of nine ships. good

Check-up showed that work had started on the Engineer ships at Antwerp. A temporary shortage of tugs had caused the delay. The St Valery wreck tied up traffic considerably in the North and was the cause of death for over 70 American soldiers and permanent injuries for more than a hundred. St- Valery lies at the bottom of a long 30-mile grade. American crews of a train drawn by a British locomotive changed at a station just on the other side of the crest of this hill, shutting off the brake pump, as was customary with British engines because they used so much water. The GI

engineer taking over was not experienced, though as a shop mechanic he knew locomotives well. He inspected the engine but assumed the pump was on. Running a dip and curve before reaching the crest, he made brake application and used up the air in the resevoir. When the train had picked up speed on the long incline, his touch on the brake levers brought no response; realizing then what the situation was he had still to get a wrench and open the valve controllong the pump (there was no wheel or handle on the British pump). By that time it was too late. Roaring through the night at 55 miles in hour, the train crashed into cars standing in the St-Valery station, hurling wreckage and soldiers in every direction. The line took many hours to reopen, and the good record of MRS operations carried a heavy figure for one of its few, but its worst wrecks (201).

At January's end the ammunition was piling up at the ports and not moving properly to the front, where it was in heavy demand. Control had to institute a special report; and Gen. ROSS made a point of urging the port officers to tackle the problem dynamically. It was soon straightened out, no revision being necessary to the February program on its account (202)

It was explained to the Services' representatives at an early February meeting that the need for an extra line of movement port to depot had occasioned amending the program in mid-January (see Number II of Appendix No2 Part II) (203)

1)Ports

The ammunition trouble mentioned above was partly caused by the fact discharge was about 2000 tons short of target(204). By 8th February the Cherbourg area was badly congested. Ammunition had high movement priority but depots were badly mixed up. All types were piling up on the ground and the smaller were being pilfered heavily probably, someone remarked. for the German garrison still holding the Channel Isles. The QM officer reported the same situation, which made everything strange; because more than the program demanded was being moved from the port, and the Base Section Commander had stated the port could accept more tonnage. After straightening out reporting methods which were at variance with each other and limiting all to strictly within-program moves the matter was cleared up (205).

In mid-February 19 of the 51 vehicle ships scheduled for Marseilles were late. Control and Planning urged they be diverted to Le Havre and Antwerp, both to keep those ports' assembly plants fully engaged and to save long overland movement of trucks. A letter was sent to Gen LEE, contesting the G4's penchant for the Southern Port. (206) Diversions were forthcoming.

Althought Antwerp failed to follow the COT's directions, backing up Control and Planning, that everything be scheduled to the fullest extent possible, an attempt was made to keep ahead of trouble by ordering rail cars for quayside 48 hours in advance. However, no particular berths, in the area to which one officer interviewed had been assigned, were delicated to ships with a particular-type cargo; and he had frequently to make last-minute changes in his car requisitions. (207).

(2) Railroads.

So much has been said about rail cars not being unloaded promptly

that it is only fair to mention here one of the many cases where that was not the situation. In late January, low tonnage in ADSEC set the controllers on the trail for the old snarl. The Chief, Control and Planning, however, reported to the morning staff conference that unloadings there were found to be on the increase, the number of cars under load on the decrease, and that, therefore, the inescapable conclusion was that Transportation was not shipping in programmed quantity to that Section. (208).

In an early February survey of hitches in meeting the program, it was pointed out that at Reims, an important depot and marshalling area from the time of its capture, congestion seemed mainly caused by lack of shunting engines. (209).

In the labor crisis in Belgium at this time an attempt was being made to pool and keep 3000 wagons at Antwerp, and loadings were ordered to be stringently held to scheduled requirements. A report was drawn up on means of decreasing car turn-around time. One of its recommendations was that all possible use be made of flat cars, the most abundant breed at that time.(210

Lincoln's birthday brought a reminder of the troubles experienced in his war moving blue-clad troops to meet Confederate thrusts into Northern territory. Now it was a question of providing locomotives to pull the troop trains full of troops who were being debarked at Marseilles from the Italian front. This large movement GOLDPLATE was to reinforce the Western front for the great push to the Rhine (211)

NRS thought the Movement Program could afford to take a little loss by the diversion of some power from its regular hauls; however, Control argued that NBS (Normandy Base Section), whose operations were the most static, ~~static~~, should furnish the power (211). A workable compromise was effected, robbing Peter to pay Paul, but leaving Paul a little short so that Peter would not feel his loss too much.

The Reims congestion focussed attention again in mid- February, when Control stated that the only thing to do about the yards there was to put T.C. personnel to running them. The French operation was hopeless, confused as they were by American methods of documentation and reconsignment and unwilling as they to assign more power or learn any faster operating methods. (212).

With the opening of March the Control men published an overall study of the situation in Belgium. It was brought out that there existed a very unfavourable balance with respect to empties going into that nation. Comparatively little went into the country by rail; and the many loaded cars which went out of Antwerp and Ghent or the depots of Brussels and Liege had a way of not returning promptly or sometimes not at all. This had already and would still more hamper operations. (213).

Conclusions were correct; It did. Both Belgian ports suffered excessive backlogs from lack of empties.

3) Motor Transport.

In mid-January a telephone request was received at OCOT to move tonnage by truck from Antwerp to Le Havre. Control asked MTS to check into the matter, since such a movement seemed highly impractical; it was a back-haul; the stuff should have been discharged at Le Havre in the first place and it was a long movement for motor when rail connections were in order. (214).

It was found to be a small tonnage of emergency category and therefore allowable; but Control was always alert for exceptions to the rule of basic transport operation.

During this phase of operations, there was consideration of whether it would not be advisable to equip truck companies to do their own unloading at depots. They were often held up, sometimes exasperatingly so, as in this instance. A company from Normandy took a priority load to SOLOC and upon returning, despite the fact they had been eight days away from base, living the life of nomads, were diverted to an emergency run to supply an air-borne division near Bastogne. After driving at high speed, in the night, they arrived at one A.M. at a forward depot, only to wait thirty-six hours to be unloaded (215).

Depots were often unequipped, with lights, personnel, or both, for night operations. The Chief of Control at first favored giving each truck company rollers, a portal crane, etc ; but it was later considered useless to do this if there were no provision made to carry stuff away for storage or sorting when it was unloaded, and to do this would have been getting far too involved in depot operations. Therefore, the consideration was dropped. (215).

(4) Inland Waterways.

As complicated as documentation and marking had become, it was not surprising that the French workers should experience difficulty in following American methods. Their confusion was responsible for much on the American's part, as the situation along the Seine-Oise canal system testified by February 8, 1945.

The various Services unloading barges at depots were embarrassed by finding cargo entirely different than the Way-bills covering shipments, different classes of supply being mixed together in no particular order and goods of other services loaded on with the effect that efficient discharge was almost impossible. (215).

On the 4th January there were 2,318 tons loaded and forwarded on barges from Rouen to Paris, a good start to the new comparatively high water tonnages in the program. (216).

About a month later, Col HUGH A. MURRILL telephoned from Antwerp that the British were holding up matters by being behind on discharges and not for lack of barges either. This was good answer to the British complaints of American slowness to move cargo in January, for at that time there had been an embargo on the canal craft's movement to Liege. (217).

At a mid-February Allocations Conference, the Ordnance representative complained that there were 38 barges either waiting at or enroute to the depot at Louviers, despite the fact that the stated capacity was 3 per day. The sudden thaw had released the boats, accumulating over a period. but he wanted the situation made clear before his office or that of the A.C. of S, G-4 began getting complaints on the depot's not unloading properly. The Control Chief asked him to stop by the Office of Colonel Case ACOT, Movements on his way out to have him go into the situation at once. (218).

As an example of the detail in which Control could be involved, it might be cited that this same officer requested at this same instance that tires not be sent by barge to the Louviers depot, as the tire warehouse was over a mile from the waterway and handling bulky tires that distance made for too much trucking and double-handling. Proper notations to effect more efficiency were made on the spot (218)

4. Drafting Branch.

Capt GEORGE T. PECK, with a roomful of skilled draftsmen and women these last British civilians was constantly employed turning out charts, illumined maps, overlays, and graphs. The CHief of the Division believed in making all plans and situations so clear they 'hit one in the face' so to speak. Obtaining the necessary figures from the Statistics Branch and main ideas of presentation from Colonel MURRILL's wealth of experience in the advertising line, this Branch kept up such an exhibit of check-charts and demonstrative exhibits that Major General ROSS declared the OCOT needed only a chart to show what charts we have. (219)

For a description of some of the charts see above under the Statistics Branch Actual charts for the Movements Program are shown at the beginning of sub-Section III d. under planning the Supply Movements Program and in the chart section of Appendix No 2 , Part II.

5. Intelligence Branch.

As has been shown in discussing long-range planning, this branch, consisting of Capt (then 1st Lt). J,D. COONEY, Lt. JA SHYBOURGH, and two specialists, gathered the information on which plans for both emergency support in the Advance across Germany and the later occupation of that country were based. It was also the duty of this section to keep files giving Intelligence on the tactical situation and to furnish all maps necessary in the OCOT.

The existent territorial divisions in Germany, the points where transportation control was situated, were things which had to be known to determine where and in what strengh personnel would have to be sent. In March Capt, J.D. COONEY was put to work on long-range planning, especially for the Bremen Enclave and the Allied Movements organization which would have to coordinate U.S. British moves in N orthern Germany. Lt SHYBOURGH. German by birth and thoroughly familiar with that country, drew up an excellent treatise on its facilities and their management and went in late March to interview railway officials captured at Mainz and Saarbruken. He found them sick and afraid to give information; one of them was so dazed by the destruction of his ideas and home he could not remember any details of the once-important

position he had held as a Reichsbahndirecter. Some valuable information was, however, gained. Most of these men the Lt . discovered had been Nazified and would be lost to American operations when the G-2 imprisoned them to wait trial. (219)

(6). Packing and Marking Branch

With Colonel HERBERT L. PHYFE at its head this branch prepared for and began operations on the vast job of assuring the proper preparation of goods for movement to the Pacific and the U.S. Some details of its work have been given previously in this section, and a full account of its problems and the set-up of the school it started and controlled will be found in Appendix No 2, Part II, Number 16.

In addition to the school for specified personnel, the Branch organized the showing of a motion picture on the subject of cleaning, drying, applying preservatives, packing, crating, and marking, This film was shown to all T.C. officers and many units.

(7) Administrative Assistance.

To take care of the phone calls, visitors, and high-level papers from all sources sent to all addresses which beset such a vital division as Control and Planning was a big job in itself. Assisting the Chief in coordinating all Branches and in charge of the group of secretaries, typists, and clerks who put ideas into published form, was Master Sgt, W T .Mc. ALLISTER (later 2nd Lt.) to whose patience and assistance this writing owes much; it was through him that access was gained to files, interviews arranged with the always-busy Colonel MURRILL, and information and minutes given on meetings and conferences.

(8). Belgian Branch.

The number of times which Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels, Liege have been mentioned in this work indicate how important was the area with which this forward echelon was charged. Its able chief, Lt Colonel, H.H. HEUMANN's, frequent visits phone calls to Paris, and the Division Chief's trips to Belgium show how constant was the liaison. The former was a member of the important BELMOT (Belgian Movements and Transportation Organization) set up by the A.C. of S G-4 Com Z and which, with Belgian transpot officials and movements officers of 21st Army group, settled most of the problems in that important little nation. He was also T.C.'s spokesman to the SHAFF Mission to Belgium the highest Authority in that country.

The Belgian Government was very unsure and communism was rife. Workers in Antwerp were hungry and many of them homeless, obliged to live temporarily long distances from the port area where they worked. Workers in the all-important coal mines were hungry and cold. Railway workers were hungry and had no shoes. The whole labor picture was grim indeed, so cruelly had the Germans raped the rich, industrial, and helpless nation.

Small wonder there were a number of strikes, even though the Belgians as a whole burned with a fierce desire for revenge and were actively cooperative with their larger allies. The most serious of these refusals to work came in early February and caused the Chief, Control and Planning, to go from Paris to assist the Chief, Belgian Branch, in helping to work out

an overall plan for the full use of Belgian facilities. In addition to a crisis in the Government there was a canal freeze; and a 5-day embargo was agreed on Antwerp and Ghent discharge, while at the same time all the free rail cars which could be found were hurried to aid in the clearance of these ports. A small amount of cargo was unloaded at Antwerp despite shortage of labor, and it was possible to lift embargo after 3 days. (220).

A strike in mid-February at Antwerp was confined to one day by meeting with government and labor officials to effect quick understanding and terms.

IV. Absorption of SOLOC.

Control and Planning officers had been familiar with plans ANVIL and DRAGOON, by which the Invasion of Southern France came to pass. Brigadier General GEORGE C. STEWART, the Transportation Officer, SOLOC, had been with T.C. in England; and his ideas and methods were well known. When in November 1944, SOLOC became a separate command of the ETO, more familiarity was gained with its facilities and methods of employing them.

Therefore, it was not too large a problem to absorb Marseilles, the Rhone Valley and Grenoble Pass rail and motor lines, the CONAD railheads, and the SOLOC Hdqs, personnel into the OCOT way of things. The Com Z Commanding General ordered that the officers from the South be placed in their respective sections in his headquarters, either in the jobs they had held or as deputies to the officers performing duties similar to those they had been doing. General STEWART, having been in charge of Transportation, was made a DCOT, ComZ . His executive Colonel THOMAS FULLER, became the OCOT Executive and Colonel LOUIS G. ZINNECKER, who had headed the Administrative Branch , was put back into the General field of operations, taking advantage of his varied T.C. work in Ireland and as Transportation Officer with Seventh U.S. Army, to learn the ins and outs of the OCOT's Supply Movements Program in the Control and Planning Division.

So well had the single line of Communications been operated, with its Base Depots at Marseilles , and its highly efficient 6th Port and Lst MRS, that only such changes were made as were necessary to comply with some minor finepoints of Com Z control. SOLOC Headquarters had coordinated the needs of CONAD which incorporated 6th Army group demands with the bids of the French military and civil agencies, and transmitted them in the form of a program to DELTA BASE SECTION for implementation. This program was simply made into the Marseille part of the Port discharge and clearance section of the Supply Movements Program for March and included in the Depot to troops portion of same, with the customary breakdown by rail and motor and some canal near Marseilles and Strasbourg.

V Relations with Outside Agencies.

I. U.S. Navy.

In Appendix No 2 Part II, No 2, there appears some treatment of the subject of the planned control of Ocean Shipping for Occupied Germany upon which a naval officer present made some comments. This matter was later

set aside for a time by the disclosure in late March that the enterprise had been definitely assigned to the Navy. with a note to coordinate with T.C. I (221).

Colonel HURRILL made much use of Naval Intelligence concerning the prospects of when the forts guarding the Bremen approaches might be reduced and the Weser freed of mines so that first Bremerhaven, then Bremen, might be worked fully into their proper place in plans. The Navy was rather unwilling to make forecasts on this matter, and played safe by assuming the port would be usable before six months after capture from the land.

2 The British

The rail problem at Antwerp was large, because the determing ~~factor~~ factor of capacity was not discharge but clearance. The British controlled the Belgian railways on a phase II basis, but the main marshalling yards at Antwerp were not under the control of the Port Commander, which was a source of considerable difficulty at times. The liaison channels for U.S. activity were as follows;

The monthly allocations of wagon and power were assigned by special conferences at the first of which the Chief, Control and Planning, OCOT, had been active, and by BELMOT, of which the Chief, Belgian Branch was a prominent member. Within the limits set, Belgian Branch liasoned with 21st Army Group's RAIL (rear Area maintenance) on movement of U.S. traffic over British-controlled lines. Building on this framework, the T.C.'s Port Transportation officer presented his needs. Transmitted to the Movements Officer on the Staff of the British Port Commander, these needs were translated into equipment furnished to ROBs(Railway Operating Battalions or by the British equivalent, an ROG(Railway operating Group) (222)

The movements liaison officer in Paris Lt Colonel A.A. FRASER represented His Majestie's Service at different staff levels: SHAEF, Movements Division, and Inter-allied Railway Commission, and Com Z His special concern was the movement of British traffic over U.S. L of C, but he acted as consul on all traffic matters affecting the two allies. (222).

Much material on the planned liaison with the British in Occupied Germany will be found in the parts of this section and Section on the Movements Division which dealt with occupation plans .

Planning and Control of movement GOLD-LAKE were a joint concern of OCOT and British transport officers during this quarter of the year. For such a large movement, superimposed on such a limited L.of C as that from Marseilles north, it went off very well.

In late January the British Commander at Antwerp was insistent that the Americans improve the speed of the discharge in their sector; but at the same time, with the Belgian-operated rail facilities, he was not providing the Americans with the numbers or type cars they requested. (223)

By the 30 th February Lt Colonel AA. FRASER Liaison Officer, was able to announce that 21st Army group was considering the matter of extra berths at Antwerp for the American. The discharge weight was being approached from a better angle. Not long after.

were obtained to accomodate more fully the ever increasing U.S. tonnages there. (224).

Though Great Britain pressed constantly for the closing out of American depots in the U.K. she was not always helpful in providing the means by which this might be best accomplished. Regarding the late February project of lifting 10,000 tons daily from England, the British protested that not enough labor was available. As a result of investigation. Mr SANDERSON HOWE (Ministry of war Transport), stated that at Bristol there was a capacity of 4000 tons as compared to a target of 6500.

However, U.K. Base was instructed to pay no attention to the controversy until it was settled one way or another and continued to load to capacity. Major General ROSS, had agreed to leave 10 port companies on that side of the channel, and there were 14 there at the time-a considerable assistance to any labor shortage in the stevedoring line. The program was kept and the tonnages fairly well met. (225).

The French.

One of the most persistent and difficult problems of transportation, in the last war as well as in this one, was the provision of a constant flow of empty wagons to ports. Delayed unloading at forward depots was a large cause for failure to provide carriers, but equally contributive was the lack of cooperation by the French railroads in returning empties. Unloaded wagons scheduled for return to ports over rails operated by the French under Phase II and III operation were too often 'borrowed' for civilian use or delayed by unsystematic dispatch from marshalling yards. (226).

The French could hardly be blamed for watering at the mouth when empty wagons were handed them for delivery back to ports. Their civilian needs were not provided for adequately by the cars assigned exclusively to that part of the traffic, so long had the nation been under the static condition of war imposed by the German occupation, that they became accustomed to thinking of war as a way of life, rather than an emergency. Under static conditions, the Germans had been able to afford them a sub-normal but more adequate supply of transportation equipment than our rapid and enormous campaigns could possibly let us allocate. Liberty-loving as they are, the French are a Latin Nation and much interested in the materialists goods; heat and food. So it was that they could, on occasion, more easily remember the German provided coal and meat than the heel of Hitler. The anguish of losing home and even a member of the family to the destruction of Allied bombing called for a peak of heroism, and the victim of such necessary loss could say, magnificently, "C'est la guerre", but to be hungry and cold day after day, in great cities which appeared to be going on a peace time basis, far behind the combat lines, was a different matter. One might well wonder at the Americans using so many wagons and locomotives and ask why they should run empty for long miles of track, forgetting that to delay them for, and divert them with, return loads would mean holding up at the ports military supplies vital to defeating Hitler. (227).

On the 5th February Control and Planning and Inland Waterways Division were asked to furnish to Lt General LEE information on how much help, in

any, the U.S. could give the French on their barge movement of civil supplies from Le Havre. They were unable to handle the full tonnage by themselves (228). The T.C. was having a time pushing its own commitments through but some assistance was rendered.

The subject came up again in the middle of the month when it was agreed at a meeting with the French Mission that some cuts would eventually have to be made at the expense of the military transportation needs. The French had foodstuffs but not the means to distribute them effectively. (224).

On Washington's birthday Brigadier, General STEWART, DCOT, called attention in the true spirit of 'Lafayette, we are here' , to a French report that there were 417 trains under load and not moving, 86 of these were military trains. Control and Planning's representative at this conference felt the figures on the military must be unreliable, as the daily checks on the progress of the Movement Program showed it to be running rather smoothly. An investigation was instigated; there were not that number of military trains halted and many of those which were only temporarily so for operational reasons, mainly of French devising. (230).

It was brought out during an occupational planning conference that the French had not been able to care for some of their displaced persons uncovered as the Allied Armies advanced, because Americans troops were using French hospitals and institutional buildings which had been earmarked as centers for the reception of these liberated slaves, and political prisonners (231)

Much more on doings which involved the French appears under different headings, particularly in the Section on Movements Division.

4. The Belgians.

Something has already been said of Belgian relations in discussing the Belgian Branch and more will be said in the details with which the Movements Division was concerned. Here it is well to take up the Belgian Program, as it was drawn up 6th February, the result of the labor crisis, of that week.

The program was the combined effort of a joint 21st Army Group-Com-Z Belgian staff group. It was designed to improve the utilization and increase the capabilities of transport facilities, and to allocate these between British and U.S. military demands, the coal industry, and Belgian civil requirements.

It gave the waterways facilities as 16,400 tons daily from the 1st to the 5th February (an amount exceeded by actual haulage for those dates) and 23,000 daily from 6 to 28 February. The coal mining would get under way as soon as certain changes had been effected in the ministry and should be, along with civil movements, better programmed, since coal totalled over 46 percent of all rail movements and 55 percent of barge. (12) (232).

To carry this traffic it was essential that Belgian rail cars in France be returned to the owning country and that the total of cars in Belgium be up to 68,000. The Committee had made available figures on what rolling stock was available as well as that available for repair. It was thought best that the program be set up every month there after by BELMOT. As a temporary expedient British RMA (Rear Maintenance Area similar to the U.S, Com Z). would make available 2000 cars from its stocks and the COT would furnish an equal number from the pool of U.S. cars in France.

Finally it would be necessary to distribute shoes, clothing, gloves, and food to the Belgian railway workers. There had been much sickness among them; they were not then capable of operating the stock and power proposed for the lines (13) (233).

5 The Russians.

Plan COLDCUP, associated with the operation ECLIPSE, had a project for flying certain key personnel into Germany to contact the Soviet transportation men as soon as possible in newly-captured areas which would be the concern of both powers. DCOT, Colonel TRAUB was slated to contact at the high level which would be taking over the functions of the Ministry of Transport,.

Russian planning, it was pointed out in the Orientation Course at OCOT in late March, was very slow, yet very clear. The British would produce a book, the Americans a chapter, and the Russians a few pages. But everything the Russians did had to be taken up with Moscow.; their agents seemed seldom to have any minds of their own or power to use them. (234).

They had very definite and independent ideas about the rights of Russians also. When agreements had practically been reached upon each nation taking care of its own displaced persons, they held up everything while they insisted on special arrangements for their own. Essential as agreement was, they got their way: Russian D P's were to be accorded the same treatment as RAMPS (Recovered Allied Military Personnel(231).

Conclusion.

In a short work such as this, cover has necessarily been sketchy, Not only has the shortness of time allotted for presentation of the material been short, but the author has also been involved in studying the current developments , as they transpire, in this and other Divisions of the OCOT It has been impossible to treat with everything which happened or was planned; but in touching upon some of the problems and achievements in the various fields of activity with which Control and Planning was connected, it is hoped an idea has been given of the large amount of work this Division performed, steering the T.C. in the European Theatre with good foresight and a knowing hand, acting as a most capable helmsman for the skipper, Maj. General FRANK S. ROSS.

CHAPTER II, SECTION II.

CONTROL AND PLANNING DIVISION.

Index to Numbered Reference Notes in the text.

I- Notes on Conference for German Occupation, Paris, I400, 2I March I945.

2- Notes on Monthly Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, I000, 27 Jan I945.

3- Notes, by Capt. F. W. Montgomery, on Monthly Supply Movements, Conference, OCOT, Paris, I000, 28 March I945.

4- Notes, on Daily Staff Conference OCOT, Paris, 0900, II Jan I945.

5- Dly C,9 Jan I945.

6- Dly C,3 Jan I945.

7- Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, I400, 8 Feb I945.

8- Assignment Memorandum No. 28,Hdqs, Com Z ETO, OCOT, APO 887 23 Mar.45.

9- Interview with Col. H.A. MURRILL, Chief, Control and Planning I230,I3 Mar 45

I0- Dly C,26 Jan 45.

II- Dly C,3I Jan 45.

I2- Dly C,2 Feb 45.

I3- " " 27 Feb 45.

I4 " " 20 Mar 45.

I5- " " 2I Mar 45.

I6- Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, I000,2I Mar 45.

I7- Notes on Conference for German Occupation, OCOT, Paris, II30, 24 Mar 45.

I8- See Note I6.

I9- " " I7.

* Daily Staff Conferences will hereinafter be referred to as 'Dly.C.'

20- Interviews with Major GRAVELLE, Captains IDE and WILKINS, Control & Planning Division, OCOT, Paris, I400 hrs, I8 July I945

20a- Assignment Order #I9, Hq, Com Z, OCOT, ETO, I8 February I945

2I- Interview with Lt Colonel OLSEN, Deputy Chief Control & Planning Division,

OCOT, Paris, 0915, 12 May 1945.

22- Assignment Meme #28, OCOT, Hq, Com Z, ETO, 23 March 1945.

23- Office Memoranda #33 , OCOT, Hq, Com Z , ETO, 8 March 1945.

24- Interview with Sgt. Davis, 3916 QM Truck Company, TC, Hotel Napoleon, Paris, 1750, 21 January 1945.

25- Remarks by Chief, Control & Planning Division, OCOT, at February Supply Moves Conference, Paris, 1000 hrs, 29 January 1945.

26- Minutes of TC Staff Conference, OCOT, Par. 548, 5 February 1945.

27- From remarks by TC representatives and Major BLAKESLY, G-4, Com Z, Plans, at Orientation Course for selected Transportation Officers, OCOT, Paris, 20-21 , March 1945.

28- Ibid: Lt Colonel EATON, SHAFF, G-4 Plans.

29 - Ibid

30- Ibid, Major BLAKESLY, Com Z- G4, Plans.

31- Ibid, Col. COWAN, USGCC .

32- See Appendix 2, Part II, no 1 page 6.

33- Report of Chief, Control and Planning Division, OCOT, Mar. 1944, 9 May 1945.

34- Remarks by Major General FRANK S. ROSS, COT, at February Supply Moves Conference, Paris, 1000 hours, 29 January 1945.

35- Ltr,Hq, Com Z, OCOT, Subj: " Combined Military and Civilian Movement Program for Belgian Effort for February;Joint 21st Army group and Com Z Staff" 6 February 1945.

36- Remarks by Colonel A.Z. CASE, ACOT, Movements, at Allocation Rail Tonnage (ART) Meeting, Paris, 1400 hrs, 23 March 1945.

37- Remarks at Supply Movement Conf, OCOT, Paris, 1000hrs, 27 February 1945.

38- From various interviews during period with OCOT and 2nd MRS representatives.

39- Interview with Major SEIBERLING, Chief, Freight Branch, Movements Division OCOT, 1400 hrs, 17 July 1945.

40- Interview with Capt. LIENHARDT, Administrative Assistant to Brig. Gen STEWART, DCOT, Paris, 1100 hrs, 19 July 1945.

41 - See note 33.

42- Interview with Col. H. A. MURRILL, Chief , Control and Planning, OCOT, 1600 hrs 6 August 1945.

43- Minutes of Staff Conference, OCOT, 0900, 8 January 1945.

44- See " Supply Movements Program for February 1945", prepared by Control and Planning Division, OCOT.

45- See Appendix No 7, General Statistics for March 1945.

46- Progress Report, Hq, COM Z, ETO, for 15 and 31 March 1945.

47- Ltr. Hqrs, COM Z. ETO, COT, Major General F.S. ROSS, to Commanding General, COM Z (through AC of S, G-4), Subj; Port Operations and Supply Movement, 27 January 1945

48- Remarks by Major General ROSS, COT, at Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, 29 January 1945.

49- Port Activity Report for 24 hours-period ending 1600 hours, 26 January 1945 Hqrs, COM Z, ETO, OCOT, 27 January 1945.

The figure for world War I was given by Colonel H.A. MURRILL, Chief, Control Planning Division, from study of " Transporting the A.E.F. in western Europe" by William J. WILGUS, Columbia University Press, 1931

50 - Interview with Colonel H.A. MURRILL, Chief, Control & Planning Division, 1030, 10 February 1945.

51 - Progress Report, Hq, COM Z, ETOUSA, for February 15 & 31 March 1945. Transportation Section

52 - Remarks by representatives of OCOT, Monthly Supply Movements Conference, 27 February 1945.

53 - Remarks by Colonel H.A. MURRILL, Chief, Control & Planning Division, OCOT

...at Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, 1000, 28 March 1945.

54- Hqrs, COM Z, ETO, OCOT, Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, Par.438, 5 January 1945.

55- Hqrs, COM Z, OCOT, Daily Staff Conference, Par 478, 16 January 1945.

56- See Appendix No. 2, Part II, No 1 Page 2.

57- Ibid, Ref. 7,

58 - Interview with Colonel H.A. MURRILL, Chief, Control & Planning, OCOT, Paris 1030 hrs, 10 February 1945.

59 - Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 12 March 1945.

60- Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 31 March 1945.

61 - Ibid, Ref 8.

62 - Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 8 February 1945.

63- Notes on Shipping Allocations Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 16 February 1945.

64- Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 31 March 1945

65 - Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 2 February 1945.

66 - Notes on Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 31 March 1945.

67- Notes on Shipping Allocations Meeting, OCOT, Paris, 1400 hrs, 8 February 1945.

68 - Remarks by Chief, Control & Planning, Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, 1000 hrs, 28 March 1945.

69 - Remarks by Major General ROSS, COT at Orientation Course on Occupation of Germany, OCOT, Paris 0930 hrs, 21 March 1945.

70 - Remarks by Major General ROSS, COT, at Conference on Occupation of Germany OCOT, Paris, 1130 hrs, 24 March 1945.

71 - Minutes of Daily Staff Conference, OCOT, Paris, 8 January 1945. & 12 Jan 45

72 - Ibid, 12 January 1945.

73 - Ltr, AC of S, G-4, COM Z, ETO, to OCOT, Subj : "Responsibility of Reporting Daily Movement of Supplies ", 12 January 1945.

75 – Remarks by Colonel POTTER, Office of AC of S, G-4, COM Z, ETO, at Monthly Supply Movement Conference, OCOT, Paris, 27 February 1945

– Due to unforseen difficulties and Shortage of time in printing, the numbers here skip to I40. There are no numbers 75 to I40.–

I40– Information from Control and Planning Division, that Col. MURRILL conferred with Gens. ROSS and STEWART over forthcoming MTS operations, II Feb, 45.

I41– 'Railway Support', a part of 'Short Report on Important Transportation Developments in ETO since I Dec 44', Historical Section, OCOT, HTQS, COM Z, ETO, I6 June 45.

I42– Ibid : Item 7 ('XYZ Motor Transport Operations')

I43– Dly C (Daily Staff Conference, OCOT), 28 Feb 45.

I44– " ", I Mar 1945.

I45– Map, Hdqs, COM Z, ETO, OCOT, Control and Planning Div, Subj: Railway Routes from Maastricht, Bypassing the Ruhr and Hiway Routes, Bypassing the Ruhr, mid- Dec 44.

I46– Report, Control and Planning Div. to Maj Gen, ROSS, COT, including maps and Planning Directive, Series 'H', No 5, to G-4, I7 May 1945.

I47 – Map, Hdqs., Com Z, ETO, OCOT, Control & Planning Div., Subj; Highways Leading from Venlo to Munster ; Rhine Crossings between Wesel and Emmerich C. L Jan 1945.

I48 – Map Hdqs, Com Z, ETO, OCOT, Control and Planning Div., Subj: Southern, Rhineland, Highway Points, c.6 Feb 45.

I49– Interview with Capt F.W. MONTGOMERY, Asst, Historical Officer, OCOT, Paris (His information based mainly on OCOT main file 314.7)

I50 – See Note 33.

I5I – " " I.

I52 – Interview with Maj. H A. KNUTSON, POL Sect, Movements Div, OCOT, Paris,

by Capt F.W. MONTGOMERY, I500, 27 March I945.

I53- See Note 3.

I54 - DLY C. 29 Mar I945.

I55 - Interview with Depputy Transportation Officer, Twelfth Army Group, Verdun, by Capt F.W. MONTGOMERY 30 Mar I945,

I56-Ibid, Note 33 (page 9)

I57 - Monograph (unpublished), Hdqs, Com Z, ETO, OCOT, Hist, Sect, Subj: ' Shifting the lines of Communication', by Capt R.B. COWDERY, Apr 45.

I58 - Dly C 27 Jan 45.

I59 - See note 2.

I60-Interview with a Field-Grade Officer from the Field, at a Supply Movements Monthly Conference, OCOT, Paris, Ist quarter, 45

I6I - See Note 35.

I62 - DLY C , 26 Feb I945.

I63 - Administrative Appreciation, SHAFF, G4 Div., Subj: 'Post Neptune Operations' Par. 8g(I), 5 July, I944.

I64-Press Conference with Lt. Gen B. H. SOMERVELL. Commdg, Gen., Service of Supply, Paris, I430, 25 Jan I945.

I65 - See note 63.

I66 - Interview with Lt. E.S. BANKERT, Inland Waterways Div., OCOT, Paris, 25 Feb45

I67 - See note 63.

I68 - Interview with Maj. Ray. K. LEWIS, Ports and Water Branch, Marine Operations Div, OCOT, Paris, II00, 9 Mar 45.

I69 - Interview with Sgt. LIPPERT, Base Transportation Office, CBS, Paris, 0900, 8 Mar 45 .

I70-Interview with Lt (then S/Sgt. Swerdlow), Technical Info Sect. OCOT, 0900, I5 Feb 45.

I7I - See Note 3.

I72 – Notes on a Shipping Allocation Meeting, OCOT, Paris, Mar 45.

I73 – See Note 3.

I74 – Ditto.

I75 – From various interviews with Col . H.A. MURRILL. Chief, Control and Planning OCOT, Mar_May I945.

I76 – Interview with Maj J.F. SEIBERLING, Chief, Freight, Branch , OCOT, I400 I7 July I945.

I77 – Ltr., Hdqs, Com Z, ETO, OCOT, Control and Planning Div., to G4, Subj: 'Port and Supply Movement for January', 27 Dec 44.

I78 – Ltr., Hdqs, ETO, OCOT, Control and Planning Div, to G4. Subj: 'Plans for Movement of Personnel thru Northern Continental Ports during Jan.',3Jan 45

I79 – DLY C, 22 Jan 45.

I80 – " " 23 " "

I8I – See Note 2.

I82 – Ditto.

I83 – See Note 65.

I84 – " " 63

I85 DLY C., 26 Feb. 45.

I86 – See Note 3.

I87 – Notes on wkly. Meeting of tech. Information Sect, OCOT, Paris, 0900 1 Mar 45

I88 – See Note 3

I89 – " " 60.

I90 – DLY C., 26 Feb 45.

I9I – See Note 35.

I92 – See Note 3.

I93 – Interview with Lt. Colonel . H.H. HEUMANN, Chief, Belgian,Branch, Control and Planning Div., OCOT, Paris, I630, 23 Mar I945.

I94 – See Note 3.

I95 - Ltr., Hdqs., Com Z, ETO, A.C. of S., G4, to Control and Planning Div., OCOT, Subj: 'Reception of French Civil Supplies' 26 Dec I944.

I96 - IRS, OCOT, Ch., Inland Waterways Div., to Ch., Control and Planning, Subj: 'Reception of French civil Supplies' 30 Dec I944.

I97 - DLY. C. 2 Jan I945.

I98 - " " 3 " "

I99 - " " II " "

200 - See Note 2.

200 a - DLY. C. , 19 Jan I945.

20I - Interview with Capt. of Hdqs., MRS, Paris, 0800, 5 Sept I945.

202 - " " " A.W. HENDERSON, Admin. Asst. to DCOT, Paris I5 Feb 45.

203 - See Note 7.

204 - Dly . C. , 3I Jan I945.

205 - See Note 7.

206 - " " 63.

207 - Interview with Lt. Mc CUTCHEON, 267 Port Co., Antwerp, at OCOT, Paris, I8 Feb. I945.

208 - DLY. C. , 23 Jan I945.

209 - " " , 6 Feb I945.

2I0 - Interview with Col. H.A. MURRILL, Ch, Control and Planning, OCOT, I0 Feb 45

2II - DLY . C, I2 Feb I945

2I2 - " ", I6 " "

2I3 - " ", 2 Mar I945

2I4 - " ",I2 Jan I945.

2I5 - Interview with Capt. N.P. STEWART, Ch., Exec. Branch, MTS, OCOT, II Feb 45.

2I5a - See Note 7.

2I6 - DLY. C. , 5 Jan I945.

217 – Telephone call, Col. HA MURRILL, Ch. , Control and Planning OCOT, 16 Feb.45.

218 – See Note 63.

219 – Magazine Article, by T/5 E. ROSS, Tech. Info. Sect., OCOT, Paris, Subj:' Profile of Gen. Ross', 2 Mar 1945.

220 – Interview with Lt. SHYBOURG (J.A.), Intelligence Branch, Control and Planning Div. , OCOT, 1100, 24 Mar 1945.

220 a – See Note 7.

221 – Ibid, Note 16, but 1400 hrs.

222. – Interview with Maj BYRON, Liaison Officer, Movements, British Army Staff, Paris, 0900, 3 May 1945.

223 – See Note 65.

224– DLY. C., 20 Feb 1945.

225 – " " 22 Feb 1945.

226 – Ibid, Note 2, but 1400 hrs.

227 – From Conservations with French People: A Countess from the Marne country, a Paris Butcher's wife., a lawyer from Lyon, and a corporal of the Britanny Maquis, Paris, Feb 1945.

228 – DLY. C., 5 Feb 1945

229 – "" ",16 " "

230 – " ",22 " "

231 – See Note 16.

232 – " " 35.

233 – DITTO.

234 – See Note 1

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CHAPTER II

SECTION III

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

General

The mission of the Administrative Division, OCOT, as originally organized in the U.K. in May 1942, was to relieve the operating Divisions of all administrative burdens and details, to centralize administrative matters, and to coordinate TC activites with G-1, the AG, and higher headquarters. During the first quarter of the year 1945, the mission of the Division remained the same and, as in the previous quarter, continued to operate under Colonel SAMUEL A. DECKER, as ACOT-Chief, Administrative Division and Executive to the Chief of Transportation*, with Lt. Colonel HERBERT W. ARONSON, as Executive Officer, Administrative Division. The various Branches for decentralization of detailed activities of the Administrative Division remained practically the same as during the previous quarter, with only a few minor changes. (See Appendix No. 2, Part I).

Among the major overall problems which had to be dealt with during this period were in connection with the use of personnel returned to the rear areas because of Combat Exhaustion, the use of POW's on technical specialists' jobs, and the most advantageous use of colored troops.

Activities of Various Administrative Division Branches

As shown in the Organization Chart of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA, at the beginning of this Chapter, the Branches within the Administrative Division were as follows:

(1) Military Personnel Branch
(2) Civilian Personnel Branch
(3) Historical & Technical Information Branch
(4) Message Center & Records Branch
(5) Troops & Training Branch
(6) Publications Branch
(7) Fiscal, Purchasing, & Contracting Branch

The activities of these branches during the first three months of 1945 are given in the subsequent paragraphs:

(1) Military Personnel Branch

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* The arrival of Colonel THOMAS FULLER at OCOT from SOLOC the latter part of February gave Colonel DECKER an opportunity to devote his energies entirely to the problems of personnel and Administration; Colonel FULLER took over the duties of Executive Officer to the Chief of Transportation (See copy of Assignment Memorandum No. 19, dated 20 February 1945, Appendix No. 2, Part I) and was to specialize in redeployment plans and activities which it was anticipated would be a great concern of the COT and his DCOT's during the ensuing months. (Colonel FULLER had previously functioned as Executive to Brigadier General GEORGE C. STEWART while the latter was Transportation Officer.

Officer's Section

During January and February this section prepared the Semi-Annual Efficiency Reports required by the War Department for all officers. To accomplish this job, the following procedure was necessary:

a. Each Officer's 201 file was examined for letters of commendation.

b. Work sheets containing extracts from Officers' Qualification Cards, WD AGO Form No. 66-1, were prepared and presented to rating officers.

c. Efficiency Reports, WD AGO Form No. 67 were typed from work sheets completed by rating officers.

d. First indorsements were typed on Efficiency Reports from units directly under the technical supervision of this headquarters.

The critical manpower situation during the early part of the year made it necessary for this section to prepare many reports showing the strength of the various offices within the Office of the Chief of Transportation. A Kardex Chart was set up and kept up to date daily to show the officer strength of each Division and Branch Office within the Office of the Chief of Transportation.

Coincident with increased field activities, it was necessary to transfer many officers from duty in the Paris and London offices to duty in the field. Division Chiefs furnished the names of personnel available for field work and this section obtained the necessary orders for transfers.

With the approach of V-E Day, the Officers Section received an increasing number of requests to find officers with specific qualifications for redeployment positions. Upon receiving such requests, the file of duplicate Officers' Qualification Cards was searched for officers meeting the requirements and concurrence for transfer was obtained from the unit of the officer selected.

Routine functions of the Officers Section were to:

a. Determine eligibility and prepare recommendation for promotion of officers.

b. Prepare and process correspondence on relief from active duty, resignations, and temporary duty in the Zone of Interior.

c. Maintain card files showing duty, office, and billet addresses and telephone numbers of all officers on duty in OCOT.

d. Prepare monthly, a roster and other data for Seine Section and OCOT Telephone Dictories.

e. Prepare monthly rosters for Finance Officer and Liquor Ration Officer.

f. Maintain copies of WD AGO Forms No. 66-1 for all officers in all TC units in the Communications Zone. Keep these forms up to date with latest manner of performance ratings, promotion dates, and transfer orders.

g. Maintain locator card file on all TC officers in the Communications Zone.

h. Maintain Kardex Files indicating duty status and authority for such status of all TC officers in all TC units in Communications Zone.

i. Maintain Officers' Register and Information Desk.

j. Obtain PX and Clothing Ration Cards, Mess Cards, Paris Assignment, and Identification Cards for officers.

k. Check monthly MRU Rosters of officers assigned to Hq Communication Zone, Transportation Section.

l. Make frequent contacts with the AG and G-1, Hq ETOUSA, regarding personnel matters.

m. Handle personnel problems of Liaison Officers attached to OCOT.

n. Prepare daily personnel change of status report.

o. Initiate requests for transfers of personnel.

Enlisted Personnel Section

January

For the purpose of supervising the operation of rapidly moving Motor Transport Service units, during January this Section arranged for large groups of OCOT, MTS enlisted men, at that time scattered throughout Belgium in various towns, to be placed on Temporary Duty with individual units. This involved quick changes of intineraries and was further complicated by enlisted personnel remaining on T/D to units beyond the authorized period or by their returning to proper station before termination of the authorized period; in addition, requests were received from MTS to delete and add enlisted men on original T/D orders and at times, due to the urgency of the situation involved, they neglected to make proper requests for such changes. Consequently, MTS. was requested to submit requests for T/D orders in advance and, in the event that amendments were needed, they were required to notify the Personnel Branch with the least possible delay so that orders could be obtained from the AG in sufficient time for them to be forwarded to the enlisted men and the units concerned.

In compliance with ETOUSA directives, manpower reports were prepared covering personnel eligible for Infantry conversional training. A periodic report was submitted to Headquarters Command as of the 1st and 15th of each month which determined the number of white enlisted men in non-combat units eligible for Infantry training. It was necessary to obtain results of physical examinations as rapidly as possible in order to prepare reports for Headquarters Command. To meet the quota requested, enlisted men were chosen by physical qualifications, and availability for release from present position. Since it was impossible to obtain results of physical examinations to complete the initial reports, the enlisted men not examined at the time were shown on the report as temporarily physically disqualified.

In order to prepare the Office of Chief of Transportation Divisions and Base Section Transportation Offices for the release of some of their enlisted personnel, a roster of enlisted men qualified for Infantry training was submitted to each OCOT Division and Base Section Transportation Office for the Chiefs to indicate priority for release of personnel. From time to time amendments and revocations were issued affecting manpower directives. For example, a breakdown by MOS of key specialists was equired on physically qualified white key specialists under 31 years of age possessing "highly specialized skills".

Leaves and furloughs to Great Britian were authorized by Headquarters, ETOUSA. Numerous requests for leaves and furloughs commenced to pour in. They were checked for proper channels and required data, and were processed for further action by organizations concerned. Members of the Enlisted Personnel Section studied all directives on furloughs to Great Britain in order to be more prepared and capable of answering all questions on this subject. This was accomplished and resulted in enlisted personnel requesting furloughs through proper channels and in turn receiving their furloughs on or about the time they had requested.

In accordance with ETOUSA directives on appointment of 2nd Lts, numerous requests from Division Chiefs were submitted for consideration of their enlisted personnel for direct appointments. A check was made for qualifications as to background, civilian and Army, Army Classification Test Scores, etc. If qualified, arrangements for physical examinations were made. Assistance was extended to candidates in completing personal questionaires and advice was given on additional information. This being accomplished, statements of service were prepared (with cooperation of unit organization headquarters) for the Commanding Officer's signature and indorsement of the Chief of Transportation. After the applicant had passed the Transportation Corps board examination, his statement of service, together with personal questionaire, physical examination papers, loyalty check sheets, affidavit, and any other necessary information, after final review, were forwarded to the Commanding General, Headquarters ETOUSA for review by the Communication Zone board of officers.

The first quota for return of enlisted personnel to the United States on Temporary Duty for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery was established. An investigation was made to determine those enlisted personnel who had the longest, current honorable, and efficient, foreign service. Reports were prepared indicating names, organization, length of foreign service, and address desired for recuperation; these were dispatched to Headquarters Command. It was not only necessary to consider personnel assigned to the Headquarters but also to determine the furlough status of enlisted personnel on Detached Service with TC organizations in Paris from organizations in Paris from organizations in Base Section in the field. Rosters of enlisted personnel on D/S to TC organizations in Paris were forwarded to the organization to which they were assigned for their consideration and to be included in the allotment of their Base Sections.

A Kardex board was set up for the purpose of determining the manpower situation in the Office of the Chief of Transportation. The board was divided into squares by organization, grade, and Division, the last square showing a recupitulation by Division. Each square indicated the authorized and actual strength of the organization, the total number of enlisted personnel of each grade in each Division and the grand total of combined grades in each Division.

The recap showed the grand total of enlisted personnel in each Division and organization combined. From this point on, all changes resulting from transfers, reassignments, promotions, Detached Service, were applied to this board daily.

Several groups of enlisted personnel assigned to one organization were on Detached Service with other organizations in different Base Sections. Examples were as follows: A large group of enlisted men assigned to Advance Section (Adsec) were on Detached Service with the 1st Group Regulating Station and enlisted men assigned to the 1st, 5th and 10th Groups were on Detached Service with Adsec. A group of enlisted men assigned to the 3rd Group were on Detached Service with the 9th Group and vice versa. With these personnel so employed, each one of the above organizations received no value from tho individuals or the vacancies. After a complete check on the status of these individuals, mutual transfers were initiated whereby the enlisted personnel on Detached Service to an organization were transferred to that organization in like numbers.

February

During February this Branch entangled a personnel problem involving 600 enlisted men who constituted authorized overstrength in NBS during September 1944. These men were placed on Detached Service with the 104th Quartermaster Battalion and they accompanied that unit to the U.K. to process delivery of Civil Affairs vehicles and where they were attached by the U.K. Base to the 111th Quartermaster Battalion. Approximately 235 of them returned to the Continent with the 104th QM Bn. The handling of Administrative details for these men had not been good. They were not being paid regularly because their service records and allied papers were in the U.K. Action was taken by The Enlisted Personnel Section in explaining the situation to U.K. Base, with the result that these men were released from Attached Unassigned (AU) to the 11th QM Bn and were AU to 104th QM Bn. Their service records and allied papers were then forwarded to the 104th QM Bn and brought up-to-date and thus resulted in their being paid in full.

To meet the Chief of Transportation's desire to reduce enlisted personnel on duty with the Office of Chief of Transportation, names of selected enlisted personnel were obtained from the Division Chiefs and arrangements for orders and transportation were made for their departure to various Base Sections in the field for Dtached Service and duty.

Following the dissolving of Headquarters Southern Line of Communications on 12 February 1945 and the expected transfer of SOLOC Transportation Corps personnel to Communication Zone, plans were made for the arrival of TC personnel for duty. Before their anticipated arrival a roaster of this personnel was secured from Southern Line of Communications with qualifications and a tentative assignment was considered for each individual. Billet arrangements were made in advance and, as they were to be carried on the Transportation Section Non-Table of Organization Allotment, orders were requested placing them on Detached Service with the 1st Group Regulating Station as other Non-T/O men were carried. After arrival and billeting, arrangements were made to bring their service records and allied papers up-to-date and each individual was interviewed for an assignment in the Office of Chief of Transportation.

After the movement of the 1st Group Regulating Station from the U.K. to the Continent in August 1944 there still remained in the U.K. a group of enlisted men assigned to the 1st Group. These enlisted men were on Detached Service with the Headquarters 5th Group, then in the U.K. During this period a considerable number of enlisted men assigned to the 5th Group were on the Continent on Detached Service with the 1st Group Regulating Station. To cut down on the cross channel administration involved, the 1st Group enlisted men in the United Kingdom were transferred to the 5th Group and a like number of 5th Group enlisted men were transferred to the 1st Group.

Headquarters Command requested the first group of men for Infantry conversion training. After men were given up by Divisions and Transportation Offices in Base Sections, a shortage of personnel began to take place. Requisitions for enlisted personnel were filed to make up for personnel lost to the Infantry, but due to the time element involved in receiving replacements, something had to be accomplished to fill vacancies. Much switching of personnel from one Base Section to another was the result.

March

A restriction was placed on the requesting of personnel to be transferred or placed on Detached Service with units in the department of the Seine. Requests for personnel had to be forwarded to the Chief of Staff indicating justification for such transfer or Detached Service. More time was taken up in requesting personnel than ordinarily, as additional information had to be compiled for the Chief of Staff showing justification for such transfer or Detached Service.

An organization order, Headquarters ETOUSA, pertaining to the organization of the 6945th to 6958th (inclusive) Mobile Packing and Marking Squads (Prov) was issued during March. Personnel was to be furnished on a Detached Service status from existing TC units in the Theater. Action was initiated to screen TC units for enlisted men who possessed specification numbers as carpenters and packing case makers. This accomplished, teleprints were dispatched to Base Sections for enlisted personnel to proceed from scattered points in the field to the Office of Chief of Transportation for training in Packing and Marking. A schedule was arranged giving specific dates for arrival of such personnel. Arrangements were made for billets, messing, pay, and supplies. Those thus transferred were placed on Detached Service with the 1st Group pending activation of mobile squads.

A "Report Plague" took place during this month. Reports connected with "Manpower" were required by Headquarters Communication Zone and ETOUSA, such as a breakdown of enlisted personnel by organization in the Paris area, and breakdown of enlisted personnel by MOS (Military Occupation Specialist) numbers. Requisitions were required for WAC personnel by Headquarters Command. The Control and Planning Division requested several reports on number of personnel in each Division broken down by Branch and the totals of each grade assigned to a Division.

The courier system operating in the field out of the Office of the Chief of Transportation Message Center was disbanded and taken over by the Signal Corps.

The enlisted men thus released were scattered all over the Base Section areas of control. A study was made of their status and necessary arrangements were made for orders for their parent organization. These men were by then actually surplus and arrangements were made to train them in Packing and Marking, making them the first class to attend the P & M School.

As Motor Transport Service expanded and their units spread out into Germany the groups of men sent to the field to supervise the operations of these units increased intensely. Orders were obtained for their travel into Germany as well as Belgium. Motor Transport Service men were scattered from Belgium to Germany. The status of these enlisted men changed rapidly, causing more deletions, revocations, and recissions of orders.

"Sea mule" operators and maintenance men were needed by the Armies during March. Men were selected by Marine Operations Division from Harbor Craft Companies and the matter was transferred to the Enlisted Personnel Section for action in the moving of these men from their organizations to the Armies. It was urgent that these men reached destination as quickly as possible. With the cooperation of G-4 and the Adjutant General, teleprints were forwarded to Base Sections and orders were issued, and the men reached their destination in time to accomplish their mission.

(2) Civilian Personnel Branch

The work performed by this Branch during the first three months of 1945 is summarized in the following:

a. Interviewed applicants for positions in the Office of the Chief of Transportation.

b. Processed requests for salary increases and reclassifications of British and French personnel.

c. Prepared semi-monthly payroll for American civilian technicians.

d. Maintained 201 files, locator cards, and sick, annual, and compassionate leave rosters for civilians assigned to OCOT.

e. Handled the administration of technical observers, highway engineers, marine technicians, and cargo, stevedore and marine superintendents.

This Section received, screened, processed, and assigned 30 cargo and marine superintendents from the U.K. to the major continental ports. Four civilian technical specialists were obtained for the Packing and Marking Branch to assist in the Redeployment Program. Thirteen civilian highway traffic engineers were obtained from the U.S. for assignment to the Base Sections, Adsec, and the U.S. Control Council.

(3) Historical & Technical Information Branch

In January 1945, at the instigation of the Theater Historian, in conference with the Chief of Transportation, the Chief of the Administrative Division, OCOT, and the Chief of the Control & Planning Division, OCOT, the Historical and Public Relations sub-sections of the Historical & Technical

A FEW PUBLISHERS OF THOUSANDS OF TRANSPORTATION CORPS STORIES



Information Section, were separated. (See Appendix No. 2, Part I, Office Memorandum No. 19, 4 February 1945) Effective 1 February 1945, Lt. Colonel HARRY J. DOOLEY was assigned as Chief, Historical & Technical Information Branch, auth: Assignment Memorandum No.12, 4 February 1945, Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, OCOT. Accompanying this change from Section to Branch status, the new Branch was removed from the Miscellaneous Branch and began operations directly under the Chief of the Administrative Division.

Historical Section.

When the Historical and Public Relations Sections were separated, the staff of the Historical Section was increased in order to widen the field of historical research being done within the organization. The mission of the Section was established as indicated below:

"a. To continue with the present requirements of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, Washington, D.C., for the preparation of a complete consolidated quarterly Historical Report on the activities of all Transportation Corps units in the ETO.

"b. To establish and operate a new procedure for obtaining additional facts known to key individuals within the OCOT, or available in their files, which constitute 'behind-the-scenes' information that explains how critical situations developed, why certain actions were, or were not, taken and why specific effects ensued. This search for such information will be extended outside the TC to other Services or headquarters, as the occasion demands. Particular attention will be given to altercations over principles and procedures and estimates of situations, and how needs were anticipated and met or, if not, why. This work will cover the obtaining of such information about past and current happenings within the Theater, as it involves the TC. The purpose of the entire project is to avoid having such facts altered, distorted, or lost with the passing of time."

To carry out the duties outlined under b above, an officer was added to the Historical Section and in February 1945 another officer became part of the Section. The second officer devoted part time to the duties outlined in b above and the remainder, to assistance in preparing the quarterly consolidated Historical Report for the Chief of Transportation and making follow-up trips to field installations.

On 21 March 1945, Volume V of the consolidated quarterly Historical Report on the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations was published, covering the months of October through December 1944. This report had a total of 553 typed pages of text and tables, 79 charts, and 27 pages of photographs. Copies were distributed to the Chief of Transportation in Washington, D.C., and in the ETO, to each Chief of Division at OCOT, to each Major Port, and to Section and Base Section Transportation Officers on the Continent.

Technical Information Section (Public Relations)

This office prepared Press, Magazine, Radio, and Photographic releases for the American public, covering the activities of the Transportation Corps in the ETO. Pertinent statistics on these releases follow:

Month	*Press Stories	Publications to which Released	Photos	Radio Broadcasts	Magazine Articles
January	43	2,689	220	123	
February	84	2,801	260	73	50
March	112	4,405	513	115	

(*31 New Items written for Stars & Stripes included)

In addition to the above, the following work was also done by this Section:

806 Promotion Cards prepared on TC personnel.

14 News Letters published. These News Letters averaged 10 to 12 pages each and were published weekly. Their purpose was to acquaint TC personnel throughout the ETO with certain unit or individual achievements within each of the principal TC operational realms, that is, rail, marine and motor transport. Approximately 1700 copies were distributed weekly, under SECRET classification.

24 SHAEF-Accredited War Correspondents were directly aided. In most instances background material was prepared and furnished these correspondents. Interviews with the Chief of Transportation were arranged for them on frequent occasions. Included among these correspondents were representatives of the New York Times, Time Magazine, Washington Star, Scripps-Howard Newspaper Lines, NANA, Christian Science Moitor, Chicago Tribune, etc.

In addition to its other duties, the Technical Information Section was assigned the responsibility of handling the drive for membership to the Army Transportation Association. Membership in the organization totaled 52 as of 1 February 1945 when these duties were taken over and by the end of March it carried a total of 3,516 names.

The Section's evaluation of the effect of its news releases was hampered by the lack of a clipping service covering newspapers in the U.S. without which it was difficult to ascertain what releases prepared by its personnel were being published and by how many organs. This was offset, to a degree, by the homemade expedient of having all members of the Section request their personal correspondents, and friends and relatives, to send them from local papers, clippings on TC activities in Europe.

(4) Message Center & Records Branch

During the first quarter of 1945 this Branch was engaged in discharging the duties of its various component sections, consisting of the Mail Section, Teleprint Section, Courier Section, and Records Section, which were responsible respectively for: recording and distributing incoming and outgoing mail, distributing personal mail and maintaining an inter-office messager service; operating a teleprint and mail and maintaining an inter-office messenger service; operating a teleprint and cable section; operating a courier service; and maintaining a central file system.

The work of this Branch continued to develop and expand during this period as the activities of the Office of the Chief of Transportation increased in volume. The primary consideration was the establishing of immediate and continuous communications with headquarters installations in the field. This was accomplished through the supplemental use of a teleprint set-up, a courier system, and a radio network. The wisdom of providing for these various methods of communication was confirmed many times. Despite communication breakdowns in the Theater on many occasions, OCOT was at no time without means of communication with vital headquarters in the field. Consequently, rapid distribution of ships' papers, cargo disposal instructions, and other important correspondence, was uninterrupted. On numerous occasions, other agencies of the Communications Zone took advantage of the TC communications facilities when others were not functioning, or when they were too heavily burdened with traffic.

The Records Section maintained the main filing system for OCOT. All correspondence, TWX's and documents were filed in accordance with the Dewey Decimal System. Following is a summary of the activities within the various other sections of this Branch during this period:

Mail Section

The Incoming Mail Section, for the month of January, processed 13,654 pieces of mail, while for the same period, the Outgoing Mail Section registered and cleared 46,746 pieces of mail. During the months of February and March, the total number of pieces of mail registered in the Incoming Mail Section was 50,351, while the Outgoing Mail Section registered and dispatched 120,866 pieces of mail for the two month period. The month of March showed a 3,000 piece increase in the Incoming Mail Section over the past two months.

Of all the correspondence handled by both the Incoming and Outgoing Mail Sections, 80 percent was classified.

Teleprint Section

The total number of messages received over TC's own lines for the month of January was 9,984, while the outgoing showed a total of 1,538. For the same period, 6,614 incoming and 728 outgoing cables were processed through Staff Message Control.

The February totals were 12,035 incoming and 1,555 outgoing over TC lines, while 5,656 incoming and 780 outgoing cables were cleared through Staff Message Control by TC Cable Section.

The month of March showed a slight increase over the previous two months, with a total of 17,323 incoming and 2,009 outgoing messages over TC lines. At the same time, 8,199 incoming and 977 outgoing messages were cleared through Staff Message Control.

During the three month period, additional lines were added connecting TC machines direct with Ghent, WSA Paris, Marseilles, Dijon, Lyon, Nancy, and DGMRS Paris. Duplex circuit to Hqs Com Z from this Hqs entered into the Army Command and Administrative Network on 1 March 1945.

Courier Section

OCOT Couriers, for the month of January, drove approximately 88,873 miles making 608 stops for that period. Courier service between Brussels and Ghent was established 18 January 1945.

For the month of February, OCOT Couriers drove 90,847 miles a total of 682 stops. On 20 February 1945 courier service between OCOT and Vaugrieuse was discontinued. At the same time, a "Through Pouch Service" handled by Com Z Messenger Service was inaugurated to service Normandy Base Section at Deauville. On 26 February, Compiegne was dropped as a relay point, and the runs to Reims and Le Havre from that point were incorporated in courier runs direct from Paris.

For the month of March OCOT Couriers drove 123,643 miles making a total of 922 stops for this period. On 19 March an OCOT Courier Control Station was opened at Liege and courier service was established between Liege and Munchen-Gladbach.

Throughout the period, the rapid steady flow of information from port, rail, and major truck units to OCOT was maintained.

In compliance with Section III, Circular 16, Hqs Com Z ETOUSA, dated 29 March 1945, the OCOT Courier Service was eliminated and all mail from OCOT, both incoming and outgoing was handled by Signal Dispatch Service, Hq Com Z, ETOUSA.

(5) Troops and Training Branch

During the period January through March 1945, the Troops and Training Branch continued to act as troop information center for the Office of the Chief of Transportation. The Branch collected facts from all TC units as to their locations, strengths, APO and telephone numbers, and names of Commanding Officers. It also processed all requests as to movements, assignments and attachments, and followed up issuance of paper orders.

For all this information, the Troops and Training Branch maintained records, and issued regular reports. Among the latter were included:

1. SEMI-MONTHLY STRENGTH REPORT - Distrubuted on the 7th and 22nd of each month, this listed strengths and locations of every TC unit in ETOUSA.

2. BASE SECTION REPORT - This report, issued on the 1st and 15th of each month and submitted to the Secretary of the General Staff, showed the total number of TC units of each type in each Section and Army.

3. PORTS AND TROOPS AT PORTS REPORT - Sent to the Secretary of the General Staff on the 4th of each month, this publication listed TC and attached organizations at the ports where there were any U.S. Army activities.

The scope of the other activities of this Branch is indicated below:

TROOP MOVEMENTS - All requests for movement of TC units between or inside Base Sections, including the shipments of units from U.K. to the Continent, were processed by Troops and Training Branch. It also assisted in the coordination of these moves, helping frequently in the procurement of the necessary concurrences. Forecasts on troop lists, troop requirements, and flow of troops from the Zone of the Interior were also included among the activities in which this Branch was engaged.

ASSIGNMENTS AND ATTACHMENTS - All changes in assignments and attachments were processed by the Troops and Training Branch and the Troop Assignment numbers for each unit were kept up-to-date. Requests for movement and assignment of TC units were issued from this Branch to G-3, Communications Zone.

OPERATIONS BOARD - For the immediate summarization by an authorized person of the locations and strength of every TC unit, plus the total TC strength, and the Troop Basis for the entire Transportation Corps, the Troops and Training Branch maintained the Operations Board. This Board was also used to indicate the status of all TC units being redeployed or utilized as occupational troops.

The responsibilities of this branch also included: the preparation of recommendations for deactivation of certain units whose mission had been fulfilled and for the activation of new types of organizations to meet operational requirements; the reorganization of Tables of Organization to effect the changes made necessary by varying operating conditions.

(6) Publications Branch

The Publications Branch operated on a 24-hour basis during the period from 1 January 1945 to 1 April 1945. Circulars, memoranda, bulletins, and other directives were published and distributed to TC field units with the least practicable delay. Circulation of directives was doubled during this period.

The Manifest Section, this Branch, had a marked increase in the reproduction and assembly of manifest due to the large number of fast convoys arriving in the Theater from the U.S. A survey was made to insure that a proper distribution of manifest, with a minimum number of copies, was given to the various Services, TC installations, and other organizations concerned.

A night shift was operated in the mimeograph section to reproduce manifest and priority reports, thus enabling the day shift to handle any stencils for the various Divisions and Branches of OCOT without delay. The mimeograph section handled approximately 12,000 stencils per month.

The typing pool continued to serve the various Divisions and Branches of OCOT. A marked increase was noted in the number of stencils cut and the amount of copy work handled.

(7) Fiscal, Purchasing & Contracting Branch

On 1 January this Branch began the preparation of the first TC Reciprocal Aid Report to be rendered on the Continent. This report normally would be for the period 1 October 1944 to 31 December 1944 but as very little aid was received from D-day through September 1944, it was decided

that the initial report would cover all reciprocal aid received from European countries from D-day to 31 December 1944.

The compiling of date for this report was accomplished by totaling the figures received daily from TC field agencies on quantities of items obtained and recording all quarterly freight and passenger reports received from Rail Transportation Officers. As a matter of interest, some figures and quantities of reciprocal aid received are indicated below:

From the French Government:

Under "Rail Transportation", a total of 338,890 passengers and 697,063 tons of freight were moved by the French railroads on behalf of U.S. Forces.

Under "Motor Transportation," a total money value of $427,591.17, covering rental of passenger cars and motor trucks was received from the French Government.

Under "Port Charges," which consisted of stevedoring, pilotage, transhipment, and miscellaneous charges, a total money value of $1,423,690.65 was received.

On French inland waterways, a total of 20,797 tons of freight was moved by barge on behalf of U.S. Forces.

A total money value of $11,208.58 covering miscellaneous labor was also received.

In addition to the above, many miscellaneous items such as building materials, etc., were received for which no money value could be determined and these items were reported in the exact quantities received.

From the Belgian Government:

A total of 114,592 passengers and 449,717 tons of freight were moved on Belgian railroads on behalf of U.S. Forces.

A total of 50,172 tons of freight was moved by barge for U.S. Forces over Belgain inland waterways.

There were also many miscellaneous items such as building materials, locomotives parts, etc., that were immediately available and these items were reported in the quantities received.

During the three month period covered by this report, a War Department communication was received making it mandatory that all reciprocal aid reports be prepared effective 1 April 1945, to show money value of all items received. These instructions were issued to all TC Fiscal Officers in the field, who immediately began placing cost prices on all procurement papers forwarded to OCOT.

On 19 March 1945 a Lend-Lease transfer report was redeemed for the period 1 January 1945 to 28 February 1945. This report indicated that U.S. property to the value of $1,572,643.89 had been transferred to the French Government during this period.

The main items transferred were locomotives, life preservers, tugs, and barges.

Other activities of the Branch during the quarter consisted mainly in the normal routine daily recording of reciprocal aid received and property transferred to the various countries under the provisions of the Reciprocal Aid Agreement.

Notes on OCOT Staff Conferences

The following notes on items referred to the Administrative Division, or discussed by the ACOT - Administrative Division (or his representative) during the first quarter of 1945 at Staff Conferences held daily in the Office of the Chief of Transportation are given as a cross-section of duties currently assigned the Division and certain of its problems which were discussed at such meetings:

6 January

Reading File: General ROSS stressed the importance of coordination between individual Divisions at OCOT, particularly the four operating Divisions. It was stated that a Reading File would be maintained in order that each Division Chief would be fully informed on overall operations, and that the Administration Division was responsible for compiling the file. Each Division was made responsible for furnishing all pertinent data. The file was to be placed in the War Room and read daily by Division Chiefs.

9 January

Personnel Cut: Administrative Division reported that the War Department had ordered a cut in personnel in the Theater and that TC's portion was 28 percent.

12 January

Replacement of Casualty Personnel: Administration Division asked for a full report on personnel lost during the German counter-offensive, in order that requisitions could be sent in for replacements.

30 January

Communications Line: Administration Division reported that a direct teletype line was being installed to Dijon, Laon, and Marseille. Communications from Ghent, it was stated, were being sent through Channel Base Section and Administration Division would check to determine if adequate lines were available there in order that complete reports could be received from that port.

3 February

Personnel: It was stated that the War Department, through the Troops Basis Department, had suggested that TC exchange 2,700 white troops for the same number of colored troops to be used in Port Companies. The matter was referred to Administrative Division for consideration and desirable action.

6 February

Loan of Equipment to the French: The question was raised as to whether or not the U.S. Army was to charge rental on the loan of tugs to the French civil authorities contemplated at that time. It was stated that Administrative Division was handling the matter and that Inland Waterways Division would coordinate accordingly.

In connection with the matter, Supply Division stated that a directive would be issued in the near future covering the loan and sale of all equipment in the Theater declared as surplus by the Services.

26 February

Personnel from U.K.: Administrative Division advised that orders had been issued for the 15th Port to come to the Continent from the U.K. and that two Harbor Craft Companies had been requested. It was further stated that no RTO's could be obtained from U.K. Base as they were working at that time with a "rock bottom" number.

1 March

Personnel for Com Z Sections: Movements Division advised that Oise Section was very short of personnel and that TC would soon have to furnish personnel for Burgundy District. Administrative Division advised that there was some personnel available from NBS and CBS and that steps were being taken to inactivate two Harbor Craft Companies to form a Regulating Battalion. The following day, concerning this same subject, Administrative Division reported that two detachments of the 8th Traffic Regulating Group, one from CBS, would be transferred to Oise Section and Dijon. It was further stated that one Harbor Craft Company would be taken from the Red Horse Staging Area to be distributed throughout the Com Z Sections for training and that another Harbor Craft Company would be brought from the U.K. for the same purpose, and that G-4 had approved the activation of the two Regulating Battalions from Harbor Craft Companies, as mentioned the previous day. Upon arrival, it was planned to use the 15th Port as Inland Waterways regulating personnel.

It was Administrative Division's responsibility to prepare a complete breakdown of personnel in this unit for use at Inland Waterways Traffic Points.

6 March

Personnel Requirements for Redeployment: In connection with the matter of TC personnel for handling redeployment, Administrative Division (as well as the other Divisions of OCOT) was instructed to furnish immediately, information as to the particular problems which would be faced by the TC after hostilities with Germany had ceased. The reports required were to contain information on such requirements as those for specially trained personnel, for personnel experienced in packing and marking, etc., or the possible exchange of personnel with authorities at the NYPE.

10 March

Reassignment of TC Troops: Administrative Division outlined the problems of reassignment of TC within Com Z Sections, RTO's, etc., in order to meet current needs. General ROSS's decision on this matter was that it would be the responsibility of each Division, and that Division Chiefs would take the necessary steps to determine what personnel was available, and further, that they would cooperate with Administrative Division in meeting the requirements. On 13 March Administrative Division reported that they had failed to reach a decision with the Base Section Commanders and the Base Transportatior Officers on the matter of releasing TC troops. It was consequently decided that OCOT work through G-3 to have these troops removed.

26 March

Radio Sets: Administrative Division was instructed to take the necessary steps to supply CONAD and ADSEC with radios in order that all possible information could be supplied between the headquarters concerned. On 30 March the following was reported by Administrative Division on this subject:

"Radios for the Highway Transport Divisions have been made ready for operation and will be in use today".

CHAPTER II

SECTION IV

SUPPLY DIVISION

General

The Organization Chart on ~~the opposite~~ page 91 shows the various Branches and Sections operating within the Supply Division, OCOT, as of the close of the first quarter of the year 1945. These departments of the Supply Division were practically the same as those operating under that control during the last three months of 1944 with the exception of the added Continental Procurement Branch. The duties and responsibilities of the former are given in Chapter II, Volume V of the Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the ETO, covering the months of October, November, and December 1944.

Procurement Branch

The Continental Procurement Branch was composed of four officers and four enlisted personnel. The mission of the Branch was to procure from sources on the Continent, such TC items of supply, services, and facilities as were available, and to assist other supply Services in obtaining items required of them by TC. It actually carried forward the work done by the Chief of the Procurement Branch, who had been attached to the Office of the General Purchasing Agent (GPA) since June 1944 as liaison officer, and who had thereby been in position to study procurement sources on the Continent. Through close liaison with GPA advance teams, and by close follow-up action, much enemy material was obtained for TC units.

Factories, repair shops, foundaries, and warehouses of dealers in marine and rail items were surveyed and recorded by the Procurement Branch. Both short-termed demands and programmed requirements were placed on the French and Belgian governments. Unlike most of the other Services the TC Supply Division received no rejections by either the French or Belgian governments on any of its long-term demands. The demands made included the overhaul of Bolero locomotives, the furnishing of 600 refrigerator cars and 19 hospital trains, the installation of cargo heating systems in tankers, the fabrication of cast iron car wheels, the manufacture and repair of injection systems in Diesel locomotives, and the use of inland waterways and canals for hauling military tonnage.

It was planned that the activities of the Continental Procurement Branch would be expanded throughout the various occupied and liberated countries in Europe, thereby greatly increasing the sources for TC facilities and materials.

Following is a summary of the demands placed on the French Government by the Procurement Branch during the period covered by this report:

1. For furnishing and converting ten hospital trains, totaling 162 cars. These cars were furnished by the SNCF and Wagon-Lits, Cie., and were converted in the SNCF shops in accordance with U.S. Army Medical Department and TC specifications. The tonnage saved by the acquisition amounted to 2430 tons.

2. For the fabrication twenty-four parts for use on USA 2-8-0 locomotives. Total material used on this demand was thirty-four tons of cast iron, ten tons of steel, and 3/4 tons of bronze. Local production of these parts in the quantities required prevented deadlining a number of locomotives in the Paris area, in addition to saving considerable shipping tonnage. This demand was placed on the firm of Corpet, Louvet, Paris for fabrication. This is the same firm which was currently repairing Bolero locomotives for TC.

3. For installation of cargo heating systems in four 850-ton "Y" Tankers. The French Government placed this demand on the firm of Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint Nazaire Penhoet (Rouen Yard) for fulfillment. Approximately 10,000 linear feet of steel pipe were used to complete this job.

4. For the regularization of the acquisition of ten French Railway postal cars by the Military Railway Service. These cars had been taken over a period of six months, and had never been reported before; therefore, it was necessary under the existing procurement regulations to regularize this tranaction, same being requested by GHQ, MRS.

5. For the fabrication of 300 French car sealing devices. These items were produced by SNCF and Corpet, Louvet and under rush orders.

6. For 500 metallic steam line connectors for use on hospital trains. These were furnished by SNCF.

7. For a special drop pit gear required by the 757th Railway Shop Bn, for repairs to drop pits, at the Cherbourg roundhouse. This was made according to special plans by Corpet, Louvet.

8. On SNCF through the French Government for the following special parts for use on 2-8-0 locomotives to make necessary connections to supply heat on hospital trains. Among the parts obtained on this demand were: 280 elbows, 125 gaskets, 360 heads of metallic steam hose, and 1357 metallic parts consisting of metallic hose and gaskets for adapting 2-8-0 type locomotives to heat hospital trains.

9. For furnishing 500 wood and steel benches which were installed in semi-trailers in order to convert same to passenger vehicles.

10. For 100 rivet sets (button-head type) for use by the Military Railway Service. These were obtained locally, and delivered at once.

11. For one spot light for small TC Craft used by the Director General, MRS. This was obtained locally, with immediate delivery.

It was estimated that procurement supplies on the Continent during the first three months of 1945 amounted to 6,500 tons. This tonnage was in addition to that saved by the local repair of thirty-six 2-8-0 locomotives weighing 80 tons each. Had it been necessary to return these locomotives to the U.S. or the U.K. for repairs, approximately 2,900 tons of shipping space each way would have been necessary for their movement. Thus, the total shipping tonnage saved by local procurement, considering all miscellaneous amounts, came to approximately 10,000 tons.

At the close of the first quarter of the year, it was planned to survey further the French and Belgian factories and natural resources for information as to their ability to produce TC items. However, a report received from GPA on the French production problem indicated that the French claimed the Americans had already exceeded their allocated coal allowance by two months and that unless coal in like quantities could be imported, the French Government would be obliged to refuse to accept demands for local fabrication. In Belgium, the situation was morefavorable, in that some raw materials were available, and the coal and coke situation was not as precarious as in France. It was anticipated that with the arrival of technical assistants from the U.S., potential sources for TC items in neutral could be investigated and thus save valuable shipping space.

During March the French placed a "freeze" on all programmed requirements at which time GPA reported that there were 237 cases pending action. Of that amount, only eight cases were approved for the entire U.S. Army, of which two belonged to TC.

The raw material and fuel shortage in France was aggravated by the fact that Belgium manufacturers were receiving large requirements from government agencies, municipalities, public service corporations, and commerical concerns, faster than raw materials could be provided. For instance, a demand was placed on the Belgian Government for 5,000 car wheels. The TC Supply Division was informed that the French Government had placed a demand for 10,000 car wheels and that the Belgian National Railways had likewise placed for 10,000 of the same item.

It was planned by the Procurement Branch to exploit to the fullest extent, all facilities in occupied territory which could be used to produce TC items, using captured stocks, scrap, and such raw material as would probably be forthcoming from such areas.

Activities of Other Branches of Supply Division

The accomplishments of the other Branches of the Supply Division, over and above the performance of their regularly assigned work, are given in subsequent paragraphs.

Stock Control Branch

The Rail Section issued a large quantity of railway parts to the 21st Army Group and the SNCF, and participated in the program for supplying much needed clothing to French Railway Workers. In conjunction with the Planning & Requirements Branch, it phased requirements for overhauling the French railway system to meet the military needs.

The Marine Section marshalled and sent forward to the Armies on emergency shipment a large number of life preservers for the Rhine River crossing.

The Organizational and Miscellaneous Equipment Section undertook the documentation of all rail shipments on the Continent. This program made it necessary for that section to mimeograph many types of blank forms to be issued to Base Sections for use of the ports, and also to release to all rail units forms peculiar to MRS. This documentation moved the supplies ~~from the~~ from the ports to the Armies, where they were urgently needed for operational purposes.

Car seals, which became an item of TC supply responsibility, were also issued by O & M to the Base Sections for the protection of pilferable materials.

The Register and Audit Section — A total of 2,879 requisitions were received during this quarter. All were registered-in and received initial processing in the Register and Audit Section, from which they were assigned to the various sections of Stock Control. During the same period, 2,085 requisitions were completely filled. This process involved not only issuing from depots out of stock on hand, but also the receipt and disbursement of material that the Supply Division had to requisition from other supply sources. A total of 7,032 tallies were also received by the Register and Audit Section, and processed by the other Stock Control sections during the quarter.

Planning and Requirements Branch

From January to March 1945, this Branch prepared 411 requisitions on the New York Port of Embarkation, 207 on other Services, and 107 on U.K. Procurement. In the latter category were requisitions requiring procurement action by U.K. Base Supply Division, and others which amounted to shipping releases, but which Theater directives required be set up as requisitions to bring material from the U.K. to the Continent. The requisitions placed on New York included nine Proco Projects for such material as trucks, steam locomotives, material for the SNCF, fork lift tractors, signal equipment, and several types of material for the outloading program. In long tons, approximately 216,363 tons were requisitioned on New York, 1062 on other Services on the Continent, and 647 on the U.K. The requisitions placed on New York were primarily to build up depot stocks of rail and marine parts, and also to provide emergency replacement parts for deadlined craft and locomotives. Requisitions to repair deadlined craft were also placed on the U.S. Navy at Exeter. Other supply services were also called upon to return such material as they could for the above purposes, but the bulk of the requisitions placed on other Services and on the U.K. were for miscellaneous items.

The recapitualation of demands placed upon the French and Belgian governments by Continental Procurement Branch given above reveals the impossibility of estimating many of them in terms of tonnage, as they called for repair of existing equipment and the furnishing of services.

Administrative Branch

The manpower shortage existing in the Theater during this quarter made it impossible for the Supply Division to secure additional personnel from ACOT-Administration. In many cases prompt replacements for men released for combat training were not made available to OCOT. It was therefore necessary for the Administrative Branch to undertake an extremely rigouous survey of the utilization of personnel already assigned to the Supply Division. As a result many reassignments within the Division were made, and it was found that when properly utilized, the existing number of personnel was a dequate to meet the current requirements. A recapitulation of the personnel status of Supply Division follows:

BRANCH OR SECTION	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	ENLISTED WOMEN	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
ACOT	4			1	5
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH	1	9	2		12
PLANNING & REQUIREMENTS	3	10	3	2	18
RECEIVING & DISTRIBUTION	2	2	3		7
STOCK CONTROL BRANCH	2				2
REPORTS & STATISTICS	1	1	1		3
REGISTER & AUDIT	1	5	5		11
RAIL SECTION	3	11	8		22
ORGANIZATIONAL & MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT SECTION	3	8	7		18
MARINE SECTION	2	10	6		18
PROCUREMENT BRANCH	2	3	1	1	7

CAPITULATION OF SECTION IN SUPPLY DIVISION

24 OFFICERS
59 ENLISTED MEN
36 ENLISTED WOMEN
4 CIVILIANS

GRAND TOTAL 123

NUMBER FROM SOLOC

1 Officer
3 Enlisted Men
3 Enlisted Women
TOTAL 6

NUMBER LOST TO INFANTRY

6 Enlisted Men

NUMBER LOST TO PACKING & MARKING BRANCH, OCOT.

2 Officers
1 Enlisted Man
TOTAL 3

MISCELLANEOUS LOSSES & REASON:

1 Enlisted Man - Direct Commission and asgmt to another Division with OCOT.
1 Enlisted Man - Reasgmt to another Division of OCOT. Unsuitable for Supply Div. requirements.
1 Enlisted Man - Returned to OCOT Personnel per phone conversation.
1 Enlisted Man - Returned to Administrative Division, OCOT.
2 Enlisted Men - Returned to States.

1 Enlisted Woman - AWOL from Supply Division and from organization to which assigned.

1 Civilian - Reassigned to UK.

The chief of Administrative Branch, Lt. Edward E. RICKMANN, undertook the establishment of an emergency trucking service for movement of critically needed TC equipment. Six trucks and 7-ton trailers had been obtained and assigned to depot T-703, and these were used on many runs from Cherbourg through Paris to Liege and back, to insure that emergency supplies were at the proper place, and when needed. This trucking operation actually moved the life preservers mentioned above as having been furnished the Army for the Rhine River crossing.

Miscellaneous

Joint Stockpile

Regarding the joint stockpile, the Supply Division was not established when it was planned, to provide supplies and equipment for four Lines of Communication, was planned. It represented the work of many key British and American officers; for TC, the most active was Colonel SIDNEY H. BINGHAM, of Military Railway Service. A parallel program for material for additional Lines of Communication was subsequently set up. The material involved was called forward by the Supply Division and stored in TC depots in the U.K., and then made available at the ports immediately prior to D-Day. During the quarter under discussion, excess joint stockpile material was released by this Division, through G-4, for return to the British.

Absorption of SOLOC

During the period, October through December 1944, the Supply Division began processing and when necessary, forwarding to New York, requisitions for rail and marine equipment for Southern Line of Communication. An extremely efficient system of handling these requisitions, to insure their being filled from excess Theater stocks whenever possible, and to insure expeditious delivery from New York when necessary, was worked out by Planning and Requirements Branch of this Division. On 12 February 1945, the Supply Division took over the administrative details of TC depots and the primary responsibility for the supply of TC equipment in Southern France. This task was accomplished without strain due to the excellent organization and sound supply position of SOLOC and the efficiency of the Supply Division.

The Supply Branch, Transportation Section, Hq, SOLOC, was formed from personnel of the Supply Branch, Transportation Section, Hq, Services of Supply, North African Theater of Operations. When plans for the detachment of the Southern France Area from the Mediterranean Theater of Operations were formulated, and the projected closing of the Mediterranean Base Section became firm, a large part of the Transportation Corps supplies and equipment in the depot at that location was shipped to Southern France Area from the Mediterranean Base Section became firm, a large part of the Transportation Corps supplies and equipment in the depot at that location was shipped to Southern France to build-up further stock level.

After the initial convoys, Transportation Corps supplies and equipment were phased into each following convoy to provide a sufficient amount of cargo handling equipment as the tonnage discharge capacity increased, and to provide replacement for any losses incurred. Simultaneously, requisitions were placed on the New York Port of Embarkation for materialfor direct delivery to Southern France in order to build up stocks of TC material at that point.

The TC depot at Marseilles was not established until after the port had been in operation for some time, and the widespread area of a ctivity and attendant confusion of the original and subsequent beach operations, a considerable amount of supplies was scattered about and not recovered. Material from the original phased shipments was still coming into the depot in March as it was discovered in depots of other Services, or in the hands of organizations not authorized to possess such items.

It was then necessary to ascertain the supply situation in Southern France as quickly as possible, and stock record cards soon indicated that it was not necessary to place maintenance requisitions on New York in January. However, it was necessary to request six medium tugs from New York for the operation of the Port of Marseilles.

Requisitions for locomotives and railway equipment generally had always been prepared by 1st MRS and processed through the Supply Branch, whose responsibility it was to insure the delivery of this material.

When SOLOC was dissolved, the Supply Division, OCOT, took over the functions of the SOLOC TC Supply Branch, and one of its officers was assigned to the Division. By the absorption of SOLOC, four more TC depot acquired. One of these, T-709, near Nancy, was operated by the 704th Railway Grand Division, and operated primarily as a construction and material yard and stores depot for the handling of bridge material to be transferred from Dijon and Marseilles. Such other equipment as it handled was exclusively rail. The operation of this depot was in no substantial way a responsibility of this Division. Depots T-707 and 708 in Marseilles staffed by the 788th and 783rd Base Depot Companies, respectively, were also railway depots, receiving all types of railway equipment, including KD cars. These depots, however, were placed under the full Administrative control of the Supply Division, as was T-706, operated in Marseilles by the 807th Base Depot Company, which specialized in the handling of stevedore equipment and other marine supplies.

Thus, the problem of receiving and disbursing TC supplies through the absorption of SOLOC was a quantitative rather than a qualitative change in the functions of this Division, and adequate supply, personnel, and installations were made available by SOLOC.

Cooperation and Liaison with Other Services

There was no major change in the nature of the high degree of coordination with other Services and headquarters maintained by this Division during this period. The ACOT-Supply, Colonel MAURICE G. JEWETT, participated in SHAEF planning activities; Lt. Colonel JOHN J. FITZPATRICK, was a member of the G-4 committee on the reduction of depot stocks in the U.K., and Captain RAYMOND B. CULP, of the Receiving and Distribution Branch, represented TC on the Theater Shipping Allocations Committee. Major GEORGE J. PEDNEAULT, Chief of Planning and Requirements Branch, made several trips to the U. K., he perfected the agreement with the U.S. Navy whereby TC marine engine parts were procured from the Navy.

Plans for redeployment and other post-hostilities activities were in some instances begun during this quarter, but their discussion more properly belongs with material for the quarter April-June 1945.

Depot Operations

Following are two tables furnishing all relevant information on the capacities etc., of TC depots, and listing the units assigned thereto. Whenever it could be effectively utilized, as, for example, T-703, French civilian labor was requisitioned through channels. Depot T-700 made extensive use of German POW's:

CODE NUMBER	LOCATION	BASE DEPOT	TYPE	BASE SECTION
T-700	Bricquebec	785th*	general	NBS
T-703	Le Bourget, Paris	786th	general	Seine
T-704	Fort *(Powder Magazine) Cherbourg	780th	marine	NBS
T-705	151 Rue deMartyrs Tilleur (Liege) Belgium	781st	general	Advance
T-706	Pier P., Marseilles	807th	marine	Delta
T-707	Gare St Louis les Aygalades, Marseilles	788th	rail (1st MRS)	Delta
T-708	Piers, W & Z, Marseilles	783rd	rail (1st MRS)	Delta
T-709	Chaligny U-U-784040 (8 mi so & E of Nancy)	704th Rwy Grand Div	rail (1st MRS)	Conad

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
SUPPLY DIVISION



TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

COM Z DEPOT STORAGE CAPACITIES AND UNLOADING & LOADING CAPABILITIES (in Long Tons per 24 hr day) APRIL 1945

Sec	DEPOT & LOCATION	CLASS OF SUPPLY	STORAGE CAPACITY (Long Tons) TOTAL	COVERED	OPEN	TOTAL HANDLING CAPABILITY	UNLOADING CAPABILITY (with Average Loading) TOTAL	RAIL	TRUCK	BARGE	LOADING CAPABILITY (with Average Unloading) TOTAL	RAIL	TRUCK	BARGE
N	T-700 Bricquebec	IV	16,000	1,000	15,000	225	225	125	100	0	150	100	50	0
N	UTAH Dump	IV	1,000	0	1,000	50	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0
N	OMAHA Dump	IV	5,000	0	5,000	100	100	0	100	0	75	0	75	0
S	T-703 Paris	II,IV	13,000	3,000	10,000	294	217	171	46	0	77	41	36	0
N	T-704 Cherbourg	IV	1,800	300	1,500	100	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
A	T-705 Liege	II,IV	18,000	10,000	8,000	660	330	200	130	0	330	200	130	0
D	T-706 Marseilles	II,IV	15,000	5,000	10,000	150	100	50	50	0	50	20	30	0
D	T-707 Marseilles	II,IV	6,700	200	6,500	225								
D	T-708 Marseilles	KD Cars	21,000	1,500	20,000	1,800	Not Reported. These Figures Estimated.							
CO	T-709 Chaligny	II,IV	5,100	100	5,000	525								

OUTLINE
CHAPTER II, SECTION V
-Movements Division -

CHAPTER II
SECTION V
-MOVEMENTS DIVISION.
by captain Richard B. Cowdery.
Special Research, Historical Section.

I. General
1. Overall Trends

Insmuch as the first quarter of 1945 was a continuation of the consolidation and better organization of existent L's of C, it was marked by many reforms in reporting and controlling the allocation and flow of inland traffic .One of these was the reorganization of the Division, treated under Changes, Part 2 of this subsection of Section V. Others applied to the field and are discussed under Freight Branch: Plans for Current Operations (Part II,1a), Passenger Branch: Same (Part IL,2a) and Operational Records Branch (Part II,3), as well as where applicable in the discussion of how the Supply Movements Program was carried out.

The merger with SOLOC brought to Com Z the attempt to apply an overall allocation of traffic equipment and moves to Northern France. At the opening conference to get this under way, Major General ROSS, COT, addressed the TC, British, and French Officers and the French civil authorities present, This, stated the General, was the first effort to get everybody concerned with transport in France together. Knowing each the other's problems, all should be able to arrive at a solution of the big one:winning the war and keeping France going at the same time. This first session woulf be the hardest, for all would be thinking in different terms and none feeling like cutting his own needs. Brigadier General STEWART, DCOT for Operations, had handled this job of coodinating transport in the South and was the man to run it, with the OCOT assuring that the U. S. part of it was effected completely. (1).

Brigadier General STEWART, thus introduced, explained that preliminary skirmishes for this engagement had come to grief over the fact that many parties did not understand what consolidated demands were.However, the plan had been pretty well threshed over now and was being started at the behest of General ROSS and Brigadier General J. A. APPLETON, Director General of Military Railways, SHAEF, and head of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission; Major General ROYAL B. LORD, 21 Army Group heads, and the French Ministry of Transport had all concurred. (1).

How this first session progressed and some study of the plan and its possibilities are taken up in Part 3 of this subsection I.

A general demarcation of Movements Division's responsibility was made at the late January Supply Movements Monthly conference. Port Officers were complaining about the difficulty of getting

emptics into which to discharge ships and claiming that Movements ought to do something about it in the port areas. While the Division's spokesman said that all possible efforts were being made to assure the speedy return of emptics to the ports, Movements was not concerned with the actual provision of the cars to the quays or their marshalling. Its responsibility commenced with loaded cars consigned to depots and ready to move. (2).

The problem of obtaining emptics was like the proverbial poor—'always with you'. Colonel CHARLES Z. CASE, ACOT, Movements, set the key by stating the Division was furnishing all the wagons possible and checking up constantly on failure to unload, but that efforts to obtain a greater proportion of the total supply in Europe were generally met by refusal , The politicians had the ear of the throne. (3).

2. Changes in Organization, Mission, and Duties

Sweeping reforms were made in the setup of Movements Division in January, The assignment of Lt. Colonel H.L., MACK, ACOT, as a special assistant to Major General ROSS left vacant the leadership of the department; it was ably filled by Lt. Colonel (soon made Colonel) CHARLES Z. CASE, who had very capably developped in England overall plans for the vast imports by American troops there from their homeland, The whole department was revamped as follows (Refer to Organization Chart I).

The Office of Executive was elevated to that of Deputy and filled by the experienced and able head of the Passenger Branch,, Lt. Colonel E.J. FINNEGAN. Young, wise Major SEIBERLING, who had been Executive was made head of the reorganized Freight Branch; and Major LUETER, who had done an excellent job assisting Lt. Colonel FINNEGAN in the Passenger Branch , now became head of that group. (4).

The new Supply Movements Program, commenced in January, added to Movements Division's regulating responsabilities and was the reason for the division of Regulating Section, Freight Branch, into L. of C. subsections, each of which was responsible for the movements program from a particular port or ports.

The Freight Branch had —like Mrs. Stowe's Topsy—'just growed'. To put it in order and to tie-in the new functions which it was absorbing from old branches avoided much inter-section cross-fire. The C.D.I., (Cargo Dispatch Information) and the Tracing Sections were made sub-sections of the new Processing Section, Tracing, as a point of information, was concerned with tracing misplaced unit equipment. The POL and Perishable Freight Section was split into separate parts, both made sub-sections of the Traffic Section, to which was added a new Barge sub-Section and of which the SOP and Documentation Section became a sub-section. The final battle line is shown on Organization Chart II. (4).

CHART I.

ACOT — Lt. Col. H. L. Mack (C. Z. Case)

BRANCH LIAISON
Capt. R. G. DeGuire

ADMINISTRATION

EXECUTIVE: (DACOT: Lt. Col. E. J. Finnegan)
Maj. J. F. Seiberling

HIGHWAY BRANCH
Maj. P. A. Ludolph

FREIGHT BRANCH
Lt. Col. L. F. Boykin
(Maj. J. F. Seiberling)

MOTOR MOVEMENTS BRANCH
Capt. O. [illegible] Cummings

PACKING & MARKING BRANCH
Lt. Col. H. L. Phyfe

OPERATIONAL RECORDS BRANCH
Capt. C. E. Acomb

PASSENGERS BRANCH
Lt. Col. E. J. Finnegan
(Maj. G. A. Puffer)

Troops Movements Section (Ceased)

Rail Section

Water Section

Traffic Section (Barge Sub-Section)

Regulating Section (L. of C. Sub-Section)

(Processing Section)

POL & Perishable Section. (Sub-Section of Traffic Section)

S/P and Documentation Section. (Sub-Section of Traffic Section)

Tracing Section (Sub-Section of Processing Section)

CDI (Cargo Dispatch Info) Section. (Sub-Section of Processing Sections

(CDI Sub-Section*

Tracing Sub-Section

Organization of Movements Division-brackets enclose changes made to enclosed set-up existing Jan. 1945.

CHART I.
CHAPTER III. SECTION V.

CHART II

Newer Organization, Movements Division



CHART II
CHAPTER II, SECTION V

The Freight Branch of the Movements Division was the primary agency for the controlling of freight movements in accordance with the monthly movements program. (5). It consisted of a:

Regulating Section, which was responsible for controlling movements from the ports in accordance with the monthly movement program, and the capacity of depots to receive, This section also prepared a breakdown of the movements program into truck, rail and barge shipments, the determining factors being the availability of each type of transportation serving the particular port, and the ability of the depot to receive tonnage by the various methods of transportation.

The Processing Section, which prepared cargo disposal instructions for all ships from the U. S. and U. K. which were to discharge at Continental ports. This section coordinated with the Regulating Section, with Marine Operations Divisionm and with the various supply services to ensure that cargo was consigned in such a way as to enable the least possible sorting at ports, the most efficient land movements and to ensure that the amount of cargo consigned to all installations was in proportion to the ability of the installation to accept.

The Traffic Section, which arranged for all movements originating at inland points. This section coordinated with the Regulating Section on movements from inland points to Com Z depots to ensure that the total flow to any given depot was in accordance with the ability of the destination to accept, This Section also contained several sub-sections for handling of special types of movement. These were:

(1) Perishable Freight Sub-Section, which handled all refrigerated cargo from ports and inland points, arranged for shifting the limited supply of refrigerator cars to meet incoming ships, and kept close record of refrigerator car movements to insure maximum economy in their use. (5).

(2) POL Sub-Section, which controlled movement of POL from ports, dumps and pipeheads, and arranged for shifting the available tank car supply from one point to another as the fluctuating tactical requirements necessitated.

(3) Outbound Freight Sub-Section, which arranged with Marine Operations Division for movements to ports of materials and supplies which were being returned to the Zone of Interior, U.K., or other theaters.

(4) SOP & Documentation Sub-Section, which prepared necessary operating publications and attended meetings concerning operating procedures affecting freight movements. (5)

How the Packing and Marking Branch came to be transferred to Control and Planning Division is explained in Section II of this Chapter II.

The Supply Movements Program placed on Movements Division new responsibilities for determining the capacities of the operating agencies, furnishing to Control and Planning the detailed breakdown of tonnages to the three carriers, and implementing, by overseeing the actual hauling of these supplies. Of the new reports necessary to control the program Movements furnished many; these are discussed under the Operational Records Branch)Part II,3 of this Section).

In the Middle of March G-4 issued a directive that the Transportation Corps take over the handling of personal baggage--all handling, in addition to its old duties of simply moving, Movements prepared a technical directive in this connection, setting forth what would be required in installations and personnel. The QM agreed to cooperate by furnishing facilities and men to cover the period during which responsibility was transferred. However, there was some question as to responsibility and the Division took action to determine whether or not the TC could take over this heavy job. (6).

These studies were favorable, and it was announced on the 18th of March that the receipt,,storage, shipment, and delivery of all personnel effects, including that of hospital patients and that unclaimed in the hands of the QM, were the responsibility of the Transportation Corps. (7). Movements Division placed this new load with its Passenger Branch.

3. Effect of Developments in the Overall Situation on Planning and Control by Movements Division.

Reinforcements demanded by combat losses , plus the constant necessity for manning new installations as the Armies advanced further and further into Germany, pinched TC personnel availability. By early February Movements was again confronted with a shortage of RTO's (Rail-Transportation Officers). An effort was being made to bring over some additional units from the U.K. but had thus far been unsuccessful. There were still depots and stations to be manned there, There was need for approximately 30 officers and 150 enlisted men in the Oise intermediate and Channel Base Sections. (8).

In mid-month the attribution of motor Transport personnel was so heavy as to occasion the makeup of a letter over Major General ROSS's signature, to the C of S., Com Z Headquarters. Looking forward to the near future when a breakthrough might well demand tremendous tonnages of L. of C. motor hauls, and desiring to keep the existent normal demands satisfied; it was felt that the movement by motor must certainly be guarded by an increase in drivers and mechanics. Some men were later made available, but not trained as the MTS required. (9). More on personnel problems appears under the discussion of the individual branches.

We have seen the general outline of plans for occupation of Germany in Section II of this Chapter under planning for Germany. Much of the personnel supervising affairs there would be under the aegis of Movements Division, as the emphasis was to be on making the conquered perform actual operations, while American personnel occupied supervisory

positions: allocating, regulating, rearranging--all essentially Movements' jobs. From the top headquarters down through the level of Military Districts, Command and Administrative duties were separate provinces of separate staffs. This meant that ordinary activities must be kept decentralized to the lower staff levels as much as possible if they were not to be lost in the red tape of places where elaborate channels existed to take care of complicated problems of an international tinge. The planners had left to the OCOT the determination of how far this decentralization might go in the field of transport; and Movements had to decide what would be the decisions and matters which might rest with Regional or Sub-District Transport Officers. (10).

The many traffic men who would have to man German installations must be trained; and most of the matters explained at the two-day orientation conference held at the OCOT, on the 20th and 21st March, dealt with inland movements and the control points necessary. Good basic material on the existent German transport system was included in the newest addition of the RTO Handbook, along with a glossary of German transport words and phrases, while a SHAEF paper on the control and set-up of local motor transport received wide circulation among the ADSEC and CONAD and Army TC men who would soon be involved in the complications of making things move in a hostile country.

3a. Development of Relations with French Agencies of Transport.

There were three categories for French Liaison within the railroad sphere. The first, concerning matters of high-level priorities and allocations--comparing in civilian practice to matters before the association of American railroads or the Board of Directors of a large system--was the province of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission, a SHAEF child at whose head was Brigadier General APPELTON. One exception to this cover was the overall settlement of allocations as between British and American and French military needs and the French civil needs. This was handled by a monthly meeting of all concerned; the Movements Division, Army Movements personnel, the French Director-General of Military Railways, and the Director of SNCF. This assemblage gathered at the OCOT, Paris, at the end of March 1945; but came to no decisions because of insurmountable technical difficulties. These were, however, so clarified as to promise at least a successful approach to negotiations at the late April meeting, to be, as was the last, under the auspices of Brigadier General STEWART, DCOT. (11).

The second category, that of procedure, documentation--corresponding to the freight and passenger agencies, the so--called 'business' ends of railways corporations--was covered by the Movements Division, OCOT, working with and through several agencies. The high-level one of these was participation in a sub-committee of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission, with SNCF representatives, members of the SOP and Documentation Sub-Section of the Traffic Section, Freight Branch, Movements Division met frequently to discuss and decide such problems as these following.

What fare division was to be made between the Southern Railway of England and the Region Ouest (Western Region of SNCF) on the daily boat trains, Paris to Dieppe, Newhaven to London? The French petitioned for a ticket system on this train, as personnel on duty, equipped with warrants, were riding; and SNCF feared lest these people be charged twice for transport, once on occupancy in the train and once on the warrant. Actually there was equal danger of the railway losing payment completely, as no tickets made accountability difficult on the train: and a unattested passenger, not being required to show his paper, might return it to office of origin. Which fear was behind the French request is a matter of conjecture. (12).

Routine and recurrent administrative problems were handled through French Liaison sections with the Movements Division at OCOT and the Movements Staffs of Section Transportation Officers. As the MRS advanced and declared rear portions of main Lines of Communications under Phase II or Phase III operation, large problems arose in documentation and priorities of military over civilian requirements. French documentation was exceedingly difficult to use for car tracing or expediting, and phase III, with French control of trains, always reflected a tendency to return to 'business as usual' and push civil shipments at the expense of military. To explain our views and needs clearly, then to enforce these demands, the liaison officers did their best and accomplished much.

Finally, the RTO's transacted local, day-to-day, liaison affairs with the Chefs de Gare with whom they worked.

The third category, that of physical, operating techniques--corresponding, to complete the parallelism with the purely operating part of a railway company: the maintenance-of-way, shops, control and operation of trains--was the untouchable prerogative of MRS. It maintained its own technical liaison connections, besides making use also of the Chefs de Gare insofar as their duties concerned yard and stations operations. (12).

When there was a shortage of power for loads destined to the North of Paris, and a surplus of locomotives assigned to Eastern hauls, it was most difficult to undo tie-ups by diversion. Even when agreement had been reached, the love of organization would come to the fore. A call from Gare du Nord requesting power from the East system was very properly referred to a referee in the person of the District Military Commissioner (DMC), who explained the unorthodoxy discussed above. When it appeared possible that the desired loan might be negotiated, despite tradition, he was asked to call the Est to make arrangements. His reply was that such procedure would be irregular; that it was necessary for the Est to initiate the action by calling him. The locomotives were finally obtained but with the lack of dispatch which red tape always means. (13).

In instituting service the French Liaison officers were particularly helpful to MRS men, in some cases to the extent of most hazardous undertakings. When in the summer of 1944 General BURPEE ordered Captain BARR,

of the 750th ROB, to make a jeep reconnaissance of the rail lines toward Brest from the Head of the Brittany Penninsula, the Captain was accompanied by two French officers familiar with the terrain and system. When the vehicle underwent shell and machine gun fire and was destroyed, the two Frenchman were killed (I4).

The French 'Chef de Gare' system was conducive to taking matters in to one's hands. Instead of controlling cars through from origin to destination by a central headquarters, the official in change of any of the Legion number of Junctions and yards was given control of the cars in his geographical domain. The troubles which the historian Wilgus describes as besetting 1917-1919 operations on this score were still with the Americans. With the best intentions of getting a wagon back to the port clearance point awaiting it, the local czar at a station well inland could and did order it loaded with a civilian shipment slated for that direction. Then came delay: switching, loading, marshalling. The consignee's reception track might be just a shade off the quickest route. Then to the further delays of again switching, and marshalling, as well as unloading, would be added the running and waiting time for the extra mileage. (I5).

Wagons were thus delayed two to three weeks. For reasons explained later, it was almost impossible to trace them, especially those without load. When shortages forced a checkup on the part of U.S. officials, diverted cars were quickly returned or replaced through liaison pressure. But the slow-up at ports and main depots would already have been felt in the form of congestion at those points and lack of supplies, both military and civilian, in the interior.

'Borrowed' locomotives were another and even more aggravating problem. A missing locomotive meant not only one load left without conveyance but a whole trainload incapable of movement.

On the Cherbourg-Paris line, the gradient and heavy loads eastbound required more power than runs west back to the major port. Consequently, engines were daily returned west light, i.e. without trains. Almost daily one or two failed to show up at the Cherbourg end, having been delayed by the French Railwaymen to haul civilian trains intermediately or to do a shift at a hard-pressed marshalling yard. Sometimes a locomotive might be diverted to a branch line and its whereabouts discovered only when its absence caused U.S. men to compare the actual with the ordinary counts of power at Branch points. (I6).

If a French train were loaded and ready to move, the 2nd Military Railways Service made a practice of hauling it with these west-bound extra engines. But it was not fessible to allocate them regularly to this task.

This liability to disappearance made it necessary to dispatch all locomotives running light over the Phase I line, over which American personnel could exercise the most supervision. As was the case with the

wagons, 'lost' locomotives were promptly and apologetically returned when their whereabouts had been discovered by U.S. checkers, but the repetition of such occurences did not seem to embarrass the Societe Nationale Chemins de Fer Francais (SNCF), for the problem still persisted.

It was incomprehensible to the average Yank railroader that diversion should be so popular with our Gallic Allies, because these same co-workers had such set ways about confining their own machines to one established run. It was a sort of sacrilege to them to schedule an engine between two termini it did not customarily serve, just as engine crews objected to operating over other than their accustomed section or anything but their regularly-assigned locomotive. Familiarity with the terrain and characteristics of another division, and knowledge of other types of engines or variations of their own type, did not mean that the French driver (engineman or engineer to the American reader) thought it natural he should be ordered out of his routine.

Consequently, when there was a shortage of power for loads destined to the North of Paris, and a surplus of locomotives assigned to Eastern hauls, it was most difficult to undo tie-ups by diversion. (16).

Train dispatching on Phase III lines often disregarded the High-level agreement that military traffic should have priority at all times. Thinking that a passenger train could clear more quickly and thus free a section of line for more movement, the French controllers delayed many American supply and troop trains to pass one of their civilian passenger trains. Poor facilities, inadequate equipment, and overcrowding more often than not made these 'varnishes' fail to meet their schedules and created further, unforseen delay to American loads. (17).

So accustomed to these halts did the GI trainmen become that they came to regard any stopping of their trains by the "Frenchies" as a plot to hold them up. Distrust was frequently without foundation; the investigation, started by a frantic call from a junction, revealed that there was actually congestion on the line or a breakdown further along. This 'crying wolf' was time-wasting and poor for morale.

Accustomed to rigidly-fixed schedules and well-defined running rights, the French guards (as trainmen-brakemen are called) refused sometimes to believe it necessary to get out in the cold or rain to protect the rear of the train. One incident of several resulting, was a collision on the night of October 21st in 1944. Running on a heavily-used portion of the Druex-Argenteuil line and moving slowly because they knew they were following another train closely, the Yank crew rounded a curve near the junction Plaisir-Grignon to see a guard waving his lamp frantically and to realize that the end of his train was too close to be spared. Brakes set, the crew 'hit the cinders', which is the railroad saying for jumping from the train, and avoided being killed or maimed by the crash which followed, and ruined wagons, damaged the locomotive, and clogged up the line three hours.

Had the second train not been moving at a slow speed, the results would propably have been fatal . And had the French guard been back around the curve, adequately protecting the train as ordered, there would have been no accident .

Operations were sometimes hindered by that Gallic love of easy living which is so galling to the American, forgetting some of his own least complimentary traits. In one loading station of the Paris region, the provision of a much-needed switching engine did not entirely solve a bottle-neck, because the locomotive was absent from noon to two P.M. Its French crew were driving into Paris every day for a leisurely lunch.(I7).

French guards eager to get home after the end of a run, left the train the second it came to a halt at a division point, taking their documents and reports God-knows-where. U.S. RTO's and station agents found it impossible to rely on them for a wheel report such as American conductors turn in on their trains, indicating any cars that have been set aside at way points, and the general history of the train for the portion of its journey under their control. Attempts had been made several times to secure this help from the French operatives, but their assent, after careful explanations, might mean a report, or several, of varying degrees of accuracy, then confusion, and no more reports.

Coupled with this inability to get reports from the train was the vast confusion of the reports from the French offices. There are, in the French systems, so many different junctions and yards where trains can be divided and sorted, and re-routed, that the absolute routing of a car or shipment, on paper, from origin to final destination,was not feasible. Even if such were not, the 'Chef de Gare' system previously referred to would make differences between plans and actual movements. Block grouping of cars, enabling a number to move as a unit and making for simpler documentation, was impractical also both for the above reasons and because greatly varying gradients and standards of power equipment caused such a variety of tonnage capacities on the long hauls from ports to forward depots. (I7.)

The net result of being strapped so far as obtaining accurate information was concerned was that tracing lost cars and shipments was next to impossible. The complexity of the railroad movements meant that cars were lost, and pressure from the Armies, interested in a particular shipment, overdue, meant they had, on many an occasion, to be traced. Without records this was a tremendous and time-consuming task, usually fruitless, since the sought-for cars turned-up for unloading before they could be located by tracers.

Another result of the trouble experienced in documentation was that pilfering, the breaking open and diversion of cars enroute, was the more difficult to note and control. Various systems of accounting for shipments and wagon movements would have to be standardized.

While we are subject of pilfering, it might be mentioned that American soldiers were not the only guilty ones. Military Police reports indicated that a goodly proportion of the dirty work was done by civilians, with French railway men sometimes partners to the crime. (I8)

The newest member of the Transportation Corps, ETO, family, the Ist Military Railway Service, found the cooperation of the railway men and civilians in Southern France more active and of more benefit than any encountered in its wide experience through North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. So skilled were the operatives of the Sud-Est lines of the SNCF that Phase I operation was skipped altogether and schools established to ensure the highest proficiency, with an advanced type of locomotives, under Phase II (I9).

It would be unfair indeed to write so much of French Transportation's shortcomings without adding that the greater part of the time the agencies performed good and valuable service for their American Allies, service without which the war could never have been won so quickly. It must be remembered that there were shortcomings on the American part as well. In the discussion of overall planning in the Section of Control and Planning Division it has been pointed out how U.S.- stipulated tonnages were sometimes not actualities because of the complicated L's of C, the lack of an efficient depot system, and the inability of the Services of Supply correctly to forecast their needs. Services' problems often led also to more reconsignment and storage of loaded rail cars than was customary in efficient railway operations; and this confused and annoyed the French railway men. In order to be sure of having enough power and wagons to meet an emergency expected or imagined an American movements man might over-order annoying the hard pressed French with the sight of some idle equipment.

Let us not forget that French systems of control and operation were efficient for them, no matter how antiquated and unmilitary they might appear to Americans. In a country with short distances, a dense railway net, and a predominance of short hauls, the local nature of the Chef de Gare system worked well in times of peace. The writer recalls his own supercilious mixture of pity and amusement when first he saw, in the Gare d'Austerlitz, one of the large passenger terminals in Paris, brake vans- a sort of passenger train caboose-being pulled in place by a pulley system, operated by a little gasoline baggage truck or by hand; An American terminal did that sort of thing with a switching locomotive. But when the American thinks over such a case, he reaches a sounder feeling. A Nation scourged by war has few locomotives to spare for anything that can be done by some other agent. Europe is a continent of many men and few natural ressources whereas America is just the opposite. The United States especially has been able to and does use machines for many things that are as well done otherwise,. And, finally, in that crowded station. Track space was saved and passengers spared the noise and danger of extra locomotives by a simple device.

Temperament is a quality people do not determine for themselves. It takes all kinds of people to make a world, and that very independance of spirit which the American so admired, and for the existence of which they were locked with a vicious enemy, was so strong in the Latin French that they could never be flatly told what to do, if it disagreed with their own ideas, and be expected to do it. Accustomed to centuries of doing with what is on

hand rather than developing new resources, the Europeans have very sacred ideas of traditional methods; the which it is better for men from the new World to learn to understand than always to seek to change, though there is no intention to disclain in any way the tremendous accomplishments of American initiative, resourcefulness, and spirited drive.

During the quarter of the year under survey, the U.S. hospital trains were frequently run to Boulogne, a port under French control, to shorten the sea voyage to the base hospitals in England. Liaison coordinated this project with smooth efficiency.

Early February brought merger with SOLOC. Details of how things were done in that part of the world are given in number one of Appendix 2, Part II. In mid-February the DCOT for operations desired to know why certain RTO's were issuing technical instructions on railway matters customarily handled by strictly railway personnel. Movements pointed out that this had been done only in Phase III territory where the absence of any MRS men made it necessary for ATO's to liaison with the SNCF on such things. (20).

23 March 1945 was the date on which Brig. Gen. STEWART, DCOT, assembled the various controllers of rail transportation facilities in France to essay ART (Allocation Rail Transportation), a plan by which all rail movements in France would be allotted monthly in due proportions to U.S. British, French Military and French civil needs. It was an auspicious affair, but it accomplished little more, so to speak, than 'break the ice) for reasons apparent below. (21).

With a map showing all Major railway lines used by the American and British military in France, and with a chart indicating the tonnages estimated necessary to satisfy military needs between each important station Brig. Gen. STEWART explained that Movements division had coordinated the estimates of the MRS and of the British and French military. What was necessary now was the submission of the French civil bid. The total would then be compared to capacity for each proportion of line; and, if it was in excess, each party to the use of the section asked where it would cut tonnage.

The General spoke in English; and a liaison officer was obliged to translate for the directors of the SNCF. This hindered the exchange of ideas and wasted a good deal of time, but it also permitted healthy discussion within each group without the necessity of being polite about what might be overheard. (21).

The Commissaire militaire des Chemins de fer, Gen, BERGER, (holding a position akin to the U.S. Director General, Military Railways), expressed himself as satisfied with the arrangement and O.K.'d the French Military bids. But then the conflict began. Who, asked the French railway men, has submitted the capacities of the lines as they appeared on the chart; they had never seen the figures before and certainly did not agree with them. Brig. Gen. STEWART replied that a liaison officer, Major GAUEY, had cleared them through the offices of the SNCF. This apparently meant next to nothing to the directors; It was something that should have been brought more to their attention. Thinking they were perhaps not impressed by a Major, Brig, Gen, STEWART, later in the meeting when mutual exasperation had had a chance to grow, stated that he himself would come to the SNCF offices to get an agreement on capacities and bids. The French chairman demurred that would hardly be necessary; he himself would have one of

his subordinates compile the necessary facts. The General responded that he would too, but that he wished to accompany that officer when he came to the French Offices. This was too much for the chairman, who signified to the interpreter that he would be there to meet the General. It all cast an interesting light on the two approaches to the subject: The DCOT was mostly anxious that the whole traffic scheme be carefully weighed and its facilities allotted. The French railway executives were not so keen on being obliged to commit themselves on the exact capacity of their system; and, independent as the French are by character, they resented having to regiment all movements. They were getting away with shipping some things and borrowing some equipment that might not fit into an overall regulation, and they doubted the Allies' ability to stay within the bids they made, for which doubt they had some grounds from experience.

To get on with the details of the meeting, the French claimed that the method of measuring capacity in tons was not customary to them; They measured in terms of rail cars. Brig. Gen. STEWART pointed out that the tonnage included personnel moves, counting troop trains 400 tons, and that the OCOT, was willing to change all the computations into cars, and re-submit in less than a week- a considerable job for the Movements Division. (21).

Not simply cars, the French then complicated, but kinds of cars; and not simply cars from junction to junction. If one car were to carry one load from Cherbourg to Rheims, that must be indicated, not implied by simply counting the car in on moves from Cherbourg to Evreux, to Creil, etc., to Rheims. The whole problem of determining line capacity was most complicated and difficult depending not only on the number of tracks and sidings but also on gradients, maximum tonnage allowances over certain bridges, the availability and condition of power and wagons, and the amount of stopping and shunting to be done -- to name some of the factors. The U.S. representative expressed his sympathy with the problem but restated his willingness to use French methods of computation.

The member of the Conference from 21st Army group next gained the floor and explained the system used in Belgium, putting it forth as an easy way out. Capacities and bids were computed from car turn-around, based on number of cars and time required to load, travel, unload, and return.

Brig. Gen. STEWART did not think this the time to change systems completely and expressed himself rather curtly as thinking the BELMOT system fine for Belgium, but; 'Let's get on with what we have in mind here! Col CASE , ACOT, Movements, who was in attendence, said later he agreed with the French that their movements were too complicated and there were too many of them to be treated with the over-simplicity which he thought characterized the BELMOT doings in that respect.

The Directors of the SNCF now raised another obstacle. They desired to review all the bids submitted before even starting on theirs for civil movement. They had been scanning the chart all during the discussion and had noted for one thing that the moves from Cherbourg were an increase over former military estimates, whereas all stated plans had indicated a decrease there. Then, as a move to conciliate, they offered to effect immediately the detailed scheduling of all strictly military trains. (21).

For that the General thanked them, taking advantage of the momentary coordiality tried to 'slip over a fast one'. When the capacities had been

trans....

lated into types of cars and types of runs (local or through), he assumed the SNCF would trim civil needs, if necessary, to what could be hauled after the military needs had been satisfied; they might close the meeting with the understanding that the OCOT's bids were accepted, with minor alterations.

There followed a dramatic, but to the Anglo-Saxon, amusing sequence. Heads close together and with gestures and grimaces which outdid a Hollywood characterization, the directors conferred in a pitch which hardly the interpreter could follow. At the other end of the room, the General waited, not comprehending the discussion, for a decision,. Finally the French nodded solemly to each other; and the chairman turned to the waiting General and said emphatically, 'Non'.

The meeting went on. The French explained again the difficulties of computation, this time in reference to submitting their civil movements bids. To the American question as to whether these could be prepared to meet the re-submission of capacities and bids 3 days later, they replied that it would be impossible to prepare their bids, on reviewed capacities, for April; they would try to do it for the following month. (21)

Whether the French were stalling for time because they did not favor the program, or whether they were simply exhibiting characteristic thoroughness and lack of working speed, are matters difficult to determine. The program certainly bogged down that day, though it did not fail entirely, as the next month's AAT activity, to be described in the next Quarterly Report, indicated. The conclusion difficult to escape, however, is that the Supply Movements Program and the multiple L's of C in a large and busy section were not conducive to such an overall plan as had been successfully inaugurated in Southern France and Belgium. And such a plan lacked, in France the High-level authority necessary to bring pressure to bear with political force.

An example of American difficulties in sticking to their forecasts came up at the month's end. Movements Division was finding it difficult to leave the Seine Waterway as much to the French canal people as much had been agreed partly because French bargees certainly took their time about getting their craft up and down river, but partly because barge movement of ammunition had to be increased— the rails were overloaded and many rail moves to Ordnance Depots in the Supply Movements Program would have to be interpreted as emergency channels only. An effort was on to get six regular daily barge sailings on the Seine for U.S. shipping (22).

II. PROBLEMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL BRANCHES OF THE DIVISION.

The sum total of this Section V will try to present the work done by Movements Division, but again the reader is reminded that many activities were not completed by any one hand. Just as it is difficult to say what was purely the result of labors in Freight Branch touching upon the ETO's passenger problems also, so it is difficult to distinguish between the Supply Movements Program's control by Control and Planning and that exercised by the Regulating Section, Freight Branch. And hardest of all is to say how much of the credit for the successful traffic movement goes to the different echelons of its control and actual work on it. We must again conceive of the team; 'the necessary transportation' would never have been furnished had not the field personnel-

performed; and it would undoubtably have been badly confused and bogged down had not the Headquarters people planned and coordinated it.

Freight and Passenger Branch were both dependent on that basic operating unit, the RTO (See number 2 of Appendix 2, Part V). Shortage of these men has already been described. It was a persistent problem, however, which reappears constantly in the history of the Freight Branch; and it is discussed under that heading, even though it supplies equally to other branches, because the major part of most RTO's work dealt with supplies.

In late January the field operators, conferring at the OCOT in Paris, complained that they were losing people right ant left, from installations already undermanned, to the reinforcement centers; even highly-skilled personnel were being taken. Movements' spokesman reasured them that new expedients were being worked on, such as hiring a number of English-speaking French to perform duties at stations, depots, and yards. One of the Section Transportation Officers requested that some of these be enlisted personnel as he wanted people who would' get out' and do some work'. Commissioned officers of the French Army were excellent administrators and commanders; but their old code, based on pre-revolutionary principles, was hardly conductive to their walking along tracks checking car numbers, which task American officers often found themselves performing. (23).

I. FREIGHT BRANCH.

Reorganized by its capable young Chief, Maj. J.F. SEIBERLING, this key branch took on the job of implementing and overseeing the Inland part of the new Supply Movements Program, instituted reforms to old services and brought in new, and carried on its traditional task of supervising the enormous transport system that was western Europe's railways, through-highways, and waterways. It had in addition to contribute its part to the post-war plans for redeployment and the occupation of Germany.

Ia. Plans for Current Operations and Reforms in Control.

General discussion of the functions of the RTO's and consideration of proposals to alter their status and the organizations which controlled them are found in Number 3 of Appendix 2 Part II. Commenting on these ideas, the Chief of Freight Branch added that high rank for certain key commissioned RTO's was designed to put persons responsible for movements at important depots in good position on the staff of the depot commander, making it possible for Transportation's views to be forcibly presented and for certain directives, which the men of the other Services did not particularly like, to be enforced on the spot, without recourse to higher echelons, where sufficient TC rank would be present. It was assumed that these higher field grades in the Traffic Group TO's (tables of Organization) would be reserved for officers of marked ability and not filled merely with anyone who had been a certain time in grade (24).

Early in January the COT announced that a special fast freight service would soon be established between Normandy-Naumur (later Aachen, for the Northern Group of Armies) and Normandy-Verdun (for the more central). This train would makeup at Cherbourg, with not more than 20 cars, daily, and would lay-off and pick up at Paris to a consist of not more than 20 cars for

each of the designated termini. Only critical items of high priority, with emphasis on L.C.L. (less-than-carload, ie; package) freight would be hauled on this service. In the event a priority had to be established between the Services using the train, G-4 would be consulted. Movements wrote the SOP covering this operation, and a contest among the enlisted personnel brought out the name 'Toot Sweet' (a play on the oft-heard French expression for ' immediately' - ' tout de suite'). (25).

For more concerning the inauguration and operation of this service, the first of its kind in the war, see part Ib, 1a of this subsection, also Chapter IV this volume, under Military Railway Service.

In late January, MRS suggested that an embargo be placed on trains to Reims. Congestion of miscellaneous freight there was so serious as to interfere with passing through trains. Freight Branch had to study the situation and report on it to Maj. Gen. ROSS. (26).

This report, plus the fact that some other information conflicted, itself, caused the General not to favor an embargo. Attention to the sore spot soon cleared up inflammation. (27).

Failure to check trains and to give information forward to destination caused many difficulties. Movements had constantly to check the operations of BTO's in this respect, though most of them performed this part of their duties faithfully. From the 27th January to the fist part of February reports built up on the shortcomings of the office at Charleroi, western Belgium. Not checking on trains there, headed toward Gembloux ADSEC, meant that main line freights not scheduled to stop there were delayed as much as an hour and forty-four minutes while cars destinations were checked. In several of these trains cars were found consigned to Charleroi or to depots for which that station was the cutoff point, adding to the delay of the train and clogging main tracks while these cars were cut out to be back-hauled. Moreover, all trains from Charleroi were arriving without notice, causing considerable confusion to schedule. (28).

This sort of thing would ordinarily have been checked and acted upon locally by the section Transportation Officer. But this was an inter-section affair; Charleroi was under control of Channel Base, whereas Gembloux was in ADSEC. As complaints built up, the OCOT had to investigate the ADSEC assertions and bring the Charleroi agent to task. (29)

The sweeping arrangements for overall traffic control in Belgium which transpired in early February came to Movements action when on the 6th the G-4 Con Z, Brig. Gen. JAMES H. STRATTON, requested that personnel be provided BELMOT loading points for the Control Movements. Plans for the detailed movement of this essential item were also required. In compliance, Lt. Col. A.C. BONNAFFON was assigned to assist Belgian Branch, Control and Planning as a Movements representative and 12 officers and 30 enlisted personnel were sent to augment BTO representation, and marshalling yards for each group of mines to make up cars from the tipples into trains for the same general destinations (30).

In mid-February occured an example of the Freight Branch's constant alertness for new and time-saving additions to traffic facilities. They recommended that the Railway bridge connecting North and South Rouen be re-

built. Only the span had been destroyed, but no plan, so far as they had been able to ascertain, existed for its rehabilitation. It was pointed out that direct crossing of the Seine there would expedite the Shipment of cargo to the North and East as trains made up on the Left Bank would not have to be routed through Paris. Furthermore, commodity loading of trains would be facilitated as partial loads on the Left Bank could be joined with their compliments, discharged on the Right, to proceed in solid car blocks or trains to their identical destinations. (31).

Mail, that high priority item for morale, was freight of a special kind, In no other war have American troops been kept so closely in touch with their homes than in this; and the speedy dispatch of mountains of mail bags to a thousand Army Post Offices was a tremendous task in itself. A new and even better mail movements program was discussed at the month's end with the Section and Port Transportation Officers. (32).

Ib. Work Performed

(I) Supplies.

Mail handling is described in Number 4 of Appendix 2 Part V. The emphasis was on more and faster schedules, details of one of which are shown, and extension of Service to new destinations. Responsibilities of the Port and Section Transportation officers were outlined and were , in brief: seeing to the coordination of rail and truck service, liaisoning with and

1. MAIL ARRIVES AND IS



2. LOADED ON BARGES AND TRUCKS

3. ALL CONCENTRATE ON MOVING IT

4. TO THE WAREHOUSES

5. TO THE TRAINS

PREREQUISITE FOR "MAIL CALL"

In the year since D-Day the Transportation Corps has handled millions of letters and packages, guaranteeing a high standard of morale for our troops.

6. FOR UNIT DELIVERY

7. AND DISTRIBUTION

supervising the loading and unloading by the A.G.'s Postal Division stressing the use of rail over motor wherever practicable, and insisting on the full use of trains up to the 400-ton limit prescribed (by filling up any leftover space with passengers, priority freight, pilferable items--since all mail trains were guarded and the short supply of guards must be used to maximum advantage).

Mid-February saw also a detailed survey of the traffic facilities of an area. Lt Colonel N.E. SMITH, and Major E.M. TROLLINGER visited Le Havre, Rouen, and the Red Horse Staging Area, the Section of the ETO most concerned with personnel movement, and their report on same is Number 5 of Appendix 2, Part V.

From Belgium came complications in early March. In Charleroi some pilotless aircraft found their targets and brought the difficulties already known in London, most markedly in Antwerp, and in Liege. The RTO's there complained there seemed to be no division of labor; they had to do everything, including supervising canal draw-bridges. (33).

In France there was some trouble over the peculiar, to Americans, rules on private railway sidings. A marker near the switch was the point beyond which road engines could not pass, making shunting about some depots and private factories complicated-- in this period sheet steel, rubber, canvas and cotton were being shipped to French manufacturers to be processed into U.S. Army goods. (33)

There were, consistently, deficiencies, in Phase II and III operation by the French These had to be reported and investigated, for it was no good to deal in generalities with this very exact race of men. A daily report met the Freight Branch's surveyal, a typical example of which is given as No.6 of Appendix 2, Part V.

Many where the demands for transportation. While every effort was made to supply all needs, the line between short supply of facilities and demands not absolutely vital had sometimes to be drawn. For example, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer requested on 24 February that trucks be furnished (10 four-tons) for a month to haul coal to french manufacturers of identification panels. The round-trip was Lille to Paris and return. This letter was answered by an endorsement to G-4, Com Z, pointing out that TC did not have the necessary trucks and suggested that the movement be placed in the regular coal program for rail. (34). Movement of coal by truck was against Freight Branch policy, especially when trucks were hard-pressed on a heavy program and in moving bridging equipment to the Rhine.

Number 7 of Appendix 2, Part II, is an extract from the Daily Empty Car Situation Report, one of the many running reports for which the Operational Records Branch served so well and with which Movements Division kept itself 'au courant' on the situation at the varied ports and depots. From the report for this day, selected at random in an attempt to give an average view, it can be seen that it was difficult to make requisitions.

and numbers supplied equal. Whereas Antwerp had 990 cars on hand at 1800 hours, 26 March, and had only ordered 805 for the 24-hour period, only 510 of the 805 ordered were recieved during the period. Of these only 157 were high-side gondolas, of which 465 had been ordered, although the requests were pretty well filled in other types. If the scene at Antwerp might have been thought of as only fair, rather than bright and sunny, that of Ghent was cloudy and threatening; only 103 cars were on hand; 485 had been ordered for the period and only 227 delivered. Only 152 highside gondolas had been received, as opposed to 450 ordered, some attempts at makeup having been made with 21 undesired flats and 19 more boxcers than requested. All these situations had to be corrected; but they always reoccured for the same old reasons; shortage of cars and delays in unloading.

Looking at another typical daily report we find a general picture of how the railroads were moving trains, with special emphasis given the delicate Belgian car return situation (see No.8 of Appendix 2, Part II). This 27th March showed a shortage of 206 wagons not returned at the border, with 10 trains waiting to move. The rest of the page looked pretty good, except that someone would have to find out why 11 trains, with 584 wagons under load were waiting at Verdun and why 41 of the 86 military trains awaiting movement on the Continent had been waiting over 24 hours. There was a pencilled note not reproduced on this sheet reading; Restrict inter-depot movements to the minimum--so the cause and solution of most of the difficulty are seen at once.

(a) Non-Perishable Supplies

One of the first Toot Sweet expresses ran from Cherbourg the 26th January, carrying 127 tons of emergency rations to the Namur area, as well as one of the small shipments in which it specialized; 1/4 ton Engineer IV supplies to the Provisional Regulating Station of ADSEC. For Verdun it carried 111 tons of rations and 2½ tons CWS (Chemical Warfare Service). At Paris a ton of Engineer IC was picked up for Namur and 140 tons of rations for Verdun. Off to a flying start, the train ran steadily after that, though either the Liege or Verdun, section was sometimes cancelled for lack of special tonnage. (35). The engine and cars bore the big wheel-and-shield insignia of the transportation Corps and were especially marked 'Toot Sweet'. The author felt the excitement of this train's thundering through a suburban station, whistle cord down, as it harried, its 20 cars off toward Verdun and the front.

On the 3rd February the Office of the Chief of Ordnance raised quite a rumpus over the failure of the Transportation Corps to move Class II supplie of their service from Cherbourg according to program. It was pointed out that for the nine-day period 23 to 1 February the movement had average 236 long tons per day as contrasted to the 600 allocated. The backlog dumped near the port was not being diminished and items critically needed by the Armies were tied up in the impromptu and disorganized stock pile. This information was all being furnished G-4, Papa was being told what Jr. had failed on (36).

Freight Branch answered over Colonel CASE's signature that short-

age of cars had ruined all plans, but that everything was being done to alleviate this difficulty and reduce the stockpiles. To show the Ordnance they had had their share of what had been available this response indicated that 47 percent of their Class II schedules had been moved; the proportion for all Services was only 52 percent. And during this period, 100 percent of Ordnance Class V had been shipped right according to target, despite car shortage and other difficulties. To divert cars from other ports, closer to the front, than Cherbourg, would merely mean longer turn-around time than ever and tie up the empties situation tighter that its existent impossible tightness. It was hinted that the Ordnance was somewhat at fault for having not complied with the spirit of the program, putting so much stuff in at a port so far removed from the using area. (37).

On the 7th February MRS brought up a typical example of Services' infraction of the sound laws of transport. QM had had supplies back hauled from Antwerp to a depot 50 miles southeast of Paris. These should have been discharged at Cherbourg or Le Havre-Rouen, or they should have been fed to a forward depot. Movements followed up the report and made strong efforts to put a stop, once and for all, to such shipments. (38).

Washington's birthday brought memories of Valley Forge, so far as most buildings in the great cities were concerned. However, the 'Stars and Stripes' of that day carried the warning news that coal from Germany, the superior coal, was beginning to move into Belgium and France, and another and very heavy burden had been added to Freight Branch'list.

Just prior to this time, DCOT Brigadier General STEWART had asked for a general statement on the empties situation, to which the answer was that boxcars had been hard to obtain at all northern ports except Rouen and Antwerp. The barge situation, hampered by freezing and floods, had been further hamstrung by the bargees' unwillingness to come within buzz-bomb range, though many of them of course did. Lt General LEE had not failed to notice several hundred boxcars not hauling freight but being used rather to barrack railroad men of the MRS. MRS promised to recheck this situation and move men into huts wherever that was feasible. (39).

Regarding protection against pilferage during motor transport, the answer was felt to lie in improved documentation and physical counts by the drivers of their loads. This would involve three different counts by different drivers because of the shuttle system on the ABC route, but it would be well worth the extra time and labor.

Questioned on the congestion at Lunes, N.E. France, which was in the limelight as a new makeup yard, Movements answered that an officer had been sent to make an investigation and his report would constitute their best reply. (39). It was a policy to find out what made things tick on the spot, rather than to make decisions from ideas conceived on the Champs Elysees, far from the sound of panting engines and hump-

ing cars.

In early March some controversy occured over allocation of space on the 'Toot Sweet'. Though the amount of mail the A.G. wanted on the train was small it nevertheless took up space, and the AF was instructed by G-4 to bid for space just as did all other customers, with the assurance that necessary mail would be carried and at a priority which the Supply Staff Section should determine. (40).

Valentine's Day might have been confused with the 4th of July by the special type of move Freight Branch found on its docket at that date. MRS reported a trainload of rockets would have to have special routing and Movements was directed to check up and follow through. (41)

There was a large volume of Movement of supplies between depots and installations in the U.K. and also of supplies which were purchased from civilian sources in the U.K., in addition to the movement from the ports to depots and installations. In order to prevent the overloading of depots and installations, and traffic congestions which would result in embargos, a survey was made of the capacities of each depot and installation relative to their ability to receive, unload, handle and load cargo via each mode of transportation (42).

To accomplish the enormous volume of movement of supplies to and from depots without overburdening or causing congestion and undue delays by tieing up transportation facilities, it was necessary to maintain complete and accurate information of the actual tonnage movement from and to all points, broken down by the method of transportation. Reports consisted of statements of imported shipments, showing the name and number of each vessel, port of discharge, due date of berthing and the tonnage of each vessel-- broken down by service and destination. A record of future movements of supplies purchased from British civilian firms, broken down by origin, tonnage, and date available for shipment, and the destination was also furnished. These moves were coordinated and all moves between depots of twenty-five cars or more had to be cleared by the Base Section Transportation officer with the regulating Section of Freight Branch , OCOT. These moves were fitted into the overall transportation movement planned from ports to depots and from British civilian firms to depots.

It was necessary to know daily the actual condition of each depot and installation. This report was prepared by the RTO and transmitted through channels by telephone each night to the OCOT, stating the actual days operation at the depot and the condition of the depot as of 18 hours. This report showed estimated number of cars en route, actual number of cars received, cars spotted for unloading, cars unloaded. cars reconsigned, and cars in depot area awaiting spotting, number of cars loaded, dispatched and awaiting dispatch, and the number of empties on hand, In addition to this report, the railroads also furnished daily

a statement of the loaded cars on hand and en route to each depot and installation. These reports enabled the Regulating Station of the Freight Branch, to know the exact condition of each depot and installation at all times and placed them in a position to request diversions or take other corrective measures in sufficient time to prevent congestions and the necessity of placing embargoes against depots and installations. The report which showed cargo being imported to the U.K. was thoroughly studied; and where the services had allocated more tonnage to a depot or installation than past performance indicated depot or installation could handle, prior to the arrival of subsequent convoy, Freight Branch called the instance to the attention of the service concerned and requested they divert a portion of the tonnage to another depot or installation. (42).

Because of the accurate information available to the Freight Branch. Service generally complied with the Freight Branch's request. However, in a few instances where because of the nature or type of the cargo, the Services contended that it had to go to destination originally designated, it was necessary for the Freight Branch to call upon G-4 for assistance in putting pressure on the Services to comply with Freight Branch's request. Closest Liaison was necessary with the British Ministry of war Transport and civilian transportation concerns, in order to accomplish the enormous movement of supplies via limited transportation facilities available in the U.K. Through the cooperation of all concerned, a greater volume of tonnage was moved than had ever been anticipated without any transportation agency or military installation being overburdened.

Possibly the one most important factor contributing to the successful movement of the enormous volume of tonnage was the efficient centralized control of the British railroads whereby each train was scheduled from point of origin to destination prior to loading of rail cars and, with but a few exceptions, these schedules were maintained.

The tracing of carload and less-than-carload shipments was a difficult task. The British railways did not maintain interchange records of car loads or records at transfer points of LCL shipments. However, because of the wholehearted cooperation of the British railroads and their employees, good results were obtained in the tracing of carload and LCL shipments.

The railways were also very helpful in disposing of carload and LCL shipments which were discovered by the railways to be without proper address or other information necessary to make delivery of cargo to its proper destination. On such shipments, the railways submitted to the Freight Branch, OCOT, markings, approximate weight, cubage and any other information they were able to develop which would assist in identifying the shipment. Freight Branch in turn referred the information to the appropriate Service for disposition instructions and then relayed the proper consigning information to the railways.

The transportation Corps did not have a single tank transporter under its control. The movement of out of gauge equipment was extremely

Branch, upon completion of the vessel's loading, listing the SSI numbers (shipment Serial Index numbers) which were added to or left off when the vessel was finally loaded. This idea was abandoned in favour of a more rapid courier system of forwarding ships papers from the U.K., which was made possible by the improvement of weather conditions after the end of the winter season. (43)

For Toot Sweet Exppess, bids were received thirty-six hours in advance by the Freight Branch, which accepted all bids up to the total capacity of the train and referred any surplus bids to AC of S, G-4. It became evident after a few weeks of operation that few of the supplies which were being moved were of a critical nature (that is, urgently required by the Armies), and gradually the express service was confined more and more exclusively to the movement of mail. This express train provided a means for cutting down transit time of mail from ports to the Armies.

With the advance of the Armies into Germany, reports as to loaded freight cars received and on hand in the Army areas became less and less accurate. As an index to the car situation in the Army areas, increasing reliance had to be placed upon Military Railway Service reports showing cars held back on the lines owing to congestion. Throughout the month of March, the cars on hand in the Army areas and held back owing to congestion showed an increasing trend resulting from the tendency of the Armies to order more than could be moved forward through transportation bottlenecks into forward areas. (43).

The U.S. Army Transportation Corps was more or less in the same category as an ordinary shipper as far as rail transportation was concerned in the United Kingdom, therefore, a great number of claims arose in which OCOT did practically nothing. A Claims Section was set up with one officer and one civilian, and an attempt was made merely to scratch the surface as in collecting on loss and damage claims, but absolutely nothing was done to prevent the loss of U.S. property while in transit. It is agreed that if everybody had done their job correctly, particularly the Ports and Depots, wagons would be sealed, G-980s would be forwarded from the consignees, and proper checks would be made on receipt of cargo. However, a great amount of traffic was pilfered or never arrived at destination, and with this, a Claims Section of one officer and one civilian could not possibly cope with the situation. Compared with the vast amount of tonnage which the U.S. Army shipped in the United Kingdom, and with the great known loss of cargo, an insignificant amount of claims in dollars and cents was recovered. The recommendation after all would be that where the U.S. Army Transportation Corps does not use its own Military Railway System for the transportation of Army cargo, but uses a common carrier system, a fair sized Claims Prevention Section should be set up, not only to recover monetary losses, but to prevent shortages and pilferages of Army cargo. (44).

1. AFTER SHIPBOARD EXAMINATION

2. THE FOOD IS UNLOADED

3. AND MOVED FORWARD

MOVING FROZEN FOODS

The great refrigeration system of the Transportation Corps . . . make it possible for soldiers thousands of miles from their initial source of supply to have fresh meat and vegetables regularly. . . . . .

4. BY REEFER TRUCKS

5. AND TRAINS

6. TO THE WAREHOUSES

7. THEN TO UNIT TRUCKS

8. AND THE CONSUMER

b. Perishable.

The report in the following paragraph indicates the amount of movement which the sub-section in charge of 'reefer' moves controlled and expedited.

From Ist January to I5th February, 59, I20 tons of perishable freight were discharged at the Ports of Antwerp, Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Rouen, for an average daily discharge of I,285 tons. The commodities were from the following vessels; 7 full reefer ships discharged 27,644 tons of fresh meats and butter; 3 personnel ships discharged 5I2 tons of fresh meats; 24 general cargo vessels discharged I5,355 tons of fresh fruit, eggs, cured meats and cheese, and I4 coasters discharged I5,609 tons of fresh vegetables. (45)

During the period, 5I,I95 tons of perishables were moved from ports to forward cold stores and depots 28,925 tons were moved by rail in 2,250 cars, which was an average of I2,8 tons per car. 22,269 tons were moved in 4,I37 trucks, with an average of 5,4 tons per truck. The daily average depots was 630 tons by rail and 484 tons by truck. (45)

The special trucks of the reefer fleet were used as much as possible on these moves; but it was often necessary, in exceptional channels, to use the rails. In early February, a reefer ship was allocated to Cherbourg rather than to Le Havre and the waiting QM reefer trucks because Cherbourg needed ships while the other port had too many on the ticket. The frozen cargo went over the rails to Paris. (46).

At the conference between Movements men of OCOT and those of the field, held in the afternoons, following the monthly Supply Movements Meeting at 52 Champs Elysees, there was a request by the Antwerp Transportation Officer that a 3,500-ton truck movement for April be changed to barge. This was denied on the grounds that the goods to be moved were perishable and must move by faster means' Perishables always had dispatch. (47)

c. POL

At the meeting described above, it was also requested that 300 tons of gasoline for depot Q-I79, Hirstal, be changed to barge haulage; this was O.K.'d. (48)

At March end, the POL sub-section was busier than ever. Again the American Armies were hurtling forward faster than railroads could be built or reconditioned. The MTS trucks were slowed by the poor Tarvia roads; but, despite the bottleneck of the Rhine crossing, were moving 4,I00 tons per day. The Remagen bridge , rail-fed to the west bank, had a pipeline laid across it delivering fuel to a canning point on the East, from which 'WXYZ' trucks carried the familiar jerricans forward to Army dumps. (49).

Difficulties having been foreseen and the fact that it was a lack of gasoline which had stopped General PATTON's Army at Metz, have been remembered plans for Airlift were well-made and went- right into effect. I,500 gallons per day were being flown to forward airfields, sometimes still under sniper fire Because the Northern airfields were not always large enough for the heaviest loaded planes, a special train was laid-on to hasten the petrol from Antwerp to the great Paris fields. (49).

Ic. Plans for Operations in Germany.

In this Field the job of Movements was to take the overall plans made by the Control and Planning Division; and, working within the frame-work of existing German organization as drawn up by Intelligence Branch, figure the details of movement control and how much and what personnel would be required Most of the data on this has already been discussed in those sub-sections of Section II, this chapter, which deals with occupation planning. Certain other more detailed features are brought up here.

At the conference for orientation of officers who would be concerned with occupation, a representative from SHAEF G-5, Economics Division, sketched the overall movements picture for the proposed American Zone-- Southwest Germany. To conduct successful operations, the military district commanders would have to provide the inhabitants with basic, minimum food supplies. This would require imports, because both the part of Germany in which the U.S. Armies would be operating tactically to complete the defeat of the Reichswehr and the later administrative area barely supplied their native populations with food in the best of peace years. Most food was produced in Eastern Germany, the Russian sphere of influence, or imported from the Balkans, Scandanavia, and South America. (50)

As for industrial shipping, there would be items required for export to aid in conducting the war against the Japanese. Some primary needs of the German population would have to be satisfied, and employment furnished, to avoid unrest, expressing itself in riots. Industries were scattered in Bavaria and the other Southern provinces. They would have to be fed coal, of which there was so little in the region that most would have to be railed in from the Saar and Ruhr, if they were to satisfy the demands stated above and play at all their old and important role in manufacturing for consumption in the liberated countries. It must be remembered that German industry had been the score of European economy and could not be eliminated without serious complications.

Wood, of which there was plenty, would have to be moved locally to feed the textile factories; the wool blankets from the looms of which would be in demand by the Armies and the displaced persons. Much of it would go by barge and train to the other German industrial areas and to the liberated countries, engaged in rebuilding what the terrible struggle had destroyed. (50).

Assisting in this movement would be trucking, upon which more em-

phasis was laid in the American scheme then in the German set-up, because both rails and barges, the big Haulers, were quite likely to be 'Kaput' The German Highway system, the Intelligence Branch's speaker explained, was the second most dense in Europe, although that density was thinnest in mountainous Bavaria in the U.S. realm. Of the I,860 miles of Autobahnm the most important were the Berlin-Munich, the Frankfurt-Erfurt, and the Karlsruhe-Salzburg; 75 feet wide with two carriage-ways for opposing traffic, these express roads would serve our MTS well. The regular, Ist-class highways were 3I feet across; and only I0 percent of all the roads were less than I5 feet wide. Administration was controlled by well-defined local political headquarters and would be easily taken over, although most of the controllers would probably end up in prison camps. Motor vehicle (commercial) distribution in provinces with which Americans would ultimately be concerned were as follows;

Berlin	- 36,000
Bavaria	- 38,000
Wurtemberg	- I5,000
Hesse	- I8,500
Bremen	- 3,300
Total	-II0,800,

of which about 36 percent would be found in the U.S. Zone proper.

It was estimated that less than I0 percent of these would be over 3 tons capacity and less than 5 percent above 5 tons. Less than 20 percent would be privately owned, while only 8 percent of any busses which might be still usable would be of that category. (5I)

On the second morning of the Conference Colonel HUGH A. MURRILL, Chief, Control and Planning Division, reminded the 'students' most of whom were movements men, that the new cells of organization for occupation would be largely of a novel type and quite a shock to normal military organizers. There would be movements experts attached to and traveling with the Armies as they swept across the Reich and who would be quickly detached, when same Armies, moved on to other delimited zones, and would be attached to the new-coming administrators, temporary or permanent. This would involve international attachments too; a group would go with the Canadians who took Bremen and with the British into Hannover and Hamm, where it was hoped a large stock of railway equipment would be captured intact. U.S. organizers must make provisions for British personnel to be attached to them in the Ruhr and French in the Saar and Southern Rhineland. To get down to details, a 'blueprint plan of action must be immediately provided for the Regulating Group ear-marked to follow the Army of General PATTON (52).

Organizational details had been discussed earlier in a much smaller conference of March I6th, when it had been foreseen that during the interim between which a conquering Army had moved to further goals or its occupation al position and the time that an interim or occupational organization had moved into replace, the transportation staff of the original Army would be missing, having gone forward. Therefore the TC nucleus which was to organize the area's facilities and begin the control .....

of its movements must be temporarily augmented. So far as augmenting the staffs of the Armies' themselves was concerned, the increase should only include the movements men who would stay in an area, becoming the administrative--as contrasted to the tactical--portion of the later Military District staffs. In this connection, Colonel WHITTLE, Transportation Officer, 12th Army Group, requested small Regulating Groups, oversize in officer strength. (53)

To return to the orientation conference, the newly-appointed Chief of the Disarmnament Branch, USCCC, outlined the heavy traffic which his subject would require. The secondary phase-control of German military equipment and plants-would involve transport personnel more than might superficially seem the case, because the Army there had gone in for much organic transport--even armored trains, etc-- and had extended its control over much transportation which would ordinarily have been thought as of civil. (54).

The final phase would involve the dismemberment of fortifications and the disposition of armaments, heavy loads from any point of view.(54)

During the open forum which ended this conference of the 20th-21st March it was pointed out to the gratification of all, that Com Z had made plans to repair all rail in Germany which was found in any reparable state. The men of movements were also reminded that there were many trucks with cranes to facilitate rail-truck interchange of cargo. Finally, they were asked to remember that any kind of a siding or yard with team tracks and turn-around space was preferable to plain 'end of track' for the switchover from rail to truck. It was better to sacrifice a few miles of trucking, if they meant a well-organized railhead. (55).

Id. Plans for Redeployment

A part of occupation would be concerned with redeploying equipment, both American and captured German, to the ports in the liberated countries for shipment to the U.S. and the far reaches of the Pacific.

The planning for redeployment discussed under Control and Planning, Section II, Chapter V, opened up great problems for Freight Branch; all the inland transport would be their headache, their achievement. Much detail in this subject will appear in the next Quarter's HISTORY, BUT the theme was already sounded. At a late afternoon conference, hastily-called to confront the rising tide of foreseen difficulties, Colonel CASE, the ACOT, Movements, Finally said wearily and simply; 'It just amounts to this; all the junk we hauled into this theater has got to be hauled out' It was a service way of saying what Sherman did for the tactical with his 'war is hell' For all concerned, no matter what skill and fortitude are exercised, the results are the same; waste and weariness.

.....

I°. Freight Documentation.

Documentation of rail traffic in the U.K. tied in completely with British military practice. Prior to the arrival of any U.S. units, the British railways were quite experienced in the handling of all types of military traffic, and British Movement Control had instituted the use of certain specific documents to cover such moves. U.S. traffic moved under similar arrangements with the exception that car labels were added of a distinctive type in order that U.S. traffic might be quickly identified throughout its course. In general, with the British transportation system as efficient as it is, and with no language difficulties to be surmounted, documentation of freight traffic did not present a problem. Experience there pointed out an axiomatic truth; namely that military documentation should conform to the maximum degree with that practice with which civilian railways were familiar. (56)

Although contacts were made late in September with the French railways with the idea of instituting a uniform system of rail documentation [redacted], the negotiations were prolonged and it was not until I January 1945 that intructions finally reached the field RTO's as to the required documentation called for by our agreement with the SNCF. The result was that TC stood unable to give accurate verification of figures for tonnage moved prior to I January 1945, whereas the British, profiting by their experience earlier in the war, were able to maintain accurate records of all tonnage moved over civilian carriers. The British maintained their records in the face of a lack of a written agreement with SNCF and profited thereby, being possessed of all the detailed figures necessary to effect an accurate settlement, whereas U.S. figures for 1944 traffic would of necessity be estimated.

With regard to the forms of documentation used for military purposes, it was felt that one lesson must be learned from experience here. Rail documentation was too difficult to prepare to be used solely for that purpose, and use of wagon waybills designed, to serve as tally-outs would have saved the Services a tremendous amount of time. The waybill form used in the light of changing conditions', was inadequate in a number of ways, but primarily because it was not large enough to permit proper usage. It was uni-lingual; it was devoted entirely to Transportation Corps information. In continuing its use an opportunity to benefit the Transportation Corps and the other Services was lost. (56).

In an effort to simplify car checking, a new stiff-paper card was put into use 6 February, 1945. It was large and uncolored and was to be placed near the waybill clip on the wagon, but not under the clip. Big, block letters showed the number of the ship from which the load came(these cards were used only on cars moving from ports inland), the number of the wagon the class of supply, by service (i.e., QM I etc.), the same of the railhead or marshalling point to which destined, and the depot or regulating group to which consigned. It was made out in dark pencil or crayon, and was removed upon the car's being unloaded, just as all other documents of billing. It did not replace other forms.....

in fact it made more work for the RTO's; but it made for easier checking en route and assured better handling than did the less legible and more easily lost existent forms. (57).

All the angles of documentation were carefully explained to the RTO's in the Handbook published by Freight Branch and revised at regular intervals, SHCF was kept up-to-date on changes through Movements liaison channels. Changes were almost always thoroughly discussed with the Port and Section Transportation Officers at the monthly Paris conference before being put into effect. The rub was always that new forms and methods generally meant more work for the hard-pressed RTO's and the District . Section and Ports Staffs. But Freight Branch, needing these new controls to effect better coordination, generally sold them on the grounds that they kept things running more smoothly and would. in the end, make life simpler for the field operators.

In late February, it was pointed out that the OCOT must have an accurate picture of the status and location of rail cars if it were to divert, allocate, and account for overall efficiency. The headquarters men asked that new documentation be implemented--a special mark on cars --which would indicate what cars had been consigned from ports from 1st February until the end of a period to be designated. These cars could be then reported on at passing points, at stations of reconsignment, or upon receipt at depots . (58).

The transportation officers felt this would be one mark too many for the already well-covered sides of the wagons and one thing too much for the RTO's. They reminded the OCOT that the waybill showed the point of origin and date of consignment. But, argued the office officers, waybills were hard to extract quickly and were sometimes lost. The answer was that the new mark would be lost too and would confuse checkers and French railroaders. In this case, the field men won; the necessary report would be achieved from existing documentation. (58).

Although hesitant at first on the work involved in posting the next request--the Keeping of a Jumbo Car Book-- the port and section transportation men were soon convinced of its utility and assented to its inauguration. The documentation men explained that the requests for tracing cars were difficult to satisfy and that lost waybills made the history of particular cars and shipments difficult to follow The books were of the type so long familiar in American practice, and would be furnished by the Movements Division, Great things had been attributed to them in the Bristol Channel movements area. (58).

2 Passenger Branch

It was easier to move men than freight. Major General ROSS, in reference to some sudden speed-ups in the redeployment schedule which would put new pressure on TC, said the men could 'get up and walk'. But men are also more sensitive to traveling conditions and time en-route than are goods, so the people working with Major NUFFER had

1. TROOPS DETRAIN

2. AND WALK

3. TO SHIPS SIDE

TROOPS AND VEHICLES

In the year following D-Day, the 14th. port embarked nearly . . 2,000,000 personnel and . . . loaded 400,000 vehicles, on over 11000 vessels bound for the continent from the United Kingdom.

4. FOR EMBARKATION

5. CONVOY MOVES

6. TO DOCKS FOR

7. LOADING ON LCT

8. AND MTS

worries aplenty. In this first quarter of the high tide of the war in Europe, tremendous numbers of men were brought in from the U. S., and from Italy to satisfy the enormous appetite of the Armies and the necessary increases in Service personnel which any such satisfaction entails. With the German putting up not only a good defense but also staging a brilliant and sudden counter-attack, with several smaller and less brilliant ones all through the period, it was a corollary that many Allied soldier was wounded, most of them badly enough to require transporting this particularly fragile commodity, the casualty, back to base hospitals in central France and England--some badly enough to mean the long voyage home by hospital ship.

Toward the end of March there began the hectic flow of RAIPS (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) and Displaced Persons, while certain key units were already being shipped Pacific-ward. All these movements were handled with the inadequate facilities which were always imposed; yet, within those limitations they were handled admirably. with the technical skill of specialization.

One of the biggest weeks in the passenger business occurred from the 15th to the 21st January, when a total of 99,561 persons were moved on the Continent in trains controlled by the U. S. Army. The previous record had been 89,959 for 18-24 December, 1944. (59).

For their fine work during the months of December, January, and February, the 1st and 5th Regulating Groups, which furnished most of the personnel working in OCOT, were given the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque. This honour reflected not only the Passenger Branch personnel, but to all of Movements and most of the people in other Divisions. It especially recognized the host of typist, clerks, secretaries, administrators, errand runners, and guards to whom all too little credit is given in these chapters. One is apt to become so absorbed in plans and deeds that the doer, especially in the lower ranks, is overlooked All the west movement of supplies was completel dependent upon individuals, from the Major General to the basic privates with the 'know-how', the native intelligence, the perseverance, and the strength to figure out what was to be done, to do it, and to control the process of doing.

Not including the men and women who traveled the five leave trains, 620.155 persons were afforded transportation during the month of March (60).

The Passenger Branch made certain recommended for the conduct of affairs; they were:

"1. Recommend that one theater agency be established to collect and submit to Transportation Corps firm station assignments by deadline date specified in published documents pertaining to troop arrivals.

2. Recommend that a permanent Troop Train Commander pool be organized under direct control of the Transportation Corps for utilization on

all personnel trains.

3. Recommended baggage details be selected and educated at port of embarkation.

4. Recommend port installations be augmented by inclusion of sufficient space to stage both incoming and outgoing personnel.

5. Recommend A.G., MRU, be responsible for the preparation and distribution of an accurate Unit Station List.

6. Recommend that future planning include a definite allocation of rolling stock and locomotive power for the movement of duty or leave personnel. Equipment uncovered in liberated or enemy territory should be controlled, so that satisfactory supervision can be maintained.

7. Recommend that representatives from Military Railway Service and Foreign Military and Civilian Transportation Agencies be assigned for duty with the Movements Division, OCOT." (61)

2a. Plans for Current Operations

The year opened with the commencement of a study to determine the possibilities of using Le Havre for the evacuation of casualties. It would involve less of a train ride than to Cherbourg from the front. However, it was found that the development of proper facilities there would be too difficult, and the port was already heavily committed to the movement of other personnel. (62)

In compliance with a request by the COT for a forecast of the flow of personnel through Le Havre-Rouen during February and March, the Passenger Branch gave these figures to the DACOT, Movements:

	February	March
U.K. (United Kingdom) to Continent:	144,323	108,492
Direct from U.S.	71,740	98,015
Total	216,063	206,507
U.K. Leave returnees	14,000	21,700
Grand Total	230,063	228,207
Daily Average	8,215	7,361 (63)

The actual import for February was very close to forecast, 208,258 being landed. (64)

By early March, the forecast for that month had increased slightly to 263,954. (64)

At the February Monthly Supply Movements Conference, to discuss plans for March, the afternoon agenda carried three items in which Passenger Branch plans had had a hand. The first was a strong request

to field sections to report all moves laid-on in addition to those programmed, including passenger trains at the rate of 400 tons per train. The OCOT knew there were many more movements than those shown as tonnages versus scheduled targets and desired a record of them, particularly to show full tonnages transported to interested parties. (65).

The second matter was a call for comments on and suggestions for the newest RTO handbook. The large number of trains carrying reinforcements and the increase in leave trains had brought up new problems to the red brassard wearers.

Finally, it was pointed out that the enemy had known far too much about U. S. troop movements of late. Both evidence siezed by Intelligence and, the successful increase in submarine activity pointed toward this. The Section and Port Officers must be more careful than ever about discussing numbers and names on the telephone. The Oise Intermediate Section representative was asked to explain the code used in his territory whereby the numbers, names of key points, services, and Class of Supply could be easily designated. Others were enjoined to use this or a similar code, or to refrain absolutely from discussing secret moves over the phones. (65).

Asked to make a critique of Passenger affairs' handling by the OCOT, the Transportation Officer of ADSEC wrote the following:

"Centralized control is not properly implemented.

(1) Rail personnel movements - Base Sections of origin attempt to set up movements without knowledge of complete schedule or routing. This is due to Phase III operation, but the result is that this headquarters is not advised on either point on moves into Germany. (66).

(a) Again, units are moved into forward areas without notice of to whom they are to report so that there is no way of notifying the receiving unit. Improvement in this regard has been noted.

(b) No information comes to this office through technical channels as to the size of movements of RAMPs or Displaced Persons.

(2) Passenger documentation is behind the times. Belgian railway officials, attempting to set up a procedure for handling US and British personnel, pointed out the lack of US documentation; and our present system is make-shift at best.

Recommended:

(1) That effort be made to obtain a greater interchange of movement information between OCOT and Section Transportation Officers, more effectually to accomplish central control and, more importantly, to accomplish effective coordination; that information be as accurate and specific as possible and disseminated far enough in advance to effected

agencies to obtain the necessary coordination; that interchange of essential information be periodically reviewed to assure that operational requirements are being met and to eliminate any procedure that are no longer effective or required.

(2) That telephonic request for action be confirmed in writing where desirability is indicated. " (66).

2b Work Performed in Connection with Movement of

(1) U.S. Military Personnel.

Passenger Branch made these general constructive criticisms:

"1. Because of extreme difficulties in obtaining U.K. station assignments and sufficient time to allow advance planning for troop arrivals. considerable confusion was experienced in establishing firm train schedules and completing billeting arrangements, Consequently, on several occasions units arrived at assigned stations without proper arrangements having been completed. (67).

2. Due to late arrival of vessels or delayed debarkation, numerous changes were encountered which effected train departures from ports of debarkation; and frequently last minute alterations of destination caused diversion of trains enroute.

3. The selection of Train Commanders from the troops traveling is unsatisfactory, as normally the persons selected do not have the background necessary competently to execute the duties and responsibilities of a Troop Train Commander.

4. Baggage details designated from units at ports of debarkation to accompany baggage to unit stations in the U.K. were not properly instructed in segregating baggage belonging to their unit nor in the fundamental precautions necessary for the safeguarding of baggage enroute.

5. In the shipment of personnel from the U.K. to the Z of I, many War Department directives were not strictly adhered to as the lack of staging areas in the vicinity of ports resulted in moving troops direct to ships' side which did not allow sufficient time for port commanders to inspect baggage, complete a physical inspection of personnel nor prepare required documentation.

6. Backlogs of personnel in Replacement Depots and transit areas became prominent as the majority of rail equipment was devoted to the movement of supplies. Consequently movements of reinforcements to units in Army areas were somewhat hampered." (67).

Major NUFFER, Chief, Passenger Branch, Felt the greatest accomplishment of the quarter was the movement of soldiers through Le Havre-Rouen into the Red Horse Staging Area and on to the forward reinforce-

ment depots. (68). Red Horse area was a series of camps east of the Seine ports where personnel were staged, i.e: processed for operations and 'married' to their equipment, and sometimes vehicles. It was also the scene for processing some personnel waiting to be redeployed or sent on leave to the U.K.; and late in March it began the outward movement of RAMPs.

The Red Horse land is shown on Chart III this section; and a detailed report of the area's entraining and detraining facilities, ably prepared by the Movements' French Liaison section, appears as Number 9 of Appendix 2, Part V.

Heavy movements increases in late February were not by an increase in rail coaches, SHAEF, which was usually taking away cars from the U.S. military, reported happily in this instance that three sets--train units of 15 coaches--were available at Calais for use at Le Havre and promised an additional 100 coaches as well. (69).

A side note on the administration of Red Horse was obtained by the comments of a TC Colonel from the 12th Port who was on his way to take over operations there and stopped to say goodby to the Chief Control and Planning, engaged in a conference on plans for German occupation, 16th March. The Colonel joshed that he might be in a tight spot, since he would have 4 bosses; the COT, General AURAND, Commanding NBS, one other Birgadier General, whose finger was in the pie, and Colonel WHITCOMB, the Transportation Officer, NBS. (70).

A large number of trucks were employed in the Red Horse operation and presented some sought-for additions to hauling by motor elsewhere.

The figures for personnel landed on the Continent (Number 10 of Appendix 2, Part V) include all persons, but the majority were U.S. Military. Again the majority of those brought in through Le Havre, and Rouen went through Red Horse, so that the figures--217,550 for January and 208,258 for the month following--are fair indication of the big job done there.

Another heavy move was that of the 1st Allied Airborne Army from rear assembly areas to forward fields of departure for the great Rhine offensive crossing of late March.

A cross-section of the type of work done by the Branch can be seen by looking at the Daily Activity Report they submitted to the ACOT, Movements for the first day of the new year. Arrangements were made for the movement of six hospital trains. Fifteen main numbers were furnished to Sections for trains moving across Sections boundaries, coordinating and uniformly designating the moves from origin to destination; and teleprints were dispatched informing all parties concerned. A study of Le Havre facilities has already been mentioned in a previous part of this discussion. The final item was one of those interesting little vignettes that make life complicated. A special

train for Lt. General LEE, the Com Z Commander, was to consist of a buffer car and a sleeper. Someone had made arrangements with the 2nd MRS, but the station of departure for Dijon, Gare de Lyon, was strictly French-operated; and the usual confusion of channel-mixup bid fair to prevent the sleeper's being spotted at that station. The matter should have been from the start, and finally was, handled by the OCOT Liaison section at St. Lazare station. The train steamed out at 2205 hours, as scheduled. (71).

There were the customary complications both ways, moving troops, Reinforcements to the front had meal stops, when they spilled from their '40 and 8's' and covered the passing tracks and station areas, inviting constant danger from other through trains and shunting operations about stations and yards. General ROSS ordered strict compliance to schedule on meal stops. Some French engine drivers simply moved the the train when they themselves were ready, leaving behind troops and, in one unfortunate case, killing a soldier who was caught unawares by the sudden movement. (72).

The special kitchen cars of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command had to have special attention. Unlike ordinary cars, which had no comment on sitting in yards or sidings until an engine could be found to get them on their way, these wagons were the dwelling places of a crew of cooks. Any delay at all--unless in the Paris area--brought complaints from them to their headquarters, which immediately complained directly to Com Z Headquarters and brought sharp remonstrance to the COT.

Regarding the other directivesn the CBS complained that personnel trains were arriving with little or no notice from their originators. With all the complications of meals and billets, an unannounced arrival was both embarrassing to the traffic men and hard on the passengers. All concerned were told to get information through. (72).

Still, said, Colonel L.A. AYERS, Transportation Officer, COMAD, brightening up the picture, there was an advantage to having unannounced troop trains over unknown freights. The troops made a racket and their commander certainly let one know a train was there; action could be initiated immediately. Freight cars, on the other hand, could n't talk; they just lay around until one found out--sometimes unhappily late--that they were on hand.

There were some unfortunate accidents with troop trains, but comparatively few, and much less than in the last war. In January alone 193,823 U. S. Military Personnel, were moved by rail on the Continent by Passenger Branch. (73). For some picture of the type of moved being made in late February, see Number II of Appendix 2, Part V.

(2) Allied Military Personnel

During January the total of 7,053 men and women of this category handled consisted of:

I,783 British
3,653 French
I,568 Polish
52 Czech (73)

Mention has already been made of the big movement of British personnel known as GOLDFLAKE. On March 5th, Movements reported a meeting with SHAFF on this Marseilles- North sharing of the main L of C up through France. The discussion was primarily concerned with railway, although some trucks would be used. 21st Army group favored the periodic use of two trains, each carrying 800 persons but Passenger Branch felt this an under-estimate of need and reserved the right to make up the extra lift in vehicles. TC and 2I st Army Group were both pretty well in agreement on the whole arrangement, SHAFF putting its lid in on only the administrative portion of the program.(74).

It was a problem to feed this extra load into cars already overdemanded and over a system which was strained to the utmost. But the troops were to force the Rhine; and they were moved there without hitches.

As the Armies pushed into Germany, they uncovered the filthy, barbarous prison camps of the Nazis, with their Allied prisoners of war, many Allied political deportees, and millions of slave laborers. The RAMPs, the emaciated and confined men who had been so unfortunate as to have been captured in combat, were the first concern. Passenger Branch took these men over from the Armies, helping to feed them, house them, and move them by train and truck to and from the air-strips, where liaison arrangements were made to fly them well back into Com Z or to the ports in the big transports which had flown forward with POL and emergency supplies. Then they had to be flown on home to Britain and the U.S. or they became the direct responsibility of TC to send back by water.

At the orientation Conference of late March, a survey was given by a SHAFF officer on what the problem of RAMPs and others would be; and it was explained that the complete SOP on handling them was at the time being reviewed at Com Z Headquarters. The Section Transportation officers commented rather caustically that they were eagerly awaiting instructions, insomuch as the Advance Sections were already receiving hundreds of these people daily; Oise intermediate Section's representative said he was quite in the know on the problem too, since those handed to ADSEC were immediately handed on to him.(75).

(3) Civilians.

The total of this passenger handled over American-controlled rails in Europe during January was 5,673 and broke down into these amounts.

Dutch 175
French 560
Russian 2386
Polish 2552 (73).

Displaced persons were ordered to stay where they were when freed, until full arrangements could be made for screening them to make sure no Nazis escaped among them and for delousing, immunizing, feeding, and housing these miserable by-products of cold Nazi- axioms. But they did not, many of them, obey the order. Their long homesickness and misery expressed itself in their migration, using a possible means. And one could not find the heart to throw them off returning trucks and trains even though they created an operating hazard and delayed schedules somewhat.

(4) Hospital Patients.

Questioned as to what he felt was the greatest problem his branch attackled during these first months of 1945, Major HUFFER, its Chief, decided that no difficulty caused more trouble than inability to keep heat in hospital trains. These trains were of special and excellent construction, but they were often too long for old and somewhat leaky French locomotives both to pull them and fill their steam pipes against the sharp winter cold. There were cases of the pipes in the cars freezing and bursting, spilling water over the cars, so that blankets hanging from the lower stretchers froze to the floor. Either through ignorance or through a selfish and thoughtless determination to make speed, the French enginemen on occasion shut off the steam to the train as soon as they were clear of the terminals and would have no check stops for some miles.(67).

Several remedies were applied. Explicit instructions to enginemen were rigorously enforced. Extra French engines were added, despite the scarcity of same and steam boosters were applied to American locomotives. The boiler cars necessary on the trains running over electrified portions of line were coupled onto steam trains.Still the problem remained vexing and never was completely solved. (67)

At the end of January, OCOT, had to request the forward Sections to give quicker and constant information on the departure of hospital trains. The great number of casualities and the difficulty of accommodating them near the front had created much demand for the trains; and the Office of the Chief Surgeon kept as close trace of them as possible to keep them constantly employed. It was embarrassing to Passenger Branch to have the Medical men telephoning about a train's arrival when the OCOTor Seine Section had not informed of its journey. Furthemore, and more serious, not knowing of arrival time might mean no power ordered for the completion of the trip on to Cherbourg or base hospital; and keeping wounded soldiers lying in a Paris station for a couple of hours more than necessary was not part of the program. Granted communications were always overworked, every effort must be made to keep all parties completely informed on where the long trains marked with the broad red cross were moving. (76)

In the wintry month of January, 91,509 patients were moved in these trains. (73) At the OCOT Daily Staff Conference of I6 February Movements Division was instructed to obtain information on which to base.

1. PATIENT ARRIVES

2. MOVED TO TRAIN

3. MADE COMFORTABLE

4. HOT FOOD AND

TRANSPORTATION OF WOUNDED

The prompt evacuation of the wounded from the battle areas to Base Hospitals in the U.K. and the U.S. is a triumph of modern military movement. The Transportation Corps Hospital Trains and ships have moved 230,114 patients from the Paris area 86,720 patients to the U.K. and 88,684 patients to the U.S. in a period of four months.

5. MEDICINE PREPARED

6. TRAIN SPEEDS TO COAST

7. PATIENT FERRIED TO SHIP



8. AND HOMEWARD BOUND

March, April, and May evacuation program, then to insist that the War Department inform exactly what steamship lift would be furnished, so that the formed needs and facilities could be known.

On 21 Mar the arrangements for evacuation of U.S. casualities throug the little channel port of Boulogne were complete ; and the first train was headed that way. This movement should have commenced earlier, but was not required because of the implementation of a new medical policy of holding patients on the Continent for 60 days' treatment before evacuating to the U.K.. From the U.K. patients were theorectically sent home after 90 days had not or would not render them fit for further duty; but the availability of shipping sometimes reduced or lengthened this stay . (78)

Some idea of the Variety of destinations and number of hospital trains moved in a 6 day period can be gained from Number 12 of Appendix 2 Part 5.

(5) Prisoners of War.

During this quarter, this problem increased measurably, due to the rapid advances of the Armies and the breakdown of German morale which made Hitler's soldiers more willing to be captured than to die for Der Vaterland.

One interesting angle was the exchange of prisoners through Switzerland The movement of five trainloads of German prisoners from the steamship " Gripsholm" at Marseilles to the Swiss border required special planning and supervision with the Ist MRS, Swiss Government, and Swiss Railways, as did the return via the same route, of an equal number of our recovered troops for embarkation. (79)

In late January the 16th Port reported that the GFRC (Ground Force Reinforcement Command officers at CBS raised a question over the point that TD (temporary duty) personnel guarding general prisoners in transit were not to be armed. Passenger Branch contacted GFRC Headquarters in Paris, which in turn asked for a comment from G-I, Com Z. This office assured that certain personnel need not be armed; and embarkation commenced with only a scattering of guards with side-arms. (82)

In January 23,218 POW's were hauled on the Continent trains under US Control . (73). In March a directive, in the makeup of which TC assisted and which ordered full compliance with all existant TC technical regulations, was issued to cover the movement of POW's. It is reproduced as Number 13 of Appendix 2, Part V.

(6) Baggage and Equipment.

Handling this type of cargo was hindered by difficulty in obtaining proper addressing. As there was a definite need to publish information disclosing unit locations it was decided that a locator card file would be compiled from all sources of information. Great diffi- .....

culty was encountered in securing current data and attempts were made to obtain locations direct from Chiefs of Services, but this proved to be futile as their own files were also incomplete. Originally, it was planned to utilize reports of arrival instigated by unit commanders upon arrival at new locations; but the plan never materialised due to the intricacies of the communications system. Letters were also dispatched to all headquarters requesting that OCOT be placed on distribution of all material concerning the Location of units including station lists published by Base Sections and Chiefs of Service. Thus information was extracted from cables, movement orders or any other documents which passed through the section and finally a list was published listing the units in serial number sequence to be used principally in identifying force-marked equipment and supplies. (81).

In late February an informational report on a visit of the Inspector General to Rouen stated that baggage unaccompanied by the owning officers was not properly documented and was a long time following them to destination. Mention of an SOP on baggage handling set Movements on the scene to discover whether the Transportation Officer at the port was aware of same document and what efforts he was making to comply with it. (82).

A little earlier they had started a big movement of foot lockers from the U.K. to a new QM depot, Q-290, at Polombray, near Reims. Major General ROSS was particularly interested in seeing that this project went well, referring to the dealings with footlockers as 'canned dynamite'. He wanted assurance that there was a depot ready and capable of steady reception once the flow started. (83).

ACOT CASE reassured the COT in an inter-office communication that the Depot selected had adequate capacity and could unload forty cars daily; 52,600 pieces, including foot-lockers, handbags, bedding rolls and Val Paks, were being loaded at Liverpool and would sail February 19th. This would pretty well clear out the stock of baggage in the U.K. addressed to the Continent. QM has already designated the ships guards who would accompany the load to depot. The ship was due at Antwerp, the port nearest the depot, 23 February, where out-movement of one train per day was scheduled. (83).

(7) Leave

A substantial portion of the troops handled through Le Havre were on leave to the U.K., and the port was handling a few lucky individuals going to the U.S. on the rotation policy. Of the estimate of men to be landed at the Seine port in March--263,954--25,613 would be returning from a well-earned vacation in the British Isles. (84).

The boat train, revival of the Famous English-French service of pre-war days, was put into service on the 15th January, carrying 29 officers, 12 enlisted men, and 35 civilians from London to New-Haven on the Southern Railway, then by express channel to Dieppe, and

on to Paris in a special train of the Ouest System, French National Railways. The vice-versa facilities carried 122 passengers. Soon running to capacity on its every-other-day schedule, it was changed to a daily service the 21st February and had by March's end, totalled almost 30,000 passengers on 1st list. Allocations of space were handled in London by the District Transportation Office, U.K. Base, and in Paris by the Transportation Office, Seine Section, with overall coordination emanating from London. (84).

The regular leave program began the 4th February with 2 officers and 55 GI's (the favorite Army term--now on this war--for enlisted men; the initials stand for Government Issue and the idea is that since practically every item used by the Army is of that category its soldiers are too). Soon there were 700 soldiers pouring into Southampton every two days from Le Havre; they went by special trains, one-half of them to the capital and one-half to various other places of interest in 'this seat of kings'. (84).

In the Continent the planning for the inauguration of 6thbr-leave trains kept passenger men busy on this important business of keeping up morale. There were special accommodations in the French limited's from Paris to Marseilles and the Riviera. From Paris to Brussels there was a space space on a daily special run by the British. The Riviera was also served from Aachen, for the Northern troops, and from Luxembourg City, while from this last favourite place there was also a special train to and from the capital of France. As soon as conditions permitted a train was also laid-on between Paris and the old Alsatian capital Strasbourg.

These trains were made up of the best equipment the Americans could obtain and started out clean, and scheduled to stop for hot meals. They did not break any speed records, because European railways had still not been repaired to pre-war standards and operations were still dependent on overworked locomotives and lines crowded with war movements. Unless the cars were well-marked and carefully watched they had a way of disappearing and turning up later in a French civilian train; but many a soldier had a satisfactory ride to and from a most refreshing furlough.

The trains for the Armies were mentally started in mid-February when Brigadier General STEWART brought up the fact that the service would be demanded and instructed Passenger men to find out how many trains would be needed , routes, and how the train paths and power would affect the Supply Movement Program. (85).

By the 24th of that month, MRS had done its job of completely scheduling the operating details; the cars would begin rolling March 1st. Movements Division was charged with keeping the DCOT, Operations, informed on their progress, (86). Quotas were derived from G-1, Com Z, and allocations of space made by Passenger Branch.

Late in March the French agreed to run leave trains to the South and MRS was instructed to liaison for the proper arrangements. (87) These were running by the 27th, when the COT assigned an OCOT officer to ride one of them to the Riviera to report on its operation. This step moved the Marine Operations Division to report that all was not too smooth on the Northern service to England. Organizations were a little loath to sign '7-day' furloughs for their personnel, when same were actually gone an average of 20 days. The planned time was 15. Passenger Branch took its defense behind the statements that the motor transport service to Le Havre was sporadic and over-burdened, while congestion occurred at the port itself because leave craft were only sailing every two days. (88). Soon corrections on both these items picked up the speed of the travel.

2c. Plans for Operations in Germany

In addition to the many demands already foreseen for TC in Germany, there were special passenger transport needs. The 400,000 troops in the Army of Occupation would have some moving about to do. It was anticipated that 70,000 American prisoners of the Germans would be liberated, requiring the fastest possible movement to hospitals, ports, and the home land. By June, the best estimates went, there would be 1,300,000 enemy POW's who would have somehow to return to their homes or be distributed about where work demanded their hands. (89)

The Representative of POW Branch, G-1, SHAEF, at the large late March Conference, explained the set up of German prison camps and cages to show how the U.S. forces might expect to uncover them. However, he added that estimates on the number of troops were likely to be inaccurate, as the Germans were very slow about getting information through Switzerland and many of the prisoners were farmed out in small groups to farming communities and small works, so that the count for particular camps might not be correct for that particular area of the country. Hospital trains and other special facilities must be ready for perhaps 50,000 of the 100,000 men, being marched on starvation rations and improperly clothed, west across wintry North Germany ahead of the advancing Russians. (90)

2d. Plans for Redeployment

Over a million German POW's in the U.S. would have to be returned to Europe and distributed to the many towns and hamlets from which they had originated. (89). The number of men somehow connected with the Reichwehr would total 10 million, and their demobilization would be a big movements job. (91)

Shipping was presumed to offer the bottleneck in moving American troops to the Pacific and home, but there was already the shadow of coming events in that certain TC movements units had been looked on greedily by G-3 for redeployment, when their present rulers throught they

were essential to the out-movement of combat and other Service troops, Most of the Divisions would depend to a large extent on Railway movement of personnel; and the ticklish arrangements of when these men would move from unit area to assembly or Port Staging Area, and from Assembly Area to the latter, were in the air.

3 Operational Records Branch.

Under the very competent control of Captain G.M. ACOMB, a staff worked on a 24 hour schedule getting out reports by which the situation in the field was made clear to the OCOT operators. Each monthly meeting had prominent in its agenda reforms in forms for reporting this data into Paris by telephone and confirming teletype. At the end of January, the Branch proposed new columns for the car-loading reports which give a clearer picture of the actual number and character of cars being loaded but not billed, billed but not marshalled, and ready to move. The Transportation Officer, I3th Port, balked at reporting cars billed, by class of Supply, arguing that such reporting was too detailed and time-consuming to be worth the information it would render. He won; the column was struck out. (92).

At the meeting for March, several new form were proposed, some of them to replace old, others to aid information necessary to further coordination from headquarters. Two old forms; No. 2 'Inbound Daily Railhead and Depot Movement Report' and No .3, 'Outbound-same' would give way to three new ones; No 4 DRM (Daily Depot Rail Movement Report), No 5 DTBM (Daily, Depot Truck & Barge Movement Report), and No 6, DDD (Daily Depot tonnage Dispatch Report). Copies of these new forms and the instructions sent out to Sections and districts to assist in their implementation are given as number I4 of Appendix 2 Part V.

Form 6 was the newest departure and inaugurated to give Freight Branch essential information with which to stem the mounting tide of secondary moves and reconsignment of cars. It was designed to show breakdown to principal destinations at principal inland installations, the method of transport subjected to such inland moves, and the amount of tons and number of cars affected, as well as the principal Services offending (93).

Forms 4 and 5 replaced 2 and 3, combining inbound and outbound movements in each form, but making a separation between rail on the one hand and truck and barge on the other. There was much discussion of the value of certain columns in the new form 4. A Seine Section man said that to give the real facts wanted for column C— cars on hand in local area—he would have to count in the whole Paris maze of sidings and yards, since cars for his depot were often considered delivered when line congestion actually meant they were well away from the depot proper and would not move to unloading tracks too complicated Colonel CASE, ACOT, Movements, thought this was making too complicated thinking on the problem. He said sarcastically he supposed some depot RTO's would count cars 'all the way from Paris back to Cherbourg' but that he hoped common sense would confine most of them to local count, The instruction sheet for filling out the form stated this count should

be obtained from the railroads and checked by balancing it against two other columns. (93).

Column I became a very hot issue. It asked for 'loaded Cars Assisting Waybilling' One of the field men stated that since the MRS did not consider a car loaded until it was billed, the column would mean nothing, the COT's desire being that the rail reports and depot's tally. However, by having a car loaded but unbilled, the depots could claim to have fulfilled their loading obligations yet actually have the car on hand in storage— the old wheeled warehouse deal. The RTOs might overlook this activity, being actually part of the depot commander's staff, unless they were obliged by this report to count these cars. Moreover, certain Section G-4's, such as Seine's, judged depot activity from cars loaded, without regard to their billing or movement. This column would put TC on their point of view.

Column M— 'Waybilled Cars Awaiting Dispatch at End of Period— was to include, at the request of the depot men, empties which the MRS was holding prior to dispatch. If these lay around for any length of time, as they sometimes did for lack of power, the Service personnel who ran the depot complained, being always harrassed by TC to get cars unloaded to be moved back to the ports. (93).

The new forms being settled, there was further discussion on reports in general. It was brought to attention that the MRS was unable to expedite the provision of empty wagons unless figures were available showing cars received at installations as against cars ordered. Present figures were inadequate. (93).

The Port Transportation Officer, Antwerp, volunteered an explanation of his system, which was working well. He received each day a simple three column report, containing; 1) Cars on hand in quay area at start of 24-hour period. 2) Cars received during period. 3) Total of cars on hand at end of period. Each column was broken down by type of car, and the report could be compared with requisitions for the same period. (93).

In addition to the reports discussed above and several others giving daily advice to the movements controllers, Operational Records Branch produced a number of five-day reports useful to both Movements and Control and Planning Divisions in watching performance versus targets as outlined in the supply Movements Program. The first pages of five of these are given as examples in appendix No 2, Part V; they are; Depot Car loading Summary, IDM (Inbound Depot Movement Summary), OPM (outbound Port Movements Summary), ODM (Outbound Depot Movement Summary), and depot Car Unloading Summary. The examples appear respectively as numbers I5, I6, I7, and I8, I9 of this Appendix. All are for the period ending I0 March.

There were still over jobs. In early February the TC was committed to a daily outloading from the U.K. of I0,000 tons. Marine Operations Division had taken the necessary steps to coordinate information

with the U.K on the program, but in order to allocate tonnages, G-4 had to have the report, broken down by services. This job went to the Branch, which screened all the reports.

The following summary of activities during this period was made by the Branch;

To provide more effective control of Freight movements, a system of reporting the daily movement of Freight was established in January of 1945. The following information was telephoned in every night to the operational Records Branch of the Movements Division.

(a) Report of rail cars received, unloaded, reconsigned, and dispatch at every depot on the continent. Report was also made on cars awaiting unloading at very depot, and empty cars on hand at depots. An estimate was also furnished of the number of cars en route, based on the traffic dispatch advices received by the RTO at the depot from other shipping agencies. Transportation Corps report of cars on hand at depots frequently did not coincide with the report furnished to the Chief of the Supply Service concerned by the depot commander. Therefore, all RTO's were directed to make a joint report with the depot commander, showing figures to which both parties agreed. This report also showed the same information for barges and truck shipments to each depot (95)

(b) Detailed report of cars and tonnage dispatched from each port, showing destination of same.

(c) Report, by type, of empty cars ordered, received and on hand at the end of each day in each report. (95).

4. Administration

With a staff of clerks and typists, and with complete intimacy with the workings of all departments, Captain R.H. STRAIN JR, attended to the numerous details of correspondance, distribution, and the difficult problem of obtaining and allocating movements personnel.

This last type of activity is well shown in operations concurrent with the first windy days of March. Oise Intermediate Section was very short of Movements personnel and some would soon have to be furnished for Burgundy Base Section, a planned newcomer with the absorption of SOLOC. Some personnel would be available from the older Sections, Normandy and Channel; and Administration of Movements Division was working through the Administrative Division OCOT, to inactivate two Harbor Craft Companies to form a regulating battalio (96).

On 2nd March some fast and adroit management had worked wonders. Two detachments of the 8th Traffic Regulating Group, one from NBS and the other from CBS, would be transferred to Oise Intermediate Section and Dijon. The Red Horse Staging Area would furnish one Harbor Craft Company to be distributed throughout the Sections for training as regulating personnel. Another would be brought from the U.K. for the

same purpose. G-4 Com Z, had approved the activation of two regulating battal ions from the Craft Companies. (97).

5 Highway Branch.

The function of this important department, led by Major P.A. LUDOLPH. was to control, coordinate, and furnish information for all inter-section moves by organic transport, of troops. A good cross-section of its activity can be gained from Number 20 of Appendix 2, Part V.

Road Intelligence was a major function of the Road Traffic Branch and in conjunction with Base Sections a system of gathering essential road information was instituted, The information was secured by actual road reconnaissance in the Base Sections. It was then sent to OCOT where it was compiled and re-issued in the form of a current summary of the existing road network. Periodic reports and maps were issued, showing road network by classification together with bivouac, medical POL, and other facilities available in all Com Z territory. (98).

Specific routes in direct support of the Armies were designated by number, letter or name. As an example, the plan moving personnel and supplies from Red Horse Staging Area at Le Havre to the 1st, 3rd and 9th US Armies is offered; Routes assigned included "I-A", "I-B" and "I-C" for 1st Army, "3-A for 3rd Army, and "9-A", "9-B","9-C" for 9th Army. These routes were design ated according to their classification, bivouacs and supplies to be furnished en route, and most direct route possible under the above circumstances to the Army concerned. The Last bivouac was in ADSEC and so arranged and staffed tha it acted as a regulating area for the Army, and units could be kept there for a limited length of time Before actual movement into Army Area. Original plans called for continued flow, with not more than one night delay. Such operational plans were usually issued in the form of OCOT Circulars.

The movement of a convoy from one point to another, especially inter-section, moves, involved a varied amount of communications, both telephonic and by cable. For security and other reasons a "Key letter" system, "A" thru "U", of recording and sending information on convoys and units was instigated and issued in OCOT Circular form to all Communications Zone installations. Instead of saying over the phone, "540" vehicles, the letter used for vehicles would be given, followed by the number. TWX's were sent in the same manner. Another circular was issued allowing for poor communications. If one Base Section could not get through to another Base Section, they could call the OCOT and the information desired would be coordinated there. The only major difficulty encountered was the fact such procedures as outlined above did not apply to the Armies. As it was essential to include on distribution of TWX's all concerned, including the Army the unit was assigned to, the meaning of each letter had to be given, therefore eliminating one of the main factors involved, that of security. On overcoming security difficulties, Unit Serial Number of Code Shipment

was used often as possible, both in TWX's and in conversations by telephone. (98).

Coordination with civilian traffic authorities was largely possible through the liaison officers assigned to Highway Branch, one French and one Belgian. Both had been members of the Transportation Corps of their respective Armies, and their knowledge of the roads, together with their ability to speak English, proved invaluable in the function of this office.

To supplement the experienced personnel assigned to Traffic Headquarters throughout the Continent, Fifteen US Civilian Highway Traffic Engineers were requested by Major General ROSS. They had arrived in December 1944, and were assigned to this office for placement where needed. The plan decided upon was to assign at least one to each of the Base Sections Traffic Headquarters, at least one to the Theater Provost Marshall's Office for traffic control purposes, one to remain in OCOT as head of the Road Intelligence Section of Highway Branch, and any remaining to be placed on detached service with any headquarters or Branch of Service where their experience could be utilized toward meeting the requirements of the Highway Branch.(Such a Branch would be the Engineers, which had the responsibility of repairing and building roads and bridges.) As nearly as possible, this plan was followed.

It was recommended that Road Traffic Headquarters should be established as a separate Branch of the Movements Division, OCOT, in order to insure freedom of operation and direct contact with subordinate headquarters in the Base Sections. At one time Road Traffic Headquarters was a section of the Passenger Branch, Movements Division, OCOT. This was not a practical working arrangement and was later changed so as to establish the Road Traffic Branch as an independant part of the Movements Division.(98).

Due to the extensive road network in existence on the Continent, it was advisible to impose a minimum of restrictions on road movement. In order that the traffic mission could be accomplished under the changing conditions to which Military Traffic was subject certain fundamental requirements were essential. Flexibility, simplicity and a minimum of restrictions, all aided the circulation and control of road movements.

The use of Civilian Traffic Engineers was not advisable within the existing Road Traffic Headquarters,. It was recommended that they should be commissionnd officers in order that they might come under the direct control of the Military. In the capacity of officers they would also be in a position to participate in combat operations and at the same time have thorough background of the operation of the Army. In the capacity of commissioned officers it would also be possible to utilize the extensive knowledge of the Highway Traffic Engineers in related fields. They would also be more acceptable to sections in the field and more adaptable to military conditions. (98).

There was much planning work for the streams of convoys which re-

deployment would bring back from the East.

6 Motor Movements Branch

We may take a page from the daily activity of Captain O.H. CUMMINGs' Branch to get a cross-section of its work. 1) On the 30th January a Lt. was lost to the office, being transferred to Channel Base Section. 2) The Branch's job being to act as a motor freight forwarder, not operating many trucks but coordinating inter-section and special motor moves for transport by IBS or the Section Transportation Offices, a request from OIS (Oise Intermediate Section) to effect the move of 1,200 badly-needed truck tires from Le Havre, in a neighboring realm, was processed. Many vehicles were deadlined pending the reciept of these rubber rounds, so special efforts were made with CBS; a convoy returning to Reims the next day would carry the goods. (99).

The same day the Branch contracted involved officers in G-4, Com Z, and G-4, SOLOC, in an effort to ascertain the exact geographical boundaries of COMAD. It was found that no such information existed; but the ball was started rolling, and firm information was expected presently. (99).

From 27 February to 14 March 1,700 tons of equipment of the 13th Airborne Division a SHAEF reserve, moved by road from Rouen to Auxerre, well south of Paris, by arrangement of Motor Movements Branch, using the 27th Truck Group. Another special move, not heavy, but to diverses destinations and speeded to meet a deadline.

date, was that of some ammunition, specially-packed for dropping by parachute, to reserve dumps at strategically-located air-strips. After the close call in the Ardennes break-through, Ordnance was under particular pressure to build up such emergency reserves. The deadline was met (100).

The most complicated move arranged by the office, taking it into the province of overall freight forwarders, and making a sort of 'little OCOT' of it, was that of 400 tons of bridge pilings, 80 feet long, from Le Havre to forward dumps in Germany. They would have to make part of their journey by road and would require special equipment, while the move would cross two Com Z Section boundaries; that is how Motor Movements Branch got mixed up in this saga. The first step to save complicating rail routine and keep such dangerous movement off crowded highways was the scheduling, 10th March, to sail them by coaster from Le Havre, where they were stored, to Ghent. This was the best Marine Operations Division could offer, so they turned to Inland Waterways Division for barges from Ghent to Antwerp, the furthest-forward port.

Having squeezed the sponge of water movement, the Branch called on the Antwerp Port Commander, the Freight Branch, OCOT, and the 2nd MRS. A rail haul was laid on from the port to Liege. Special low-bed truck trailers were the only possibility fromthere on. ADSEC had some tractor units which could draw the trailers, but the only available trailers belonged to the Ordnance and were in Paris. So liaison was accomplished and arrangements were made for the tractors to come to the French capital and pull the trailers to the great Belgian dump area to meet the incoming pilings. The giant road-crawlers carried the essential bridging material right up to the little German village of Gerland, near the site of the proposed Wesel bridge over the Rhine, depositing them there just two days after the town had been wrested from the enemy. (100).

With all its good work the Branch felt it might have done more had its recommendation been accepted for a central agency to assure loads for returning convoys. It did a great deal of this sort of work and succeeded in getting through an order that all convoy commanders must check with the local RTO at destination to get a return load. But, although the convoys did report, it was often merely to say that they could not wait a day or so for such a load to be assembled. They were nearly always under orders from the Section to which they belonged to return immediately; trucks were in great demand, and each Section was afraid of losing one of its precious companies to another Section or to an Army. Had a real system been worked out such a thing as supplying food for hungry Paris would have been much more realizable.

G-4 wisely transferred its power to set priorities on inter-Section motor supply movements to this technically-skilled and well-informed Branch. (100).

7. Air Branch

Air transport of supplies for the Armies, heavy movements which would ordinarily have gone by truck or train, were first resorted to after the Normandy break-through of July 1944. With that experience in fast transportation the Armies had developed, figuratively speaking, a 'champagne taste', and with the rapid build-up of the transport fleet, including its everyday use for casualty evacuation to the U.K., the national standard became less 'beer' than it had been. With the constant increase of shipments by the Services from Com Z to the Armies, and with the sure plans of using planes to carry POL in large quantities when the Armies might again smash through the ever-weakening enemy and out-run their long L's of C, the need for transportation experience in handling air moves became more and more apparent. Movements Division was increasingly called upon to act as liaison between the shipping Services and the Air Corps, both unfamiliar with methods of scheduling the many details between a rear depot and a forward air-strip. Just as it acted as the agent to assign tonnages to railways, trucks, and barges, the Division now took on the additional duty of allocating and arranging movements for the transport planes. As with its other carriers, it had no operating functions; the Air Corps flew the planes. But it was to have a great deal to say about how many planes would be needed and what schedule they should fly.

The Air Branch was activated the 30th March, under Colonel C.H. THOMPSON, Air Corps Liaison. Prior to this time there had been several conferences with G-4, the Services, and CATOR (Combined Air Transport Operations Room). These assured no duplication of effort or overlapping of responsibilities, complete coordination, and thorough understanding of everyone's part in the undertaking. These things were especially important since the pace of operations would mean that most transactions would be telephonic; and written confirmations or discussions, favorites of the Army in all its activities, would generally arrive after the fact; the mission would already have been flown. (101).

The mission specifically assigned to TC was as follows:

1. Process of supply by Air Demands approved by G-4, COM Z.
2. Establish schedules for movement of supplies.
3. Procurement through Army Groups of clearance for use of airfields as required.
4. Necessary coordination with Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR) and the Supply Services, Com Z, on actual performance of air lift, including emergency missions to isolated or rapidly advancing units.
5. Technical advice to Section Commanders, COM Z, on movement of supplies to proper destinations.
6. Maintenance of necessary records and reports.
7. Preparation of plans for air lift programs.
8. Necessary action to release supplies required for emergency supply to isolated or rapidly advancing units.

9. Movement of supplies to Airfields, loading and unloading of Aircraft, movement of supplies from reception Airfield to proper destination. (101)

One interesting new departure is to be noted. While TC was responsible for discharging ships, it gave only technical supervision to the loading and unloading of its inland carriers (with occasional exception of some port units employed in barge work at inland ports like Reims). Now it was directly charged with the loading and unloading of this newest carrier, the plane.

III. Relations with Other U.S. Military Agencies

1. G-4, Com Z

In the opening days of January, movements around Paris were held up by 13 trains of salvage coming in weekly from forward areas. Movements Division asked G-4 to cut down what of this seemed unnecessary (102). Some diversion was ordered.

With the intense cold of mid-month as a reminder, G-4 called attention to the drastic coal situation in Paris. Ice on the river had made it impossible to move that scheduled for barge, and the bad state of repair of most French locomotives meant most rail moves were alarmingly on the decrease, coal average being 12,000 tons daily as contrasted to the 20,000 minimum requirement stated for the city. The waterways backlog was 60,000 tons, which could not come in any faster than 8,000 a day under the most favorable conditions. (103). The matter was further discussed and some rail power reassigned; but the city continued without as much coal as made for even minimum comfort.

Technical instructions were sent Antwerp by the OCOT in late January directing that outloading be done by commodity, by type. The port replied it had already received a directive from G-4 giving similar instructions, with some differences in details. It was the old 'bugaboo'; a 'command staff' was operating again. ACOT CASE informed the G-4 agent responsible that not only were his instructions to the port incorrect, but that he was invading the TC realm; technical directions to ports should come from Transportation and Transportation alone. (104).

Similarly, 26 January, the office of G-4 blithely gave 'Toot Sweet' priority to some tentage for Charleroi, so that the train had to stop there despite its schedule calling for no stops until Namur. The higher echelon was requested not to ball things up in such a manner in the future. (105).

Mid-February saw the G-4 ordering that the movement of mail take priority over the 10,000 ton cargo program from the U.K. Mail ships were to be sailed daily from Southampton. (106). The new schedule for mail trains to connect was submitted by Movements the evening of the day the order was received. (107)

With the report, on the 20th, that excessive reconsignment of cars was confusing rail operations, especially for the French, G-4 was requested to restrict depots from reconsigning more than 15 cars in a short period except in the course of meeting their regular programmed committments. (108). G-4 did same and later cut the number still further to 10, but many were the corners cut by depots to escape this binding.

On the 5th March, the Division submitted a draft to G-4 on an SOP for expeditious handling of specially-marked express shipments. It was a process of simplification for such shipments from port to destination, and was soon approved and put into force. (109).

Toward the end of March, Movements stated that there were between 5,000 and 7,000 captured cars under load in forward areas. If the contents of these cars could be dumped, the cars could be pressed into much needed use. Colonel TRAUB, DCOT, instructed the Division to check the report carefully and, if as thought, to request action from G-4. (110). That office ordered some dumping under Services' instructions and general expediting of unloading; many cars were released.

Movements Division felt this way about the general relationship:

In summary, the principle lessons learned in freight movement control by the TC in the ETO have been:

a. The necessity of centralizing control of movements to the maximum extent possible.
b. The necessity of having a constant flow of detailed information from the field to the controlling agency and vice versa.
c. The necessity of having a movement program based as far as possible on actual movements to be performed and projected as far as possible into the future, so that all agencies concerned with transportation can be given the picture as to what desired. (111).

It is recommended that the Chief of Transportation should have general staff authority to establish movements policies, issue movement instructions, and exercise complete control over military freight traffic. This would include the power to embargo. The effect of this would be to establish a movements channel in addition to command and technical channels.

All matters concerning the selection of supply installations should be referred to a representative of the Chief of Transportation for approval from a transportation standpoint.

2. The Supply Services

Detailed information concerning their special needs were sent direct to Transportation by the Services, after G-4 had approved the general idea of a project. On January 23 the AG, a 'Service' insofar as the printing and distributing of publications and the handling of mail were concerned, sent its detailed requirements, for the movement

of mail by rail, to Movements Division, Here recommendations were made for four regular trains each way between key points, for space on several regular passenger trains, and the balance was to be taken care of by the Base Section in which it originated, either in freights or in specially laid-on truck moves. These recommendations were qualified by the reminder that mail trains out of Le Havre would necessarily cut down the available train-paths thereby one and one-half, a serious consideration in view of the heavy demand for the paths. It was brought to attention that TC had already arranged for rail and motor lift, Paris to Le Havre, to substitute for air lift when weather should preclude its use. (112).

All through this period an interesting correspondence over long-standing grievances was going on between the Ordnance, G-4, and Movements Division. The complete correspondence is given as Number 21 of Appendix 2, Part V. On the 16th January, the Deputy Chief Ordnance Officer complained to G-4 that Transportation had followed the practice of not loading the full December allocation of Class II and IV with covering, during the first eight days of January, only 577 tons by Movements Instructions, whereas 19,975 were on DSSD's (Depot Shipping Supply Documents) --- the notice that they were ready for shipment. It was pointed out also that the other Services had higher percentages of their allocations shipped than had Ordnance. Some 5,000 tons of priority goods, ready in English depots since November, 1944, had not been called to move, even though they were in short supply on the Continent and were demanded by the Armies. Finally there was the reminder that the outflow of goods must be regular, hinting that it had been too sporadic, to fuse in with programmed arrival on the Continent from the U.S. and not overtax the depots there.

G-4 replied that the Ordnance was under some misconceptions. In the first place, they had not fulfilled Theater orders that monthly allocations should be completely covered by documents indicating readiness to move. In December, the Ordnance had had more than its pro rata share of tonnage moved; and the other Services, contrary to the ideas and figures of Ordnance, had not failed to fill their allocations. Early January moves had been approximately 66 percent of allocations, higher than the complaining Service thought; and steps were being taken to realize more lift. Finally the priority tonnage mentioned had received special attention and would shortly be on its way.

The Service replied with a battery of reasons for its predicament. The reason why more tonnage had not been covered by DSSD's was that to do so would be to take it off the stock control lists so that it no longer appeared as available at depot. This was allright when it was immediately covered by movements instructions from the Base Transportation Officer; but, as had been previously pointed out, this was not the case. Many of the items now on DSSD would have to be requisitioned from the U.S. if they continued to stay unaccounted at depots. (See Appendix)

Furthermore, when the movements instructions were given, they came with such short notice that the depots were hard-pressed to accomplish them, and the critical shortage of man-power at U.K. depots made things especially difficult. Experience had been that calls came irregularly and caused the uneven flow complained of both at shipping depots and those receiving on the Continent. It was requested a scheduled movement be worked out — rather a surprise, this, to TC, which had been trying consistently to win over the Services to scheduling.

Admitting it had been in error on the assertion that it had not received its share of allocation and lift, the Ordnance stated that more tonnage still must be given it, if the Armies were to be adequately supplied with vital materials. Moreover, it claimed that the assertion it had not had 100 percent coverage by DSSD's was not wholly correct, since it had complied completely with this condition since 6 January.

Lack of storage space in the U.K. depots was another why for moving Ordnance supplies out as soon as they were marked for same. (See Appendix 2, Part V, No. 21)

For an answer to these complications G-4 turned to the OCOT, Movements Division. There the whole correspondence was forwarded to the U.K. Base Transportation Office, where complete familiarity with the problem would afford the most light. This office pointed out again that the Ordnance had received consistently more than its proportionate share of lift. Although availability of shipping had only allowed 67 percent of the total allocation to all Services to be lifted, 70.5 percent of this had been Ordnance. That Service was now complying completely with rules on DSSD's, and the move was going well, moving from the depots at a reasonably level rate. The crux of the matter lay not in the fact that the Movements Instructions came irregularly (though the irregularity of ship availability had undoubtably caused some of this) and with short notice, but that Ordnance had a habit of covering tonnage with DSSD's which was not actually ready for movement at the depots. When the OMI's were issued the depots began frantic, last-minute segregation and preparation of the material. This was why, short of man-power, they complained of confusion. Moreover what segregation they did accomplish was often not enough, different items for the same shipment remaining in different parts of the depot and resulting in items from the same shipment number not being in the same cars. This meant sorting and checking at the ports before loading into ships was possible and before the Port could be sure it had received the total shipment; consequently sailings were delayed and port congestion increased. Exemplary cooperation had been obtained from Ordnance in straightening out this difficulty when it was brought to their attention; but the source of delays was depot procedure rather than transportation. With these kinks out and additional ships forthcoming for cross-channel lift, there would be no more trouble. And so that story ends. (See No. 21 of Appendices)

At February's end the MRS reported that excess loading of Engineer supplies in the Liege area had caused considerable congestion. Movements informed they had already checked into the matter with the Service and necessary steps were being taken . They voiced, through DCOT STEWART, the desire that the railways report as soon as possible a tendency to load more tonnage than could be handled, so that the Services could be brought to task before real congestion set in. (113)

3. Control and Planning Division

To present the overall capabilities of inland transport and to make the breakdown of tonnage between the three principal carriers was the big concern of Movements in the plans turned out by Control and Planning Division. Controlling the traffic so that it conformed to program was another heavy task requiring liaison. There was a Movements Division man in attendance and often heard at each Shipping Allocations Meeting. The Regulating Section of the Freight Branch controlled freight movements from the ports in accordance with the monthly movements program and the capacity of depots to receive. This section also prepared the breakdown into truck, rail, and barge shipments -- the determining factors being the availability of each type of transportation serving the particular port compared with the ability of the depot receiving to accept tonnage by the particular means of transport. (114).

The following recommendation made by Movements Division was directed at Control and Planning, whose ideas they felt were sometimes a bit impractical, but of whose overall principles they approved:

'Movements programs should be as long range and comprehensive as possible, but they should be based on current facts and not long-range estimates. It is suggested that an overall program be published once a month and a detailed one, based on actually-planned shipments, thrice monthly. This detailed plan should be given complete distribution to all RTO's and shippers. Only a program based on actual tonnage to be moved can give the carriers sufficient information to enable scheduling of freight trains, etc., and can enable the COT to enforce compliance of all shippers'. (115)

4. Motor Transport Service

At the opening of the year, Motor Movements Branch of Movements Division received a request from G-4, Troop Movements, to furnish 200 2½-ton equivalents for high priority personnel movement forward from OIS. These troops were reinforcements for the hard-pressed Ardennes front. This movement was coordinated with MTS, which diverted the equipment from the White Ball Route. (116).

At the end of January, MTS representatives at the monthly supply conference asked that their Division receive from movements people in the field notice of important moves with-in sections. MTS had no control over such movements, but desired knowledge of them to assist in their own status records on availability of trucks and capacity of highways. (117).

Other instances of relations with MTS are interspered in other parts of the Section, just as are many of those with other Military agencies. Given here are only examples and highlights of relationships which were on a generally routine basis.

5. The Armies

On the morning of January 2nd, the Assistant G-3 of the 8th Armored Division called at the office of the Highway Branch, Movements Division, relative to his unit's pending move and interviewed Captain R.M.BOLTON. The SOP for movement was thoroughly explained to him and sample forms of Motor Movement Instruction were furnished. (118)

In early February a bad car tie-up in the ADSEC-Army area occasioned special efforts to get the Army to unload and the Section to take it easy on the number of cars sent forward. The Section Transportation Officer replied by TWX that every effort had been made to get unloading done faster by the Armies. Each regulating officer with the Army was told to use all possible influence to expedite, and the Air Force Liaison Officer was working closely with the 9th Air Force on the matter. Tactical movements which reduced railhead clearance had made for a forward movement of Army dumps, which had resulted in an unmanageable increase in loaded cars in Army territory. The First Army was cooperating by putting all available service troops on the job and had even procured some civil labor. G-4, Ninth Army had instructed all Services to release cars promptly. The flow of Class V (Ammunition) had been temporarily stopped by the 24th Regulating Station and only Class III was being allowed to pass when the Army QM could assure quick direction and fast unloading of cars. (119)

By the 14th, a marked downward trend in loaded cars had been noted by the ACOT, Movements; but only the day before the curve had started up again and a TWX of complaint had been promptly dispatched to 12th Army Group. (120). Soon matters were back on a normal footing.

In the daily staff conference of 10 February, Brigadier General STEWART discussed generally the reports available from the Ports, Sections, Armies, and the French, directing Movements Division to determine which of these might be useful to OCOT. Some of these were from the 7th Army railheads. (121).

6. Sections

Working always as they did through the Section Transportation Officers, Movements Division had constant contact with the Sections; and almost every problem in some way involved them. In mid-January, the Commanding General of CBS expressed concern over the fact that no trains had begun running between Antwerp and the Lille depot area. Movements replied they had a check on the situation and that the first cars had left Antwerp the morning of the General's expression. (122)

CBS again protested on the 16th. This time it was concerning the hazard of the increasing backlog of ammunition, temporarily held at Le Havre, to the extent of some 16,000 tons. OCOT contacted G-4, asking them to determine whether a hazard existed. (123). The reply was in the affirmative, and on the 17th 12 trains moved out 5,500 tons of the explosive materiel. (124).

At the month's end the northern section which closely supported the Armies, ADSEC, was consulted; 555 barges were under load in Belgium. Brussels was out of coal and dependent upon barges for supplying some. Antwerp's barge congestion would call for more water-ways lift; and the whole situation was tied up by frozen canals. The organization in Ghent had been opened and would get stuff moving as soon as ever the barges could navigate. But all this would affect ADSEC's receipts adversely; and an officer was sent forward to contact the Section Transportation Officer, Colonel R.C.TRIPP. (125).

10 February, GOLDFLAKE was the subject of some attention. A slight change had been made in the route from the south as it passed thru OIS. Bivouac areas had been selected but were not yet set up. It was contemplated that some American Divisions would move on this path. But sure information was not yet in from SHAEF, the source in this instance. Highway Branch had the responsibility of coordinating these movements and was instructed by Brigadier General STEWART, DCOT, Operations, to keep DBS (Delta Base Section) informed on the latest developments. (126).

In mid-month Movements was able to report that figures on Antwerp, from the port and from CBS, indicated everything was running pretty close to the target. However, further west, from NBS, came a request that all rail operations in the Red Horse Area, be conducted by American rail personnel. (127). Complete changeover was not possible, considering availability of personnel, but some MRS men were infused for further control.

7. Others

13 February, Movements was requested to meet with Brigadier General STEWART to take action on certain matters brought up by an inspection trip made by the Commanding General, Com Z. Two of these required working with Inland Waterways Division: the number of proper type barges in ports, and the organization of Belgian Inland Waterways. (128).

A few days later the consideration of a partial shift of evacuation of casualties from Cherbourg to Boulogne meant coordinating work between Movements and Marine Operations Division. (129). Almost daily these two important departments were contacting each other on the CDI's (Cargo Disposal Instructions). The Processing Section of Freight Branch handled the Movements end of these dealings.

IV. Liaison and Cooperation with Outside Agencies

1. The British

As in the case in relations with other military agencies, much bearing on the subject appears all through the discussion of Movements Division's activities. This sub-section purports only to give a few specific examples of the type of liaison in which the Division was engaged.

At the curtain-rising of the year, we find the Highway Branch arranging for the movement of two small groups of British Army vehicles to travel 3 and 5 January from Boulogne to Toulouse and Lyon. Clearance and routes had to be requested of SOLOC, whose territory would be entered at Dijon. (130).

In mid-February, DCOT STEWART complained of the apparent lack of specific information on GOLDFLAKE from DBS. Movements had been working with G-4 and had informed the British they were to coordinate directly with TC on this move; but things were still rather indefinite. (131). They soon cleared; and GOLDFLAKE was a smooth-running and very satisfactory project.

2. The French

In mid-March the commander of the French truck companies hauling Civil Affairs tonnage objected to putting requisitions for same through the Movements Division. He stated an agreement between Lt. General JOHN C. H. LEE and the Minister of Transport did not call for such submission. Not to have any record of this tonnage or control of its movement would have thrown the Motor Movements Branch and Freight Branch into some involving guesswork, so G-4, Com Z, was asked to review the whole matter. (131). Not only was it found necessary to keep the requisitions, but the whole conduct of operations was reviewed; and the truck companies were put under MTS.

As the month closed, Movements brought to the attention of the staff conference at 52 Champs-Elysees the practical collapse of box-car shipments out of le Havre, where the French were not furnishing the rolling stock agreed and the situation was most grave. Neither were passenger cars being furnished for the Riviera leave train at Aachen. These matters were referred to MRS and straightened out with the usual careful explanations, French protestations, and apologies. (133)

3. The Belgians

In mid-February there was a recurrence of trouble with Belgian barge documentation, especially aggravating since there were 40,000 tons under load in that country. Movements brought the matter to the attention of G-4. (134).

Strikes, coal movements, overall rail car control, and related subjects are discussed elsewhere in this Section of Chapter II.

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DEDICATION AT LIEGE, BELGIUM

Anderson C. J.
Creamer C. H.
Gugger R. D.
Lindsey H. B.
Massaro M. H.
Reiss B.
Wiese E. H.
Auriemma J. A.
McGillis J. M.

Belcastro S. P.
Genovese D. R.
Greco R. J.
Lewis A. G.
Lance O. L.
Mullin J. L.
Rallo F.
Van Kleek

In Leige on the 27th February 1945, Major General Frank S. Ross dedicated a locomotive to an M.R.S. soldier, Pvt. H. J. O'Brien, who had lost his life in the performance of his duty.

Within a few weeks other engines shown here were likewise dedicated for comrades who had also made the supreme sacrifice.

V. Carrying out the Supply Movements Program: Problems and Accomplishments

This might well be the title of the whole discussion of Movements Division, since most activity was directed toward the end of accomplishing the program, representing as it did the major tonnage moved. However, many items which do not exactly fit the pattern of branches and sections or represent relations with other agencies are best covered under this general heading.

The best overall light on accomplishments is found by comparing tonnages planned, in the program published each month by Control and Planning Division -- the major part of it dealing with inland transport -- with tonnages moved, as shown in the overall statistics published by OCOT (and included in Appendix No. 7, this volume) or sent to the Control Division, Com Z, for publication in the monthly and semi-monthly Progress Report. Even making allowances for the many movements which pressure from the Services caused to be hauled 'out of program', for the shortages of cars caused by French tactics and Army inability to unload rapidly, the showing is most creditable. Even though Movements Division saw some shortcomings to the program which Control and Planning overlooked, they tried their level best to carry it out; and in most cases they succeeded.

The Normandy Base Section Transportation Office had this to say of the movements part of the program:

The supply movement program has served as an excellent guide for all agencies involved in forwarding supplies from ports and depots to forward areas. However, it is suggested that:

a. More consideration to be given intra-base movements and so-called non-priority movements, all of which require transportation facilities over and above the movement program.

b. That the program from the ports be amended currently in accordance with cargo disposal instructions.

c. Program should be consistent insofar as practicable with transportation facilities, due regard being given all movements, including the movement of personnel.

d. Some provision should be made for less-than-carload-lot shipments. (135).

As an example both of the reports turned in by ports and used by Movements Divisions and the performance at a port and on a date selected at random, a group of sheets turned in by Le Havre on the 24 March are given as Number 22 of Appendix 2, Part V.

At the monthly conference held the end of January, a Port Transportation Officer asked how to determine priority of shipment when all goods on hand had the same Service priority yet there were not enough rail cars to meet all scheduled shipments. OCOT Movements answered that the Port men must be governed by their own discretion. However, he gave as a guide the following:

First-Programmed material which it was known depots could receive.

Second-Programmed, but for which it was not known adequate receiption capacity existed.

Third-Unprogrammed, with favoritism to coal if the railways needed same for locomotive fuel, and to ammunition otherwise. (136).

The same inspection by Lt. General LEE which had focussed Movements' attention on inland waterways in Belgium also brought some action on such assorted items as the protection of truck cargoes from pilferage and a general review of the conditions under which personnel were moved in that period of mid-February. (128).

On the 21st Movements reported that overall inland transport operations had the day before been the closest to target they had ever reached up to that time. (137).

About this time was inaugurated the custom of naming new American locomotives after men of the MRS who had been killed in line of duty. Perhaps the engines felt the honour of their names as they pulled their important trains out of the ports and across strange lines on the long journeys to the great depot areas and forward, or close to the fighting -- to the same kind of places and under the same kind of conditions that had exacted the final payment from some brave boys. Certainly the men at throttle and coal-scoop worked the harder and were the more careful because of what these name-plates meant. Unconsciously, perhaps, but surely, the other railway men and the traffic men and the men who controlled movements with a stroke of the pen and the picking up of a phone all felt the obligation they had to these names on locomotives, and later on craft too. And since the human element is the strongest one in everything man does, it is not too much to think that performance was even finer than usual because the sacrifice of the dead was brought to bear on the minds of the living.

The conference to outline the March program and review February's work brought up a host of problems. Colonel CASE, ACOT, Movements, newly promoted, presided over the afternoon session. He mentioned that the section of the program's movements breakdown, the part contributed almost entirely by Movements Division, was qualified so far as the movement from depots forward and to other depots by the fact that the information obtainable was pretty sketchy. These moves depended mainly on requisitions over which TC had no say. (138)

To expedite traffic and comply with the program, it was essential that Freight Branch be able to get an accurate picture of the number of cars enroute from ports to depots. Previous expedients employed had not given this information. Now it was decided to have the RTO's at depots check TDA's (Traffic Dispatch Advices), putting new figures for cars enroute on the regular daily car reports for the 1st and 15th of each month.

A representative from ADSEC explained the need for more careful documentation on truck cargo to prevent some of the heavy pilferage going on. It was decided to make each driver sign a waybill, checking the load for completeness when the truck was turned over to him , instead of merely looking over the existent load and receipting for it as it was. This latter careless practice allowed the previous driver to sell some items and some could be stolen without any check. Better documentation was also required for planning moves at truckheads. Recently a shipment of 2,400 pounds, harmlessly billed 'Miscellaneous' had turned out to be welding equipment, requiring spectial facilities for unloading and handling. And the facilities had not been on hand because the need for them was unknown. (138).

Section Transportation Officers were enjoined to tell their RTO's at Oriel and Paris to be especially of the heavy movements of mail going through these important points. They were the connection places for the bulk shipments from Le Havre and Rouen, and smooth operation to the forward receiving stations was impaired by failure of connections to be made as scheduled.

A discussion of documentation brought up an interesting explanation of SOLOC procedure from the COMZ men, at the meeting for the first time in view of the recent amalgamation of SOLOC with Com Z. There were two large classification yards, one for the 7th U.S., and the other for 1st French, armies. All cars were routed to one of these for reconsignment and simply billed 'COMZ'. The yards acted, in effect, as regulating stations, working with 10-day requisitions rather than Daily Telegrams. But instead of going to railheads for the Armies many of these cars went to forward depots. There would have to be some minor changes made in procedure to make it suit the form of the Com Z program system. (138).

Toward the close of the long afternoon session the program-maker, Colonel H. A. MURRILL, Chief, Control and Planning Division dropped around to see how things were going. He got a general impression that most of the field men felt the demands were too high, so he explained that they were within reason, providing every man gave the best of his thought and effort; they must plan to move as much as was humanly possible if the designs of the tacticians were to be realized. The Colonel was not the type of the man to make any sort of apology, but he did explain his motives in the form of an appeal to the spirits of these tired men of action. Quoting from Shakespeare; a rather surprising authority to hear in the conference room of a business organization, he reminded them of a kingly speech; 'Make me no little plans. They have no quality to warm mens blood.' (138).

In mid-March, Movements reported to Major General ROSS on the percentage of program being attained by inland transport. This was for the five-day period ending the 15th, figured on an over-all basis;

barge - 67 percent (partly due to the lack of barge cargo at Ghent)
trucks - 75 percent

rail - 98 percent (the old reliable:)

total tonnage - 80 per cent (not an average figure for 5-day period) (139).

Brigadier General STEWART, returning to a controlling hand over the Movements Division after a long absence during which he had moved supplies for the African, Scicilian, Italian, and Southern France campaigns, gave his general ideas on the subject of Transportation to the Movements men assembled at February's close. One had to be willing to get things done, this affable and decisive officer said, and everybody knew you couldn't do that without sometimes getting mixed up and doing badly. 'Anybody who doesn't make 13 mistakes a day only tried 12 things', he quoted. Not that he would tolerate inefficiency--- he was far too efficient himself to let laxness or stupidity slide by-- but he would appreciate difficulties and emergency necessities. To the new DCOT, Supply and Transport were almost the same thing, dependent on each other to such an extent they must be considered together. Certainly and expedition was limited to what supply its transport could furnish it, which meant that to win, TC must pull with the other Services and G-4; and they with it. (138)

1 Cherbourg and Granville

The German raid on Granville naturally affected the moves from this busy little port adversely; but it quickly came back to normal and put through the coal. (See Chapter III, Section I, under 4th Major Port).

In early March, Movements noticed that ammunition discharge at Cherbourg was more than target. This could have an adverse effect on moves if the depots to which shipments were being made were unable to receive above capacity. The Division was to make a close check on depot capacity and restrict discharge if the sky looked cloudy; 'an ounce of prevention'. (140)

March 14th, Movements had to check with Normandy Base Section to make sure adequate rail lift could be laid-on for the Cherbourg share of 70,000 mail bags coming in on two ships in a regular convoy from the States. (14).

a Rail

In mid-January an ammunition train piled up pretty badly at Lison, on the main line from the port east. The line was repaired in less time than was thought possible, four days, so that this much-used channel could resume its burden to the full. (122 & 142).

Through February and March Cherbourg passed a good deal of equipment for French rearmament. It was also the orgin of the Toot Sweet Express and sent out special loads daily.

Number 23 of the Appendices to this Section is a tabulation of Vehicles landed on the Continent, January and February, all ports. The planned movement from Cherbourg for January is shown as Number 24 of Appendix 2, Part V.

2 Le Havre and Rouen

Moves as planned for January from Le Havre and Rouen are shown in Number 25 of the Appendices. The first day of the new year found the truck situation still bad at Le Havre. Short of trucks to begin with, the port had lost some to the Red Horse Area and some to emergency hauls for the Ardennes front. Movements felt, however, that a number of factors--rail management, clearance plans, etc.--were all contributing to the low tonnage figures for port clearance there. (143).

The next day General ROSS instructed Movements and MTS to watch carefully all operations in CBS, in an attempt to pick up tonnage figures. Of 200 truck equivalents ordered back to Reims the day before, 70 were being sent on back to Le Havre immediately. Three hundred forty-six trucks sent up to carry troops and equipment to contain Von Runstedt had not been returned, and some never would, having been lost in combat. (144).

The 13th turned out as unlucky as assumed; 18,000 tons of barge cargo destined for Paris were backlogged at Roued. Barges were available to move this cargo, but inland Waterways Division had been unable to get clearances from the Services to receive it. Movements got the job of arranging these clearances. (122).

Turning to March, we find Movements making sure arrangements were complete for the reception of that part of 70,000 mail sacks which would arrive at Le Havre in a convoy direct from the States. (141).

On the 23rd the COT complained of the low-freight tonnage out of Le Havre for the last few days. Movements pointed out that overall tonnage, however, had been in excess of target. The General ordered that as many ships as possible should be diverted to Antwerp, and that, whenever possible, vehicles should be carried to Rouen for discharge. (145).

3 Antwerp

Number 28 of Appendix 2, Part V is a tabulation of movements proposed for Antwerp in January. On the 6th of that chilly month Movements Division stated that one reason for the low tonnage figure for Motor Movements out of Antwerp was the lack of roads to service new forward depots. (146).

Mid-February saw Antwerp visited by the Commanding General, Com Z, who was not pleased with the barge situation. In assisting to pre-

pare an answer to his report, Movements gave the revised program for Inland Waterways and an explanation of how floods and civilians unwilling to work under buzz-bomb fire had hampered the previous one. (147).

On the 15th the Director, Supply Division, Office of the Signal Officer, wrote to Movements Division through G-4 that the time had certainly come to move tonnage from Antwerp by consigning from manifests rather that simply by Class of Supply. This had been thought of for Antwerp when the port's opening was being planned; but so far nothing had been done. The large area and vast number of depots served by the huge port made such action essential now. Moreover, General SUMMERVELL, the Chief of Service Forces, had reported in late January that the supply system must run 'according to the book', with depots stocked according to mission and the balance of supplies kept level. This was impossible, considering the limitations imposed by TC on inter-depot movements, if the present methods of consignment continued. (148).

The Movements' answer was short and to the point. No facilities for sorting existed at Antwerp. The General Staff was understood to be exploring the possibility of establishing Base Depots at the port, which would straighten out everything. (148). If the depot system were to work properly, it would have to be set up the way it was originally envisioned, with base depots near ports, although this late stage in the game was hardly the time to begin.

At the monthly conference for March, ACOT, Movements reminded that the energy and equipment required to move a ton from the port of Cherbourg to the front could move three from Antwerp there. As an example of the million and one details that go to make up the movements game: at the opening of the session, the Antwerp people asked for an extra allottment of rail tonnage to clear the cargo of a ship carrying greatly-demanded hospital supplies. Two extra trains, 800 tons total lift, were given them. (138).

Pilferage of trains was as big a problem out of Antwerp as anywhere. With the increased employment of civilians on the quays, port units of Americans were released to do guard duty on the trains. (149).

4 Ghent

January's last day saw the opening of a direct line of communication between OCOT and the 17th Port, facilitating greatly arrangements for and control of Movements. (150).

On the 14th February, the Port Transportation Officer complained to the Director of Operations that changes in destination of cargo were being received after discharge had begun and train paths arranged. In the recent case of the steamship RONDO, changes had meant redocumentation for 533 tons already loaded in 63 freight cars; but in many cases

the work wrought by last-minute change could mean returning cars from the marshalling yards, unloading, sorting, as well as redocumentation. (151).

This protest found its way to Movements Division, where it was answered that the inconveniences caused were known and every effort being made to hold changes to a minimum. In the case of the ROMDO, the destination of the Air Force bombs on board had been altered at the request of the Service concerned. Technical considerations had outweighed the thought of convenience. (152).

The mention of bombs brings up the fact that Ghent had become quite an ammunition receiver. This heavy stuff had to be deposited as near the front as possible to save its expensive land haul. With Antwerp closed to ammunition ships because of buzz-bombs, consideration was given to using Ghent for their discharge in early February. At the time, Movements objected that they had no clearances from the Services to cover such a change and that the new problem of moving this cargo forward, involving new channels from port to depots, would have to be considered. (153).

As an indication of how involved the handling of tonnage could become, we cite the instance, 27th February, of some comment on the discharge of seed potatoes from the U.K. at Ghent. The important vegetables were for the needy French farmers and were set up on the basis of an equal exchange of eating potatoes. Since the cargo was French-bound and for French civil use, Colonel TRAUB, DCOT, questioned the advisability of using the Belgian port. Movements had reports covering the whole matter, but went into an investigation of this particular matter. (154).

At the end of February Ghent requested more information on what equipment and power the British were getting from the 2nd MRS. The Port's car orders were not being handled satisfactorily, and they needed information on which to base comparisons and make demands for readjustment. (138).

On 5 March, Ghent as well as Cherbourg was exceeding its quota for discharge of ammunition. Check-up on capacity of depots to receive in excess of target was instituted by Movements. (140).

5 Marseilles

This and quickly-rehabilitated port was going strong when its absorbtion by Com Z brought its affairs under Movements Division's surveillance. Much has already been said of GOLDFLAKE, which originated there, and of the diversion of vehicle ships.

Although as late as early March, the U.S. unit working the port was classified as a Mobile Port, it had handled more tonnage than some of the Major Ports of the TC and was shortly afterward successful in

attaining that nomination. The movement of ammunition and POL was effectively and interestingly expedited by the 372nd and 357th Harbor Craft Companies, hauling by barge through the longest canal tunnel in the world, on the Rhone canal, to Fort de Bouc. (155).

6 Depots

Planned moves from depot areas for January are in Number 27 of Appendix 2, Part V. Many were the reports turned in like that of 3 January when Movements stated at the daily staff conference that depot O-644, the huge Ordnance installation near the old royal chateau at Vincennes, just east of Paris, would very soon have to be embargoed because too many loaded cars were piling up there. (156).

February opened with a tie-up of heavy truck trailers at Mons, Belgium, due to the inability of a large depot to unload. Both Movements and Control and Planning Divisions took prompt action to speed up the depot's reception, (157) and the situation was much improved within a few days: precisely, by the 5th, when the depot's full commitment of 1,000 tons per day seemed realizable. (157).

In Mid-March, Major General ROSS asked why Movements had been unable to relieve the existent congestion at Reims. The ACOT's representative at the staff conference, Lt. Colonel W.L. SMITH, answered, That a large amount of coal and salvage, over and above the program, had been received there and was hampering operations. (139).

Toward the end of the month, Inland Waterways Division reported that CBS Headquarters had called Ghent and asked that QM depot, Q-185, in the vicinity, be embargoed. The Base Section was promptly informed, with the COT's concurrence, that all requests for embargoes must go through Movements Division, OCOT. (139).

At the conference held the end of the month to discuss the April program, Colonel CASE called attention to the fact that boundary changes of Sections on the 26th had misplaced some depots so far as old channels of control were concerned. Certain inconsistencies would have to be watched. (160).

All through the period, the men of final action, the RTO's had been having heavy going. Too much cannot be said of their devotion to fatiguing routine and emergency demands, especially those up close behind the Armies. In Belgium the Movements men at Arlon had to move three times in as many weeks, being consistently bombed out of their office. The staff stayed at their post all during the German breakthrough, despite the reduced flow of traffic, because if they had left the civilians who worked around the station would have left too: and nothing would have moved. At Spa the TC men kept guard over 2,000 gallons of packaged POL, left in their charge because no one else did anything about it; the Germans came at one time within 500 yards of

the dump. (161).

The important station of the city of Aschen was for a period shorthanded to the extent that only two enlisted men had to cover the whole job, alternating 16-hour shifts. The RTO's rode the first train into the little Belgian town of Lander, and were the first US troops stationed there, close to the scene of battle. One day at Liege, a buzz-bomb landed every four minutes. All troops were being diverted around the city, but freight still came in and went out. The men who regulated it stayed in that mental hell all through the seige. (161).

VI Conclusion

This was a period of reform, of straightening out new L's of C to make them carry maximum loads. Routine went on, punctuated by such emergencies as the Ardennes break-through and the persistent efforts of weather to make barge shipments impossible. New records were broken in the movements of tonnage and passengers, with many new services--leave trains, mail trains, express freights--being laid-on. Plans were made for occupation, break-through, and eventual redeployment of troops and equipment. It was a critical and exacting period, in which the Movements Division showed the capable stuff of which it was made.

INDEX TO NUMBERED REFERENCES IN THE TEXT

MOVEMENTS DIVISION

CHAPTER II, SECTION V

1 – Notes on conference for ART (Allocation of Rail Transport), OCOT, Paris, 1400, 23 Mar. 45

2 – Notes on Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, 1400, 29 Jan. 45

3 – Notes on Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, 0900, 28 Mar. 45

4 – Interview with Capt. R.H. STRAIN Jr., Admin. Asst., Movements Division, OCOT, Paris, 2 Feb. 45

5 – Folder, "ovements Division, OCOT, Subj.: 'Operations in the ETO (June 1942 – May 8, 1945)', 5 Aug. 45, Part 1, page 18

6 – Daily Staff Conference (Minutes of), OCOT, Paris, 0900, 15 Mar. 45 (*)

7 – Dly C, 19 Mar. 45

8 – " ", 2 Feb. 45

9 – Interview with Capt. N.P. STEWART, Ch/Exec. Branch, MTS, OCOT, Paris, 11 Feb. 45

10 – Notes on Conference for Occupation of Germany, OCOT, Paris, 20 and 21 Mar. 45

11 – See Note 1

12 – Interview with Capt. J.M. SCHUCK, Ch/SOP and Documentation Section, Movements Division, OCOT, Paris, 0830, 24 April 45

13 – Interview with Sgt. BERGDAHL, 724 Railway Operating Battalion, Paris, 15 Feb. 45

14 – Interview with Tech. Sgt. J.S. RICE, 720th Railway Operating Battalion, Caen, Normandy, at OCOT, Paris, 1500, 14 Mar. 45

(*) – Inasmuch as many references apply to the Daily Staff Conferences, they will be hereafter referred to as : Dly C

15 - 'Transporting the AEF in Western Europe', by W.M.J. WILGUS, Columbia University Press, NY., 1931 - pages 394-5

16 - See Note 13

17 - Ibid

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18 - Press Conference with Lt. Gen. B.E. SOMMERVELL, Ch/Service of Supply, Paris, 1400, 25 Jan. 45

19 - Interview with Sgt. BLOMME, Tech. Info. Sect., OCOT, Following his trip to Lyon, 22 Feb. 45

20 - Dly C, 15 Feb. 45

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22 - " " 3

23 - " " 2

24 - Interview with Maj. J.F. SEIBERLING, Ch/Freight Branch, OCOT, Paris, 1400, 17 July 45

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27 - " ", 22 " "

28 - Reading File of Movements Division (*), Extracts of Reports received from ADSEC on Failure of RTO at Charleroi to check trains, 27 Jan., 10 Feb. 45

29 - Ltr. Col. CASE to CG, CBS (attn. Transportation Officer), same subject, 19 Feb. 45

(*) - Hereinafter abbreviated as 'Rdg F'

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31 - Memo., Col. CASE, to G-4, Subj.: 'Rehabilitation of Railway Bridge at Rouen', 19 Feb. 45

32 - Agenda for Monthly Supply Movements Conference, OCOT, Paris, 1400, 27 Feb. 45

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59 - IRS, Hqs, COM Z, ETO, OCOT, Ch/Passenger Br., to TC, PRO, Sub.: 'Passenger Movements', 28 Jan. 45

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CHAPTER II

SECTION VI

MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE

The Organization Chart of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, at the beginning of this Chapter, shows the various departments under the Director General, Military Railway Service. The changes made in connection with the operation of railways on the Continent for military purposes, and the activities of 1st and 2nd Military Railway Service during the first quarter of the year 1945, as well as those of the new General Headquarters, Military Railway Service during the first quarter of the year 1945, as well as these of the new General Headquarters, Military Railway Service, established on 12 February 1945, are covered in Chapter IV.

CHAPTER II
SECTION VII
MARINE OPERATIONS DIVISION

General:

Marine Operations Division (MOD) in the first quarter of the year 1945 made its most significant strides in the application of an efficient plan for the reception and discharge of cargo vessels from both the United Kingdom and the United States. Based on plans made well in advance, which included opening of the port of Antwerp in early December 1944 and the port of Ghent in January 1945, the large backlog of ex-U.S. shipping held at anchorage, which had continuously accumulated since August 1944, receded to a point where only a sufficient number of ships were present in the Theater to maintain an efficient working program. From a high-point in mid-November when 233 ex-U.S. cargo ships were in the Theater, to the first of January when this total had been reduced to 120, a substantial beginning was made in reducing the backlog of ships, the number of which then gradually dropped to 57 by 31 March thus permitting a full realization of previous planning. Not only was cargo discharged at ports nearer the using Armies, thus shortening Line of Communication hauls, but also an immeasurable saving in ships' turn-around time was brought about, largely by proper allocation of ships to ports for discharge nearest the proper destination for their cargo. The latter was made possible by holding shipping allocation meetings, at which all Services were represented and the destination of all vessels planned for continental discharge was decided, well in advance of individual convoys entering ETO waters.

The improvements made in the allocation of ships were far reaching, permitting a degree of planning by the Services for the reception of the cargo and planning subsequent to its discharge, as well as materially aiding those agencies directly responsible for the sailing of convoys. Recognition of the latter is perhaps best expressed by quoting from a letter received from the 4th Lord of the Admiralty to the U.K. Base through which, information on the results of these ship allocation meetings were passed to the Admiralty:

"I want to let you know how very much I appreciate the cooperation shown by letting us have the destination for incoming convoys on the very day of the principal diversion meeting in London. It is another example of the very good feeling which has existed ever since we have had contact with the United States Army. We all realize how much extra work is involved in getting this information over so early. I understand that Captain Wilson is sending some message of appreciation to you for forwarding to Paris. Can you let them know in Paris that I as Convoy Officer convey my sincere thanks?

(signed)T.C. Watkins,
Commander, Royal Navy."

"I want to thank you very much for obtaining early decisions on the destinations of your ships in convoys entering our area. This has enabled destinations for the whole convoy to be sent out in a single signal right on time. The commodore of the convoy will have been saved considerable anxiety, for late decisions are always liable to go wrong for a variety of causes which we cannot control. Thanking you again and assuring you of our sincere appreciation.

(signed) H.F. Wilson,
Captain, Royal Navy."

Daily discharge per ship increased considerably during this period and port targets were met and exceeded. Port equipment of all types was augmented and shifted to facilitate operations and then through overall planning, critically needed equipment was released to the Zone of Interior and to the French.

The impact of the programmed moving of accumulated Bolero supplies in the U.K. to the Continent (although this amounted to over 200,000 deadweight tons in February and 345,000 in March) did not disturb the balancing of the allocations program which accomplished the discharge of close to four million deadweight tons of cargo in Northern France and Belgian ports during this quarter. With the dissolving of SOLOC during February and with the responsibility for TC activities in Delta Base Section coming under the Chief of Transportation, ETO, approximately another one and one-half million deadweight tons of supplies were added to the programming responsibility resting with MOD. However, it was recognized that this change brought on comparatively little additional administrative load from this well established Base Section. Throughout the period covered by this report, MOD continued to prepare detailed reports which reflected the changing trends in operations and became useful instruments for anticipating needs in future marine operations.

Organization:

The changes in organization of Marine Operations Division, as planned in December 1944, were put into effect during this period, as were certain other changes, the most important of which was the activation of two new Branches, i.e., Troop Ship and T/BA Branch, and the Ship Programming Branch. The Organization Chart at the beginning of this Chapter indicates the various branches operating under MOD as of the close of the first quarter of 1945. The duties assigned to each of these branches, as of 31 March 1945, are summarized in the following subparagraphs:

1. Chief of Division - (Ass't Chief of Transportation) Colonel G. BARTLETT: Responsible to the Chief of Transportation for the activities of the Marine Operations Division. Furnishes the necessary staff, and technical and supervisory assistance, to Ports and other field installations concerned with the discharge of cargo and personnel and the operation of floating equipment.

2. Deputy Chief of Division - (Deputy Ass't Chief of Transportation) Colonel J. M. GAFFNEY: Performs duties as Chief of Division in the absence of ACOT and is directly responsible to the ACOT, Marine Operations Division, for ship programming and operations.

3. Executive Officer - Captain L. H. BAILEY, Jr: Acts in capacity of Assistant to ACOT and DACOT, and relieves them of details. Holds administrative supervision over Branch Chiefs.

4. Administrative Officer - 1st Lt. A. GOODMAN: Receives and distributes all incoming and outgoing communications. Advises Branch Chiefs as to proper form, procedure, security classifications, and precedence instructions relative to outgoing communications. Deals with Administrative Division, OCOT, in matters affecting personnel communications, building facilities, and transportation of Marine Operations Division personnel. Acts as office of record and maintains central files of Division.

5. Marine Intelligence & Diversion Branch (MI&D) - Lt. Colonel W. L. SCHULTZ: Keeps spot-check information on all vessels that are assigned to carry U.S. cargo and personnel or use U.S.-operated ports on the Continent. Compiles and furnishes AGWAR (Adjutant General, War Department) with ACTREP (Activity Report) Report. Provides liaison for Marine Operations Division, Movements Division, G-4, U.S. Navy, War Shipping Administration, British Ministry of War Transport, and French Marine Merchande, in connection with vessel movements.

a. Vessel Section:- Maintains complete records as to arrivals, sailings, turn-around time, and anchorages in which ocean going vessels and coasters are being held; all information concerning movements of vessels is maintained by this section. Assigns vessels to ports according to program and makes necessary diversions of vessels in order to meet emergency changes. Notifies proper authority of vessel departures from continental ports, when necessary.

b. Sitrep Section:- Publishes Daily Shipping Report, Port Situation Reports, and maintains correct information on all vessels operated for or by the U.S. Army. Maintains MI&D Kadex and other files; also, published any additional statistical information required.

6. Ports & Water Branch - Lt. Colonel W. R. STRONG, Chief: Acts as technical advisor to Port Operations Division in Ports, keeping constantly in contact with Ports and furnishes advance vessel and cargo information in order that Ports may be able to plan for efficient discharge of vessels.

a. Inbound Cargo Section:- Maintains manifest section, forwarding manifest and cargo plans to port of discharge. Checks and recapitulates vessel manifests and stowage plans to be used as a guide for port assignment in order to place vessels at ports best equipped to perform the discharge. Keeps constant check on vessel priorities and notifies Ports in order that vessels may be discharged expeditiously. Reports delays in cargo discharge and determines causes.

b. Outbound Cargo & Mail Section:- Receives requests from Movements Division, OCOT, on cargo destined for the U.K. and U.S. Through MI&D Branch, arranges with Port Commander, Ministry of War Transport, and War Shipping Administration for allocation of shipping space. Notifies Movements Division of the time cargo is to arrive at the port for export. Prepares necessary information regarding the type and stowage of cargo loaded aboard vessels; this is furnished to MI&D for transmission in sailing cables to U.K. Base Section or to the United States.

c. Coal and Reefer Section:- Maintains running records on arrival and discharge of coal and reefers (refrigerator vessels) at all ports. Keeps constant check on facilities set up for reception and movements. Has the direct responsibility for port turn-around of vessels and for coordination with other interested agencies in order to avoid vessel delays.

7. Troop Ship & TP/A Branch - Major F. W. WIERDSMA, Chief: Keeps detailed information as to the movement of all vessels assigned to carrying troops, whether US/Continental, or UK/Continental. Maintains complete records of capacities on all Troop, T/BA, and Hospital vessels, keeping Passenger Branch, Movements Division, currently informed. Requests MI&D to place vessels on berth when required. Liaison with Movements Division and G-4 on Troop and T/BA matters.

a. Ship & Craft Section:- Keeps spot checks on all troop and hospital carriers or ships, LST's, LCI's, LSI's in US/Continental, UK/Continental, Continental/US and UK/US moves. Notifies Ports of ETA (Estimated Time of Arrival) and cargo on board. Keeps in contact with Ports on arrivals and sailings of these vessels. Notifies all interested parties of anticipated moves.

b. Casualty Section:- Arranges for necessary Troop Lists and maintains complete files on arrivals of all troops when casualties occur. Keeps in contact with Ports where casualties are landed and notifies all parties concerned of details of survivors, missing, and dead.

8. Requirements & Allocations Branch - Lt. Colonel S. F. HYDE, Chief, Assigns the necessary troops, and land and floating equipment to Ports in accordance with planned monthly discharge program. Maintains up-to-date records on Port facilities and coordinates equipment assignments with Control & Planning Division, OCOT.

a. Land Equipment Section: - Maintains records of land based equipment assigned to port of operations. Arranges for transfer of equipment if it is to be moved from one port to another or to any depot. Arranges for movement and assignment of new equipment.

b. Floating Equipment Section:- Maintains records of floating equipment and determines port requirements and assignments.

c. Troop Section:- Maintains complete records of all MOD Port units. Recommends assignment and arranges movement of all units to be transferred from one port location to another.

9. Harbor Craft & Repair Branch:- Lt. Colonel W. F. SCHULTZ, Jr. Chief: Technical advisor on use and Operation of all harbor craft equipment, Supervision of construction of barges and floating equipment to be assembled, and responsible for maintenance and repair of all floating equipment assigned to MOD.

a. Harbor Craft Section:- Operated all floating equipment. Maintains detailed records regarding location of all equipment of this Branch. Arranges for movement of cross-channel tows in accordance with priorities. Transfers floating equipment from one port to another.

b. Maintenance & Repair Section:- Responsible for repair and maintenance of all floating equipment. Acquires needed materials and parts for repair and maintenance of all floating equipment assigned to Branch. Arranges for repairs beyond local capacities. Responsible for erection program and facilities used in connection therewith.

10. Ship Programming Branch - Captain A. J. RITT, Chief: Maintains up-to-the minute information on ports as to capacity to discharge and dispatch freight from the ports. Maintains detailed information as to port facilities and performance. Prepares projected port capacity information for Control & Planning Division, OCOT, and recommends allocation of vessels by class of supply. Prepares estimated vessel position report to be used in monthly projected program. Coordinates with G-4 on necessary modifications in programming of vessels to be sailed from U.S. Furnished 5-day reports to AGWAR of projected vessel discharge by Ports for 30-day period.

Activities of Various Branches

1. Ports & Waters Branch:- In addition to its normal functional operations the following are a few of the more noteworthy achievements of this Branch for the first quarter of 1945:

a. Coal Imports:- (1) During the first three months of 1945, Ports & Water Branch maintained constant liaison with SHAEF, Com Zone G-4, Solid Fuels, BMOWT, War Office, Base Sections, and Ports, and assisted in coordinating collier and deep-sea vessel movements and discharge of coal from U.K. and U.S. in Continental Ports: 705,173 tons of coal, pitch and pit-props were imported by sea in January, February, and March.

(2) Ports & Water Branch developed communications information to a point where all the concerned agencies as indicated above were advised by teletype of all colliers loading in the U.K., their destination, type of coal carried, and expected time of departure. This expected time of departure was subsequently confirmed by an actual sailing dispatch.

(3) Statistics on total tonnages discharged daily by all Ports, U.S., British, or French operated, were compiled daily by this Branch and distributed to SHAEF (Main), Solid Fuels, SHAEF (Fwd) Solid Fuels, G-4, Com Z, Solid Fuels and OCQM, SHAEF, in turn, used these statistics as a basis for all their reports on coal, pitch and pit-props discharged on the Continent.

(4) A daily check-up was made of collier positions as well as port capacities and necessary diversions were accomplished (with assent of Com Z, G-4) to prevent "bunching" and to expedite the turn-around of colliers.

(5) As a result of the close supervision maintained, time lost by colliers on the continental side was reduced to a minimum. Of 1,109 ship-days lost in March only 114 ship-days were attributable to "slow discharge" or "awaiting berth" in continental ports. The balance of the loss was attributable to delay in loading ports, weather, and repairs to coasters.

(6) When Granville was temporarily immobilized, due to an enemy raid in March, an immediate change was made in the quotas of other ports, with an attendant diversion of colliers accordingly, and the month's volumes of coal discharge did not suffer.

b. Mail:- (1) TC was called upon by Army Postal Service to help them improve the delivery of the overflow of mail, over and above the air lift allocation, which amounted to about 20,000 pounds per day, from the United Kingdom to the Continent and vice versa.

(2) Second and fourth class mail from the U.S. arriving in the U.K. on fast troop vessels, such as the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, was being trans-shipped to the Continent by coaster. The average time for delivery to the Base Post Office on the Continent after the mail had been loaded in the United Kingdom was approximately 10 days, due to coasters waiting for convoys off Southampton and due to the tidal conditions prevailing at Rouen where these vessels were discharged. MOD had always been in favor of a more direct service and at a meeting held at G-4, SHAEF, last December, the division requested that small coasters be assigned to carry the mail regularly between the ports of Newhaven and Dieppe. At that time MOD was advised that it was impossible to

provide the necessary coaster service. Still striving to improve the mail service, about the middle of February arrangements were made with the MOWT to load approximately 20 tons per day on LSI's leaving Southampton for Le Havre. This service did improve delivery and the mail was reaching the Base Post Offices on the Continent in about six or seven days.

(3) In the meantime MOD felt as though it could still improve the delivery time and discussions relative to the movement of mail were continually being held with Ministry of War Transport officials in London, and finally an outright bid for allocation of space on the two packet vessels which were operating a daily service between Newhaven and Dieppe was made. On 21st March MOD was advised by the MOWT that they would allocate enough space on each of these vessels to carry 50 tons of mail per day. The first vessel, the Isle of Tnanet, sailed from Newhaven at 0500 hours 23 March carrying 2,338 bags of mail which were delivered to the 17th Base Post Office in Paris within 12 hours after the vessel left Newhaven. Capt. Warner of the Office of the Chief Postal Officer, Com Zone, phoned Major Cain, Ports & Water Branch, MOD, and extended to him the congratulations of Colonel Schroeder, Chief Postal Officer, ETOUSA, on the expeditious delivery of the mail. Captain Warner stated that everyone in the Postal Division was surprised that the mail could be delivered so promptly, and that this delivery had far exceeded their expectations.

(4) Mail returning from the Continent to the United Kingdom was handled in the same expeditious manner. During the 37 days this service was in operation in this period MOD moved 550 tons of mail from the UK and delivered 855 tons to the UK. It was anticipated that this service would continue until such time as the Postal authorities advised the Transportation Corps that tonnage allocation was not required.

c. Civil Imports:- (1) In order to meet demands from many agencies who wanted definite information on the new French Civil Import Program, it was necessary, late in February 1945, to set-up within Ports & Water Branch a separate Section known as the Civil Imports Section. The providing of this data necessitated close liaison and coordination of all available information between Marine Merchande, W.S.A., B.M.O.W.T., and SHAEF Mission to France.

(2) During this quarter there was programmed a movement of 30,000 tons of seed potatoes from the U.K. to the Continent for delivery to the French in exchange for which the U.S. Army was to be supplied the equivalent tonnage in edible potatoes. The successful completion of this programmed movement by 20 April, which was the deadline date for planting potatoes, was directly attributable to the close contact and coordination which this Section maintained between shipping agencies and ports of discharge.

(3) Bulk Wheat Imports:- The programmed importation of some 450,000 tons of bulk wheat per month to the Continent for the relief of civilian population was a matter of extreme importance as well as one which had many related problems. Many meetings were held by concerned agencies in order to insure sufficient capacities for receipt, discharge, storage, and milling of this bulk wheat, all of which representatives from this Section attended. The Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces was personnally interested in this matter and everythin possible was done to insure successful completion of this program.

(4) The great improvement in the ability of the French to handle Civil Imports, and the attendant turn-over of ports and sections of U.S. controlled ports to the French for discharge of their vessels was a progressive factor in the eventual turn-over of complete responsibility for Civil Imports and Civil Affairs to the French, which, it was anticipated, would in turn result in a decrease in the activities and responsibilities as well as the eventual inactivation of this Section.

d. Port Discharge Figures:- Discharge figures for the first three months of 1945 indicate that the port of Antwerp's average discharge in January was 305 tons per ship per day while February figures show an increase to 459 tons per ship per day, and for March a further increase to 699 tons per ship per day is indicated. The port of Ghent started operations 24 January, and its average discharge for the month of February was 336 tons per ship per day while the March figure increased to 617 tons per ship per day. Cherbourg discharged an average of approximately 500 tons per ship per day for the first three months of the year 1945, and Le Havre averaged about 300 tons per ship per day for the same period. Rouen discharged approximately 250 tons per ship per day as an average.

2. Ship Programming Branch:- a. This Branch was activated on 1 February 1945. To begin with, the problems of most concern were the maintenance of a minimum number of U.S. Army vessels in ETO waters sufficient for the support of tactical operations, and the keeping of reserve supplies at levels consistent with known and anticipated needs. For the accomplishment of this program, a Shipping Control Committee was inaugurated. All matters directly related to problems of shipping and supply, policy and direction, were coordinated by the Committee before final decision was reached. Coordination of this manner brought the Ship Programming Branch into immediate contact with AGWAR and NYPE and through exchanges of information, the desired programs were attained. Knowledge of expected transportation, primarily marine, resulted in reaching a peak of discharge at continental ports in February - despite the short month. It was the responsibility of this Branch to provide all necessary data pertinent to expected shipping, (number of ships, Service and Class of supply and tonnages involved) for incorporation into the overall transportation plan prepared monthly by Control & Planning Division, OCOT. As one of the major features of the plan, clear and accurate knowledge was presented in a manner so as to reveal to all military agencies in the Theater what action might be taken and followed during a transportation period - in this instance, a month. In addition, the continental Major Port installations were placed by virtue of prior shipping intelligence, in a position whereby plans for the utmost utilization of all facilities might be formulated and acted upon.

b. Subsequent weeks brought difficulties related to shipments of knocked down railway wagons for discharge at Southern France ports and Air Corps supplies. TC erection facilities at assembly areas were sufficient to accommodate all rail wagons expected to be available and were in fact capable of a greater effort. Accordingly, action was initiated by this Branch, after consultation with the TC Supply Division, OCOT, to effect an increase in lift of this type cargo for future shipping periods up to and including July. Approved by Shipping Control Committee, notification was dispatched to NYPE, outlining new requirements and resulting in revisions by the Zone of Interior for the procurement of all requested cargo and for making available additional lift for the transportation to this Theater. Satisfactory program was attained by the end of March, to the extent that the increased reception of knocked

down rail wagons contributed to the relief of shortages of this supply item and to the relief of inland movement difficulties.

c. Concurrent with this activity, requirements during the early months of 1945 for Air Corps supplies were multiplied considerably, in consequence of the conduct of vast operations and severe diminutions in stock levels. In conjunction with USSTAF authorities, attention was focused principally upon the shortage of bombs, and in increasing the amounts of aircraft for which an operational urgency existed, in view of the fact that airborne operations were then visualized. Provisions were made for transferring to Continental Depots from U.K. storage, a quantity of bombs necessary for expected use; and at the same time there was an increase in the allocation of shipping space for bombs from U.S. production. Again, through exchanges of information with both the U.S. and the U.K., the objectives for both sources were successfully achieved. Finally, details of the availability of bomb cargo at continental ports for future inland movement were transmitted to Movements Division in order that the necessary arrangements for prompt clearance could be concluded.

d. The Ship Programming Branch functioned primarily viewing Marine transportation operations as a whole. Of particular interest was the period during which the discontinuance of Commodity Loading was proposed. Opinions were justly varied as to the initial effect of this alteration in loading policy, and a thorough study by this Branch was conducted. Proposals agreed upon through the united thought of this Branch, MOD, and other Divisions in OCOT, and sanctioned by the Shipping Control Committee, were tendered to AGWAR and NYPE for consideration and amendment, if necessary, so that the desires of conservation of shipping and the utilization of ship's capacities could be readily realized. These desiderata were realized by the end of March to a point where commodity loading no longer prevailed, where vessels could be classified by Service and Class of supply, and where suggested inclusions of Theater recommendations in loading considerably reduced attendant ship discharge difficulties.

e. Responsibility for apprising AGWAR of estimated monthly (thirty-day) periods shipping capabilities at continental ports rested with the Ship Programming Branch and was met through the medium of Cargo Discharge and Vessel Activity Reports submitted every five days. Calculated on the knowledge of scheduled programs, projected sufficiently in advance to warrant accurate determinations of ETO shipping positions, this report brought to AGWAR a means whereby shipping requirements might be reserved to meet the requirements of all Theaters by understanding the probable situations in an individual Theater.

3. Troop Ships & T/BA Branch:- a. After being activated on 13 January 1945, this Branch worked very closely with Passenger Branch, Movements Division, OCOT, in determining the number of sick and wounded and other personnel that could be evacuated on vessels returning in UC convoys, and with the U.S. Navy, Admiralty and U.K. Base Section in order to determine the actual time of arrival of CU convoys for the purpose of establishing embarkation dates at Le Havre as well as at Southampton or Plymouth.

b. An intensive study was made of the requirements for cross-channel lift and close contact was maintained with G-4 and G-3 in order to determine a reasonable accurate estimate of future requirements, which studies were instrumental in bringing about subsequent reallocation of cross-channel vessels, including the release of MT vessels and LST's. Whenever the necessity occurred for making special lifts such as from Cherbourg to Le Havre this Branch was re-

sponsible for coordinating such moves with Normandy Base Section, SHAEF, ANCXF (BUCO), and other interested agencies. A special requirement for the use of LST's for the evacuation of U.S. bound POW's was completed and coordinated by this Branch with Normandy Base Section, U.K. Base Section, and ANCXF (BUCO).

c. With the inception of the US-UK leave program, averaging approximately 700 per day, arrangements were made and approval of AGWAR was obtained for the withdrawing of two vessels from the trans-Atlantic run, to be used for this purpose. These vessels were placed in a regular service providing a sailing every other day between Le Havre and Southampton. Due to the desire to provide every possible comfort for leave personnel, special arrangements were made to have them especially well taken care of aboard the leave vessels, including particularly the serving of three hot meals a day.

d. On 4 March the War Department decided that a certain type of Liberty vessel known as the North Atlantic Blow-up or POW fitted, would be used for the transportation of German POW's to the U.S. Arrangements were made to have these POW's embark at either Marseilles, Cherbourg, Le Havre, or Rouen. Antwerp could not be considered for this use because no POW cages were located in that port's vicinity. Originally such vessels discharging in U.K. ports were also used and embarked in port of discharge. Eventually, however, it became necessary to have these vessels diverted from U.K. ports to Cherbourg as all U.K. POW cages were filled to capacity with POW's assigned to work in the U.K. In the initial stages, close liaison was kept with the Office of the Provost Marshal, in order that arrangements could be made to have the required number of POW's transported to POW stockades in the immediate vicinity of the port areas. This function was subsequently taken over by Movements Division OCOT. Arrangements were made with Ports of Embarkation to supply the necessary provisions, life-saving equipment etc., until the vessels which had been stored in the U.S., had started arriving. On 26 March, the Chief of the Branch made an inspection, proceeding to Rouen to be present at the embarkation of POW's on a fitted Liberty HENRY BALDWIN. He was immediately struck by the excellent facilities that these vessels had to offer, with comparatively more comfortable quarters assigned than a great many of the American personnel had occupied on their trans-Atlantic crossing. The suggestion to overberth all Liberties fitted for 316 passengers to 500, was immediately made to the ACOT-MOD. This matter was consequently discussed by telephone with Washington and authority was received to commence embarkation of POW's on this basis. At a still later stage, it became obvious that further steps would have to be taken to increase the number of POW's shipped to the U.S. and a further increase was authorized, originally 750 and subsequently the number was increased to 1,000. For all these increases it was necessary to maintain close liaison with the different Ports of Embarkation in order to keep them fully posted as to the number of vessels expected to load POW's at that port and for them to make necessary arrangements for storing and equipping.

e. After preliminary investigation and reconnaissance as to the possibility of using the ports of Boulogne and Rouen for the evacuation of sick and wounded on hospital carriers, SHAEF directed on 15 February that this service should commence on 15 March 1945. Arrangements were concluded to have a small detachment from the 17th Port proceed to Boulogne and complete all arrangements to handle adequately this service. Due to the fact, however, that a period of sustained good weather was encountered, it was possible to evacuate nearly all sick and wounded by air and this new cross-channel evacuation service was not used to the capacity it was capable of handling. Nevertheless

if this period of favorable weather conditions had not occurred, TC would have been in position to handle the requirements for the Medical Corps.

4. Requirements & Allocations Branch:- a. During this quarter requirements for equipment pertaining to port operations continued to be placed with this Branch. These requirements came from various TC installations such as ports, TC depots, OCOT Supply Division, Military Railways, Inland Waterways, and on some occasions from SHAEF. In most instances, requests were placed with the Marine Equipment Section of the Supply Division, OCOT, and then forwarded by them to this Branch for study and recommendations. In many instances, however, telephone calls setting forth requirements were made directly to MOD from field installations. Such was usually the case when an emergency existed, or when a particularly heavy type of equipment, such as crawler cranes or 22-ton trailers were required. In such cases, problems of transportation were frequently encountered which necessitated coordination by this Branch with the other various Divisions and arranging for the most suitable method of transportation. In all cases, arrangements for the allocation of required equipment were made through the Supply Division, OCOT.

b. Engineer Cranes from Zone of Interior:- During the first part of the year, cranes of all types and sizes to be used by TC and which were on Engineer requisition began arriving from the States. These cranes were under Engineer markings and were Engineer equipment until released to TC. It was decided, in order to save transporting the cranes from port of discharge to Engineer depots for release to TC and then transporting them back to ports, that TC would obtain release at port of discharge. This presented two problems. First, an agency had to be set-up at the ports to accept and place into operating condition these cranes as they were discharged. This was accomplished through the 13th Port at Antwerp where it was contemplated that most of the cranes would be discharged. Many problems arose in connection with this method as it was necessary that this agency have the proper tools to carry out its function. These problems were overcome. Secondly, it was necessary that Administrative procedure for obtaining releases from the Corps of Engineers be carried out prior to discharge of a vessel carrying these cranes. This met with difficulty inasmuch as the Corps of Engineers would not release cranes until the vessel was in port, which meant that by the time a release reached the port of discharge the vessel had completed discharge and the cranes had gone forward to an Engineer depot; a policy of not holding Engineer equipment in ports for more than 48 hours was in existence and for this reason the cranes would have been forwarded. Consequently, this Branch discussed its problems with OCOT Supply Division and representatives of the Corps of Engineers and subsequently set up a method of informing the Supply Division, OCOT, when cranes were enroute. Supply would in turn requisition them from the Engineers. When the vessel arrived in port this Branch would inform the Engineers and obtain a release number, and then telephone such release numbers to the port of discharge so that the TC Supply Officer could pick up the cranes. It was in this manner that TC cranes were finally taken over at the port of discharge.

c. Opening of Port of Ghent:- In early January when 17th Port was making preparations to operate Ghent, a representative from the Port was detailed to MOD, OCOT, to work over equipment requirements. It developed from various conversations with U.K. Base that sufficient equipment for immediate operation of the port could be brought from the U.K. The remainder of the equipment necessary to operate the port fully would have to be supplied from

depot stocks on the Continent. Many problems arose regarding the build-up of equipment for the 17th Port, once this Port had arrived on the Continent. As usual the most difficulty was in obtaining transportation to ship equipment into the port from Continental depots. However, most of these problems were overcome and equipment was rushed into the port of Ghent in sufficient time to open it within the target date.

d. Turn-over of Granville to the French:- This Branch was involved in concluding the details of turning over Granville to the French. Agreements had to be made as to the removal of U.S. Army personnel and transfer of certain essential equipment to the French, and the final details were discussed and agreed upon with Com Z Headquarters and SHAEF. Prior to turning over the port to the French, and when the enemy raided Granville from the Channel Islands, on the night of 8-9 March, some of the TC heavy equipment in use there was damaged. The Chief of the Requirements & Allocations Branch proceeded to Granville the day following the raid, in order to estimate the damage done. A few days later another officer from this Branch was sent to the port to assist in rebuilding the damaged wharf cranes. By means of this immediate on-the-spot survey and assistance, repair and rehabilitation of the damaged equipment at Granville was completed in record time with a minimum of delay in operations. (See Chapter III, Section I, under 4th Major Port for details).

e. TC Equipment Turn-over at Brest:- French naval authorities at Brest requested that certain floating and land-based equipment be turned over for their use. The details of this transfer were worked out between MOD and Supply Division, OCOT, and the transfer of this equipment was accomplished on a lend-lease basis with instructions for the final transfer being issued by this Branch.

f. SHAEF Requirements:- On two occasions during the first three months of 1945 it was necessary to work out details and make coal handling equipment available for SHAEF requirements. In one instance SHAEF required that 20 coal grabs of various sizes be made available at TC Depots, in working order, for immediate withdrawal. This was accomplished by building a stock-pile of buckets from U.K. sources. In the second instance it was necessary to ship coal tipping buckets to the British at U.K. Base. Arrangements for this shipment had to be worked quickly inasmuch as this was an operational requirement. This also was satisfactorily accomplished.

g. Planning for Redeployment:- In planning for redeployment, and directly in connection with the necessary equipment and personnel required, one of the difficulties encountered due to lack of available specific information on the outloading program was the rendition of estimates of equipment requirements. During March steps were being taken to develop a series of requirements to be taken to the Zone of Interior by a group of officers from OCOT. The majority of these requirements concerned information required relative to the Pacific ports, drafts, personnel required in the ETO who were familiar with outloading, etc. In this connection, this Branch was engaged during March in working out the requirements as to dunnage, dock lashings, documentation machines, and other requirements of this nature in order to accomplish the outloading program.

h. Salvage Program:- Commencing the last of February, all Ports were directed to assemble all port mechanical equipment, which was Ordnance or Eng-

ineer maintained, for the purpose of starting a large scale salvage program. This equipment had operated on the beaches, in the ports, and had been transported overland and by ship several times. Most of it had operated on a 24-hour basis for a six- or seven-months period and was badly in need of high echelon repair. An officer was dispatched from HOD to assist the Ports and issue instructions concerning the procedure for this program. Up to that time Ordnance and the Engineers had not been able to handle the maintenance of this equipment. Arrangements were made with the various Base Section depots nearest the ports for the transfer of all tractors, fork lift trucks, and crawler cranes which required 3rd, 4th, or 5th echelon repair work. During the period of a month, about 120 pieces of equipment were moved to Engineer or Ordnance shops.

5. Harbor Craft & Repair Branch:- The following is a resume of activities of this Branch for the first quarter of 1945. It includes a record of activities of both Harbor Boat Service and Maintenance Sections:-

a. Reduction in Personnel:- During this period, the strength of this Branch was reduced by three field grade officers, nine company grade officers, three NCO's and one British Civilian. Of this number one company grade officer was reassigned to another Division within the OCOT; and the balance were redistributed to field installations. The three enlisted men were transferred to Ground Force Replacement Center for combat duty. This reduction placed an additional burden on the equivalent staffs in the Base Sections but did not result in an appreciable lack of efficiency therefrom. It was considered that the Branch, suffered no lack of efficiency from such reduction, but that at the close of the quarter it was at about minimum strength for the continued performance of its mission.

b. Planning for Redeployment:- With the approach of the end of hostilities, about the middle of March a study was made in connection with possible releases of equipment that could be made immediately, without hindering current operations. The cross-channel towing program was nearing completion and it was determined that approximately 15 large tugs could be made available for transfer to other Theaters, and the War Department was so advised. It was proposed that these tugs be released during the latter part of the month of May. In further redeploying critical equipment, minimum requirements in Y-tankers for use on the Continent were established, and the necessary vessels were transferred from Ministry of War Transport operational control to military control on the Continent. This fleet included two 850-ton tankers at Marseilles, fifteen tankers in the Seine River Shuttle Service with a daily capacity of approximately 3,000 tons, and one tanker each in Antwerp and Ghent. In addition to this, six 650-ton tankers were returned to military control for ultimate use in the transportation of bunker fuel oil, which would require the installation of heating coils. This redistribution left a balance of 21 units still under MOWT control and, two under Navy operational control. During this period the Navy had released seven tankers, their mission having been completed. This redistribution, it was anticipated, would permit release of Y-tankers actually employed in direct support of military operations upon cessation of hostilities, and a minimum of derangement of existing POL transportation in the U.K. it was felt would result.

c. Release of TC Equipment to Z of I:- While not directly connected with redeployment, the release of tugs, large floating cranes, and barges still

1. TUGS

2. J-BOATS

3. FIRE BOATS

HARBOR CRAFT COMPANIES

The Harbor Craft Companies of the Transportation Corps attached to the great . . . ports play a strenuous and adventuresome role in the daily operations of these huge supply headquarters. . . . . .

4. REPAIRS FORE

5. AND AFT



6. HEAVY TOWING

7 AND OVERHAULING

8 BY THE T.C. SAILJERS

remaining in the U.S. representing the balance of TC Projects 1 & 18, were made available for other distribution. This release was based on a careful study of continuing requirements in the Theater for the equipment currently in operation. It consisted essentially of thirty-three 85-ft. tugs, one 100-ton crane and six 50-ton floating cranes. It was determined that current Theater levels would be adequate to support projected operations without requiring additional equipment and it was considered that a very substantial saving in time would be accomplished, if this equipment were required in other Theaters.

d. Release of Equipment to the French:- During this period, twenty-six tugs and forty 104-ft. steel barges were turned over to the French under the provisions of lend-lease. In addition, two tugs, four MTL's, one 30-ton Whirley crane, and thirty-six miscellaneous barges were loaned to the French Government for the operation of the ports of Morlaix and Brest which, during this time, had been reopened under French control.

e. Crane Erection Program:- Early in January, work was started on the construction of a temporary crane barge erection plant at Petite Couronne, Rouen, to provide for the construction of sixteen 30-ton floating cranes. A provisional Battalion was organized and operations commenced. Two building ways were constructed and four cranes were produced during the month of March. This design was as yet untried, having several mechanical features which had not previously been installed in similar equipment. Two of the cranes were placed in service immediately and a study was made of their characteristics. The capacity of the plant was one crane every fifteen days.

f. Modification of Harbor Craft:- During this period there were three principal problems in connection with the more efficient utilization of TC vessels. These concerned Y-tankers for the transportation of bunker fuel oil; provision for more positive braking action for the 30-ton, Design 317-A, cranes; and the further development of the 85-ft tug as a tow boat for narrow waterways where the current was strong. In the case of the Y-tankers, this 650-ton 162-ft. vessel was selected by reason of the existence of displacement type cargo pumps which would permit the discharging of high viscosity fuel oils. A system of heating coils was designed to provide for approximately one square foot of heating surface per ton of cargo and a contract was placed with the French Government to produce four of these installations. The contract was later modified to provide for six installations. Two of these tankers were completed during this period and were in service, at the end of the quarter, lightening Liberty ships for passage of the Terneuzen Canal and for the passage of the Seine River. By this means, a very substantial saving of time was effected in turn-around of ships and it was especially useful in minimizing the hazards of transferring fuel oil from ship to ship directly, which called for very difficult maneuvering in normal weather. It was anticipated that the balance of the original four vessels would be completed by the end of May.

The next problem was that of the braking system for the 30-ton cranes. These units were provided with an air operated control which required a considerably higher degree of skill on the part of the operator than was previously the case with mechanical braking. A system of mechanical brakes was designed for superimposing on the existing air operated system and a trial installation was made. The design was developed by the Commanding Officer of the Provisional Battalion, with the assistance of Mr. Faust and the technicians of the American Steel Dredge Co. The mechanical braking system proved highly satisfactory and it was decided that all of the cranes would be so fitted. Drawings were

prepared and a contract was placed with the Penhoet Co. (Chantiers de Normandie). Certain other changes were made of a minor nature to improve the operation of the cranes.

In connection with 85-ft tugs, a modification was proposed that would remove the after part of the deck erection and move the towing bits as far forward as could be in order to place the bits as close to the turning center of the tug as was possible. Previous experiences with this class of tug showed that it was not safe to tow with a short line in swift currents or in narrow waters which would not permit manouvering space for the tugs, and one of these vessels was capsized in such an operation. Negotiations were initiated to modify one tug in order to study the effect of the movement of the towing bits. It was decided that another tug be modified by military personnel at Ghent. This work had not been completed by the end of March but it was expected that it would be by early June. It was believed that this modification would greatly improve the performance of this class of tug for service in European waters.

g. Losses in TC Vessels:-During this period two Y-tankers and three 85' tugs were sunk. One of the tankers developed a leak while proceeding from Antwerp to Ostend in ballast, and was lost as a result of enemy action, with all hands aboard. Three 85-ft. tugs were sunk as a result of a collision with underwater objects but in no instance was the vessel lost. All four were raised, and the equipment was salvaged on three; in the case of one, it was anticipated that it would be returned to service during the month of May. In addition, one 74-ft. tug which collided with an underwater object in the harbor of Cherbourg, was salvaged and placed in operation within a period of ten days. This was believed to be a record performance for a comparatively unskilled salvaging organization. During this period also, a number of small craft were sunk, but in only one case with the T-163, were salvage operations unsuccessful. In this case, all the machinery considered salvageable and reclaimable was removed from the vessel and the hulk was abandoned.

h. Improved Maintenance Facilities:- During this period the small graving dock of the Homel Co. at Cherbourg was placed in operation by the Port Marine Maintenance organization at that port. Use of this drydock resulted in a very substantial increase in the number of deadlined major craft returned to operating condition by relieving the heavy burden on U.K. repair facilities which were already overtaxed by British and American Naval requirements. A repair shop for injectors was set up in Cherbourg which noticeably decreased parts requirements for this very critical item of equipment. The release of drydock space in Antwerp materially assisted in decreasing the work load on U.K. repair facilities. Also, during this period it was noted that the experience index of the Port Marine Maintenance Companies showed a very substantial improvement and the maintenance capacity for the ETO increased to approximately 400 craft per month, as compared with about half of that figure prior to January 1945. This figure was due to improved shop facilities that were made available.

i. Standard Operating Procedures and Reports:- An SOP was set up for the operation of convoys in this Theater, the use of which it was believed would materially increase the safety of the vessels operating in such convoys. This procedure was worked out in conjunction with the Navy. In order to pro-

vide for more accurate information with reference to work actually performed in returning equipment to operation, a sample form of reporting was set up and a code for identifying items of equipment was incorporated therein similar to the Navy filing system, which had proved of considerable value.

6. Marine Intelligence & Diversion Branch:- a. The part played by the Marine Intelligence & Diversion Branch during this quarterly period continued to be that of an information gathering and disseminating unit dealing principally with the ocean-going and cross-channel shipping phase of Marine Operations Division activities. This Branch provided an increased report coverage of shipping activities and indicated trends in operations.

b. Recognized as the channel for coordination of MOD activities with the U.S. and British Navy, the War Shipping Administration, and with the British Ministry of War Transport, as regards movement of shipping, the efforts of this Branch were highly successful in increasing the necessary cooperation between these Allied Services and civilian organizations. The resulting two-way flow of this information materially contributed to the establishment of a more efficient handling of shipping in the Theater.

c. Considerable thought was given to the activities that would subsequently follow V-E day on the Continent. Plans were formulated for the transition from a receiving and discharge operation to that of an outloading program and machinery was set in motion to handle this phase of TC work when combat ceased and redeployment became an actuality.

d. At some time following cessation of hostilities in Europe it was realized that the convoy system, at least for cargo vessels, would be discontinued and plans were formulated to insure the handling of shipping on this new basis.

7. Administrative Officer - In addition to the normally assigned duties of the Administrative Officer, a great deal of effort was given to the reduction and elimination of required reports. This involved considerable investigation and coordination in order to insure that all required information was being received with a minimum duplication of effort. The work of the Administrative Officer in this connection was very successful and many reports were simplified or eliminated in their entirety.

Liaison

1. The administrative change in U.S. Navy Headquarters on the Continent did away with the necessity of continuing the OCOT Liaison Group which had been assigned to the Naval Party while it was stationed at Le Havre. Following closely on this, the Naval Liaison Group assigned to the OCOT was inactivated. Liaison with the U.S. Navy due to the physical change in location of headquarters, however, continued on a very close basis.

2. The improved overall position in shipping and the ports' ability to accept ships direct from convoy, made possible requests to the British Admiralty to program convoys to Ghent and Antwerp so as to eliminate all possible delays. These requests were met on a cooperative basis and materially contributed to the improvement of the overall situation.

3. Close liaison was maintained with the British Ministry of War Transport and through their cooperation numerous small coastwise lifts of cargo on the Continent and lifts from the Continent to the U.K. were arranged. A consolidated coaster turn-around report was devised which currently portrayed a more truly representative picture of this fleet than was previously possible in the reports published separately. MOD was in daily contact with the War Shipping Administration Office in London as well as Paris, and close cooperation was maintained in respect to all shipping problems. Expediting the discharge of ships in port when possible to make an earlier convoy was accomplished through cooperation of War Shipping Administration, the U.S. Navy, and Port Authority, working in conjunction with MOD.

4. Regarding the activities of the Transportation Office of the U.K. Base, actually the Marine Operations Division of U.K. Base, because of its proximity to the British sailing authorities, consistently performed many tasks ordinarily not in the scope of a Base Section. The coordination of sailing information and cooperation received from this source was of great value to MOD on the Continent.

Port Target vs Accomplishment

ANTWERP

	Daily Plan	Monthly Plan	Discharge For Month
Jan.	16,000	496,000	433,004
Feb.	18,000	504,000	478,463
Mar.	17,775	551,025	458,066

CHERBOURG

	Daily Plan	Monthly Plan	Discharge For Month
Jan.	6,700	207,700	262,423
Feb.	10,350	289,800	286,591
Mar.	6,750	309,250	261,492

LE HAVRE

	Daily Plan	Monthly Plan	Discharge For Month
Jan.	7,100	220,100	198,768
Feb.	6,100	170,800	195,332
Mar.	4,750	147,250	192,593

ROUEN

	Daily Plan	Monthly Plan	Discharge For Month
Jan.	6,600*	204,600	157,709
Feb.	6,300	176,400	173,016
Mar.	5,850	181,350	268,174

GHENT

	Daily Plan	Monthly Plan	Discharge For Month
Jan.	--	--	15,742
Feb.	4,600	128,800	69,698
Mar.	6,450	199,950	172,259

SOUTHERN FRANCE

	Daily Plan	Monthly Plan	Discharge For Month
Jan.	--**	--	385,760
Feb.	--**	--	495,566
Mar.	14,475	448,725	547,503

* Includes Tonnage for Ghent
** Not included in Movement Plan.

NOTE: Planned figures include only ocean going and coaster discharge tonnage. Discharge figures include DWT from MT's, LST's and other craft, which amounted to 167,803 DWT.



1. RESCUE BARGES ARRIVE



2. PILOT HOUSE BREAKS WATER



3. AND THE TUG EMERGES

RAISING A TUG

In operating the European Theater of Operations key ports the . . . . . Transportation Corps must maintain its harbor fleets, this salvage operation put another . . boat back on the job. . . . . These harbor fleets . . . consisting of all types of vessels used in a major port operation have often been called the Armie's Navy. . . . . .

4. MADE READY FOR PUMPING

5. WATER IS PUMPED OUT

6. DAMAGE IS CHECKED AND REPAIRED

7. CREW TAKES OVER

8. AND BACK ON THE JOB

Conclusion

Throughout the first quarter of 1945 new problems were encountered, and organization and procedures were changed to meet the varying requirements. Cross-channel shuttle of sick, wounded, and leave personnel - return of POW's to US - expediting mail - coal imports - erection of cranes - programming of shipping - Civil Imports - Bulk Wheat Imports - Turnover of Granville to French - TC Equipment turn-over at Brest - Release of TC Equipment to Z of I - Release of Equipment to the French - Modification of Harbor Craft - Losses in TC vessels - Improved Maintenance Facilities - these are but a few of the actual requirements, while plans for redeployment following V-E day commenced to influence all decisions.

Statistics

See Appendix No. 7 for additional statistics on marine operations and equipment at the various ports operating on the Continent under U.S. control.

CHAPTER II

SECTION VIII

INLAND WATER WAYS DIVISION

General:

During the first quarter of 1945, in the Inland Waterways Division (IWD), emphasis was placed on increasing the movement of supplies from port areas to depots by inland waterways, thereby relieving the rail and motor transportation facilities for movement into forward areas. Colonel N.A. RYAN remained ACOT, Inland Waterways Division, throughout this period. The Organization Chart for the Office of the Chief of Transportation, at the beginning of this Chapter, indicates the various branches operating within the Inland Waterways Division as of 1 April 1945. Only a few minor changes were made in the headquarters set-up of IWD during this period. These will be noted upon referring back to the IWD Organization Chart in Volume V, Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations, Chapter II.

As the traffic on inland waterways increased, it became necessary to make provisions for unloading at inland terminals and depots, as barges were backlogged at destination and the Services did not have adequate facilities or equipment for handling the supplies as they arrived. This resulted in the establishment of inland ports at Paris, Reims, Lille, Brussels, La Louviere, and Liege. These ports were supervised by personnel from the Base Section Transportation Offices and manned by either U.S. Port Companies, British Port Companies, civilian labor, or by POW's. Since IWD had to furnish labor at inland ports, it also became its responsibility to furnish marine equipment for operating these ports. In previous months, little traffic moved on inland waterways and the division's mission was mainly one of rehabilitation of inland waterways and equipment. In the first quarter of 1945, the mission of IWD gradually changed from rehabilitation to operations, as reconstruction of the canals was in the main a responsibility of the liberated countries, and all U.S. Army Engineers were taken off this work and the only aid given the liberated countries was in the form of supplies and equipment that the countries were unable to obtain.

Summary of Accomplishments:

Requirements Branch - Major Wayne Smith

This branch, during the first quarter of 1945, secured and set into operation the inland ports of Lille, Brussels, Liege, Reims, and La Louviere. At the start of inland waterway operations, the plan was to have the Services unload their respective supplies because this operation is primarily a Service function, particularly in rail and motor movement, where this type of carrier can be unloaded within the depot. With barge shipments this is not true, however, as some locations for barge unloading were from 3 to 5 miles from the depots. It was then decided that IWD would be responsible for unloading at Quayside. In other words, removing cargo from barges was an IWD responsibility, and once cargo was on the quayside, it became a depot responsibility. With this in mind, the above inland ports were established (with the exception of Brussels). These were operated and supervised by TC Port Companies. The

Requirements Branch also obtained the necessary gear and equipment for their functioning. Six TC Port Companies were located as follows:

2	at Lille	1	at La Louviere
2	at Liege	1	at Reims

While the port of Paris had sufficient personnel, it was necessary to obtain cranes, gear, and motive power for this port. The port of Brussels was handled entirely by British port personnel, using British equipment. With the increase of tonnage moved by IWD, it became necessary for the Operations Branch, IWD, to have some check on barge operations. Thus, a canal patrol was established in Belgium and France. The Requirements Branch obtained MTL's for patrol work in Belgian waters and Army J-Boats for French waters. "Sea Mules" were also obtained to assist in shifting barges within the port of Paris. The Requirements Branch, during this period, was called upon by the French and Belgians to obtain many supplies that were unobtainable from their own sources. These included floating equipment, POL, steel for repairing barges, pontoons and diving equipment for salvage work, welding equipment, and transportation facilities so that supplies could be moved to French shipyards. After a study by SHAEF and the Operations Branch, IWD, it was determined that the tug lift on the Seine and Oise Rivers would have to be increased; otherwise, the Army would derive no benefit from these rivers as all available tugs were needed to transport urgently needed civilian supplies. The Requirements Branch took the necessary action to transfer under lend lease, 25 surplus CT tugs. In conjunction with the Equipment Branch, IWD, the necessary arrangements were made to have them adapted for use on the Seine and Oise Rivers. Their superstructure had to be cut down to give them clearance under the temporary bridges erected on the waterways. During early operations, it was found that the French were unable to control their POL. In other words, the U.S. Army would allot them POL for tugs each month, but their method of distribution was very poor, with the result that IWD was always having to place emergency requisitions. To eliminate this, the Requirements Branch, in conjunction with CCQM, set up a system whereby POL would be available at all times for barges carrying Army cargo.

Operations Branch - Lt. E. S. Bankart

At the start of the year, all waterways in France and Belgium which the Army planned to use had been repaired sufficiently to permit limited operations, with the exception of the Rhone River. The Rhone project was dropped at a later date due to the lack of French Rhone type tugs and the Allies had no tugs available suitable for this river. The Rhone tug is a shallow draft sidewheel tug of approximately 1,200 h.p. This type is needed because the river has a depth of only 1m80 with a very swift current. With the start of the year, a planned movement program was set up for barges; however, this program could not be followed for the following reasons:

(1) The German break-through in the Ardennes necessitated the stopping of all barge traffic on the Albert Canal which at that time carried the bulk of barge traffic in Belgium. This traffic originated in Antwerp and moved to the depot area in Liege.

(2) The inland waterways in France and Belgium froze over so as to hinder barge operations. IWD had been advised by the French and Belgians that waterways very seldom froze with the result that when they did freeze, IWD was not prepared to keep the canals open. However, within a very few days, bulldozer blades were mounted on sea mules and began functioning as ice breakers in Belgium. In this way, a limited amount of tonnage was moved on the Albert Canal. However, on canals in the coal region of Belgium, it was necessary to use dynamite as well as the equipment mentioned previously in order to open the canals so that coal barges could move this critically needed product from the mines to the cities of Belgium. In France, this means of breaking the ice was successful in basins around Paris, but in regions of Nord it was not, due to the fact that the French let the ice reach a thickness of 90 cm before they asked for assistance in breaking it.

(3) With the melting of the ice, floods became the next hazard to operating inland waterways. These stopped traffic on the majority of the waterways in both France and Belgium. During these floods the Seine River reached a height of 6m90 at a point where normal water was 1m15. The Oise reached a height of 6 m against normal of 2m50. These heights were the highest for the past 30 years.

For the above reasons, traffic on inland waterways of France and Belgium was of a limited nature from 1 January to 25 February and stopped from 24 January until 25 February 1945. After the high water receded, and waterways became operational, an influx of civilian imports started to arrive at the Seine River ports. This led to a shortage of barges for Army cargo as French civilian imports had been given first priority on barges. This necessitated prevailing upon the French to make a survey of their barges and transferring to the Seine all self-propelled barges of the 38.50 meter class.

French Barge Control Branch - Major Noel Mayer, French Army

The work of this branch, in addition to its liaison duties, was to establish a barge control system so that headquarters would know at all times the position of all barges in France. This system in principle was good; however, with poor communications facilities in France, they were unable to keep the barge information accurate and up-to-date. All demands for barges for U. S. Army cargo were placed with this branch and they in turn had them placed at the loading points.

Belgian Branch - Major F. L. Boyd

This branch was Branch Office for IWD for Belgium. Army traffic in Belgium was a matter of joint British and U. S. control, and it was the responsibility of this branch to be the Belgium field representative of this Division.

Equipment Branch - Major C. .. McKeown

The primary function of this branch for this quarter was to assist or rather bring pressure to bear upon the French to speed up their barge repairs

program. In line with this program, all shipyards were canvassed to determine their available facilities for repairs; also, to find out what materials and supplies would be needed to resume barge and tug repairs in these yards. Assistance was then given them in procuring these materials and in obtaining transportation for moving them to the yards. In addition to the above, this branch completed a survey of all damaged barges on the Continent thus far liberated. It then worked with the authorities of the respective countries to arrange a systematic program of barge and tug rehabilitation. In addition to the above work, this branch also kept a close watch over all U.S. equipment in custody of IWD and was responsible to see that a minimum of time was lost due to deadlining of equipment. This branch made frequent tests to determine what U.S. equipment was suitable to be used as replacement for damaged standard waterway equipment.

Operations:

The map on the opposite page shows the canals and navigable waterways on the Continent, as of 5 January and 20 March 1945.

Engineer and construction work on the canals and waterways was coordinated between G-4, Engineers, and IWD, OCOT, through the Com Zone Inland Waterways Committee. Reconstruction was requested by IWD at Com Zone Inland Waterways meetings at which priority would be granted. The French placed all their requests for construction and repair through this committee.

Target dates for the opening of all canals of military value were met with the exception of a major lock on the Oise River at Creil. This was delayed approximately 45 days due to high water and the removal of U.S. troops to other work. This in no way hampered tonnage on the canal as the French were never able to use to capacity the small lock at that location. Tonnage forecasts and targets for total movements on the canals were never reached because of the inability of the French and Belgians to force the barge operators to move with the maximum of efficiency. For example, it was recommended by U.S. and British that lights be installed at obstacles and locks in order that tugs could be manned by a double crew and work 24 hours a day shuttling barges on the waterways. The French would not agree to this. They offered many reasons; however, they never offered a strong enough argument against it to satisfy the U.S. and British. Nevertheless, tugs did not operate 24 hours per day. Also barges never made maximum use of daylight hours for operation. The above, plus the lack of cooperation by barge operators, were the main reasons why tonnage forecasts were never met.

IWD established Inland Waterways Control Offices at 11th, 13th, and 17th Port Headquarters. These offices were established to assist the port with their barge operations. The main duties of these offices were to:

(1) Obtain the barges required by the port.
(2) See that they were fueled and stocked ready for operation.
(3) Assist the port in determining that they were properly loaded.
(4) Determine that they were properly documented.
(5) Dispatch the barges.

1. ROUTE IS PLOTTED

2. FOR LOADED LCT

3. AS THE PILOT TAKES OVER

FIRST U.S. LCTs TO REACH PARIS

The first LCTs to navigate the upper reaches of the Seine river arrived at Paris loaded with lubricating oil. This trip initiates a scheduled run from le Havre to Paris, planned and executed by the inland waterways experts of the Transportation Corps to supply food and other commodities to the Paris civilian population.

4. ROPES ARE CAST OFF

5. LCT PASSES WRECKAGE

6. AND GOES THRU LOCKS

7. PARIS IS REACHED

8. AND UNLOADING BEGINS

(6) Notify destination of sailing.
(7) Assist the ports in any way possible to increase the efficiency of barge operations.

These control offices were staffed with an officer from the IWD, a liaison officer of either French or Belgian nationality depending on location, as well as by several civilian marine superintendents. While there were IWD representatives at the port, their primary function was to assist the port wherever and whenever the port asked for it.

IWD's relation with Base Sections was to assist them whenever assistance was needed. With the establishment of the inland ports referred to above this Division assisted in obtaining the equipment and troops needed for the operation. The IWD took the attitude that Base Sections were the operators and IWD would get into the picture only as a policy making body and offer assistance when the Base Section was in need of it.

TC personnel under IWD but assigned to Base Sections were as follows:

Paris:

Seventy enlisted men and three officers were assigned by Seine Section to supervise unloading in the Paris area.

Reims:

The 529th Port Company was assigned to this inland port for unloading; in addition to the above Port Company, 500 POW's were also used as labor.

Lille:

The 645th and 533rd Port Companies were assigned to this port to unload barges with supplies consigned to depots in that area.

La Louviere:

The 434th Port Company was assigned to unload Ordnance supplies at depot O-656.

Liege:

The 184th Port Company was assigned to this inland port to supervise unloading at this point.

The 584th Port Company was assigned to depot O-610 to unload ammunition at that depot.

Cooperation and Liaison:

British - The operations in Belgium were a joint operation between U.S. and British, workings in that country were on a very cooperative basis. Some examples of this cooperation were: Channel Base Section had established a

POL dump in the Lille area. There was insufficient transportation to move the above supplies. An agreement was worked out whereby the British would transport this product in tank barges assigned to them, thereby relieving much needed U.S. transport for hauls to the Armies. IWD dispatched MTL's to help the British barges when they were stopped due to lack of tugs. Canal patrols established by U.S. Army in Belgian waters kept barges with British cargo moving as well as those carrying U.S. cargo.

Navy - During this period IWD worked with the Navy to obtain LCT5's to transport Army cargo up the Seine. Up to end of March, no final agreement had been reached.

G-4 and other Divisions of OCOT - IWD worked very closely with G-4 and Movements Division, OCOT, on the Monthly Supply Program; also, on the clearing-up of any difficulties that came up in connection with unloadings at depots. All difficulties with other Services were taken up by IWD through G-4. All movements by barge were coordinated with Movements Division, OCOT. The Division also worked very closely with Marine Operations Divisions, OCOT, in obtaining substitute U.S. equipment to be used on French and Belgian waterways.

The only example of reciprocal aid activity of IWD was in obtaining 25 CT tugs for the French to be used on the Seine and Oise Rivers. While other equipment was loaned to the countries to help them out, nothing else was turned over under reciprocal aid.

Plans for Future Operations:

It was contemplated at the close of the first quarter of 1945 that the first waterway in Germany to be opened would be the Rhine system as this waterway would be greatly needed to transport supplies from the Ruhr area to Holland as well as within Germany. It was planned, at that time, that as soon as the tactical situation permitted, IWD would open a Rhine Branch to make reconnaissances and also to start the work of raising and salvaging damaged equipment. While it was not thought that there would be any military traffic on the waterways of Germany, they would be a big factor in the movement of coal, wheat and numerous other civilian supplies.

It was foreseen that operations in France and Belgium would continue to increase as the Armies moved ahead; rail and motor would have to move with them, thereby necessitating movement of supplies from port to rear depots by waterway whereever possible.

Statistics

The following figures are quoted from a PROGRESS REPORT, published by Communications Zone, ETOUSA on 30 April 1945 which shows the total tonnages handled by barge from December 1944 through April 1945:

PORT	OPERATION	DEC. 1944	Jan. 1945	Feb. 1945	Mar. 1945	Apr. 1945	PLANNED* ESTIMATE APRIL
TOTAL	Loaded	63,697	100,877	105,704	213,065	335,264	254,850
	Dispatched	26,359	113,635	108,020	218,256	330,886	
	Unloaded at Destination	4,659	58,534	101,967	191,660	291,874	
ANTWERP	Loaded	50,172	39,751	49,808	78,298	148,926	69,000
	Dispatched	15,630	59,218	62,651	79,697	140,465	
	Unloaded at Destination	1,507	34,078	69,028	83,666	139,764	
GHENT	Loaded	0	3,349	24,990	47,921	80,490	57,000
	Dispatched	0	968	23,508	48,596	83,491	
	Unloaded at Destination	0	0	11,264	40,718	68,754	
ROUEN	Loaded	13,525	57,777	30,906	85,195	100,786	111,600
	Dispatched	10,729	53,449	21,861	89,312	102,531	
	Unloaded at Destination	3,152	24,456	21,675	67,276	82,013	
LE HAVRE	Loaded	0	0	0	651	5,062	17,250
	Dispatched	0	0	0	651	4,399	
	Unloaded at Destination	0	0	0	0	1,343	

*Planned estimate is taken from April Port Operations and Supply Movement Program.

CHAPTER II

SECTION IX

MOTOR TRANSPORT SERVICE

The Organization Chart for the Office of the Chief of Transportation, at the beginning of this Chapter, shows the various Branches operating under the Chief, Motor Transport Service during the first quarter of the year 1945. Details on the activities of these branches during this period are covered in Chapter V. There were no changes in the organization of the Division before the end of March 1945.