HISTORICAL REPORT

OF THE

TRANSPORTATION CORPS

IN THE

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

VOLUME V

— IN THREE PARTS —

OCTOBER - NOVEMBER - DECEMBER

1944

PART 3

Mod. 76999 - Pap. du Sentier, Imp., Paris - C.O.L. 31 3134

CHAPTER VI

TRANSPORTATION SECTIONS

WITHIN

COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

ADVANCE, INTERMEDIATE, AND BASE SECTIONS

* * *

Normandy Base Section
Brittany Base Section
Channel Base Section
Loire Section
Seine Section
Oise Section
Advance Section

— BASE SECTIONS ON THE CONTINENT —

7 - OCT - 1944



CHART I
CHAPTER VI

CONFIDENTIAL

BASE SECTIONS

OF THE

COMMUNICATIONS ZONE. ETOUSA

BOUNDARIES AS OF 10 DEC, '44

NOTE: THIS MAP IS NOT OFFICIAL AND IS PREPARED PRIMARILY FOR USE IN THE OFFICES OF TRANSPORTATION CORPS HQ.

BASE MAP — CARTE MICHELIN, LES GRANDE ROUTES
SCALE 1:1,000,000

DRAWN 10 DEC. 1944

21 AG AREA CONTROL
(US ACTIVITY CONTROLLED BY CHANNEL)

CHANNEL
(AREA CONTROL)

21 AG AREA CONTROL
(US ACTIVITY CONTROLLED BY NORMANDY)

NORMANDY

BRITTANY

SEINE

OISE

ADVANCE

ARMY TERRITORY

EINDHOVEN
ANTWERP
GHENT
CALAIS
BRUSSELS
HASSELT
ST TROND
MAASTRICHT
LIEGE
LILLE
TOURNAI
ATH
MONS
CHARLEROI
NAMUR
HAINE
ST POL
ARRAS
CAMBRAI
BAPAUME
ABBEVILLE
DIEPPE
AMIENS
ST QUENTIN
HIRSON
ROCROI
FUMAY
HIERGES
GIVET
TORCY
ST LAURENT-
NEUFCHATEL
FORGES-
GOURNAY-
BEAUVAIS
BRETEUIL
MONTDIDIER
COMPIEGNE
LAON
SEDAN
ARLON
LUXEMBOURG
STENAY
LONGUYON
BUZANCY
VOUZIERS
REIMS
ETAIN
METZ
NEUVILLY
MACNY-
PONTOISE
ERMENONVILLE
CHATEAU-THIERRY
EPERNAY
CHALONS
MANTES
MEAUX
PARIS
MOUDAN
MONTCEAUX-
SEZANNE
VILLENAUXE
NOGENT
ST MIHIEL
BAR-LE-DUC
COMMERCY
VAUCOULEURS
NANCY
MONTIERS
NEUFCHATEAU
GRAND
TROYES
SENS
PITHIVIERS
FONTAINEBLEAU
TOURY
ABLIS
CHARTRES
CHATEAUDUN
ARTENAY
MONTARGIS
ORLEANS
VENDOME
CHATEAU RENAULT
TOURS
LANGRES
AUXERRE
CHAUMONT
CHERBOURG
CARENTAN
BAYEUX
BALLERON
ST LO
VIRE
TINCHEBRAY
FLERS
ARGENTAN
DOMFRONT
RANES
MOULINS-LA-MARCHE
VERNEUIL
DREUX
EVREUX
ROUEN
LE HAVRE
MORLAIX
BREST
DOL
LE FAOUET
PONTIVY
QUIMPERLE
PLOERMEL
MESSAC
CHATEAUBRIANT
SEGRE
ANGERS
BAUGE
RENNES
LE MANS
NANTES

CHART 2
CHAPTER VI

60 COPIES 11 DEC. 44
15 " 13 " "
15 " 25 " "

OCOS CWW ETOUSA

NORMANDY BASE SECTION

(Chapter VI)

Administration and Personnel

Normandy Base Section (NBS) was established in Normandy, France, on 16 August 1944 with the issuing of General Order No.36, Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, under the command of Colonel THEODORE WYMAN, Jr. The section had previously been designated Base Section 3, under the same command, and at the time Base Section 3 was organized, 7 August 1944, the Transportation Section staff consisted of only two officers, Major FRANCIS J. LADWIG and Captain (later Major) CHESTER A. ROSE, who served as Motor Transport Officer and Acting Transportation Officer, respectively. There were four other Transportation Corps officers in the section at that time, engaged in field activities; these were: Major WILLIAM R. MULVIHILL, Captain ARTHUR D. McCLEAN, 1st Lt. FRANCIS N. SPURLOCK, and 2nd Lt. GEORGE G. McCLEARY.

On 17 August 1944, Lt. Colonel ABRAHAM J. ROSENBLUM, who had previously served as Officer in Charge, Overseas Staging Area, Fort Slocum, N.Y., arrived from the United Kingdom with 14 officers, assigned to the Transportation Section, and the following day, Colonel JOHN C.F. HANLEY arrived at Cherbourg, having been appointed Transportation Officer of Normandy Base Section. Lt. Colonel ROSENBLUM became his Deputy, and the task of organizing the Normandy Base Section Transportation Section was begun. By 18 August there were a total of 22 officers in the section and by 23 August, an additional 15 had been assigned.

The first enlisted personnel for the Transportation Section reached Cherbourg on 20 August 1944 and consisted of 70 enlisted men from the 1st and 5th Group Regulating Stations. A few days later, the 3rd Group Regulating Station, consisting of 81 officers nad 322 enlisted men, under the command of Lt. Colonel HENRY M. TAYLOR, formerly assigned to Advance Section, and later to Cherbourg Command and Base Section 3, became available to the Transportation Section. On 25 August, 5 officers of the 10th Traffic Regulation Group were assigned, and during October, 21 officers and 152 enlisted men from the 8th Traffic Regulation Group in Brittany Base Section were placed on Detached Service with Normandy Base Section. In November, the use of the ports to the east of Cherbourg relieved some of the pressure for additional Transportation Corps personnel in Normandy Base Section, and at the same time, closing of the Red Ball Route and the beaches had their effect on the situation. On 28 November, the 8th Traffic Regulation Group returned to Brittany Base Section.

Organization and Function of Section Transportation Office

On 30 October 1944, Major General LUCIUS B. CLAY assumed command of Normandy Base Section on the authority of verbal orders of the Theater Commanding General. These orders were confirmed on 2 November. During the early part of October, Normandy Base Section had been divided into four Districts, namely, the Cherbourg, Utah, Omaha, and Granville Districts. Effective at 0001 hours, 1 December, Normandy Base Section was repartitioned into two Districts, Omaha and Utah. The former included all territory previously designated the Granville

District in addition to that already under Omaha District, and Utah added Cherbourg to its original area. Major General CLAY was succeeded by Major General HENRY S. AURAND on 17 December 1944.

Within Normandy Base Section, the chain of command was from the Commanding General to the District Commanding Officers from whom the command channel extended to all troops within their respective Districts. Exceptions to this were: Headquarters Company and Headquarters Detachment, NBS, and the W.C Detachment, NBS, which were geographically located in Utah District, but came directly under the Commanding General of NBS.

On the staff of the Base Section Commanding General were: the Chief of Staff, the General Staff (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and G-5) and the Special Staff which included the Chiefs of Services, the I.G., A.G., J.A.G., F.O., F.M., Chaplain, Hq Cmdt., Claims, G.P.A., A.E.S., and Special Appointments. On this basis, the Section Transportation Officer was on the staff of the Base Section Commanding General and had no units under its control. However, as Transportation Corps specialists and technical representatives of the Chief of Transportation in Normandy Base Section, certain orders were issued by the Section Transportation Officer to District Commanders, in the name of the Base Section Commanding General, when the occasion demanded such action. Operational control of the Transportation Corps units within the various Districts of Normandy Base Section was normally exercised through the District Commander who also had a staff organized similarly to that of the Base Section Commanding General. Thus the Commanding Officer of the District received staff assistance from a T.C. District Transportation Officer.

Since D plus 1, Transportation Corps units had been arriving on the Continent and taking over their assigned duties in the areas that subsequently became Normandy Base Section. The majority of these units operated under the Major Ports, the 2nd Military Railway Service, or were attached to the Engineer Special Brigades, for the performance of their duties. Thus, when the Section Transportation Office was organized in Normandy Base Section on 17 August 1944, there were 281 Transportation Corps units totaling a personnel strength of approximately 50,000. Towards the end of November, the number of these units dropped to 181 with a personnel strength of approximately 32,000; by 1 January 1945, there were only 125 Transportation Corps units in Normandy Base Section; Appendix No.1 shows the Transportation Corps Station List effective as of that date. Opening of the ports at Le Havre, Rouen, and Antwerp, and the closing of the Normandy beaches and sub-ports accounted for the majority of the transfers that occurred. By type, the Transportation Corps units in Normandy Base Section as of 1 September, 1 December 1944 and 1 January 1945 were as follows:

Type of Unit	1 Sept. '44	1 Dec. '44	1 Jan. '45
Quartermaster Group (TC)	2	1	1
Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile) (TC)	13	10	5
Truck Companies-QM, QM(TC), TC	61	47	31
Engineer Truck Companies	0	14	0
CWS Truck Companies	0	4	4
Amphibious Truck Battalions	3	1	0
Amphibious Truck Companies	19	8	3

Type of Unit	1 Sept.'44	1 Dec.'44	1 Jan.'45
Harbor Craft Companies	8	7	4
Port Marine Maintenance Cos.	4	2	3
Port Service Sig.Companies	3	0	0
Port Battalions	27	12	11
Port Companies	117	62	54
Major Port Headquarters	3	2	2
Group Regulating Stations	1	1	1
Traffic Regulation Group	1	0	0
Military Ry.Serv.(Hq & Hq Det)	1	0	0
Military Railway Grand Div.	2	1	0
Railway Operating Battalion	4	5	2
Railway Shop Battalion	1	2	1
Base Depot Companies	2	3	3
Quartermaster Service Cos.	12	0	0
TOTALS	284	182	* 125

*(Note: See Appendix No.1 for names of units)

Under the original plan, the Transportation Section of Normandy Base Section was composed of the following divisions: Administrative, Marine, Motor Operations, and Movements. The latter was subdivided into branches, designated as: Administrative, Rail Movements, and Motor and Highway Control. On the basis of this organization, the various Transportation Corps personnel assigned to the Transportation Section were given appropriate duties accordingly.

As the work of the Transportation Section progressed, minor modifications and changes were made in its organization, and a Standard Operating Procedure was issued during the latter part of September. (See Volume IV, History of the Transportation Corps in the Battle of France, for a true copy of this SOP). The organization of the Transportation Section established at that time, and which remained essentially the same until the end of December 1944 (with minor changes), was as follows:

TRANSPORTATION OFFICER

Colonel JOHN C. P. HANLEY

DEPUTY TRANSPORTATION OFFICER

Lt. Colonel ABRAHAM J. ROSENBLUM

CHIEF ADMINISTRATION

1st Lt. RAYMOND D. WALL (later Captain)

Branches

1. Personnel
2. Supply
3. Public Relations and Historical
4. Message Center

CHIEF MOVEMENTS

Lt. Colonel HENRY M. TAYLOR

Branches

1. Highway Control:
   a. Traffic Engineering
   b. Convoys: Stabling, Routing, Timing
2. Motor:
   a. Availability
      (1) Depot Operations
      (2) Freight
      (3) Personnel
3. Rail:
   a. Freight
   b. Personnel
4. Field Operations
   a. District Transportation Officer
      (1) RTO, (2) RTO (3) RTO

CHIEF PLANNING AND CONTROL

1st Lt. ARTHUR K. MEYERS

Branches

1. Reports and Statistics
2. Staff Planning
3. Training

CHIEF MOTOR OPERATIONS

Lt. Colonel THEODORE A. RATHJE

Branches

1. Dispatch and Availability
2. Reports, Statistics and Allocations
3. Personnel and Supply
4. Inspection
5. QM Truck
6. Amphibian Truck

TROOP MOVEMENTS

Captain Temple J. Swetman

CHIEF MARINE OPERATIONS

Major FRANCIS C. LEWIS

Branches

1. Port Planning
   a. Requisitions and Allocations
      (1) Floating Equipment
      (2) Maintenance Liaison
      (3) Shore Equipment
2. Vessel Allocations, Diversion, and Naval Liaison
   a. Ocean Vessel
   b. Coastal Vessel
   c. Freight and Personnel.

In the sections that follow, the three basic utility facilities -- for movements by water, rail, and road -- provided by the Transportation Corps in Normandy Base Section, from 18 August through 31 December 1944, are briefly described. For details of port rehabilitation, construction, and operations see Chapter III, under 4th Major Port.

Marine Operations

When Normandy Base Section was organized, cargo was being discharged at Cherbourg, across the Omaha and Utah beaches, and at the sub-ports of Grandcamp, Isigny, St. Vaast and Barfleur, at a rate of approximately 38,000 tons per day. Keeping informed of the situations and problems of the ports, and at the beaches, and offering the necessary technical advice in connection with operations and planning in order to assure the movement of maximun tonnages under the existing circumstances, were the major tasks confronting the Marine Operations Division, under Major FRANCIS C. LEWIS. The actual operations at the ports were conducted by the Transportation Corps personnel attached to the Major Ports, while operations at the beaches were the direct responsibility of the Engineer Special Brigades, which by that time had had their unit attachments changed to such an extent that they were composed of a larger percentage of Transportation Corps personnel than Engineers. For example, on 18 September, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, operating Utah beach, had 41.4 percent Transportation Corps personnel, 25.7 percent from the Quartermaster Corps, 21.4 percent from the Corps of Engineers, and 11.5 percent from other branches of the Service, such as Signal, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare, and Medical. For a period of five months, each of these beaches operated 24 hours per day, seven days a week; the night portion of this operating time was done under blackout conditions, until the latter part of August, and frequently strong winds made operations on the water impossible. The ports also operated on a 24-hour 7-day week basis.

As a statistical summary of port operations in Normandy Base Section, the following figures represent the amount of army cargo discharged on the Continent, by port area, in long tons during the periods indicated:

(1) From July through December 1944, the port of Cherbourg discharged a total of 1,661,749 long tons.

(2) From June through November 1944, Omaha Beach discharged a total of 1,264, 999 long tons.
(Beach closed 15 November)

(3) From June through November 1944, Utah Beach discharged a total of 726,014 long tons
(Beach closed 15 November)

(4) From July through December 1944, the Normandy minor ports discharged a total of 424,042 long tons.

(See Chapter VII, Table 84, for a breakdown of these figures by months, and others showing comparisons with other ports in ETO).

The types of ships unloaded through the port of Cherbourg and unloading facilities at the beaches included large cargo vessels, Liberty Ships, coasters, LST's, LCT's, crane ships, tankers, troop transports, MT vessels and lighters. In most cases LST's and LCT's were unloaded directly on the beaches, while the other types of vessels discharged directly to the quays or to DUKW's, landing craft or barges.

Excepting during adverse weather conditions, DUKW operations in Normandy Base Section were on a 24-hour basis. On the beaches, they began their operations on D-Day and were in service until 15 November when the beaches closed. At Cherbourg, the first DUKW came ashore on 16 July at 1738 hours, and during the remainder of the month of July, 79.9 percent of the total cargo discharged was to barges and other craft; 12.7 percent was discharged to DUKWs and the remainder was unloaded ship-to-shore. During August, the percentage of cargo unloaded at Cherbourg by DUKW amounted to approximately 20 percent, which was the highest percentage reached at that port. The last DUKW unloading at Cherbourg was on 15 December 1944. The use of DUKWs in cargo unloading operations is flexible, depending upon the operation as a whole. The extent of their use at the beaches, as compared to the service they performed at Cherbourg, varied throughout the various stages of operations at each locality. In general, their use in the discharge of cargo at the beaches was of major concern to the operation while at Cherbourg it was supplementary.

DUKWs are actually amphibian trucks and their use in the unloading of cargo from ships offshore was a development of World War II. They were operated by Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Companies. Essentially, their operation in NBS consisted of pulling-up alongside vessels and tying-up to a "Guest Warp" rigged around the ship and equipped with hooks placed opposite the ship's hatches in such a manner that they held the DUKWs in place alongside the ship, while Transportation Corps Port Company personnel operated the winches, worked the hatches, and gave each DUKW its load which, in case of unloading packaged goods, was normally two cargo nets full. These amphibian vehicles were then navigated ashore and driven over land to a Transfer Point where their loads were transferred by crane to trucks and from there their loads were hauled by trucks to classified dumps. Fork lifts were also set up on trucks or platforms, and heavy iron arms with a hook on the end were used to remove sling loads from DUKWs. During the early stages of unloading, immediately after seizing and establishing the beachhead, DUKWs traveled over roads to the dumps before unloading. This feature of operating the amphibian truck was used to advantage where necessary or where considered advisable in the situation. Maintenance and the replacement of damaged or worn parts became a serious problem during operations so that an abnormal number of DUKWs was deadlined and this hampered operations considerably. The following figures show the percentages of assigned

DUKWs operating at Cherbourg and Omaha beach from June through November 1944:

	CHERBOURG	OMAHA
June	-	76 percent
July	-	71 percent
August	66 percent	62 percent
September	54 percent	76 percent
October	34 percent	57 percent
November	32 percent	38 percent

For ships with cargo requiring unloading offshore and that could not be handled by DUKWs because of its bulk or weight, landing craft, barges, and lighters were used extensively. Their operation was more dependent upon clement weather than the DUKW, due to the fact that in a heavy sea the larger craft would swing out and crash into the side of the ship's hull. The Harbor Craft Companies under Transportation Corps control operated the barges and lighters by means of tugs. They experienced the same difficulties with maintenance and the lack of spare parts for their towing equipment as did the DUKW companies. Most of the tug boats are powered by Diesel engines and piston parts failed frequently, resulting in inoperative craft. In December, at Cherbourg, an average of 38 percent of all harbor craft, that is, tugs, barges and dispatch boats, was deadlined.

As the reconstruction work by the Engineers progressed at Cherbourg (See also Chapter III, under 4th Major Port), quaysides were repaired and opened to the discharge of large ocean-going vessels as well as coasters; the quayside capacities were thus increased considerably. The repair of railway trackage made direct ship-to-train unloading possible. Concrete runways for entering and leaving the water, and a large paved area adjoining these runways, were constructed and resulted in improved facilities for the use of DUKWs at Cherbourg. The paved area eliminated the mud conditions that were developing elsewhere in Normandy Base Section during October and November. The hard standings constructed at the seaplane base proved valuable for landing craft and DUKWs. Barges and tugs operated throughout the port and were discharged alongside the basin, usually directly to rail cars. The DUKWs normally worked in the inner harbor and the barges in the outer harbor. Listed below are the capacities of the port of Cherbourg on 12 August and again on 31 December:

	12 August	31 December
Liberty Berths	2	21
Coasters	6	13
Lighters	47	80
LST's	8	14
Train Ferries	0	2
Tonnage Capacity	9,050	24,800

(Excluding vessels at anchorage being unloaded by DUKWs, barges, landing craft and lighters).

Adverse weather conditions had their hampering effect on port operations at Cherbourg as well as at the beaches. Often stevedore gangs boarded a ship and before the first draft was lowered over the side, high winds and heavy slashing rain necessitated a suspending of operations. Manpower shortages were also serious. It was necessary to work Port Company troops on 12-hour shifts, exclusive of the two or three hours required to move from their work to bivouac areas. Skilled labor was scarce because more trained crane operators, signalmen and winch drivers were required for the equipment available than was provided for by unit Tables of Organization.

The small sub-ports of Isigny, Barfleur, St. Vaast and Grandcamp were capable of handling only coasters and harbor craft, yet they proved immensely valuable. Their quayside facilities were used frequently in the movement of perishables and refrigerated cargo brought to the Continent on specially fitted coasters. The use of these minor ports became a greater necessity in view of the fact that the larger Brittany ports were not captured as planned, and when the advance of the Armies became so rapid that the construction of the large supply bases in Brittany were seen as an economic impossibility. The sub-ports in Normandy Base Section were initially assigned to the 11th Port. However, Grandcamp closed on 16 September; Isigny, St. Vaast and Barfleur closed on 17 October. Granville continued operation after the departure of 11th Port for Rouen on 24 October, becoming a sub-port of the 4th Port at Cherbourg. (See Chapter III, under 4th Port and 11th Port). The British authorities granted the U.S. Forces the use of their "Mulberries" or artificial ports at Arromanches late in October. The tonnages unloaded at Arromanches are included among those shown above for the total tonnage handled at Omaha beach.

When Normandy Base Section began operation under that name on 16 August, 1944 the port of Cherbourg was operated by the 4th and 12th Port, and was averaging 10,000 tons per day unloading and clearing that tonnage from the port area, two-thirds by truck and one-third by rail. By 1 September the daily rail and motor clearances were about the same, with minor fluctuations indicating the availability of more rail facilities. By November, the ratio originally shown was reversed, two-thirds of all port clearance at that time being by rail.

An accomplishment of major importance at Cherbourg was the discharge of rolling stock. This railway equipment was moved into the harbor on one of three different types of vessels: the sea-train, formerly on the pre-war Mobile-Havanna run; the cross-channel train ferry, which was made up of specially fitted coasters; and LST's in which tracks had been laid. The first two types unloaded at quayside, and the third at the rail ramp constructed at the seaplane base. Rolling stock discharge figures as of 30 November and 31 December are as follows:

	30 Nov. '44	31 Dec. '44
Diesel Locomotives	123	123
Steam Locomotives	997	1013
Gondolas	7086	7095
Box Cars	8539	8550
Flat Cars	1820	1843
Tank Cars	657	657
Reefer Cars	169	169

	30 Nov.'44	31 Dec.'44
Wrecking Units (Including 11 Mobile Work Shop Units)	27	36
Cabooses	370	371
Hospital Units (14-15 cars per unit)	34	36

It was necessary for the NBS Transportation Section to maintain full information on all of the numerous activities within the Base Section relating to Transportation Corps facilities and to become fully acquainted with the problems involved, and that its Marine Operations Division devise, where practical, means of improving the use of men and material available in order to obtain greater efficiency and economy in marine operations. The Marine Operations Division was also charged with the responsibility for collecting and disseminating information from and to the Normandy ports and beaches, and the Transportation Corps Headquarters in Paris and London. Daily situation reports covering every phase of port and beach activity, and reports on incoming and outgoing vessels were prepared and forwarded to the various officers or individuals concerned. The arrival of build-up units for movement through the ports or over the beaches brought on unanticipated problems, among which were the frequent occurrence of a unit becoming separated from its organizational equipment due to a change in movement plans. The handling of such matters was a part of the work required of the Marine Division of the Section Transportation Office.

During December, in accordance with vessel diversion plans and tonnage allocations, the tonnage discharge figures were lower than for previous months at the ports in Normandy Base Section. The demand on Cherbourg and Granville was noticeably less, as unloadings at Le Havre, Rouen and Antwerp increased. The total number of tons of cargo discharged at Cherbourg and Granville combined, amounted to 301,647 tons, 75 percent of which was unloaded from large ocean-going vessels, 24 percent from coasters and the balance from other types of craft. Granville's all-coaster operations accounted for 50,749 tons of the total.

There was some activity in the beach areas during December, but it was concerned mostly with the clearance of such marine equipment as floating cranes, barges, tugs and other Transportation Corps equipment from these areas. In some instances, certain units of this equipment were moved over land on trucks or trailers to Cherbourg or to Channel Base Section ports. The remaining items were moved by water to these or other destinations. Included in the activity involving the movement of equipment, was the moving of Engineer port reconstruction equipment to Le Havre. During December, the Coaster "Barons Court" embarked carrying 683 tons of tentage and asphalt. It was planned that additional equipment would be loaded during January on the Liberty Ship "Schoarie" upon the return of this vessel from Le Havre.

Outloading operations from Cherbourg showed a gradual increase during December. A total of 8,484 tons were shipped to the United Kingdom and to Channel Base Section. Casualty evacuations amounted to 23,445 and a total of 1,382 POW's were evacuated.

During December, G-4 of Normandy Base Section conducted an inquiry into the practicability of moving 312,000 tons of supples from the various NBS

depots into Cherbourg and outloading them for Antwerp. The various staff sections of NBS were requested to make recommendations. After investigating and considering the proposal, the Transportation Section reported that the plan would be costly. Substantiating its findings, the fact was particularly pointed out that the facilities of the port, reconstructed primarily for off-loading, would not allow for the outloading of more than 5000 tons of cargo per day, regardless of the number of ships made available for the operation. However, the matter was not acted upon or brought to a conclusion before the end of December, and under directives from higher headquarters, the investigation was carried on into January 1945.

Several marine casualties, due to enemy action, occurred during December. The incident which brought about the greatest loss occurred on Christmas Eve when the LSI "Leopoldville" was torpedoed about 4000 yards from the outer breakwater at Cherbourg. There were 2,455 troops aboard, members of the 66th Infantry Division. The known casualties exceeded 800, with several hundred missing. The day before the "Leopoldville" disaster, the Coaster "Slamish", with a cargo of coal for Cherbourg, was torpedoed in the English Channel. There were three other casualties on the water near Cherbourg during the month, but these did not affect NBS operations.

Motor Transport

There were many motor transportation problems in Normandy Base Section, in addition to those presented by establishment and operation of the Red Ball Express. Most of the priority trains that were outloaded involved truck hauls over various distances from dumps to the railheads. Beach and port clearance was a major problem requiring about 30 percent of the available truck companies.

As fall and winter approached, the frequent rains and heavy wheels of army trucks and trailers soon made quagmires of the Normandy pastures and orchards which throughout the summer had served as bivouac areas, motor pools, dumps and military rail sidings. Continual usage developed small patches of mud into deep ruts which soon made ploughs of vehicle axles, and necessitated the constant use of front wheel drive and the auxiliary range. These trucks, moving from a heavily mudded area, carried large quantites of mud on the chassis and tires. As they traveled over the paved roads, the mud was jolted or washed from the truck and consequently it became so deep in many places that it was impossible to recognize the road as pavement. A couple of days without rain caused a semi-dry condition which changed the mud into a pasty sticky mass. This gave a "taffy pulling" reaction between the pavement and truck tires that was so violent in some places that huge pieces of pavement were pulled from the road surface and made it useless indefinitely because of a shortage of Engineers for making road repairs in such instances.

Operating motor vehicles under these circumstances, and in defiance of the increasing quantites of mud throughout the area, helped to bring on the serious motor maintenance problem that developed. Thus, the number of flat tires increased; and mud-ground brake bands, burned out valves and overheated engines were among the other major difficulties that followed. The Group, Battalion and Company headquarters under the Transportation Office were making urgent demands for assistance. Maintenance required extensive coordination with the Ordnance Section. Together, the latter with the Transportation Corps,

established a system of "De Luxe" service stations located at critical points throughout Normandy Base Section. Each of these stations was capable of completely servicing 20 vehicles per hour.

When the Normandy Base Section was organized, there were two Quartermaster Groups, eight Quartermaster Battalions, Mobile (TC), and 84 Truck Companies assigned for duty within its limits in addition to those assigned to Red Ball. The 1323rd and 388th Engineer General Service Regiments, while in the United Kingdom, formed seven truck companies each, within their respective organizations and in NBS these were under Transportation Corps control. Each Regiment was divided into two battalions. Another battalion was added when the 25th Chemical Smoke Generating Battalion was reorganized into a truck battalion, while maintaining its original identity, and its four companies were equipped with 2½-ton Standard 6 x 6 trucks. When the Red Ball program was established the latter part of August, many truck companies were taken away from other Base Section operations. In order to help offset the shortage thus created, ten truck companies were organized from Anti-Aircraft Battalions in the Normandy Base Section area and these were assigned to NBS. Additional vehicles were furnished 10 September when 1750 men from Replacement Pools were organized into provisional units and given a pool of 1000 trucks. These trucks were divided into five groups or units and distributed to Utah and Omaha Districts, and to the 4th and 11th Ports, in proportion to the work required.

One of the greatest difficulties experienced in NBS in using these provisional companies was the lack of tools for proper vehicle maintenance. Those tools already in use by regular trucking units had to meet this need. In addition to this drawback, the personnel drawn from Replacement Pools were not accompanied by officers and this resulted in an extreme shortage of supervisory personnel. These two factors contributed greatly to the high mortality rate among the vehicles.

Near the end of November, the number of truck companies in NBS amounted to 64, but the number of deadlined vehicles within these units reduced their effectiveness in some instances more than 50 percent. Between 35 and 50 percent more transportation was needed in dump and railhead operations due to mud.

Brief History of the Red Ball Route in NBS

Late in August, the Army dumps at Dreux and Chartres issued an urgent call for supplies in order to maintain the might of the Armies' offensive against the enemy moving south and to the east. Their requirements were for 72,000 tons to be delivered within 10 days, from 25 August to 5 September. To meet this demand, plans were developed by the headquarters staff of Normandy Base Section for the Red Ball Express operation, using 2½-ton 6 x 6 GMC trucks. This expedient was devised because the railroads were still being repaired and the rolling stock available at that time was insufficient to handle the demands of the Armies.

One-way routes over Class 70 roads, leading to and from the Army depots and NBS dumps, were designated and the highways were marked "Red Ball Trucks Only". Truck convoy regulating points were established on each of the routes; TCP No.1 was set up near Torigny and TCP No.2 near St. Lo. All inbound Red Ball convoys pulled into TCP No.2 and, while the drivers obtained coffee and sandwiches, the Convoy Commanders were given instructions as to depot destinations and the

supplies that were to be picked up. All outbound Red Ball convoys funneled through TCP No.1 where drivers received coffee, while TCP personnel checked for overloads, proper waybilling and entered the convoy information on their convoy ledger. From there to destination, the way was scheduled "non-stop". (See Chart I, Chapter V, for layout of Red Ball route as of 15 October 1944).

During the period of operations indicated above, which was later referred to as Phase I, a total of 74,585 tons were moved forward. The trucks averaged a three-day turn-around. Truck Company bivouac areas were set up along the return route so that driver or truck changes could be made with the minimum loss of time. Full headlights were permitted on vehicles. Only 1st echelon maintenance was practical, but Ordnance maintenance units, consisting of mobile work shops, patrolled the highways as "aid men" for emergency repairs.

Phase II operations on the Red Ball Express began on 5 September and continued until 13 November 1944, when the operation ended as a large scale commitment. During that time, as the tactical situation developed, the Red Ball route had been extended to Paris and beyond to Soissons, Chateau-Thierry and Sommesous. Although the routes remained practically the same as originally established, or as extended during the development of the tactical situation, minor changes were made at various times and places because of extensive damage to the roads under heavy rains and the traffic involved in their use for these convoys.

During the entire time the Red Ball route was in operation, approximately 7000 trucks, averaging from 10 to 12 round trips each, carried 355,519 tons of supplies forward, often making deliveries directly to the requisitioning unit. The maximum number of truck companies assigned to the Red Ball route was 140; shortly before closing, this number dropped to 19. On 29 September, as a peak-operation day, 1,318 loaded trucks passed through TCP No.1, carrying approximately 8000 tons of supplies. Charts show a steady decline in movement of tonnage following the high record made during the latter part of September. The roads were becoming rougher; vehicles were beginning to feel the strain of steady use and limited maintenance, and more of them were becoming deadlined each day; constant rains created mud conditions which gradually made it almost impossible to move vehicles at the depots and this condition spread to the roads; in many instances, loaded trucks had to be pulled from depot areas by bulldozer. Added to these local operational difficulties was the fact that the length of the haul from NBS to the front had become too great for efficient operation of the route as a major supply line. Appendix No.2, this chapter; summarizes the major conditions which interfered with truck movements in NBS, shows action taken to alleviate the situation arising, and recommendations.

Other difficulties were encountered during the operation of the Red Ball route, in addition to mechanical failures, road disintegration, and mud conditions. The "One Way" and the "Red Ball Only" signs were ignored at places where, because of the distance involved, it was impossible to maintain adequate Military Police coverage. Often single vehicles would travel the routes, pass convoys; and occasionally cause the last few vehicles to lose the convoy. Some drivers, it was found, purposely became lost in or near large towns, returning several days later; some were found to have sold their entire load, or part of it, to willing French buyers. On other occasions, French bandits "hi-jacked" trucks on lonely lengthy climbs, a situation which was greatly relieved after a guard sustem had been initiated.

Although the truck companies were under the administrative control of the Motor Transport Brigade, which later became the Motor Transport Division of the Office Chief of Transportation after 31 October, the actual allocation of trucks for picking up and delivering Red Ball cargo was done by the Movements Division of the NBS Transportation Section. The daily commitments of the Supply Services were given to the Transportation Officer and through him to the Movements Division. This information was then relayed to TCP No. 2 and on the basis of this information, truck allocations were made as convoys arrived. The dispatching of convoys was made in accordance with priorities furnished by G-4, NBS, who in turn was acting in accordance with instructions from G-4, Com Z.

On 10th October, NBS was assigned the Green Diamond mission, requiring the utilization of 40 truck companies to haul 4,800 tons of supplies daily from ports and beach dumps to the Granville-Dol area railheads. The plan was similar to that used for the Red Ball express, with special routes established and operating in conjunction with Traffic Control Points. (See Chart I, Chapter V). The truck companies were to be primarily tractor-trailer units. Only 24 truck companies were available in NBS for the Green Diamond operation; however, on 14 October the operation began. The mud conditions became an immediate and serious problem, defying all efforts to meet the requirements as stipulated. With few exceptions, the large vehicles could not navigate in the depots and consequently, in order to load them, 2½-ton truck companies were often assigned to pick up loads from the stock piles and take them to the tractor-trailer units parked outside the depot on the hard surfaced road. During its first days of operation, the trucks used were employed to deplete the dumps at Vire and Villedieu. When this was accomplished, and no commitments had been received from Com Z, the Green Diamond operation was terminated on 1 November 1944

Port clearance and dump-railhead hauls provided the bulk of the work for truck units within NBS during the month of December. The total tonnage lifted amounted to 187,535 tons; the number of personnel moved by motor transport, including troop movements and normal administrative moves, totaled 338,114. For the purpose of handling emergency shipments of special cargo to Paris, Motor Transport Division, OCOT, established a commitment calling for 100 tons of supplies to be moved daily from NBS over a route known as Emergency Shipment Express or Miniature Red Ball. The operations began on 13 December. Route N-13 was followed, from the truckhead at Carentan to Paris; the round trip required 20 hours. The 3582nd Quartermaster Truck Company (TC) with 35 tractors and 96 10-ton trailers, was the only unit assigned to the move. There were no "en route" servicing arrangements and no traffic control points were established. Tonnage allocations were made daily by G-4, Com Z, to G-4, NBS; no Service was alloted more than 200 tons at one time.

The number of truck companies operating within NBS decreased from 51 to 35 during the month of December. The transfer of the two Engineer General Service Regiments, from Omaha District to Rouen, accounted for most of this change. At the end of the month, five truck companies were working in Utah District, 11 in Omaha and 19 at Cherbourg and Granville on port operations. During December the percentage deadlined vehicles dropped from 44 percent on 5 December to less than 10 percent on 31 December. The greatest decrease was at Omaha where, from a top figure of 70 percent, the drop was to below 10 percent. The total number of vehicles available amounted to 34,023, for a daily average of 1,807,

and an average tonnage lift per truck per day amounting to 5.5 tons. Inclement weather and the damaging mud conditions throughout the area impeded loading and unloading operations. The average loading and unloading time per vehicle consequently increased. Following are comparative figures for the months indicated:

	November	December
Average Loading Time	1 hr; 55 min	2 hrs;07 min
Average Unloading Time	2 hrs; 35 min	2 hrs; 55 min

Highway Control and Troop Movement

Control of the tremendous volume of traffic on the roads in Normandy Base Section came under the Movements Division of the Transportation Section. All supply and personnel convoys of more than ten vehicles were cleared and given definite instructions as to when they should move on specific routes.

Supplies were moved over the Red Ball route or over roads not included in this circuit. Movements over the Red Ball route were handled by the Traffic Control Points, designated as TCP No.1 and TCP No.2. Due to the fact that the arrival time for convoys at the TCP was indeterminable, the units cleared from the road on to lanes laid out in fields. There, they were time-spaced before being permitted to travel on the route. This system usually succeeded in preventing convoys from crowding upon each other. Non-Red Ball shipments by road were cleared through local RTO's, DTO's and the Transportation Section at Cherbourg. This required the centralized recording and control provided by the Transportation Section for all large road movements within NBS. When clearance was impossible on a selected route through American or British sectors, a new routing was planned and followed.

Late in November, a system was devised in which units were assigned, in advance, to bivouac areas along the route. The Transportation Corps, through NBS Transportation Section, coordinating with G-4, NBS and Com Z, ETOUSA, arranged to supply POL at a certain time to these areas. Usually these bivouac areas were located, figuring on an average move of 400 to 600 miles per day, depending upon the size of the vehicles and weight of their loads. When a convoy started, the Transportation Section notified MP and RTO installations along the route. As soon as the time of departure was determined, a TWX was dispatched to the Chief of Transportation, Com Z, ETOUSA.

During August, much of the traffic for combat personnel was under control of the Armies and subsequently Advance Section was charged with the control of personnel movements. Late in August, the NBS Transportation Section took over these responsibilities and immediately began arranging road clearance for all units. The following figures indicate the number of certain types of units which were staged in NBS during the period 1 September through 30 November 1944:

8 Infantry Divisions
5 Corps Headquarters
10 Tank Battalions
46 AAA Battalions
26 Engineer Battalions
31 Field Artillery Battalions
2 Armored Divisions
5 Armored Infantry Battalions
12 Tank Destroyer Battalions
6 Engineer Regiments
35 Engineer Companies
46 Ordnance Companies

40 Quartermaster Companies
17 General and Station Hospitals
13 Transportation Corps Companies
Over 100 other miscellaneous units

All of the units listed above received road clearance through the NBS Transportation Section. In many instances their organic transportation was insufficient to move the entire unit with its equipment. To meet this shortage Transportation Corps vehicles were furnished. Where practical, personnel trains were made up, usually the "40 and 8" type.

The arrival of casuals presented additional problems because no provisions could be made for the transportation of such personnel by separate vehicle. In some instances, it was possible to add extra box cars to trains for transportation of such personnel. To keep the situation from mounting to serious proportions, it became necessary to be on a continual search for vehicles with extra space or empty railroad cars, in order to move men arriving without transportation.

During December, troop movements through NBS from the United States and United Kingdom dropped as Le Havre became a larger personnel port and the Channel Base Section Staging Area became operative. However, some personnel movement continued to flow through NBS, as indicated by the following, covering the month of December:

Units	Number of Vehicles	Personnel Moved by Road	Personnel Moved by Rail
1 Armored Division	1;079	8;892	0
1 Infantry Division	1,056	4,953	7,703
6 Groups (Hqrs)	158	475	0
8 Engineer Regiments	648	4;443	2;985
34 Battalions	1;720	11;435	2;218
72 Companies and Detachments	2,039	7,370	1,659
3 Hospitals	34	77	0
Replacements	0	0	3,379
	7,534	27,645	17,944

Total Personnel Moved 45,589

Railroads

Prior to the Allied invasion of Western Europe through Normandy, France, the railroads were subjected to heavy and repeated aerial bombardments. The resulting destruction, and the damage done during the movement of the invading forces, left many miles of tracks and roadbeds practically useless. Rails, ties, engines, cars, watering points, stations, and the signal system were seriously affected. Details of the work done to rehabilitate these railroad facilities from July through September 1944 are covered in Section IV, Volume IV of the Transportation Corps History in the ETO, which covers the months of July, Ausust and September 1944. The work of the 2nd Military Railway Service in the ETO during the last three months of the year 1944 is discussed in Chapter IV, this volume of the Transportation Corps History. The paragraphs immediately following summarize the railroad activities in Normandy Base

Section since the Transportation Section was organized in August 1944.

By September, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the railroads and auxiliary facilities in NBS, and the development of the tactical situation, had made it possible to move approximately 150,000 tons of supplies by rail before the close of the month; this figure compared as about equal with the number of tons handled by truck. In October the total tonnage moved by truck declined, while the movement by rail had increased to approximately 335,000 tons, and in November, approximately 400,000 tons were moved by rail.

When the NBS Transportation Section was organized, the 707th Railway Grand Division was assigned to the Base Section and under it were the 728th and 729th Railway Operating Battalions. The 757th Railway Shop Battalion was working on a 24-hour basis repairing French engines and servicing those brought over by the Americans.

At that time there were no departure schedules for trains; instead, as loaded, they were moved forward. On 15 September a daily schedule of 20 400-ton priority trains was established. Gradually the number increased until by 18 November, 48 trains carrying approximately 20,000 tons of supplies left NBS in a 24-hour period, 39 of which moved from Cherbourg. Mud conditions prevented the loading and moving of a planned schedule of 54 trains per day.

Besides Cherbourg, there were few loading points in operation during August, but by 15 September, 26 were available, among which were Sottevast, Barfleur, St. Vaast, Couville, Coutances, La Haye du Puits, Dol, Pontarson, Granville, Le Meauffe, Airel, Lison, Le Molay (military and civilian sidings), Isigny, Carentan, Villedieu, St. Lo, Folligny, Vire, Valognes, Montebourg, Bricquebec, Caen and Chef du Pont.

The Movements Division of the Transportation Section was charged with the responsibility for scheduling the movement of trains. Priorities and tonnages were stipulated by G-4. For the fulfilling of these requirements, liaison was required between and among the Military Railway Service, the Commodity Services and the Movements Division of the Section Transportation Office. The RTO's in the field were organized and set up by the latter, to perform their prescribed duties at the various railheads and depots. As soon as the train schedules were composed, Movements Division notified the RTO's at the railheads involved, and gave them information on the commitments. The RTO contacted the Railway Operating Battalion (ROB) and ordered the cars and indicated where they should be spotted. The RTO and ROB endeavored to have them spotted 24 hours in advance of the scheduled time for departure, in order to allow maximum loading time for the Service concerned. After the cars had been spotted, the RTO notified the Services and checked with them in order to make certain that the procedure for making out the documentations was understood.

During loading, RTO personnel remained in the yard, checking to make certain that the loading was carried out properly and that rated loading capacities were not exceeded. If a shortage of trucks appeared likely to prevent meeting the scheduled time for departure of the train, the RTO requested additional trucks through the District Transportation Officer.

Excepting at Cherbourg, where hard standing and quayside loading were

possible, mud conditions at the depots hampered outloading at an increasing rate during October and November. In some fields, which constituted the depot areas, conditions were worse than in others. Consequently, if the Distribution Directive (DD or Shipping Order) called for a commodity in a field that was not normally muddy or had gravel or planking roads, the loading deadline was met; but loading in a badly mired field often resulted in a 24-hour delay in meeting the schedule for movement. On some occasions the commodity called for in the DD was unavailable at a given depot, in the quantity required, but was obtainable at one of the beach dumps; accordingly, trucks were dispatched to complete the loading requirements. However, unpredictable delays caused from bad road conditions and traffic resulted in trains loading behind schedule.

Another delaying factor entered into the matter of meeting train loading schedules at Le Molay where the siding tracks failed due to the fact that they had been laid without ballast. There were seven of these tracks and it was planned to ballast them two at a time while the others were in use. The rains came, however, after the outloading began, and before long the tracks were settling into the soft earth. Because drainage facilities had not been completed, most of the water remained in the yard, resulting in covering the tracks with water and sections of them were under mud. Consequently, derailments were frequent and in one 8-hour period particularly, the latter part of September, there were 21 derailments. By the end of November, drainage and ballasting were completed and the yards were comparatively usable. However, by that time, commitments had decreased and the dumps were in such badly mired fields that loading operations were long and costly. Too many trucks and too much manpower were needed to make its use practicable when considering the tonnage results.

In addition to Le Molay, other military sidings were constructed near Sottevast and Couville. Sottevast was a marshalling yard for the loading of cars in Cherbourg. There the empty cars were brought in and classified according to type so that when the RTO requested a certain number of box cars, gondolas, or tankers, they were readily available. At Sottevast there was sufficient trackage to accomodate 2,430 cars with adequate space left for switching. Couville was a marshalling yard for eastbound loaded trains from Cherbourg. In effect, it was a railroad traffic control point where trains were pulled in, classified and moved out when track clearance was received. Normally, trains were pulled in pairs by "double-header" engines. The crew of the leading engine was of military personnel, while the second engine was operated by a French civilian crew.

There were difficulties on the Main lines as well as in the loading yards. Through to the end of November, the following occurred:

1. Derailments--29, due to various causes, among them soft track from settling of filled-in bomb craters, switch points not completely closed, and inexperience of personnel with French type switches.

2. Rear-end collisions--29, due mainly to inadequate protection of rear of train by trainmen, and engineers not having train under control in occupied blocks.

3. Side-swipe collisions--7, due to various causes, mainly man failures.

4. Accidents not involving trains but personal injuries, totalled eight military and one civilian; due to low hanging wires knocking crew members from trains, sudden stops and starts of trains, crawling under trains, and detraining from one into path of another.

5. Miscellaneous--13, including trucks struck at crossings, fires breaking out in overloaded cars, etc.

Pilferage of trains also became a problem during operation of the railroads in NBS, so that special arrangements were necessary in order to provide for a sufficient number of guards to cope with the situation. A battalion of Infantrymen from the 104th Division was given the task of providing guards for each ration train. Four guards were placed aboard each double-header to protect the load.

On 19 September, the 720th Railway Operating Battalion was assigned to the 707th Railway Grand Division. At 0001 hours on 23 October 1944, the 720th ROB assumed the duties of maintenance and operation of the lines from Lison to Lisieux and Caen to Courseulles. Previously these lines had been under British jurisdiction; in November, the first American trains were loaded at Caen. During October and November, five additional operating battalions, five mobile workshops and two hospital maintenance platoons were assigned to the 707th Railway Grand Division.

Passenger service, which had begun in August, operating from Cherbourg to Lison, carried approximately 70,000 civilian, military and Prisoner of War passengers during the first six weeks of railroad operation. By the end of November the total number of passengers amounted to approximately 260,000. Passenger trains did not move on schedule but as practical

Hospital trains, elaborately equipped (See Chapter IV for description), and in many ways equal to the most excellent Pullman in the United States, were in operation in July. They were moving into Cherbourg at a rate of three to four daily by the end of November. Tracks on the quayside permitted casualty evacuation directly from train to ship with little exposure. All hospital trains moved with a "clear the track" priority.

During December, priority trains averaging 27 per day moved from NBS carrying a daily average of 10,518 tons, the bulk of which was ammunition totaling 105,173 tons. Other classes of supplies shipped forward during December by rail were as follows.

QM Cl I	52;884	Sig Cl II & IV	11;529
QM Cl III	15;104	Eng Cl II & IV	32;393
QM Cl II & IV	22;743	Med Cl II & IV	3,956
Ord Cl II & IV	26,517	TC Cl II & IV	3
		CWS Cl II & IV	6,904

The total of all classes of supplies moved during the month of December over railroads was 326;075. In addition to above tonnages, this figure includes non-priority shipments, such as mail, MRS coal; it also includes passenger and hospital trains, figured at 400 tons each, since they each use an engine and

rail path for that amount of freight. There were also 95 hospital trains and 48 personnel trains moving to the front from Cherbourg during December; 86 returned through NBS. The personnel trains carried approximately 18,000 troops, of which 3,379 were replacements. A total of 71,000 tons of supplies were shipped to Advance Section and 48,000 tons went to Seine Section. During the month 3,623 tons of mail were sent forward through NBS.

Effective 7 December, the daily commitment was 8,400 tons of supplies; this daily average was exceeded during December and many orders were filled that had been back-logged during the two previous months due to the mud conditions at the depots.

Railroad operations in NBS entered what is referred to as Stage III (or Phase III) operations during December (See Chapter IV). According to the SHAEF plan, this meant essentially that executive control of the railroads was assumed by French Railway authorities. Actually, however, control over the two main routes used by the U.S. Forces remained with the 2nd Military Railway Service. The Cherbourg-Paris lines through Caen and Argentan were still U.S. operated. In general, all other lines within NBS reverted to French control. Under this arrangement, the RTO placed his demands for service with the local Chef de Gare, in a manner similar to operations in the United Kingdom. French control offices were established at Caen, Folligny, Vire and Lison.

The 707th Railway Grand Division, which had controlled rail operations in Normandy since the allies began operations in connection with rehabilitating and utilizing the railroads in France on 19 July 1944, departed during the month of December. Their control was taken over by the 710th Railway Grand Division, operating from Seine Section. As the year 1944 ended, most of the U.S. operated rail lines in Normandy were under the 728th Railway Operating Battalion. In the Allied-controlled area east of Normandy and west of the Seine River, the 720th Railway Operating Battalion worked the lines. Proposed additional developments in the rail facilities in NBS were discussed but unfavourably considered by G-4 at that time.

APPENDIX NO.1

(Chapter VI)

LIST OF TRANSPORTATION CORPS UNITS IN NORMANDY BASE SECTION AS OF 1 JANUARY 1945

UNIT	LOCATION
474th QM Grp	Cherbourg
6th Bn (M)	St. Mere Eglise
25th Cml Sm Gen Bn (M)	Le Molay
151st QM Bn (M)	Cherbourg
513th QM Bn (M)	St. Pierre Eglise
521st QM Bn (M)	Formigny
780 Base Depot Co	Cherbourg
784th Base Depot Co	Bricquebec
785th Base Depot Co	ricquebec
483rd Port Bn	Cherbourg
498th Port Bn	Cherbourg
499th Port Bn	Cherbourg
500th Port Bn	Cherbourg
511th Port Bn	Rouge Terre
513th Port Bn	Cherbourg
514th Port Bn	Granville
516th Port Bn	Cherbourg
518th Port Bn	Cherbourg
3rd Grp R Sta	Cherbourg
4th Port Hq	Cherbourg
12th Port Hq	Cherbourg
85th Cml Sm Gen Co	Le Molay
86th Cml Gen Co	Le Molay
133rd QM Trk Co	St. Vaast
165th Cml Sm Gen Co	Le Molay
171st Cml Sm Gen Co	Le Molay
391st QM Trk Co	Formigny
3383rd QM Trk Co	Reville
3440th QM Trk Co	Delasse
3459th QM Trk Co	Delasse
3560th QM Trk Co	Le Molay
3575th QM Trk Co	Cherbourg
3595th QM Trk Co	Cherbourg
3599th QM Trk Co	Formigny
3600th QM Trk Co	Cherbourg
3620th QM Trk Co	Cherbourg
3629th QM Trk Co	Cherbourg
3660th QM Trk Co	St. Vaast
3674th QM Trk Co	St. Pierre Eglise
3690th QM Trk Co	Donville
3692nd QM Trk Co	St. Marie

(LIST OF TC UNITS CONT'D)

UNIT	LOCATION
3700th QM Trk Co	Air Strip T-2-A22c
3737th QM Trk Co	St. Pierre Eglise
3738th QM Trk Co	St. Mere Eglise
3863rd QM Trk Co	Hav Gros
3869th QM Trk Co	St. Pierre Eglise
3870th QM Trk Co	Bandienville
3881st QM Trk Co	Cherbourg
4002nd QM Trk Co	St. Mere Eglise
4026th QM Trk Co	Formigny
4027th QM Trk Co	Le Molay
4028th QM Trk Co	St. Mere Eglise
4031st QM Trk Co	St. Pierre Eglise
254th Port Co	Cherbourg
255th Port Co	Cherboug
356th Port Co	Cherbourg
257th Port Co	Cherbourg
258th Port Co	Cherbourg
259th Port Co	Cherbourg
260th Port Co	Cherbourg
261st Port Co	Cherbourg
262nd Port Co	Quelvillon
263rd Port Co	Quelvillon
264th Port Co	Quelvillon
265th Port Co	Quelvillon
278th Port Co	St. Saveur le Vicomte
298th Port Co	Cherbourg
299th Port Co	Colombe
300th Port Co	Cherbourg
301st Port Co	Cherbourg
322nd Port Co	Cherbourg
323rd Port Co	Cherbourg
324th Port Co	Cherbourg
325th Port Co	Cherbourg
526th Port Co	Granville
527th Port Co	Barfleur
528th Port Co	Campeux
529th Port Co	St. Vaast
533rd Port Co	Equerdville
534th Port Co	Cherbourg
535th Port Co	Cherbourg
536th Port Co	Cherbourg
537th Port Co	Cherbourg
548th Port Co	Rouge Terre
549th Port Co	Rouge Terre
553rd Port Co	Cherbourg
555th Port Co	Cherbourg
557th Port Co	Rouge Terre
558th Port Co	Rouge Terre
574th Port Co	Cherbourg

(LIST OF TC UNITS CONT'D)

UNIT	LOCATION
594th Port Co	Rouge Terre
630th Port Co	Granville
645th Port Co	Cherbourg
646th Port Co	Octeville
647th Port Co	Octeville
656th Port Co	Cherbourg
657th Port Co	Cherbourg
658th Port Co	Octeville
659th Port Co	Octeville
328th Harbor Craft Co	Cherbourg
335th Harbor Craft Co	Cherbourg
337th Harbor Craft Co	Cherbourg
821st Amphibious Trk Co	Cherbourg
822nd Amphibious Trk Co	Cherbourg
720th Railway Oper Bn	Caen
728th Railway Oper Bn	Cherbourg
757th Railway Shop Bn	Cherbourg
101st Port Marine Maint Co	Cherbourg
102nd Port Marine Maint Co	Cherbourg
107th Port Marine Maint Co	Cherbourg

APPENDIX NO. 2

(Chapter VI)

CONDITIONS INTERFERING WITH TRUCK MOVEMENT

A. Mud in Depots
   1. Effects:
      a. Ruins brake linings and systems.
      b. Overheats engines trying to pull out of mud.
      c. Causes extra work for cleaning and maintenance.
      d. Makes it necessary to handle cargo several times over, resulting in increased loading time.
   2. Action taken:
      a. Mud constantly being fought by road maintenance and drainage.
      b. Supplies, except for extra heavy equipment, being moved to hard surfaced roads for loading into trucks.
   3. Improvements recommended:
      More and better means of fighting mud.

B. Shortage of critical supplies and parts.
   1. Effects:
      Ties up trucks which would ordinarily be in use.
   2. Action taken:
      Tire and tube problem still remains acute but because of extensive emphasis on proper tire maintenance and better distribution by Ordnance, the tire situation is not so serious as the previous month (November). At the end of this month (December) only one vehicle was deadlined for lack of tires.
   3. Improvements recommended:
      a. Solving the tire shortage problem.
      b. Better planning for allocation of spare parts to various Ordnance shops.
      c. Continuous inspection and pressure on units and drivers to give vehicles and tires proper maintenance.
      d. That vehicles be available so that a unit which has turned in a vehicle to an Ordnance shop for repairs can draw a replacement immediately without having to be content with a form 221 and the additional red tape necessary to get a replacement.
      e. That trucks sent to forward areas be released immediately upon completion of their original missions.

C. Shortage of Man Power:
   1. Effects:
      a. Full use of vehicles not utilized because of lack of drivers.
      b. Same thing applies for maintenance.
   2. Action taken:
      Army truck companies, a majority of which are colored, on load to Com Z, have only 76 drivers for each company allotment of 48 trucks. There are not enough drivers to maintain a 24 hour use of the trucks and colored drivers are not obtainable from replacement centers to augment these units.
   3. Improvements recommended:
      a. That enough drivers be supplied these units for maximum use of vehicles, or

b. That a system of loaning drivers from one unit to another be followed if the case permits.
c. That a pool of drivers be provided from which a unit can draw in case of temporary shortage within its own organization.

BRITTANY BASE SECTION

(CHAPTER VI)

The organization which became Brittany Base Section (BBS) on the Continent was originally established in the European Theater of Operations in the United Kingdom, as Eastern Base Section under the command of Colonel (later Brigadier General) EWART G. PLANK. On 28 April 1944, under the command of Colonel (later Brigadier General) ROY W. GROWER, this organization became Base Section No. 1, by authority of General Order No. 37, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. For Continental operations, Base Section No. 1 was redesignated and established in France as Brittany Base Section, by authority of General Order No. 36, Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, dated 16 August 1944. At the close of the year 1944, Brigadier General GROWER was still in command of Brittany Base Section.

The Transportation Section was originally planned and came into existence with the appointment of Colonel LYLE M. SHIELDS as Section Traffic Officer (STO) on 17 May 1944. On 27 August, Lt. Colonel W. EUGENE SMITH, was appointed STO for BBS and on 1 December 1944, Colonel EUGENE A. EVERSBERG received the appointment and occupied this position at the close of the year 1944.

The Transportation Officer of Brittany Base Section was charged with the technical operation of all ports, inland waterways and water transportation; the operation of the railroads in conjunction with the French officials who actually operated the lines; and operational control of all Quartermaster Truck Companies in BBS. Originally, the STO was in command of all TC troops and units in BBS but later was charged with their technical and operational control only, in which the STO was responsible for carrying out the obligations of the Transportation Corps to G-4 for the movement of supplies in BBS. The organizational chart for BBS indicates that the Transportation Officer was one of 19 officers on the Special Staff of the Base Section Commanding General. In this position his duties were in line with normal staff responsibilities, that is, for advice, information, coordination, cooperation, and planning within the BBS headquarters organization.

When Lt. Colonel W. EUGENE SMITH was appointed BBS Transportation Officer on 27 August 1944, the various activities of the Transportation Section were organized under his direction. The divisions and branches which were formed remained practically the same through the end of the year, with a few changes in personnel. As of 31 December 1944, the organization of the BBS Transportation Office was as follows:

Transportation Officer: Colonel EUGENE A. EVERSBERG
Deputy Transportation Officer: Lt. Colonel J. R. KRIECHBAUM
Chief, Movements Division: Major A. A. WILSON
    Chief, Freight Branch: Captain EDMUND F. KIRK
    Chief, Passenger Branch: Captain JERRY L. DICKSON
    Chief, Motor Transport Branch: Captain T. A. SABATELLI
    Chief, Rail Allocations Branch: Captain H. P. CLARK
Chief, Highway Traffic Division: Captain KENNETH T. WILSON
Chief, Administrative & Supply Division: Captain M. R. MANDEBERG
Chief, Marine Operations Division: Captain MANUEL O. LEWIS
Chief, Statistical & Control Section: Captain C. G. TURNER

Movements Division

The responsibility of Movements Division was the coordination and control of the various Transportation Corps facilities within the Base Section and the assurance that supplies were moved by the most suitable and efficient method. Under the direct supervision of Movements Division were: the Freight, Passennger, Motor Transport, and Rail Allocations Branches, whose activities for the period 1 October through 31 December are indicated below:

Freight Branch

The Freight Branch of Movements Division was charged with the mission of moving supplies, especially those handled by rail. The following is quoted from the Freight Branch Historical Report for the period 1 October through 31 December 1944:

"1. The most acute problem at the end of 1944 was that of cooperation of French Railway Officials and workers. Due to the acute food shortage in Paris and to the east of Paris, the French were inclined to give priority to civilian freight traffic, thereby delaying military traffic. This difficulty has not been overcome completely but by close coordination of rail facilities and constant follow-up of military shipments the general overall picture has been improved from the military standpoint. Other factors contributing to the solution of the problem are the increase of rolling stock due to repairs, the location and use of additional wagons, and the decreasing military requirements in Brittany Base Section.

"2. The only other major problems are the continued shortage of specialized equipment and the shortage of locomotives of all types. The best use of locomotives is made by dispatching trains of maximum weight and reducing switching to a minimum.

"3. During August and September, there were many problems of organization and operation. The organizational problems were solved by the addition of personnel and the added experience of the staff; the problems of operation were reduced by repair of trackage, wagons and locomotives, and the increase in the supply of coal.

"4. With the change in the tactical situation and the movement of forces from the Brest area, the problem of supply was considerably reduced.

"5. Following is a summary of freight hauled from the beginning of operations on 18 August 1944:

	AMMO	RATIONS	POL	OTHER	TOTAL
August	11839	2846	6055	4786	23526
September	52194	69899	37238	40656	199987
October	41249	100213	19024	32574	193060
November	29975	46631	10604	15451	102661
December	19222	25725	19645	30073	94665
Total	154479	245314	92566	121540	613899 "

Passenger Branch

The Passenger Branch of Movements Division was charged with the mission of handling the movement of all personnel by rail or motor transport, civilians as well as military personnel and POW's.

This branch remained under the direction of Captain JERRY L. DICKSON, Chief of Branch, during the last quarter of the year 1944. A summary of the total personnel moved by road and rail for the months indicated follows:

OCTOBER - 1944

	Rail	Motor	Total
U.S. Troops	9,950	1,704	11,654
Allied Troops	2,659	389	3,048
POW's	31,943	1,962	33,905
Patients	(No Hospital Trains originated in BBS during October)		48,607
TOTAL	44,552	4,055	

NOVEMBER - 1944

	Rail	Motor	Total
U. S. Troops	3,582	667	4,249
Allied Troops	2,914	-	2,914
POW's	10,971	-	10,971
Patients	(No hospital trains originated in BBS during November)		
TOTAL	17,467	667	18,134

DECEMBER - 1944

	Rail	Motor	Total
U. S. Troops	14,379	744	15,123
Allied Troops	1,340	268	1,608
POW's	18,334	244	18,578
Patients	1,823	-	1,823
TOTAL	35,876	1,256	37,132

During December, 11 hospital trains detrained 4,107 personnel; 5 hospital trains entrained 1,828 personnel in BBS.

As a temporary means of assisting French officials during October in handling the movement of French civilians, their own limited number of passenger trains having been halted due to shortage of coal, action was taken in BBS for the movement of such passengers in limited numbers on regularly scheduled supply trains. A detailed plan was devised and issued as Operations Memorandum No. 3, Transportation Section, BBS, dated 28 October 1944. This plan was effective as of 0001 hours, 29 October 1944 for personnel traveling between the points of Morlaix, St. Brieuc, L'Hermitage, Rennes, Dol, Le Mans, and Paris. The plan called for the addition of one empty box car to each symbol train originating in Brittany Base Section, and where authorized travel requirements were justified, one empty car was attached to local supply trains. The number of personnel on each train was not to exceed 39. Warrents were to be issued to authorized personnel as shown below:

a. Allied Army and Navy personnel (except French as in "c" below)

b. US Red Cross and civilian employees of the US Army.
c. French personnel authorized by the French RTO.

This plan was discontinued when the SNCF instigated operation of passenger service 1 November 1944. Operation Memorandum No. 3 was rescinded by letter dated 1 November 1944.

Motor Transport Branch

This branch of Movements Division was responsible for the operational control of all Quartermaster Truck Companies in the area, authorizing trips, establishing priorities in accordance with G-4 policy and stipulations, and for consolidating and rendering all motor vehicle operational reports to OCOT. This means of centralized control for all truck operations served to avoid loss of ton-miles and to conserve and use to the maximum extent the available motor transportation facilities. The branch supplied truck transportation for the 5th Major Port in the operation of the ports of Morlaix-Roscoff and St. Michel-en-Greve until these ports closed. On 2 November, Captain THOMAS A. SHATELLI took over the duties of Motor Transport Officer.

Under the supervision and direct control of the Transportation Section, BBS, trucking units in Brittany Base Section operated under Hq. 512th QM Truck Group (TC), which functioned as a command agency for planning, supervising, and coordinating the operation, training, administration, and supply of the Quartermaster units attached or assigned to the Group. During October, the following trucking units operated under this Group:

196th QM Battaltion, Mobile (TC)
398th QM Truck Co (TC)
670th QM Truck Co (TC)
3902nd QM Truck Co (TC)
4005th QM Truck Co (TC)
4012nd QM Truck Co (TC)
388th QM Truck Co (TC)
669th QM Truck Co (TC)
3399th QM Truck Co (TC)
3409th QM Truck Co (TC)
(Employing a total of 304 vehicles)

Headquarters, 470th QM Battalion Mobile (TC) was relieved from attachment to 512th QM Group (TC) and assigned to Advance Section, Com Z, on 25 October.

During October, each of the truck companies listed above operated a fleet of 48 2½-ton 6 x 6 cargo vehicles excepting the 388th QM Truck Co (TC), which had two platoons of 2½-ton 6 x 6 cargo vehicles and one platoon of 2½-ton 6 x 6 COE vehicles. The 388th, 669th, 3399th and 3409th QM Truck Companies (TC) operated directly under the 512th QM Group (TC), engaged in general Line of Communications transport. Hq. 196th QM Battalion, Mobile (TC), 670th and 3902nd QM Truck Companies (TC) were engaged in port clearance for the 5th Major Port. The 398th and 4005th Truck Companies (TC) were engaged in general hauling at Morlaix and transporting POW's at St. Theogonnec; the 4012th QM Truck Co (TC) was at Brest doing general hauling.

On 30 October, the 388th and 669th QM Truck Companies (TC) departed from BBS. On 20 December the 3902nd QM Truck Co (TC) was relieved of attachment to 196 QM Battalion, Mobile (TC) and on 23 December, the 398th QM Truck Co was relieved from 196th QM Battalion Mobile (TC). Hq and Hq Det. 196th QM Battalion, Mobile (TC) moved from Morlaix to Rennes and took over operations there on 23 December. On 28 December, the 670th QM Truck Co (TC) was relieved from attachment to 196th QM Battalion, Mobile (TC).

At the end of December, the following units were operating under 512th QM Group (TC), engaged in general Line of Communications hauls and port clearance for the 5th Major Port at Morlaix and St. Theogonnec:

196th QM Battalion, Mobile (TC)
3399th QM Truck Co (TC)
3409th QM Truck Co (TC)
4005th QM Truck Co (TC)
4012th QM Truck Co (TC)
(Employing a total of 174 vehicles)

The principal problem confronted by the TC trucking companies operating in BBS during the last quarter of the year 1944 was that of obtaining materials for tire repairs, particularly tire patches. Cold patches were not practicable as they peeled off; for this reason, only hot patches could be used but they were not available. As high as 75 to 85 punctures were encountered each day per truck company at Brest during the period just after the city was taken. In opening depots, about 25 or 30 punctures a day were encountered per truck company due to muddy roads, imbedded with sharp rocks. Difficulty was also experienced in obtaining vehicles from Ordnance Shops within 72 hours. During December there was considerable difficulty in obtaining anti-freeze solution.

During this quarter 308,855 tons were hauled; 65,171 officers and enlisted men were moved and approximately 763,969 miles were traveled during the process of making these various hauls. November was the greatest month in point of volume of tons and personnel transported; these were 128,850 and 22,404 respectively. October showed less tonnage and personnel moved, but more mileage was covered.

Rail Allocations Branch

This branch was established under the Transportation Office in November. Its mission was to distribute cars and engines in the BBS area and to maintain liaison between BBS and the French SNCF.

In carrying out its duties, one project of importance was in connection with the securing of initials and numbers of damaged cars in BBS area; this was done through the RTO's. Arrangements were then made with SNCF officials to make the necessary repairs, giving preference to box cars and high-side gondolas. The result of this work was a return of approximately 2000 cars in November and 2000 cars in December. During the car shortage that developed during these two months their distribution was done through the Transportation Officer, BBS, on a priority basis established by G-4.

Rolling stock available in BBS as of 30 November and 31 December was as follows:

Item	As of 30 Nov 1944	As of 31 Dec 1944
Box Cars	246	214
Gondolas, high sides	75	322
Gondolas, low sides	32	84
Flats, short wheel base	645	531
Flats, long wheel base	62	46
Passenger Coaches, 1st Cl	-	-

Item	As of 30 Nov 1944	As of 31 Dec 1944
Passenger Coaches, 2nd and 3rd Cl	1	6
Switch Engines	34	34
Road Engines	159	95

Highway Traffic Division

The Highway Traffic Division was charged with the responsibility for the routing of all road movements through and within BBS, the clearing of road convoys, the preparing of strip maps, and for maintaining road reconnaissance for an up-to-date picture of the condition of highway routes within the area. Reconnaissance was done in connection with the Engineers who repaired roads on the basis of recommendations from the Highway Traffic Division. The following is quoted from an Historical Report prepared by this division covering operations from 1 October through 31 December 1944:

"1. During this period the number of convoys routed and scheduled by this division included 109 Intra-Section Convoys totaling 1022 vehicles, 252 Inter-Section convoys totaling 7267 vehicles.

"2. Movement of VIII Corps Units; the 2nd, 8th, and 11th Divisions were handled by this office. No unusual difficulties were encountered and movements were accomplished without confusion.

"3. The movement of the 66th Division into this base section was difficult to handle as confusion at port of debarkation made proper convoy advice from Normandy Base impossible. Close liaison with the Military Police, BBS expedited this move by use of M.P. escorts through this base section to the Assembly area. The movement of the Division from the Assembly area to operational area was without incident.

"4. Highway reconnaisance throughout the Base Section was kept up to date and overlays showing most recent highway conditions were prepared for distribution. Information was also recorded on a master highway map along with all highway information of other Base Sections, giving a picture of available highways throughout France."

Administration & Supply Division

This division was responsible for handling all personnel, files, records, and correspondence pertaining to Transportation Corps activities

Marine Operations Division

This division was initially under Lt. Colonel GEORGE D. HUBBARD. The first marine operations in BBS were at St. Michel-en-Greve and Morlaix-Roscoff, these ports having been opened 3 August and 5 September, respectively. The port of St. Brieuc was opened in BBS on 16 September.

During October, Lt. Colonel HUBBARD was transferred to the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the Marine Operations Division was placed under the supervision of Captain MANUEL O. LEWIS of the 8th Traffic Regulating Group.

The duties involved during the last quarter of the year were essentially the same as previously established, that is, supervising records, equipment and personnel needed in the maintenance of the various marine operations in the BBS keeping complete records of all daily discharge operations, ship turn-around, cargo disposals, equipment needs, storm and tidal conditions; maintaining liaison with other marine operations branches on the Continent, in the US and the U.K.

Operations at St. Michel-en-Greve closed on 1 October and at St. Brieuc, on 25 October (See under 5th Major Port, Chapter III).

Statistical & Control Section

This section handled all reports and was responsible for forwarding them to OCOT.

Operation of Port of Morlaix-Roscoff thru 31 December 1944

The Port of Morlaix-Roscoff continued operations during October. Six moorings were in use and the principal classes of supplies unloaded consisted principally of ammunition and rations from Liberty Ships and POL from Tankers. At about 1500 hours on 4 October, during a storm, two Liberty Ships broke from their moorings and small craft were scattered about; a 30-ton floating crane was beached and several DBR's were damaged. It was not until daylight 9 October that operations at the port had returned to normal. On 15 October, the Marine Superintendent of the 5th Major Port reported that three of the buoys in the inner anchorage were out of line and that the Navy had requested a buoying ship from Cherbourg. These buoys could not be used until reset which was not accomplished until 19 November.

At 0430 hours on 15 October, approximately 220 French civilian stevedores refused to proceed with discharge operations at Morlaix because of the heavy rain. This left craft in the harbor that they had not discharged in time for moving out with the tide. To meet the emergency thus created, the 5th Major Port transferred the 386th Port Battalion to Morlaix from St. Michel-en-Greve; at that time this battalion was being used to clear surplus in dumps adjacent to Morlaix. One Company was sent to Landivisiau to complete the unfinished work there and the other was assigned duties assisting in sorting at Roscoff. The other two companies were assigned to discharging operations at Morlaix.

On 18 October, another storm broke which necessitated the cessation of operations at 1600 hours. During the night, several Liberty Ships were torn from their moorings. The ship "Zarembe" sustained two broken anchors and returned to the U.K. shortly afterwards. All ships were damaged by drifting barges; several harbor craft were beached or grounded. During mid-afternoon the following day the storm subsided but the Navy advised that only four cargo vessels could be moored because of mooring shiftings.

On 23 October, the ship "Empire Pym" arrived at Morlaix with 2945 tons (DW) of 80 octane gasoline, the first large tanker to be placed in POL service in BBS. Turn-around of this tanker, and the "Y" tankers which shuttled to and from Cherbourg, was delayed because of weather conditions and frequent grounding of POL barges, resulting in the port not meeting the POL tonnage target of 600

tons per day. An ammunition discharge target of 1500 tons daily was set but was also difficult to maintain because of the prevailing weather conditions. Ships loaded with Quartermaster Class I supplies were also unloaded during October, but Ordnance Class V supplies were given priority in discharging operations in order to arrive as closely as possible to set targets. Despite the reverses caused by inclement weather and vessel groundings during October, in five instances, over 1000 tons were discharged from one vessel in one day.

During November, operations at the port of Morlaix-Roscoff continued with four ocean-going cargo ships being worked. Only three moorings were available at the beginning of the month and this number dropped to two, the remaining four being under repair. This resulted in a reduction of overside tonnages. The mooring situation was finally cleared up by 13 November and all six were placed in service. This made it possible to work four ships while two were awaiting discharge in the inner anchorage. The total number of ships completing discharge during November was 15, with total tonnage discharge as follows:

Ammunition	32,263
Rations	29,991
POL	4,073
Vehicles	2,035
TOTAL	68,362

Several barges at St. Malo were conditioned during November and sent to Morlaix for service; these were the Solon, the Francois, and the Edith. It was agreed by the OCOT that on 2 November all tank convoys from Cherbourg to Morlaix would be discontinued and all future tankers destined for the port of Morlaix would originate in the U.K. On request from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, SHAEF Main S-67008, dated 16 1245 A November, it was decided that no further bulk POL shipments would be made to Morlaix after 30 November 1944. The last discharge of POL supplies was on 23 November, and all future forecasted arrivals were cancelled and the vessels were diverted.

In order to relieve the serious shortage of cranes at the ports of Le Havre and Rouen, the ship "Empire Harcourt" was ordered to Morlaix to unload eleven cranes which were released by the 5th Major Port and loaded on this vessel, which sailed from Morlaix on 15 November 1944.

Tentative plans were made for the closing of the port of Morlaix and the transfer of the 5th Major Port personnel to the port of Antwerp. Approximately one half of the personnel of the 5th Major Port, Hq and Hq. Co., were ordered to move to Antwerp. On 24 November, Captain DOUGLAS C. PORTEOUS and Captain MANUEL O. LEWIS, proceeded to Morlaix for the purpose of surveying the port and to assist the 5th Major Port in attempting to increase its daily tonnage. Subsequently, the daily tonnage overside was increased from approximately 2400 tons to 3000 tons. On 27 November, Movements Division, OCOT, surveyed the possibility of using the port of St. Malo for future operations. The results of the survey showed that the port of St. Malo could handle at least 1000 tons of coal per day. The coal was to be brought in on coasters from the U.K. and it was anticipated that the port of St. Malo would soon be in operation.

Upon request from Loire Section, and in agreement with 5th Major Port and OCOT, arrangements were made for the shipment of 30,000 sacks of U.S. Mail, destined for the United States. Permission was obtained from the War Shipping Administration for the handling of this cargo and the mail was loaded aboard the "Pio Pica"; 496 tons (DW) were loaded. The total amount of mail handled was 1272 tons.

In conjunction with the French authorities, a meeting was held on 8 December in the office of the Commanding Officer of the 5th Major Port, in compliance with a TWX received from OCOT. Captain DOUGLAS C. PORTEOUS attended representing the Marine Operations Branch, BBS, and Lt. Colonel S. F. HYDE, from Marine Operations Division, OCOT. The meeting was held to discuss the feasibility of using the port of Morlaix for the unloading of coal, using French civilian agencies, and to consider the possibilities of opening the port by 20 December. It was finally decided that the 5th Major Port would release certain ships and equipment to the French, providing that the equipment remain at Morlaix, and that the Transportation Corps would furnish a representative at the port for the purpose of reporting on the maintenance of the equipment and furnishing a situation report on the amount of coal discharged daily. On 18 December, 90,000 gallons of Diesel oil was pumped into the tanker "Francois" and turned over to the French. On 8 December, the Liberty Ship PH-249 established a new port record by completely unloading in 119 hours at an average rate of 955 tons (DW) per day, which was 90 percent of the daily target; average unloading was 67 percent of the daily target. The following units were released from assignment to Brittany Base Section and departed for Antwerp on 22 December:

104th Port Marine Maintenance Co.
134th Finance Detachment
345th Medical Dispensary
1592nd Engineer Utilities Det.
995th Signal Port Service Co.
330th Harbor Craft Co.
520th Port Battalion
562nd Port Battalion
386th Port Battalion.

The Port Battalions left Morlaix, loaded on two LSI's; the balance of the 5th Major Port units, including a Headquarters Detachment, the 333rd Harbor Craft Company, and the 583rd Port Company were left behind to close out the remaining installations and to assist in loading out the Liberty Ship with the equipment of the 5th Port and the 333rd Harbor Craft Comapny's vessels and were scheduled to depart as soon as the equipment had been loaded.

District Transportation Office
Central District, Brittany Base Section

Activation and Assignment of Personnel

On 30 November 1944, Loire Section was dissolved and the area previously administered by that Section was incorporated within the boundaries of Brittany Base Section. This change was made in accordance with General Order No. 66, Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, issued on that date. As a result, a sub-office of the Transportation Section, BBS, was established and designated the Transportation Office, Central District, BBS, located in Le Mans and occupying the former Loire Transportation Section building. The new sub-office began operations on 5 December 1944, with Lt. Colonel DONALD M. JACQUES, as District Transportation Officer, (DTO), and a detachment of the 8th Traffic Regulation Group, relieving Colonel GEORGE A. FORD, previously Loire Section Transportation Officer and 15th Traffic Regulation Group.

The duties of the DTO were much the same as those formerly assigned to the Loire Section Transportation Officer. However, after the area for which he was responsible came under the jurisdiction of Brittany Base Section, the DTO came under the BBS Transportation Officer and was responsible to the latter for all policies and operations within the District Area. The relationship between the STO and DTO was similar to that of a "Branch and Home Office". The functions of each were similar, the DTO covering a more limited area. The District Transportation Office forwarded all reports to the Base Section Transportation Office for consolidation and forwarding to OCOT. Orders, directives, and OCOT circulars, were forwarded by the STO to the DTO. Complaints and suggestions from the DTO were forwarded to the STO for action or sending to higher headquarters.

It had been decided during preliminary planning for this change, that personnel of the 8th Traffic Regulation Group would be assigned to each installation operated by personnel of the 15th Traffic Regulation Group, on the basis of man for man, in order to facilitate instruction and the transfer of duties. An advance party consisting of Lt. Colonel JACQUES, DTO, Major R.L. BREWER, Chief Movements Division, and Lt. H.J. BURSO, Administrative Officer, arrived at Le Mans to coordinate and arrange with the 15th Traffic Regulation Group for the transfer. Major W. C. HOPKINS, RTO at Dreux, accompanied the party to Le Mans and proceeded on to Dreux.

The main party of the 8th Traffic Regulation Group detachment arrived at Le Mans on 29 November from NBS where most of them had been on Detached Service. Initial assignments of personnel were made as indicated below:

DTO, Le Mans : 11 officers, 48 enlisted men
RTO, Le Mans : 6 officers, 34 enlisted men
RTO, Chartres : 3 officers, 12 enlisted men
RTO, Dreux : 3 officers, 16 enlisted men
RTO, Laval : 1 officer, 4 enlisted men
RTO, Alencon and sub-RTO, Surdon: 1 officer, 5 enlisted men.

Members of the 8th Traffic Regulation Group worked with personnel of the 15th Traffic Regulation Group at RTO installations until 2 December, when the 15th TRG began concentrating at Le Mans for movement. Members of the 15th TRG previously in the Loire Section Transportation Office continued operations until relieved by personnel of the 8th TRG on 5 December.

In order to comply with orders from the BBS Transportation Officer, for the release of 4 officers and 40 enlisted men on Detached Service, changes were made in the number of active installations and personnel assigned to them. Changes in installations were as follows:

RTO, Alencon and sub-RTO, Surdon, closed 13 December
RTO, Laval, closed 14 December
RTO, Couterne, opened 22 December - to service Quartermaster activities in the Couterne-Bagnolles area in the shipping of firewood.
Sub-RTO, Ecommsy, servicing the 15th Replacement Depot, closed 26 December.
Sub-RTO, Champagne, servicing Q-175 A, closed 28 December, due to transfer of depot to Le Mans.

Unit Changes

During the period 11 December to 16 December, the 3890th QM Truck Company was converted from a 2½-ton 6 x 6 standard truck company to a 10-ton semi-

trailer truck company. On 17 December, the 381st and 695th QM Truck Companies were placed on Detached Service with the 11th Armored Division. The 3902 QM Truck Company was relieved from attachment to the 512th QM Group (Mobile) on 19 December. The 3438th QM Truck Co was transferred to Oise Section on 27 December.

Operations of DTO and RTO's

The principal activities of the DTO during December are summarized below:

(1) Supervised and coordinated the Chartres-Rennes bulk POL service.
(2) Made a survey and reported to the Transportation Officer, BBS, regarding rail facilities and the status of SNCF rolling stock,
(3) Made reconnaissances and coordinated with the Quartermaster in order to expedite the movement of firewood from the Couterne- Bagnolles area.
(4) Coordinated and expedited the movement of lumber shipped by the Engineers from the Tours area.
(5) Instituted a survey of SNCF car repair facilities at Le Mans and Chartres.
(6) Reactivated bivouac area at the junction of Highways N-157 and N-23 in order to accomodate transient organizations.
(7) Supplied vehicles to the various services and agencies for use in building and maintaining POW camps, building and maintaining roads, depot-to-railhead hauling, railhead-to-depot hauling, and the transporting of supplies to hospitals and other installations in the district.
(8) Established procedure for operation of RTO's in the district.

The RTO at Le Mans encountered a considerable amount of difficulty in coordinating and controlling yard operations and obtaining correct information from the SNCF during December but after several experiments, a prodecure was agreed upon and subsequently the most important deficiencies were corrected In order to expedite the handling of trains through the station at night, floodlights were installed. Initially, there was a great amount of difficulty in servicing and operating the heating units of hospital trains but improvements were made as a part of the concerted efforts expended by the RTO in handling these trains as promptly as possible.

At Chartres, during December, the RTO experienced a great increase in depot activity. The sealing of cars and placing guards on shipments from other Sections and Base Sections were necessary in many instances. The RTO at Dreux had very little depot activity and work there consisted mainly of checking passing trains and normal station routine. It became necessary to correct the documentation of 28 trains originating in Normandy Base Section.

The District Transportation Office remained essentially the same except for the changes indicated above, due to a reduction in personnel. The personnel strength and organization of the DTO at the end of December was as follows:

(1) Strength - 8 officers and 28 enlisted men.
(2) Organization:
District Transportation Officer - Lt. Colonel D. M. JACQUES
Chief, Movements Division - Major R. L. BREWER
Chief, Freight Branch - Major R. J. DOTY
Chief, Passenger Branch - Lt. R. E. EATHEN
Chief, Highway Branch, Capt. C. E. McKEEN
Chief, Motor Transport Division - Major W. S. DAVIDSON
Chief, Administrative Division - Lt. H. J. BURSO
Chief, Historical & Statistical Branch - Lt. E. W. OAKS.

Active RTO installations were at Le Mans, Chartres, Dreux, and Couterne where the personnel strength at the close of December was:

RTO, Le Mans - 7 officers and 27 enlisted men
RTO, Chartres, 2 officers and 12 enlisted men
RTO, Dreux - 2 officers and 12 enlisted men
RTO, Couterne - 1 enlisted man.

ORGANIZATION CHART
TRANSPORTATION SECTION, CHANNEL BASE SECTION



CHANNEL BASE SECTION

(Chapter VI)

Channel Base Section (CBS), an area bounded by the Seine River on the south, the English Channel on the west, Holland on the north, and Advance, Oise, and Seine Sections on the east, was activated on 15 September 1944 under the command of Colonel FENTON S. JACOBS. The position of CBS Transportation Officer was assigned to Colonel JOSEPH W. PALMER, who still officiated in this capacity at the close of the year 1944. (See Chart on opposite page for organization of CBS Transportation Office).

In September 1944, an Advance Detachment of 12 officers and 9 enlisted men, formerly on duty with the Transportation Section of Western Base Section in the United Kingdom, proceeded to Le Havre, the temporarily designated headquarters for Channel Base Section, and arrived on 18 September. Their date of arrival at Le Havre was only six days after the British and Canadians had captured the German garrisons in the city.

Le Havre, including not only the port facilities but also the central part of the city and residental districts, was in an exceedingly devastated condition resulting from the heavy bombardments to which it was subjected before and during the latest stages of the seige. The city and most of the port installations had been blasted to a mass of rubble and twisted steel frames, and added to this were the demolished docks, bridges, and locks which the enemy had destroyed to keep them from falling intact into Allied possession. In addition to this chaotic situation was the naturally unfriendly and uncooperative attitude of the people of the city whose homes had been destroyed and whose numerous relatives and friends had become casualties.

The first few days after the arrival of the Advance Party were devoted to making surveys of the area in order to locate available billets for the Port units, possible areas for beaching LST's and smaller craft until dock facilities could be repaired, dump and turn-around areas, and in conjunction with the Base Section Engineers reconnaissances were made covering the various railway facilities within the area. Details regarding the work that was done to rehabilitate the port of Le Havre are given in Chapter III, under 16th Major Port. The CBS Transportation Section subsequently became operative on 21 September, when the 3616th Quartermaster Truck Company performed the first assigned mission for the Base Section Transportation Officer by hauling rations and gasoline for Headquarters, Channel Base Section.

It was planned that Channel Base Section would cover the same territory north of the Seine River as the 21st Army Group and that as the area changed for the latter, Channel Base Section boundaries would be adjusted accordingly (See Appendix No. 1, this Chapter, for CBS Station List as of 31 December 1944).

The Transportation Section Advance Party at Antwerp

After the main body of the Transportation Corps officers and enlisted men arrived at Le Havre, reconnaissance parties were sent to Brussels and Antwerp as well as to key cities on the main routes, in order to determine the most suitable depot sites and installations required to handle the approximate 100,000 troops that would function under the jurisdiction of Channel Base Section within a few days. Upon return of these reconnaisance parties to

Le Havre and, after a study of their reports, an Advance Party of the Transportation Section, CBS, left for Antwerp to arrange for a Transportation Section Headquarters in that city. At that time it was anticipated that Antwerp would be the location for Headquarters, Channel Base Section, and meetings were held daily with the Civil and British authorities in that area to determine the facilities that would be used by the Americans.

On 15 November, the Advance Party at Antwerp was directed to proceed immediately to Lille, as it had been decided to locate the headquarters of CBS in that city. Upon arrival of the party at Lille, the necessary arrangements were made for billeting personnel and a building for the Transportation Office was selected at 607 Rue de la Republique in an apartment house formerly used by the Gestapo. The move of Headquarters, CBS, from Le Havre to Lille was made on 27 November.

One of the duties of the Advance Party sent to Antwerp was to proceed to the port at Ostend and make arrangements for the handling of POL at that port. As a result, operations began immediately; tank cars were obtained from various sources and yard installations were set up to handle POL. Plans for this operation had set as an immediate target for movement, at least 2/5ths of the port intake capacity. When it was found that the targets established later exceeded the storage facilities of the port they were reduced. The handling of POL at Ostend was discontinued as the port of Antwerp became operative, and the RTO's which had been set up at Ostend and Brugge to control POL movement were inactivated.

The TC party sent to Antwerp from Le Havre had also carefully surveyed the area in order to determine the most practical routes for movement of supplies by motor transport and it was discovered that considerable engineer work would be required to make these routes usable for supply traffic. The work forseen included bridging the Albert Canal, widening roads, and removing corners and opening defiles in order to make it practical to move 10-ton semi-trailers from the quayside to the highways south and east of Antwerp. RTO installations were set up during November at Brugge, Ghent, Malines, Louvain, Brussels, and Antwerp and other areas were reconnoitered in order to plan for future RTO installations requirements. During November, the 13th Major Port arrived and began clearing the docks in preparation for receiving the first ships for unloading.

The Transportation Section at Le Havre

At their temporary headquarters in Le Havre, the Transportation Section had also been making various surveys and had decided upon Beauvais for the first rail-truck transfer point. On 28 September, RTO's were established at Le Havre and Beauvais, and the Engineers began clearing the right-of-way for railway service between these two points.

Port operations began at Le Havre on 2 October when three LST's were beached and their cargo was dispatched to the Gare Centrale sorting shed. These ships had been completely unloaded by 4 October and the first supply convoy, consisting of 40 trucks, departed with an emergency shipment of approximately 160 tons of Class II supplies, destined for Depot C-180 at Reims. At that time, port operations were at a minimum due to the fact that Liberty ships were excluded from the harbor by the Navy on account of undetonated

mines and all port equipment was aboard the SS Beaconfield outside the harbor. Attempts to unload ships in the outer harbor into DUKWs proved impractical because of the rough sea and heavy equipment. It was not until 10 October that clearance was given to the larger ships for entering the port. Following this, Port equipment was immediately unloaded and set up for operation.

Port Operations

Transportation Corps operations in Channel Base Section during the last quarter of the year 1944, were of paramount importance due to the fact that CBS contained the three major ports, of Le Havre, Rouen, and Antwerp that were opened during that time, and because their value to the Allied Continental operation as a whole in shortening supply Lines of Communication. It was the responsibility of CBS to keep these port areas free from congestion at all times. An account of the activities in the rehabilitation and operation of each of these ports is given in Chapter III under the Major Ports concerned, but a brief resume of their operations insofar as the CBS Transportation Office was concerned follows:

Le Havre --- 16th Major Port:

The Advance Party of the 16th Major Port arrived at Le Havre on 21 September. Before rehabilitating the port so that it could be operated, it was necessary to conduct extensive reconnaissances and to estimate the amount of repairs required before vessels could be unloaded. Transportation facilities by rail and highway had to be thoroughly evaluated and plans drawn up to place the port in operating condition. DUKWs and other floating equipment were used exclusively at Le Havre while in operation during 1944, as no docks were available, the damage to the quayside installations being great. When the port first operated only LST's were discharged. On 9 October the first Liberty ships arrived and both coasters and Liberty ships were then handled subsequently; after 16 October, however, coasters were taken up the Seine to Rouen, leaving Le Havre to accept the larger vessels including troop ships coming directly from the United States. The plans called for a daily discharge of 7,000 tons at Le Havre; this target was not within a few weeks after the port went into operation, and was exceeded daily, thereafter, for the remainder of the year. On 13 October, the Seine River was given clearance by the Navy for coasters and a detachment of the 16th Major Port proceeded to Rouen to carry on temporarily with the operations of that port.

Rouen --- 11th Port:

The Rouen dock facilities were not as completely demolished as were those found at Le Havre; however, no dock cranes were available having been destroyed or pushed into the harbor by the enemy. Three vessels had been sunk in such a position that they restricted the use of the harbor. Conferences were held with the Royal Navy to clear the harbor of wreckage and mines, and on 16 October the first coasters arrived at Rouen and commenced unloading. On 20 October the 11th Port arrived and assumed command of the port, taking over duties from the detachment of the 16th Major Port that had made the preliminary surveys and had started operations. A reconnaissance party was sent up the Seine to determine the feasibility of operating barge service to Paris. All concerned concurred in the proposal and on 4 November the Navy had completely cleared the river of all mines and obstacles; on 22 November, the first 17 barges started

the trip up the Seine River to Paris.

Antwerp --- 13th Major Port:

An Advance Echelon of Channel Base Section was formed and sent to Antwerp with the purpose of conducting the necessary reconnaissance and taking definite action to set up the port of Antwerp, which was to be the largest port for the unloading of cargo on the Continent. Antwerp had been captured from the Germans in excellent condition. On 23 September 1944, the first meeting was held at Brussels, attended by representatives of SHAEF, Communications Zone, 21st Army Group, the Chief of Transportation, Advance Section, and representatives of the CBS Transportation Section, for the purpose of laying the groundwork for the joint operation of the port of Antwerp. Subsequent meetings at Brussels and Antwerp were held resulting in an agreement between the U.S. Army and the British for the operation. This agreement was known as the "Treaty of Antwerp". The various Services represented by Advanced Echelon, CBS, stationed at Antwerp were engaged in working out the details and final plans for the port. Civilian personnel and the requisitioning of port units and other TC personnel, and the setting up of DTO and RTO offices in Antwerp, Brussels, Ostend, Ghent, and Malines, were all on the agenda to be worked out so that when the port was ready to open there would be no serious tie-ups. A traffic control system was devised and river operating units were organized. Approximately, 9,000 civilian dock laborers were engaged by the port at the close of the year.

Divisions Operating under CBS Transportation Section

Motor Transport Division

The Motor Transport Division of the Transportation Section, under the direct supervision of Capt. E. L. RICHARDSON, became operational on 21 September. The 152nd QM Bn (TC) arrived for duty, its mission being port clearance and assistance in clearing and rebuilding port facilities. A few days later, the 27th QM Gp, Mobile, (TC) reported for duty with four other QM Truck Bns and proceeded immediately to carry out their assigned mission of supervising the White Ball operations. The first TCRP was established in CBS on 28 September outside of Le Havre, to serve as an information control post.

Movements Division

An Advance Detachment of the 735th Railway Operating Battalion arrived at Le Havre in time to make the initial run on 12 October when the first train load of supplies handled by the STO and SNCF (35 carloads of Class II supplies weighing approximately 350 tons) made the first trip to Reims, a beginning for trips which became more numerous daily and increased in tonnage until the target for port clearance was soon surpassed. On 16 October, the regular scheduled trucking operations to Beauvais from Rouen commenced, and on the same day the transfer truck-to-rail operations were set in motion at Beauvais, with the first train leaving Beauvais for the forward area on 17 October.

On 21 October, it was decided that 5,000 tons of supplies would be handled daily from Le Havre to Belgium. Trains were to be 65-wagon limit; an immediate need for 100 locomotives was indicated, while the wagon supply was found to be ample. Forty trains (French type) were reported as enroute and the balance promised for the immediate future.

Due to the military and civilian requirements, a priority was established to put the passenger lines into operation without delay and with the cooperation of the Engineers, the last of the important communications routes to begin a scheduled run was the Diesel passenger coach service between Paris and Le Havre which made its initial run on 30 October. A tentative schedule called for one train in each direction daily, on a six-hour running-time basis. The Le Havre-Antwerp run had already been inaugerated on 25 October.

Highway Branch

A great responsibility was placedon the Highway Branch in Channel Base Section because of the fact that movements by rail were necessarily restricted for a number of weeks after the areas in CBS were taken over. A brief account of the activities of this branch follows:

On 21 September 1944, the Highway Branch of the Transportation Section Channel Base Section became operational with headquarters at Le Havre. 1st Lt. JACK SCHINAGLE was designated as Chief of the branch. For the balance of September and the month of October, activity was largely devoted to reconnaissance of roads, classification of roads and bridges in cooperation with the Base Engineer, establishment of liaison with British opposites, and the setting up of a system of traffic regulation and control in cooperation with the Base Provost Marshall. During this same period, and in keeping with the Le Havre and Rouen port repair and development programs, a road net for truck lifts was established and designated as the White Ball Route. (See Chapter V).

Because of extensive damage caused by aerial bombardment, artillery fire, and enemy demolitions, road damage and bridge destruction both in the port and inland areas were great. Road reconnaissance, as a result, was necessarily a continuous and extensive project until one-way routes were developed that could handle safely the required volume and weight of traffic. Also, there were the additional problems of traffic regulation and control, and coordinating with the British in their use of supply routes in the area, as well as the handling of administrative details such as the servicing of vehicles and resting and feeding drivers. TCRP's were established at Le Havre, Rouen, and at the Beauvais railhead. Traffic points which were manned jointly by the British and U.S. Military Police, were set up at critical points in towns along the routes and at origins and destinations.

A few convoys were dispatched from Le Havre and Rouen; however, a majority of the truck convoys entered Channel Base Section from areas south and west of the Base Section, and the Section Transportation Highway Branch was used primarily to service these convoys with Class I and Class III supplies while in temporary bivouac areas, and to furnish road and route information.

During October, the Highway Branch became a part of Movements Division under the direction of Colonel B. A. SHIPP. A policy was established by which all personnel and freight movements by water, rail, or road would be handled first through Movements Division and then forwarded for action to the branch concerned.

Inland Waterways Division

Although the Inland Waterways Division was activated on 8 November 1944 by

Office Memorandum No. 55, Office of the Chief of Transportation, the Inland Waterways Division of Channel Base Section was not set up until 18 December 1944. The policy as set forth was for the Inland Waterways Division to be principally a supervising agency for canal operations through Army and Communications Zone Sections, with French, Belgian, and Dutch Governmental agencies performing the actual operations.

As soon as the Inland Waterways Division was organized, work was started in consolidating information concerning the canals, barges, facilities for loading and unloading at depots, and other pertinent facts regarding the use of inland waterway transportation in the areas under control of CBS. With the aid of the French and Belgian authorities, and U.S. Army Engineers, much information was obtained concerning the condition of the canals, rivers, and their quaysides.

On 19 December 1944, the first barge with U.S. Army supplies sailed from the port of Rouen up the Seine River to Paris, a distance of 144 miles. Although barge movements were hampered by the bridge at Le Manior, operations on the Seine River gradually improved through the remainder of December; beginning 30 December 1944, the Le Manior bridge was opened daily for four hours to allow traffic to move up and down the river. On 19 December the first barge of U.S. Army supplies sailed from the port of Antwerp to Liege, Belgium, via the Boom and Albert Canals. On 30 December, the first barge containing POL was dispatched from the port of Antwerp to Boom. Many of the barges enroute via the via the Albert Canal from the port of Antwerp had to be held along the canal because of the counterattack made by the Germans. However, loading continued for, the Albert Canal. This tonnage increased considerably durrng the last two weeks of December, and the total tonnage moved by barge by the end of December was 15,471,10 tons via the Albert canal from the port of Antwerp.

Special Assignments

Coal:

One of the most important phases of the Transportation Corps operations in Channel Base Section, not directly relating to TC port operations was in connection with the coal supply situation. There was a definite shortage of coal, both for military and civilian needs, and to add difficulties to the situation, civilian truck transport was practically non-existent. The control of Transportation Corps facilities in CBS relating to the movement of coal was, therefore, carefully checked in order to permit the maximum distribution of coal. Black Market activities made it necessary for SHAEF to impose military control on production and transportation of coal in Belgium, commencing on 15 December, with the stipulation that it remain in force for approximately sixty days. Most of the mines concerned were in the Mons-Charleroi Area, under the jurisdiction of the DTO at Charleroi. An interesting but deplorable condition was the fact that in some shipments of coal as much as 50 percent shrinkage occurred, dur to theft by civilians from the time the coal left the mines until it arrived at its scheduled destination; in one instance a whole train load of coal "disappeared".

Depots

The two principal depots in CBS were located at Charleroi (Q-183) and at Lille (Q-185); The former was established and expanded in mid-December when the

tactical situation changed with the launching of the German counter-offensive. Q-185 was activated in late December to permit clearance of the congestion in the various ports due to an embargo necessitated by the "Breakthrough" and to permit further use of the canals and barge transportation.

Rail-Truck Transfer Point

Beauvais was selected as the rail-truck transfer point in order to permit clearance of the port of Le Havre and to move supplies until the forward areas could be established or until new depot sites were located. The use of Beauvais as a rail loading point, which began on 17 October, was terminated on 28 December 1944, with a total of 49,929 tons of supplies being handled from the beginning of operations. This tonnage was dispatched in 4,502 wagons. Labor for the accomplishment of this operation was supplied by French civilians and Prisoners of War under supervision of RTO personnel.

Movement of POL

The movement of POL (bulk and package) was arranged for by the Transportation Corps through 2nd Military Railway Service and civilian railways, which provided the power and crews for railway movement. The documention, which was prepared by the Service involved, was checked for legibility and correct waybilling. TWX's were transmitted advising all concerned of the departure, number of cars, contents, and destination. Depot situation reports were compiled for the purpose of keeping a record of cars on hand, unloaded, and enroute. This resulted in keeping the proper flow of traffic and served to prevent congestion. There was one through-pipeline (USA) extending from Antwerp to Maastricht, running from CBS at Hasselt. The Transportation Corps did not enter into the movement of POL until it was loaded into cars.

Movement of POW's

Generally speaking, POW's in Channel Base Section were under the supervision of the Quartermaster Corps for which they served as labor personnel at various depots and installations. Therefore, arrangements for movement of POW's was made by the Quartermaster Corps through the RTO nearest the installation from which they were to be moved.

If the party was of sufficient size, movement was made by special train; otherwise, by ordinary freight or passenger service. Guards (usually QM personnel) accompanied prisoners to their destination, the number of guards depending upon the number of prisoners involved. After delivering the prisoners, the guards were usually returned to their point of origin or to some other installation designated by the Quartermaster Corps.

Red Horse

An area in the Le Havre-Rouen District was set up to handle the flow of personnel and units arriving from the UK and the USA. These camps and bivouac areas were known as the "Red Horse Area". The camps were set up during the latter part of October and the first GFRS Troops arrived on 6 November. In early December plans were received from Communications Zone to set up a "Red Horse Expansion Program" to handle, in addition to the incoming troops, the units and personnel embarking for the UK and USA either on rotation, rehabili-

tation, replacement, furloughs, or on temporary duty. Colonel WALTER D. CORD was temporarily assigned as Commander of this area and began developing and planning for efficient movement of troops within the area. Camps were set up to handle the various types of operations and Transportation Corps personnel were assigned to each camp to handle the RTO problems. In late December, Brigadier General JOSEPH L. PHILLIPS, was assigned as Commanding General of this area. Under General JOSEPH L. PHILLIPS, units were attached to handle all the problems relative to this program. The RTO personnel remained on duty, however, under the DTO at Rouen, and included the following locations: RTO Twenty Grand, RTO Lucky Strike, RTO UK Leave Camp at Etretat, and RTO Motteville. The transportation Section also maintained TCHP's at six other blocks and camps, thus giving coverage for the entire area.

Train Guards

After the first Allied troops arrived on the Continent, a definite shortage of many of the essentials of life, among the civilian populations, was apparent. As a result of this situation, and since the civilians in these areas possessed sufficient money, a ready market for all obtainable supplies that might be pilfered was created. An easy source of supplies for pilferage was the supply train moving from the ports and depots to the front, The uncertain schedules and lack of open rail lines made it necessary for all trains to make numerous stops and travel at slow speeds. This situation created the perfect set-up for allowing the civilians to board these supply trains at will, and to remove whatever supplies they desired. It was found necessary to place train guards on duty with each train in an attempt to prevent such losses. Since the majority of supply trains in Channel Base Section originated at ports, it was decided that personnel in units under the jurisdiction of the port would be utilized for guard assignments. Therefore, the Transportation Corps was ordered to furnish personnel for train guards in order to protect the supplies being transported forward to the Armies.

Enemy Action.

Since the personnel of the Channel Base Section moved into most of the cities and territories shortly after the enemy had evacuated, they were subjected to constant danger of enemy action. Casualties were suffered among the personnel of the Transportation Corps while carrying out their missions. At Le Havre the greatest danger was from hidden mines. When the enemy departed from certain areas they left behind snipers to harass the troops whenever possible; some of these were assisted by collaborators. Antwerp received heavy and frequent V-1 and V-2 raids with the result that the port and all attached TC personnel were constantly under the strain of danger both day and night. Numerous casualties and serious injuries occurred as the result of these attacks (See Chapter III under Antwerp).

12th Traffic Regulation Group

It was not until 16 October when the 12th Traffic Regulation Group reported for duty that sufficient personnel was available for the various assignments. Upon arrival, the unit was billeted at Etrétat and after interviews to determine the capabilities of each individual, assignments were made. As the various DTO and RTO installations were activated, the personnel proceeded to their proper stations for duty.

6th Traffic Regulation Group

The 6th Traffic Regulation Group arrived on the Continent on 12 December, disembarking at Le Havre and proceeded immediately to Rouen. They were billeted in a Chateau a mile from the city awaiting assignment to the various installations already determined by OCOT. It had been decided that a small detachment was to be assigned to Oise Section, several casuals to report to OCOT as requested by name, and the balance of the personnel was to be divided evenly between Advance Section and Channel Base Section. The personnel scheduled for Channel Base Section, consisting of 24 officers and 134 enlisted men, reported for duty on 16 December 1944. The Commanding Officer of the 6th Traffic Regulation Group, Colonel WALTER D. MC CORD, along with Lt. Colonel WM. MANGINE, Executive Officer, and Capt. A. S. ARMSTRONG, Planning and Control Officer, were assigned to duty in the "Red Horse Area" and proceeded to carry out their mission of developing the "Red Horse Expansion Program" as originally set up by the CG, Communications Zone. Until the arrival of the permanent Commanding Officer of this Area, Colonel MC CORD assumed command. It was necessary to withdraw personnel of the 6th Traffic Regulation Group assigned to the 16th Major Port at Le Havre to assist in setting up RTO and TCRP installations in the "Red Horse Area". Personnel of this organization was therefore responsible for most of the groundwork necessary for this tremendous operation which it was planned would eventually handle all in-bound and out-bound movements of troops between the UK and USA, and the Continent.

Statistics as Reported by Channel Base Section

TONNAGE FORWARDED BY THE PORTS

	Via Rail	Via Truck	Via Barge
11th Port:			
September	Nil	Nil	Nil
October	Nil	893	242
November	7,227	89,847	10,771
December	54,102	52,866	9,164
Totals	61,329	143,606	20,177
13th Port:			
September	Nil	Nil	Nil
October	Nil	Nil	Nil
November	799	749	Nil
December	138,115	127,588	47,829
Totals	138,914	128,337	47,829
16th Port:			
September	Nil	Nil	Nil
October	22,845	18,882	Nil
November	100,639	65,064	473
December	112,391	58,272	767
Totals	235,875	142,218	1242
GRAND TOTAL FOR THE BASE	436,118	414,161	69,248

HIGHWAY BRANCH DATA

	No. of Convoys	No. of Personnel	No. of Vehicles	Total Vehicle Miles	Total Convoy Miles
September	0	0	0	0	0
October	4	933	345	73,485	852
November	183	38,584	7,461	1,380,285	33,855
December	418	90,958	24,121	4,631,232	80,256
TOTALS	605	130,475	31,927	6,084,902	114,963

PORT DATA

	Supply Ships Unloaded No.	Tonnage	No. Personnel Ships Unloaded	No. of Personnel
16th Port:				
September	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
October	57	62,313	Nil	1,887
November	240	171,612	33	89,825
December	239	201,028	51	101,646
Totals	536	434,953	84	193,358
13th Port:				
September	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
October	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
November	Nil	5,873	Nil	Nil
December	128	428,993	Nil	276
Totals	128	434,866	Nil	276
11th Port:				
September	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
October	38	23,844	Nil	Nil
November	151	127,610	83	16,124
December	152	133,609	206	33,437
Totals	341	285,063	289	49,561
GRAND TOTALS	905	1,154,882	289	242,919

INLAND WATERWAY TONNAGE MOVEMENTS

Class of Supplies	Antwerp	Rouen
Engineer II&IV	14,407	1,463
Quartermaster I & II	Nil	4,293
Ordnance II & IV	Nil	1,877
Medical	Nil	107
Signal II & IV	Nil	158
Quartermaster III (POL)	1,069	2,692

Class of Supplies	Antwerp	Rouen
Miscellaneous	Nil	547
TOTALS	15,471	11,137
PORT OF ANTWERP	15,471	126 Barges
PORT OF ROUEN	11,137	58 Barges
GRAND TOTALS	26,608	184 Barges

APPENDIX NO. 1
(Chapter VI)

T.C. UNITS IN CBS - 31 DECEMBER 1944

UNIT	C.O.	LOCATION
152 QM Bn TC (M)	Lt Col A B Johnson	Antwerp
3616 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Peter L Baugi	Antwerp
3583 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Olin C Taylor	Antwerp
3596 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Jack R Singleton	Antwerp
3865 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Paul T Sturgis	Hemixem, Belgium
3883 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Edw Truncellito	Antwerp
4256 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt S H Clymer	Q-183-T Charleroi
4261 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Jos F Dickmann	Antwerp
4262 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Lee A Nelson	Antwerp
467 QM Bn TC	Lt Col Ernest G Parks	Lierville
134 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
378 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3574 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3584 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt M Rubin	Bouchout, Belgium
3622 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3623 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3631 QM Trk Co TC		3 Mi NE/Mons, Belg
3343 QM Trk Co TC		St Ghislain, Belg
27 QM Group TC	Col Percy S Haydon	Elbeuf
174 QM (M) Hq & Hq Det	Lt Col Frank W Broderick	Forges Les Eaux
399 QM Trk Co (27 Gp)	1st Lt Wm H Hugill	Forges Les Eaux
645 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Gerald J Druck	Forges Les Eaux
3398 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Robert C Kaiser	Forges Les Eaux
3543 QM Trk Co TC (27 Gp)	Capt Justin R Howard	Forges Les Eaux
3871 QM Trk Co TC (27 Gp)	Capt Redmond Calloway	Forges Les Eaux
4271 QM Trk Co (27 Gp)	Capt Rolland L Collins	Forges Les Eaux
H/H Det 181 QM Bn (TC)	Maj George F Nixon	M-185080
146 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Clifford M Beasley	M-185080
400 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Andrew T McGrath	M-185080
3397 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Andrew T Costarino	M-185080
3580 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Wm F Schiefer	M-185080
3613 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Huber H Reynolds	M-185080
3627 QM Trk Co TC	Capt James F Clark	M-185080
3992 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Linton D Lewis	5 Mi SE/Rouen
238 QM Bn TC	Lt Col Collis P Hudson	Fontaine
3395 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Claborn J Bell	St Andre
3864 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Carl F Muse	Fontaine, Le Bourg
3982 QM Trk Co TC	Capt David M Schuyman	Fontaine
3986 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Irvin C Gorman	Fontaine
3989 QM Trk Co TC	Capt S S Stann	Fontaine
4004 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Wm I Boudro	Fontaine

APPENDIX NO. 1
(Chapter VI)

T.C. UNITS IN CBS - 31 DECEMBER 1944

UNIT	C.O.	LOCATION
152 QM Bn TC (M)	Lt Col A B Johnson	Antwerp
3616 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Peter L Raugi	Antwerp
3583 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Olin C Taylor	Antwerp
3596 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Jack R Singleton	Antwerp
3865 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Paul T Sturgis	Hemixem, Belgium
3883 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Edw Truncellito	Antwerp
4256 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt S H Clymer	Q-183-T Charleroi
4261 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Jos F Dickmann	Antwerp
4262 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Lee A Nelson	Antwerp
467 QM Bn TC	Lt Col Ernest C Parks	Lierville
134 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
378 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3574 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3584 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt M Rubin	Bouchout, Belgium
3622 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3623 QM Trk Co TC		Lierville
3631 QM Trk Co TC		3 Mi NE/Mons, Belg
3343 QM Trk Co TC		St Ghislain, Belg
27 QM Group TC	Col Percy S Haydon	Elbeuf
174 QM (M) Hq & Hq Det	Lt Col Frank W Broderick	Forges Les Eaux
399 QM Trk Co (27 Gp)	1st Lt Wm H Hugill	Forges Les Eaux
645 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Gerald J Druck	Forges Les Eaux
3398 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Robert C Kaser	Forges Les Eaux
3543 QM Trk Co TC (27 Gp)	Capt Justin R Howard	Forges Les Eaux
3871 QM Trk Co TC (27 Gp)	Capt Redmond Calloway	Forges Les Eaux
4271 QM Trk Co (27 Gp)	Capt Rolland L Collins	Forges Les Eaux
H/H Det 181 QM Bn (TC)	Maj George F Nixon	M-185080
146 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Clifford M Beasley	M-185080
400 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Andrew T McGrath	M-185080
3397 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Andrew T Costarino	M-185080
3580 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Wm F Schieffer	M-185080
3613 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Huber H Reynolds	M-185080
3627 QM Trk Co TC	Capt James F Clark	M-185080
3992 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Linton D Lewis	5 Mi SE/Rouen
238 QM Bn TC	Lt Col Collis P Hudson	Fontaine
3395 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Claborn J Bell	St Andre
3864 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Carl F Muse	Fontaine, Le Bourg
3982 QM Trk Co TC	Capt David M Schulman	Fontaine
3986 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Irvin C Gorman	Fontaine
3989 QM Trk Co TC	Capt S S Stann	Fontaine
4004 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Wm I Boudro	Fontaine

UNIT	C.O.	LOCATION
239 QM Bn TC (Col)	Maj W L Tindall	Chateau El Beauf
3904 QM Trk Co TC (Col)	Capt Francis Kattner	St Etienne
4010 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Clarence A Witzal	Menequesville
3988 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Frank H Price	Vasceuil
3394 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Arthur J Sheridan	Lyons La Foret
513 QM Group TC	Col Hugh H Tolman	Tirlemont, Belgium
3625 QM Trk Co TC		Tirlemont, Belgium
3882 QM Trk Co TC		Tirlemont, Belgium
175 QM Bn TC	Lt Col Clinton E Sanderson	Tirlemont, Belgium
3573 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Melvin R Downey	Tirlemont, Belgium
3576 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Kindle Walston	Tirlemont, Belgium
3602 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Charles S Fraleigh Jr	St Trond
3609 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Stuart M Low	Tirlemont
3614 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Marinus Goote	Tirlemont
3617 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Howard F Harper	Tirlemont
3621 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Charles E Sams	Tirlemont
3630 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Victor Leatzow	St Trond
4257 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Robert M Thill	Hoegaarden
4258 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt William V Couch	St Trond
4259 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Raymond Q Doyle	Tirlemont
4260 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt John G Gaines	Tirlemont
141 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Theodore R Laputka	Tirlemont
168 QM Trk Co TC	Capt James D McKean	St Trond
Hq Det 466 QM Bn (M) TC	Lt Col A E Parrott	N Deurne, Belgium
3610 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Howard W Veitch	Duerne, Belgium
3611 QM Trk Co TC	Capt John W Gagler	Duerne, Belgium
520 QM Group TC	Col Harry A Fudge	St Pierre de Ver
86 QM Bn (M) TC	Lt Col A S Packard	Rouen
3396 QM Trk Co TC		Rouen
3454 QM Trk Co TC (Col)		Rouen
3658 QM Trk Co TC (Col)		Rouen
3862 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Claude H Stewart	Rouen
3868 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt John D Morris	St Etienne du Roury
104 QM Bn TC	Lt Col E D Mulvanity	Tancarville
660 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Paul S Eddy	Forges Les Eaux
751 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt T A Edgell	Forges Les Eaux
4252 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Zebedee C Chaney Jr	Le Havre
4266 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt N M Rappeport	Antwerp
212 QM Bn TC	Lt Col Asa G Atwater	Le Havre
3433 QM Trk Co	1st Lt Melbourne G Presley	1½ Mi S/Forges L E
3497 QM Trk Co TC	Capt S C Tolbert	Le Havre
3533 QM Trk Co TC	Capt A S Landforce	Le Havre
3612 QM Trk Co TC		Montevilliers
3689 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Mw M Benton Jr	Le Havre
3691 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Jack L Clark	Sneider Wks Le Havr
3867 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Robt F Shanahan	Le Havre

UNIT	C.O.	LOCATION
3872 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Kenneth C Moore	Le Havre
3885 QM Trk Co TC	Capt John M Lambert	Le Havre
3888 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Marion L Crandall	Le Havre
3985 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Inyard	Le Havre
4001 QM Trk Co TC	Capt Robt J Hackenberger	Le Havre
4253 QM Trk Co TC	1st Lt Yancy F Groggs	Fontaine
11th Port Hqs TC	Col R S Whitcomb	Rouen
1st Group Hcg Sta		
104 Port Maint Co		Petite courronne
104 Port Mrn Maint	Capt Erwin W Larsen	Rouen
330 Harbor Craft	Capt W Nixon	Petite Courronne
333 Harbor Craft		Petite Courronne
334 Harbor Craft	Capt Philip J Spears	Rouen
336 Harbor Craft	Capt Vergess	Petite Courronne
338 Harbor Craft	Capt J W Dalton	Rouen
531 Port Co	Lt P C Reese	Rouen
625 Port Co	Capt W I Goldstein	Rouen
386th Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col Eazippel	Rouen
214 Port Co	Capt G Deepee	Rouen
215 Port Co	Capt M E Shoemaker	Rouen
216 Port Co		Rouen
217 Port Co		Rouen
392 Port Bn H/H Det	Maj John A Dale	Rouen
155 Port Co	Capt Erwin D Bradshaw	Rouen
156 Port Co	Capt Ferdinand V Plain	Rouen
171 Port Co	Capt Richard C Rikar	Rouen
172 Port Co	Capt John Baumler	Rouen
490 Port Bn H/H Det	Capt Calloc	Rouen
226 Port Co	1st Lt Baxter	Rouen
227 Port Co	1st Lt G D Cohee	Rouen
228 Port Co	1st Lt T J Usher	Rouen
229 Port Co	1st Lt J M Sutton	Rouen
501 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col John W Harrington	Rouen
434 Port Co	Capt Hubert J Skelton	Rouen
435 Port Co	1st Lt J W Hoben	Rouen
436 Port Co	1st Lt Joseph C Case	Rouen
437 Port Co	Capt Penrose E Goodall	Rouen
628 Port Co	Capt L R Ellenberger	Rouen
631 Port Co	Lt R E Laurence	Rouen
509 Port Bn H/H Det	Maj John W Wynne	Rouen
306 Port Co	Capt Kenneth L Jessop	Rouen
307 Port Co	1st Lt Douglas F Griffin	Rouen
308 Port Co	1st Lt James E Nunn	Rouen
309 Port Co	1st Lt Wade H Smith Jr	Rouen
Det "M" 12th Major Port		Red Horse

UNIT	C.O.	LOCATION
13th Major Port H/H Co	Col Doswell Gullatt	Antwerp
Det B 5th Major Port.	Col Edw C Forsythe	Antwerp
Det C 11th Traff Reg Gp	Major Albert McCullough	Antwerp
Det 15 TRG	Maj Manie H Meyer	Antwerp
267 Port Co	Capt Glen L Nichols	Antwerp
268 Port Co	1st Lt Rayne W Labre	Antwerp
339 Harbor Craft Co	Capt J K Kane	Antwerp
344 Harbor Craft Co	Capt Louis McAllister	Antwerp
345 Harbor Craft Co	Capt Shannon O Albright	Antwerp
352 Harbor Craft Co	1st Lt O J Bourg	Antwerp
105 Port Marine Maint	Capt George W Doran	Antwerp
487 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col Mont C Jackson	Antwerp
184 Port Co	Capt Bert H Hakanson	Antwerp
185 Port Co	Capt James A Boocock	Antwerp
186 Port Co	Capt Clifford J Anderson	Antwerp
187 Port Co	Capt Eugene M Conlon	Antwerp
282 Port Co	1st Lt Conrad B Wingfield	Antwerp
283 Port Co	1st Lt Kenneth D Bridgen	Antwerp
517 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col Harold E Bonar	Antwerp
284 Port Co	Capt Robert Ward	Antwerp
285 Port Co	Capt Harold Steeleman	Antwerp
797 Port Co	Capt James J Powell	Antwerp
798 Port Co	1st Lt Charles W Ker	Antwerp
799 Port Co	1st Lt Henry O McGonigal	Antwerp
800 Port Co	Capt William J Ryan	Antwerp
519 Port Bn H/H Det	Maj Charles M Nabors	Antwerp
280 Port Co	1st Lt James J Walsh	Antwerp
281 Port Co	1st Lt Andrew Prudhomme	Antwerp
302 Port Co	Capt Arthur W Anderson	Antwerp
303 Port Co	Capt Stanley Dulski	Antwerp
304 Port Co	1st Lt Ray J Tyson	Antwerp
305 Port Co	Capt Ralph F Close	Antwerp
16th Port TC (Major)	Col T J Wood	Le Havre
Det A 4 Maj Port		Le Havre
Det L 12 Maj Port		Le Havre
520 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt L W Lambert	Le Havre
174 Port Co	Capt Harold D Higby	Le Havre
279 Port Co	1st Lt John J Walsh	Le Havre
577 Port Co	Lt K L Peterson	Le Havre
624 Port Co	Lt R D Gennette	Le Havre
626 Port Co	Capt J E Kimmel	Le Havre
627 Port Co	Capt C H Dann	Le Havre
332 Harbor Craft	Capt R B Lyons	Le Havre
351 Harbor Craft	Capt J S Wilson	Le Havre
355 Harbor Craft		Le Havre
358 Harbor Craft Co	Capt Melvin R Poor	Le Havre
360 Harbor Craft Co		Le Havre
103 Port Mrn Maint	1st Lt J G Fritz	Le Havre
458 Amph Trk Co		Le Havre
461 Amph Trk Co		Le Havre

UNIT	C.O.	LOCATION
131 QM Bn	Capt H A Lang	Le Havre
463 Amph Trk Co	1st Lt Wm L Tait Jr	Le Havre
467 Amph Trk Co	Capt Raymond A Deardorff	Le Havre
468 Amph Trk Co	1st Lt Wm J Redmond	Le Havre
469 Amph Trk Co	Capt K A Jones	Le Havre
470 Amph Trk Co	Capt J B McGhee	Le Havre
815 Amph Trk Co	1st Lt Eugene D Heath	Le Havre
817 Amph Trk Co	1st Lt Lawrence D McDaniel	Le Havre
818 Amph Trk Co	1st Lt J E Mallen	Le Havre
362 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col W S Holcomb	Le Havre
580 Port Co		Le Havre
581 Port Co		Le Havre
583 Port Co		Le Havre
584 Port Co		Le Havre
485 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col John W Ross	Le Havre
222 Port Co	Capt Jean E Pierson	Le Havre
223 Port Co	1st Lt Thomas D Walling	Le Havre
224 Port Co	1st Lt Don G Potty	Le Havre
225 Port Co	Capt Lee E Carothers	Le Havre
494 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col John F Condon	Le Havre
238 Port Co	Capt Harry L Carpenter	Le Havre
239 Port Co	Capt Donald E Campbell	Le Havre
240 Port Co	1st Lt Albert Simmons	Le Havre
241 Port Co	1st Lt Frederick P Hatch	Le Havre
502 Port Bn H/H Det	Lt Col Edward Burns	Le Havre
270 Port Co	Capt M P Martino	Le Havre
271 Port Co	Capt Daniel J Mahar	Le Havre
272 Port Co	1st Lt Clarence J Menke	Le Havre
273 Port Co	1st Lt Samuel J Abraham	Le Havre
505 Port Bn H/H Det W/Med	Maj G L Oliver	Cours de la Republique
547 Port Co	Capt H E Hazel	Le Havre
550 Port Co	Capt G Fishbone	Le Havre
551 Port Co	Capt F W Pfluoger	Le Havre
602 Port Co	Capt E L Bogolfer	Le Havre
649 Port Co	Capt A C Verner	Le Havre
512 Port Bn H/H Det W/Med	Maj Wilton H Crosby	Le Havre
319 Port Co	Lt W E Stimpert	Le Havre
556 Port Co	Lt T J Conroy	Le Havre
560 Port Co	Lt B Golden	Le Havre
561 Port Co	Lt A Mello	Le Havre

UNIT	C.O.	LOCATION
6th Traf Reg Gp TC	Col Walter D McCord	Lille
12th Traf Reg Gp TC	Col B A Shipp	Lille
707 Rwy Grand Division		Antwerp
709 Rwy Grand Div	Col Frank E Cheshire	Brussels
722 Rwy Opn Bn		Jeumont
729 Rwy Opn Bn		Antwerp
734 Rwy Opn Bn		Trans Area "B"
735 Rwy Opn Bn	Lt Col H C Baughan	Malines, Belgium
743 Rwy Opn Bn	Lt Col Frank G Cook	Antwerp
744 Rwy Opn Bn		Charleroi
763 Rwy Shop Bn H/H	Lt Col James Purcell	Malines, Belgium
240 Rwy Bn Mil	Lt Col Frank A Cook	Antwerp

UNITS ASSIGNED BUT NOT YET REPORTED FOR DUTY

532 QM Gp H/H Det	
H/H Det 60th QM Bn	
64 QM Bn H/H Det	
H/H Det 135 QM Bn 'M'	
245 QM Bn H/H Det	
280 QM Bn H/H Det	
3601 QM Trk Co	Antwerp
403 QM Trk Co	
653 QM Trk Co TC	
3625 QM Trk Co	Tirlemont
3682 QM Trk Co	Antwerp
3717 QM Trk Co	
3759 QM Trk Co	
3760 QM Trk Co	
3973 QM Trk Co	
4009 QM Trk Co	Antwerp
4011 QM Trk Co	Antwerp
17 Port	
H/H Det 365 Port Bn	
H/H Det 521 Port Bn	Red Horse
268 Port Co	
582 Port Co	Red Horse
585 Port Co	Red Horse
588 Port Co	Red Horse
589 Port Co	Red Horse
595 Port Co	Rouen
597 Port Co	Rouen
600 Port Co	Rouen
601 Port Co	Rouen
357 Harbor Craft Co	
816 A mph Trk Co	

LOIRE SECTION
(CHAPTER VI)

On 28 August 1944, Loire Section was established at Le Mans and the Transportation Section officially began operations on that date. The 15th Traffic Regulation Group reported to Loire Section on 4 September and some of its personnel were assigned immediately to take over the duties being performed by the 9th Traffic Regulation Group which had previously worked under Advance Section. In order to carry out their normally assigned duties, the Transportation Section was organized as follows:

Transportation Officer – Colonel GEORGE A. FORD
Deputy Transportation Officer – Lt. Colonel JOSEPH R. KRIECHBAUM
Executive Officer – Captain LEE M. MC TURNAN
Military Railway System – Captain WALLACE G. EVANS
Movements Division – Lt. Colonel PETER M. MILLER JR.
Freight Branch – Capt. JOHN R. MICHENER
Passenger Branch – Capt. KINSLEY G. ROMER
Motor Transport Branch – Capt. WILLIAM S. KUTSCHBACH
Installations Branch – Major MADISON A. DANIELS
Highway Control Division – Major KENNETH B. FOSTER
Administration Division – Lt. Colonel FRANK T. HURLEY
Supply, Statistics & Reports Branch – Lt. Colonel ACA F. MILLER.

Until Loire Section was dissolved on 30 November 1944 and became a part of Brittany Base Section, the various divisions and branches of the Loire Section Transportation Office continued in the performance of their regular duties under the same officers, excepting as indicated below.

Movements Division

The branches previously operating under this division remained the same until Loire Section was dissolved. Following is a summary of their activities during October and November 1944:

Freight Branch: The Principal duties of this branch were in connection with the movement of supplies and equipment throught the area assigned to Loire Section:

(1) In order to increase the amount of available rolling stock, the Freight Branch worked with the other Loire Section Services in disposing of loads found oncaptured enemy cars. Approximately 200 carloads were handled and the loaded equipment was released. The greatest percentage of such property was Engineer and Ordnance, with a small amount of Quartermaster items.

(2) Efforts were made to improve documentation in Loire Section through RTO's, and adjoining Sections and Base Sections concerned. Improperly billed cars or cars marked for units which had moved from the areas, were reconsigned or disposed of locally, thus freeing equipment and promptly moving supplies to their proper destinations.

(3) To combat a steady increase in pilferage the Freight Branch coordinated its activities closely with those of other Communications Zone Sections in providing train guards and reporting improperly sealed cars, as

well as cars found with missing seals and open doors.

(4) The Transportation Section was called upon to arrange for the movement of pit-props to French coal mines, and from 24 October to 20 November, 591 cars containing 7,243 tons of pit-props were forwarded.

(5) The following statistical data is furnished covering the periods indicated:

LE MANS

	EASTBOUND			WESTBOUND		
Date	Empty Trains	Freight Trains	Tonnage	Empty Trains	Freight Trains	Tonnage
21 Sept thru 18 Oct.	4	306	130,486	215	9	3,740
21 Oct to 20 Nov	10	449	174,417	238	59	20,198

DREUX

21 Sept. thru 18 Oct.	10	566	365,255	510	9	2,854
21 Oct to 20 Nov.	0	534	345,246	406	35	10,278
TOTAL	24	1,855	1,015,404	1,369	112	37,070

Passenger Branch: From 21 September to 18 October, personnel moves in Loire section were:

	Number Personnel
22 Troop Trains Departed - - - -	12,896
14 " " Arrived - - - -	9,834
49 " " Passing (Le Mans) - - -	29,771
75 " " Passing (Surdon) - - -	85,000 (Approx)
32 POW (Originated in Loire Section) - - -	48,867
(16 POW Convoys by road. - - - -	15,128)

There was a daily movement of approximately 2000 troops to the 14th and 15th Replacement Depots during October. Two trains of Singalese troops were operated for the French Army in connection with the movement of repatriated Colonials from La Flèche to Morlaix. One train of French Recruits was operated from Alencon to Caen. Detachment "A" of the 15th Traffic Regulation Group was forwarded to Dijon by air. Twelve ships were supplied by the 50th Troop Transport Wing, and the Detachment together with 12 tons of equipment was transferred in a few hours from Le Mans to destination. A large number of casuals and detachments of from 100 to 200 men with equipment were moved to various destinations, mostly from Le Mans and from the assembly area at Chartres. Full use was made of current French passenger service which added to the speed and comfort of the operations.

The total number of personnel movements handled through Loire Section from 21 October through 20 November amounted to 36,102 by rail and 206 by air.

Installations Branch: The duties of this branch were to train RTO personnel, to outline procedures in the preparation of records and reports relative to the movement of supplies, equipment, and personnel, and to advise the Movements Division Officer of any changes affecting rail service or capacity in the Loire Section. The following list shows the location of RTO's and the number of officers and enlisted men at each, as of 18 October:

RTO	Officers	Enlisted Men
Le Mans	5	46
Alencon	2	3
Laval	1	5
Chartres	3	19
Surdon	3	16
Droux	3	15
La Loupe	1	3
TOTALS	16	107

In order to cope with the increasing traffic problems at certain installations in Loire Section, and a decrease in personnel caused by the departure of two detachments from the 15th Traffic Regulation Group, various changes in RTO personnel were made from 18 October until the section was dissolved at the end of November. Thus, the RTO installation at Surdon was inactivated 29 October; the RTO installation at La Loupe was inactivated 25 October.

Motor Transport Branch: During October, the following Quartermaster Truck Companies were assigned to the Motor Transport Branch:

381st QM Truck Company
659th QM Truck Company
3413th QM Truck Company
3438th QM Truck Company
3890th QM Truck Company

On 14 November, the 3479th QM Truck Company arrived in Loire Section, having drawn their quota of trucks from Normandy Base Section but the equipment was found to be in a very bad state of repair. This situation made it necessary for the company to spend the remainder of its time in Loire Section repairing vehicles, turning some in for replacement, and getting ready for trucking operations.

A pool of ¼-ton 4 x 4 trucks was established and operated with headquarters at Chanzy Barracks, Le Mans. The 49th Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile) supervised the maintenance of these vehicles, which were on Memorandum Receipt to RTO's and TCP's within Loire Section. A few were held available for use locally by the Section Transportation Office.

Motor Transport equipment available for use in Loire Section was as follows:

Task vehicles, 2½-ton 6 x 6 cargo	240
1-ton trailers	214
Total tonnage capacity of all vehicles	1,414

Administration Branch: This branch was established under the Movements division during October and became responsible for the preparation and distribution of all operational and informative material, to the various branches of the division and to RTO installations in the field. It was also made responsible for training RTO personnel in administrative duties, and for the preservation of all records pertaining to the division. The branch arranged for a Reading File shortly after being organized, the purpose of which was to make available to all branches of the division, all pertinent daily incoming and outgoing reports and correspondence.

Highway Control Division

Under Major KENNETH B. FOSTER, this division continued during October with the performance of its regular duties in connection with the issuing of road clearances, the preparation of traffic flow charts, march graphs and tables, traffic circulation plans, strip maps and overlays, and the furnishing of highway information, upon request. During the latter part of October, Major FOSTER was succeeded by Major ARTHUR G. BLISS, as Chief of the Division.

By 20 October, personnel of the Highway Control Division had covered approximately 8,200 miles on road reconnaissance, sign posting and removal, and in carrying out administrative duties. At a meeting held by the Chief of the division with the Chiefs of Highway Control Divisions from Normandy and Brittany Base Sections, an agreement was reached on the coordination of activities on the various routes in the Sections and Base Sections. They selected a through-route, to be known as the "Star Route" for movement of highway traffic. Personnel of the Loire Section Highway Control Division erected signs marking the portion of the route passing through Loire Section territory. The Sign Shop, operated by the division, produced approximately 711 signs for the Military Police, RTO's, TCP's and for route marking. Personnel of the division removed approximately 962 obsolete signs in Loire Section.

On road reconnaissance, personnel of the Highway Control Division reported the location of abandoned German and American equipment. This included such items as generators, concrete mixers, crawler cranes, asphalt, steel I-beams, engineer equipment and supplies, and empty gasoline cans.

Operating that portion of the Red Ball Route located in Loire Section, was a responsibility of the Highway Control Division. There were six Traffic Control Points on the route established for the purpose of regulating and recording the flow of traffic. They were located at Alencon, Chartres, Courville, Droux, Laigle, and Brioze. Each TCP was operated by one officer and eight enlisted men, on a 24-hour basis. By means of these TCP's the Motor Transport Brigade was kept informed continuously of the location and movement of truck companies under their command. Traffic flow charts on the Red Ball Route were reported daily to the division, from these TCP's and the officers in charge of them made a reconnaissance of all routes and installa-

tions within a ten-mile radius of their location and compiled the information thus gained, for assistance in directing traffic. Information Points were established in Chartres, Le Mans, and in the Le Mans bivouac areas in order to assist movements over roads through Loire Section and to furnish information on routes and locations of installations. The division also initiated the establishment of Medical Aid Posts on the Red Ball Route at Droux, Courville, Nogent-le-Rotrou, and Alencon, and helped draw up plans for the employment of French military forces to assist in traffic control on the Red Ball route from Manors to Juvigny.

In November, the number of personnel in the division was reduced and Captain GEORGE E. GROTZ became Chief. The operation of TCP's at Chartres, Droux, and Alencon was discontinued and on 19 November the TCP at Courville was closed, since the Red Ball operations over this route had ceased. At the close of the month the division was operating only two Traffic Control Points, one at the Le Mans bivouac area and the other at the intersection of the Laval-Alencon roads.

During November, upon recommendation of the division, when movement orders were issued to units, instructions were also issued for the unit concerned to communicate with the Loire Section Transportation Office for "Road Movement Instructions". This procedure provided closer control of highway movements within Loire Section. Resulting from requests made by the division to Normandy Base Section, the route for the majority of eastbound convoys from NBS was changed. The new route provided for a bivouac area, water point, and Ordnance service. A sketch map of the Loire Section showing primary and secondary convoy routes, bridge capacities, bivouac areas, and water and supply points, was prepared and copies were sent to all Base Section Highway Traffic Offices.

Administrative Division:

The Administrative Branch under this division continued to operate as previously established. Normal administrative duties were handled, including the operation of a Courier Service between the Section Transportation Office and the RTO's and TCP's of Loire Section, and operation of the Message Center, the Typing Pool, the file section, and Public Relations, and the handling of personnel records, both military and civilian.

The Supply, Statistics and Reports Branch: The Supply Section under this branch procured and delivered rations to troop and hospital trains passing through Loire Section, assisted various Transportation Corps units in the area in obtaining supplies, and obtained bicycles for RTO's. Various reports and graphs were prepared and submitted by the Statistics and Reports Section of the branch.

SEINE SECTION
(CHAPTER VI)
GENERAL

The Transportation Office, Seine Section (Seine STO), was organized on 27 August 1944, by an Advance Detachment of four officers and ten enlisted men, with Lt. Colonel HERBERT P. EVANS in charge as Transportation Officer. This initial staff was increased on 31 August by the arrival of 4 officers and 54 inlisted men.

When Headquarters, Seine Section, began operations at 2 Place de l'Opera, on 27 August, the various staff sections had to survey the Paris area for sites needed by coming units and installations, to inventory captured German stocks, and to appraise existing facilities and their condition. Available transportation consisted of twenty vehicles, comprising staff cars, jeeps, and cargo trucks. This transportation being inadequate, and furthermore being needed to haul rations and supplies, French civilian cars and trucks were placed in service.

On 3 September 1944, 300 tons of supplies were received in the Paris area; for September, the total tonnage was 13,116 tons. As railway reconstruction progressed, these figures rose to 317,220 tons in October, and reached a peak of 611,030 tons in November. Tonnage decreased to 474,746 tons in December.

Rail passenger traffic was resumed as soon as the repair of facilities permitted. Suburban trains were in operation as early as 4 September 1944. Subsequently, service was resumed west to the Loire Section and Brittany Base Section, south to Marseilles, and east as far as Charleville. During September 37,000 troops were transported; during the period 1 October - 31 December, 591,469 were carried by rail.

On 4 September 1944, the personnel problem of the Seine STO was eased by the arrival in Paris of the 13th Traffic Regulation Group, with 46 officers and 308 enlisted men. Thus, the STO was reorganized and expanded. On 6 September, the Paris area was divided into four Transportation Districts as a first step towards effecting traffic control in the field. A District Transportation Officer was placed in charge of each district, with the mission of placing Railway Traffic Offices and Traffic Control Points at key rail and road locations, and of supervising District Operations.

The opening of the Vincennes Transfer Point on 27 September 1944 marked the appearance of a new type of Transportation Corps installation, improvised to meet a new situation. Railway lines east of Paris were relatively undamaged, while those west of Paris required much repair, especially to bridges. In order to shorten the Red Ball haul and conserve motor transportation, transfer points were set up at Vincennes, La Courneuve, Reuilly and later at Pantin. Most Red Ball convoys from Cherbourg and the beaches were routed to one of these points where the loads were transferred to trains and shipped east to the Armies.

Meanwhile, Seine Section had taken over all the territory intended for it, roughly, the Departments of Seine-et-Oise and Seine-et-Marne, in addition to that of the Seine. Transportation personnel was needed in all parts of the Section. On 4 October 1944, the 11th Traffic Regulation Group arrived for duty in Seine Section; this made possible the manning of new traffic control installations removed from the immediate Paris area. In November, the Red Ball

Route was discontinued and the two transfer points of La Courneuve and Vincennes were closed.

The German counter-offensive in December required increased activity by the Seine STO, and sudden demands were made on certain units. The case of the 3619th QM Truck Company is an example. At 0100 hurs on 18 December 1944, this unit was ordered to report to a point near Reims by 1030 hrs. At 1500 hrs the company left Reims for Bastogne, with men and equipment for the 101st Airborne Division. One officer, 29 enlisted men and 18 vehicles were still with the 101st Airborne in Bastogne at the end of 1944. Others, attached to the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, were forced to destroy their equipment and march back through the German lines.

On 31 December 1944, after four months of operations, the total number of personnel under the administrative or operational control of the Seine STO amounted to 3976, consisting of 226 officers, 2 warrant officers, 3029 enlisted men, and 719 civilian employees. The military personnel strength remained fairly constant until December, when detachments were furnished to Channel Base Section, and to Oise and Advance Sections. The number of skilled civilian employees did not fluctuate, while unskilled labor reached its peak in October when Freight Transfer Points were in full operation. They then decreased sharply; this accounts for the high total of 3333 civilian employees in October, 1025 in November, and a total of 719 at the close of the year. The trend at that time was to replace military personnel by civilians, releasing the former for Transportation Corps duty in forward areas and for Combat duty; a rise in the number of skilled civilians employed was anticipated for 1945.

The TC units under administrative or operational control of the Seine STO at the end of the year was comprised of one Railway Grand Division, one Railway Shop Battalion, one Base Depot Company, eleven Quartermaster Truck Companies, and two Traffic Regulation Groups. These Traffic Regulation Groups furnished the necessary military personnel for the District Transportation Office, 29 Railway Traffic Offices, 8 inland waterways offloading points and one freight transfer point.

SUMMARY OF SEINE SECTION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE ACTIVITES

Organization of Seine STO

The Transportation Office of Seine Section was organized in three Sections, with branches as follows:

1. Motor Transport Section

2. Movements Section:

   a. Freight Branch
   b. Passenger Branch
   c. Highway Branch

3. Operations Section:

   a. Freight Transfer Points
   b. Inland Waterways Branch

Motor Transport Section

The Motor Transport Section of the Seine STO, began operations on the morning of 27 August 1944 with equipment consisting of staff cars, jeeps, and cargo trucks numbering twenty in all. On that morning, Seine Section was still in the planning stage. To accomplish its missions, the Section required the installation of Service units, depots, hospitals, billets, and utilities, the survey of damages, the inventory of scattered captured materiel, and the restoration of power and communications. This called for motor transportation, and for this reason the addition of civilian vehicles was an absolute necessity.

An appeal was made to the French population and civilians immediately offered cars and trucks, some of which were museum pieces, with seven to ten years' service. Many had been kept hidden, some even dismantled, during the German occupation. The vehicles were hired on a per-day basis. On 30 August, four civilian taxis were placed in service. A few days later the first civilian trucks were hired. On 3 September, the 44 taxis in service were still inadequate for the job. Hiring continued up to a total of 645 vehicles by the end of the year. Taxis were used by military personnel going to and from installations, while the trucks hauled rations and supplies to the city. These civilian vehicles formed the nucleus of the motor transportation system in Seine Section, and with the passing of time the better equipment came out of hiding, giving the US Army a wider choice of vehicles, thereby, insuring more dependable transportation as well as more economical performance.

Available taxis were operated by gasoline engines and entirely dependent upon the US Army for gasoline. Trucks were operated by city or bottle gas, wood and charcoal or gasoline. To service and maintain these vehicles a garage was required. Accordingly, on 5 September, the seven-story modern garage at 34 Rue du Chomin-Vert, was opened to these vehicles. It was evident that they would have to be placed under U.S. Army control as the gasoline supply was critical. To prevent pilferage of gasoline and to insure maximum performance of vehicles, a system of control was installed, providing at a glance the performance records of each. The wood and charcoal vehicles could not be speedily converted to use gasoline, and being less reliable than horse and wagon, were never actually put into operation. The trucks operating on city or bottle gas were converted for gasoline operation, excepting the trucks operated for Army Exchange Service.

As airstrips and Hospital trains demanded a form of transportation which could not be profitably or comfortably handled by taxis or trucks, buses were placed in service and, although slow and of questionable dependability, they met the existing needs. Regular scheduled trips were made to the airports in the vicinity of the city and extra bus crews were maintained to insure service for hospital trains during the night.

While civilian facilities were being developed, regular U.S. Army vehicles were employed for the purpose of hauling gasoline to Seine Section, and the transporting of personnel and cargo towards the front. These vehicles were housed at the Royal Garage.

Aside from their own needs as an Intermediate Section, other Com Z units were setting up headquarters in Seine Section, and being without sufficient organic transportation, they appealed to Seine Section for assistance. To meet these demands, taxis, trucks, and buses were furnished by the same STO.

Paris proved a haven for all those seeking transportation of personnel and cargo. Groups and individuals separated from their units and trying to rejoin them, found their way to Paris with no means of transport beyond. The Seine Section Motor Pool was from the start overworked and in no position to keep up with the expansion taking place. The STO then arranged for the assignment of a QM Truck Company to help carry the burden.

On 15 September 1944, the 3619 QM Truck Co was assigned to the Seine STO, and installed at Chemin Vert Garage. This organization was assigned to priority shipments towards the front, with the left-over vehicles being strictly confined to operations in Seine Section. The demands for cargo vehicles increased so that another truck company had to be brought in. Thus, the 3626 QM Truck Company was assigned on 19 September and subsequently was installed at Chemin Vert Garage. However, the tonnage demands placed upon the Motor Transport Section still exceeded the facilities available. During the month of October, Seine Section was rapidly expanding, with the result that motor transport was employed to such an extent that the hiring of civilian trucks, buses, and taxis was continued on a day-to-day basis, and on 4 November , the 3618th QM Truck Company was assigned to Seine Section. In the early part of December two additional truck companies were assigned, the 4009th and 4011th QM Truck Companies, the latter company being used exclusively to move Christmas mail to the front.

All of the QM Truck companies were extremely busy during October, November, and December and two were used almost exclusively for shipments of cargo and personnel towards the front. During the German counter-offensive in mid-December, these truck companies were engaged in moving combat units and material to the threatened areas. In these operations some vehicles were lost as combat casualties and some personnel were wounded in action.

The substantial increase in personnel movements during December is shown in the movement figures for this period. The increase over and above normal expansion was attributed to the rotation plan and the increase in hospital train service. These two factors so increased Seine Section personnel movements as to necessitate curtailment of bus schedules.

The Motor Section supervised the maintenance and records of performance, pay rolls, and register of civilian vehicles in addition to the dispatch of all Army and civilian vehicles. Below is a record of freight and personnel transported by motor during the period 1 October to 31 December 1944:

	Freight Tonnage			Personnel Carried		
	Army Vehicles	Civilian Vehicles	Total	Army Vehicles	Civilian Vehicles	Total
October	18528	11485	30013	3867	60441	64308
November	24552	14710	39262	3552	65766	69318
December	25382	15824	41206	17425	89633	107058

Movements Section:

The Movements Section was organized on 5 September 1944, to control and coordinate the activities of its component branches and those of the

and coordinate the activities of its component branches and those of the Transportation Corps traffic control installations in the field. The Movements Section was comprised of Freight, Passenger, and Highway Branches; the field installations were the Railway Traffic Offices and the Traffic Control Points.

To facilitate control of dispersed field installations, the territory was divided into four districts, the inner bourdaires of which were a straight vertical and a straight horizontal line through 2 Place de l'Opera, Paris, to the outer bourdaries of Seine Section. Later this arrangement was changed to one district.

RTO's were set up at Orly and Le Bourget airfields, and at St. Lazare Station, the latter for handling hospital trains. Later, RTO's were set up at Batignolles Freight Yards, Gare Montparnasse, Etampes, Vaugirard, Rambouillet, Versailles, Gare de L'Est, Gare du Nord, Gare d' Austerlitz, Saint Ouen les Docks, Gare de Pantin, M-407 Medical Depot, Q-177 Depot at Magasins Generaux, Gare de la Villette, Saint-Denis Yards, and Valenton Yards.

Traffic Control Points were set up at Vincennes-Fontenay and La Courneuve for the purpose of transferring freight from Red Ball trucks to rail, for movement to the front. Eighteen other Traffic Control Points were set up on the exterior boulevards of Paris to control and direct traffic in order to prevent drivers from losing their way in Paris, and to keep through-traffic out of the city. Surveys were made to determine the condition of the road system around Paris and military routes were established. From 21 September to 30 September, the Traffic Control Points directed 451 convoys consisting of 6,251 vehicles hauling 33,238 tons of supplies.

Freight Branch

The mission of the Freight Branch was to provide a service for the expeditious movement of U.S. Army supplies into, through, or originating in the Paris area.

As a result of the damage done by Allied bombings and the retreating Germans, the key railroad bridges which formerly enabled rail traffic to by-pass Paris were in such condition that it was necessary for rail traffic pass into Paris Yards before movement to the front could be accomplished and much of this rail traffic arriving in Paris required reclassification before forwarding to the front. The first reclassification yard was established at Gare Batignolles. Fortunately, this was one of the few large Paris yards that escaped with only minor destruction. As the volume of traffic increased, this one yard was soon found to be insufficent and a second classification yard was established at Valenton, a suburb to the south of Paris. This yard was to serve the Third Army and southern Advance Section, while Batignolles was to serve the First Army, Ninth Air Force, and northern Advance Section. These yards soon became beehives of activity for the RTO staffs; OCOT ordered that the Transportation Officer, Seine Section, use these yards for the following purposes; first, to reclassify freight and make up in trainload lots; second, to check and correct documentation; third, to provide train consist; fourth, to accomplish diversions. During this period, numerous carloads were received improperly documented and serious delays and unnecessary expenditure of time was spent in disposing of such traffic.

Another problem that confronted the Seine STO was the handling of traffic

consigned to Paris depots and installations. Trains were arriving merely billed to the RTO, Paris, and it was difficult to furnish disposition in many cases because of a lack of knowledge as to the location of the depots. This situation was occasioned by the fact that the Transportation Corps was not notified at the time depot location were selected. Mutual cooperation would have proved valuable in this instance, inasmuch as the TC had available information, or was informed of necessary sources, on the rail facilities available in the area. However, information on the location of these service depots was ultimately obtained by the Seine Section RTO staff, and there was no serious delay in the movement of freight.

During this preiod, OCOT requested that the Seine STO produce a car number record of every rail car that passed through or that was loaded out of the Paris area to the front. This was accomplished by the RTO's in Matelot, Valenton, Batignolles, and at the depot installations in the Paris area. Each of these points telephoned a complete train consist to Seine Section as soon after the train departure as possible. A copy of each departing train consist was furnished OCOT before 2000 hours each day for the preceding 24-hour period ending at 1800 hours. This information was also telephoned twice daily to the Transportation Officer, Advance Section, to enable the expeditious handling of traffic upon arrival at forward installations.

Another difficulty encountered by the Seine STO during the early stages of operations was with communications, in connection with the advance forwardings from points of origin and intermediate points and in relaying the advice to forward areas. Inadequate communications facilities also made it very difficult to reconsign trainloads and make disposition of cars on hand without documentation in the Paris area.

The latter part of September, the first truck-to-rail transfer points were established. The purpose of these points was to remove from roads and place on rail, all possible tonnage transported by Red Ball vehicles consigned to forward installations. The Freight Branch was directly involved in this operation to the extent that selection of sites, instruction in documentation, and additional record-keeping was necessary. Various railroad yards in the Paris area were surveyed and from them final selections were made.

During the first week of October, the 11th Traffic Regulation Group arrived in Paris and was assigned to the Seine STO. The members of this organization were immediately given various field duties and this section received two officers who were assigned to the Records Section of the Freight Branch. Reports were required by G-4, Com Z, OCOT, and Seine Section and as a result record keeping increased with the establishment of each new installation. These records and statistics showed the movement of freight by road and rail into, through and from Seine Section.

With the Paris transfer points in full use, during the month of October, another operation was established, namely, the daily loading and movement of thousands of tons of POL products by rail. Awaiting the completion of the military pipeline to Paris, gasoline was trucked to the Paris area by road tanker and decanted into jerricans for loading and hauling via rail to the front. This operation required close coordination with 2nd MRS in order to guarantee the return movement of empty jerricans so that the decanting of

gasoline would not be stopped. The return of empty jerricans was often on a "hand to mouth" basis and at several times decanting operations practically ceased because of the lack of cans. The establishment of the military pipeline and the constant short supply of empty jerricans caused the POL operations to change to bulk or tank car shipments. Tank cars, also were available in a limited supply only and constant coordination with 2nd MRS was necessary in order to insure the rapid return and placement of tank cars.

A serious problem that developed during the months of November and December was the inability of several of the Paris depots to handle efficiently their incoming volume of traffic. This situation in most cases resulted from the lack of sufficient storage and unloading space, insufficient depot personnel, and the lack of advice on traffic being forwarded from the beaches. Depots were committed to take much more traffic than they could possibly handle with the result that in several instances complete embargo of several depots was necessary. Depots were pressed to speed up their unloadings, to acquire additional storage and unloading space, and to free the large number of loaded rail cars which were charged to them. In the opinion of the Seine STO, such difficulties could have been kept to a minimum had the proper authorities given due consideration to the facilities and capacities of these newly established depots prior to movement of the freight from the ports. Improper consigning of shipments was to some extent responsible for the congestion. There were many examples of improper consigning of rail shipments that caused an increased burden to all concerned and served to delay and "Pile up" railcars. Thus, it appeared to the Seine STO that in relieving the congestion at the ports the result was a congestion at the interior depots.

Phase III or exclusively French operation of the railways became effective on several rail lines into and out of the Paris area during this period. It was soon found that reliance upon the French Railroad service did not meet with U.S. Army requirements. To protect U.S. traffic it was necessary that the movement of U.S. freight in trainload lots only be assured. This procedure required, insofar, as Paris depot traffic was concerned, a considerable amount of switching within the Paris area. The movement of rail cars within the Paris area was a slow and tedious process as operated by the French; however, it was felt that this delay was justified in assuring delivery to proper consignees. Action was taken with the French railroads to remedy the numerous switching problems which arose. To some extent these remedies showed their value; however, intra-Paris movement was far from satisfactory, at close of the year 1944. The shortage of power was felt daily and the inability of the French to understand U.S. Army needs did not aid in the situation that developed.

With the French operation of rail lines, the RTO's problems became more numerous. RTO's at the various Paris rail junction points assumed more and more responsibility for the proper and quick dispatch of U.S. Army freight. Even after utmost caution was taken, U.S. Army traffic was frequently dispatched on French commercial trains. Dispatches of this nature ultimately caused numerous inquiries and requests for tracing, which was an especially laborious task in that the French records were incomplete and incorrect. It was with this in mind that the Seine STO, with the help of the SNCF, established the six digit military train number which to a great extent proved invaluable in tracing full trainload shipments. This system of train numbering was adopted by the other Base Sections on the Continent.

During this period the so-called "Colis Express" for parcel shipments was established. This service was instigated by the Seine STO after numerous requests from the Services to provide transportation by rail for less than carload shipments up to 40 lbs weight per package. This service utilized the French commercial passenger-merchandise trains and served to provide transport of supplies to points generally not reached by the movement of U.S. Army trains. This service conserved the use of essential motor transportation which would otherwise have been required to accomplish delivery.

The Return Load Plan became more important during this period and many thousands of tons of freight were moved in all directions by utilizing this service. The Freight Branch was responsible for making the decision whether shipments would be forwarded by road or rail. Many empty return truck-miles were prevented by the use of this plan.

The following statistics show monthly tonnages and the number of cars moving through Paris and ex Paris depots to the fronts.

	No. of Tons	No. of Cars
October	317,220	24,971
November	611,030	43,325
December	474,746	34,440

Passenger Branch

The Passenger Branch commenced operations on 27 August 1944 with a limited staff from the London District. On 4 September, the 13th Traffic Regulation Group arrived in Paris and was assigned to Seine Section. As of 3 October, the staff consisted of one officer and seven enlisted personnel. On 30 November, it consisted of three officers and nine enlisted personnel, and one French civilian interpreter. Attached to this branch were British, Canadian, and French Railway Transportation Officers, and a French Liaison Officer. On 31 December 1944, personnel consisted of five officers and twelve enlisted personnel.

In the beginning, most of the traveling was done by individuals and small parties. Except for a few suburban lines, there was no rail service until the latter part of September. Motor and Air Service, up to this time, furnished most of the necessary transportation. On 29 August, the first station to be opened was Gare St. Lazare. Other installations were set up in Austerlitz Station, Gare du Nord, Gare Montparnasse and Le Bourget Airport. On 4 September, several trains started operation from these stations. This service was for civilian commuters but was also used in rare cases, for transporting individuals personnel.

On 17 September 1944, the RTO at Orly was deactivated, due to the fact that Air Transport Command had established itself, and was able to handle all Passenger Traffic at this Airport. On 25 September, the SNCF published the first train schedules that were to be resumed in France; the services available were limited in distance and areas served. One main line train, daily from Austerlitz Station was utilized for personnel traveling on orders, to both Loire Section Headquarters at Le Mans, and Brittany Base Section Headquarters at Rennes. Gare de Lyon started one main line train daily, to Marseilles, with an overnight stop at Lyon. Gare du Nord services started with one daily train to Lille, and Gare de L'Est started with services as far as Charleville. The latter three were not used to any great extent. On 26

September, the Surgeon, Seine Section, requested shipment of discharged personnel from General Hospitals in the Paris area, to the 19th Replacement Depot at Etampes for return to duty. These shipments were accomplished, over a period of five days, by motor transport.

On 30 September 1944, a special Army train was inaugurated for the movement of hospital-discharged patients to Etampes, departing daily at 1200 hours. A special military train, Paris to Cherbourg, commenced operations 9 October. On occasional requests from The Provost Marshal, stragglers that had been picked up in the Paris area, and were to be taken to Etampes, were also transported on this train.

During the month of September, more than 37,000 troops were handled by RTO's in Seine Section. Statistics for the three months ending 31 December 1944 are as follows:

Rail Movements	387,679
Hospital Trains	203,790
Motor Movements other than convoys	2,786
TOTAL	594,255

Through 30 September 1944, the Passenger Branch largely confined its duties and staff work to organization and establishing standing Operational Procedures, and making reconnaissance of rail facilities in Seine Section. During the months of October, November, and December, emphasis was placed on troop movements. In the handling of a vast number of troop trains, over 40,000 rations were furnished by the Passenger Branch. These troops were of many nationalities: French, British, Canadian, Czechs, Poles as well as POW's. Many of the foreign troops were transported to ports overseas shipment.

Metropolitain (French Subway) operations were resumed about 1 October, having been stopped during the liberation of Paris. Pending arrangements for payment of transportation charges, military personnel traveled free until 6 November 1944, when negotiations were consummated. Tickets were available and ready for distribution, 26 October 1944. In the agreement with the Metropolitain Company, 80,000 free tickets were to be given monthly to personnel on leave. Distribution of tickets and passes, through 31 December 1944 was as follows:

Tickets for personnel traveling on leave	240,000
Tickets for personnel traveling on official business	1,152,700
Sixty (60) Day passes	480
TOTAL	1,393,180

Beginning 12 December 1944, special leave trains were laid on for troops going to Paris on leave and going to the United States on rotation leave. The figures up through 31 December 1944 were as follows:

Daily leave trains (in)	8,960
Daily leave trains (out)	8,954
Rotation to U.S. (in)	2,000
Rotation to U.S. (out)	1,491
TOTAL	21,405

Highway Branch

The Highway Branch was established 5 September 1944 to effect road traffic regulation. In starting operations it was obvious immediately that all data would have to be obtained in the face of no established precedent. There were no maps available through normal sources and no Military Police personnel in sufficient numbers to provided traffic control. Units and installations listed were not available and information relative to road and bridge conditions were practically negligible. Steps were promptly taken to obtain single maps of roadnets and copies were reproduced for use by this Branch. Various reconnaissances were made in order to gather all information of a military nature necessary to the operation. The MP's and the Seine Section Engineers were contacted for the necessary action to improve general as well as specific traffic conditions and problems.

A survey was made of the highways in Seine Section to determine road and bridge conditions, and a careful study of the general traffic situation throughout the area was completed. This survey revealed the necessity of immediate action to clear various underpasses around the Paris boulevard exteriors which were then blocked with wrecked cars and German tanks. The necessary action was then taken and the required work was completed 15 September 1944, making possible an even and uninterrupted flow of military traffic around the boulevard exteriors to the various military installations and to the highways leading to the front. As a further result of this traffic study, eighteen traffic control points were established on the boulevard exteriors to control military traffic and to direct such traffic, originating at the beaches and westward areas, around the boulevard exteriors and to the principal highways designated to handle the flow to and from the forward supply areas. This work was properly that of MP personnel, but was undertaken by the Seine STO, pending the arrival of sufficient MP's to assume these duties. This change was completed partially on or about 18 September, and the last four TCP's were withdrawn on about 26 September 1944.

Surveys and various reports were completed in connection with the projected Red Ball Route Traffic Control Point at Trappes and the Rail Transfer Points at Fontainebleau, Vincennes-Fontenay, Aubervilliers-Le Courneuve and Reuilly Freight Yards. Upon establishment of these installations, the Seine STO assigned specific routes to and from such installations and the TC points at Trappes on the Red Ball Route. Signs were then ordered and placed along such routes providing directions for convoys diverted to the rail-truck transfer points. In connection with these same operations, approximately 5000 copies of the specific routes to be used were prepared and provided the TC Point for distribution to convoys diverted from the Red Ball Route to the Transfer Points.

In the meantime, the necessary organizational procedure was being set up and placed in effect to provide road clearances to convoys originating in Seine Section, and although, communications were extremely limited, to coordinate moves as closely as possible with other Sections and Base Sections; also to provide control of and to direct convoys coming into and moving through Seine Section when originating elsewhere. Two hundred fifty overlays of military routes and installations were prepared and distributed to DTO's and RTO's to aid in their operations and for guidance to units in transit. At the same time, the Highway Branch had 1000 maps of Paris and roadnets, reproduced and distributed to the various installations and units as needed.

During the latter part of September, a road and route information booth was established and maintained in the rotunda of Seine Section Headquarters. As the need for such information became apparent, reconnaissances to obtain data relative to conditions and progress of repair on roads and bridges were carried out as a continuous function of the Seine STO.

During October, there was considerable activity in the activation and inactivation of various freight transfer points and specific military and supply routes. These changes were as follows:

Rouilly	Fr. Tr. Pt.	Inactivated	16 Oct. 1944
Pantin	Fr. Tr. Pt.	Activated	11 Oct. 1944
La Courneuve	Fr. Tr. Pt.	Inactivated	8 Nov. 1944
Vincennes-Fontenay	Fr. Tr. Pt.	Inactivated	18 Nov. 1944
White Ball Highway	- -	Established	10 Oct. 1944
Red Ball Highway	- -	Discontinued	13 Nov. 1944
Paris By-Passes	- -	Established	15 Nov. 1944
TCP - Trappes	- -	Inactivated	8 Dec. 1944
E-S-E- Route	- -	Established	15 Dec. 1944

In connection with these changes, numerous reconnaissances were necessary, in order to establish the desired routes to and from the main supply routes and Seine Section installations. Signs to inactivated installations and along discontinued routes were removed and new and additional signs were posted to direct convoys along the newly assigned routes. Overlays, maps, and written information concerning these routes were prepared and submitted to all interested Base Sections in order that convoys would receive full route and directional information at points of origin.

Effective 15 October 1944, a Return Load Plan was placed in effect in order to insure maximum use of all vehicles operating into and within Seine Section. RTO's, QM Truck Co's, and Seine Section installations, were alerted as to the need of greater use of vehicles which up to that time had an appalling record of empty truck-miles on the return portion of supply movements. Cooperation of all concerned resulted in the use of 1296 vehicles in 2½ months transporting a total of 3365 tons to points en-route to the vehicles' return destination. In addition to those vehicles used for supply moves, a considerably greater number made use of their return miles by transporting military personnel desirous of reaching stations which were either en-route or at the vehicles' various destinations. All arrangements were handled by and through the Return Load Section, Highway Branch.

As a result of numerous conferences with Seine Section Engineers, and after many road reconnaissances, a complete up-to-date Military Road Network for Seine Section was adopted for military traffic. The responsibility for maintenance of such routes, particularly during the winter months, was accepted by the Seine Section Engineers. Complete road network maps were prepared and submitted to OCOT and all Base Sections, for use in conjunction with movement of all military traffic by road through Seine Section.

Specific activities within the Highway Branch:

(1) The White Ball Route, insofar as the portion running from Rouen to St. Denis was concerned, ran along N14 through Pontoise within Seine Section. Vehicles traveling the route suddenly encountered extreme difficulties in the

city of Pontoise, due to a destroyed railroad bridge on the Northwest outskirts of the city and a narrow twisting, two-way route through the center of town. A by-pass was established around the destroyed bridge and a sharp turn widened by removal of a small house at the corner of the turn. A reconnaissance of the town revealed the presence of an additional route, closed however, by a local firm employed in the process of removing debris. A conference was held with the Mayor of Pontoise and Seine Section Engineers. An agreement was reached wherin the route would be reopened upon completion of a limited amount of work by U.S. Army Engineers. This work was accomplished and separated one-way routes through the town were in operation at the end of the year, completely eliminating the original cause for congestion. Ample traffic control was provided at intersections leading to the separate routes.

(2) The Highway Branch was requested to submit a report of the most desirable sites available for use in connection with the following two plans:

a. Messing Plan for Road Movement Personnel.
b. Proposed Plan for vehicle washing facilities for use by convoys moving through Seine Section.

Statistics and data concerning convoys and personnel movements were compiled to determine the most heavily traveled routes and areas within Seine Section. Reconnaissance of the areas surrounding Paris, through which the bulk of the convoys and troop personnel moved, was immediately made and various sites were chosen. Complete reports and recommendations in connection with both plans were promptly submitted for further consideration and possible action.

(3) Due to the German counter-offensive in December, and the changes in the tactical situation, the Seine STO, upon receipt of instructions from G-2 and the Office of the Chief of Transportation, contacted a number of convoys in the field en-route to previously assigned stations and diverted same to altered destinations. Also, at the front a number of units were contacted in order that corrected routing instructions could be provided so as to re-route convoys around and away from areas designated as closed to road movement.

(4) In connection with the same situation, special attention was provided for the forced march of the 11th Armored Division which was completely moved through Seine Section in three days. Close contact was constantly maintained with the many serials involved, in connection with bivouac requirements and numerous telephone advices were forwarded to interested Base Sections as to timings, POL, and ration requirements. French as well as U.S. Army MP personnel were arranged for in order to provide traffic control and to expedite the move.

(5) The Inquiry Section, Seine STO, continued its compilation of up-to-date information on highways; locations of units and installations, assigned routes, and bivouac and POL facilities along routes, for the purpose of furnishing such information to authorized military personnel. Approximately 2500 copies of the France roadnet, and Paris route maps were obtained and distributed through the Inquiry Section.

(6) In addition to the above, this branch handled the clearance of, the following convoys:

a. Originating in Seine Section and destined to areas outside Seine Section:

Convoys	Vehicles	Personnel
182	6710	25000

b. Originating in other Base Sections and destined to points within Seine Section:

Convoys	Vehicles	Personnel
100	4485	18165

c. Originating in other Base Sections and routed through Seine Section to destination:

Convoys	Vehicles	Personnel
355	29000	131000

Operations Section

The Operations Section was organized in October to relieve the Movements Section of any transportation activities which did not concern the usual traffic control of rail and road movements. These activities which were placed under the control of the Operations Section were the Freight Transfer Points and later the Inland Waterways Branch.

Freight Transfer Points

On 27 September 1944, the first of a series of freight transfer points was established to unload freight from the Red Ball Route in Paris and to load it into rail wagons for shipment towards the front. The first point was established at Gare des Marchandises, Vincennes Fontenay-sous-Bois, and was known as the Vincennes-Fontenay Freight Transfer Point. On 29 September, another transfer point was established, known as Le Courneuve Freight Transfer Point, near Aubervilliers, in the northern suburbs of Paris, A third transfer point was set up at Reuilly, in southeast Paris, on 2 October, but was discontinued on 16 October, as the other installations then operating were deemed sufficient and more suitable. Finally, a fourth was established at Pantin on 11 October 1944. The transfer points at La Courneuve and Vincennes were discontinued on 8 November and 18 November, respectively, when POL operations were transferred to the Linas Autodrome, and shipment by rail could be affected at nearby St Michel. The remaining truck-to-rail transfers could well be handled at Pantin.

Each of these freight transfer points was easily accessible to routes followed by the Red Ball convoys. There were also adequate dock facilities for the simultaneous unloading of approximately 150 trucks at each freight transfer point. In addition, the same number of loaded trucks could be readily marshalled inside the property with sufficient space for the marshalling of unloaded trucks either inside or nearby at both points.

The operational functions of these freight transfer points involved the following:

(1) Receiving Red Ball convoys and arranging trucks for the proper discharging of freight from trucks to freight cars.

(2) Receiving and checking documentation of convoys in an effort to discern the destination, type of freight, and number and type of freight cars required.

(3) Checking and tallying the supplies and equipment from the trucks to the freight cars.

(4) Originating proper documentation of trains and the maintenance of records on all convoys, freight cars, and trains.

(5) Supervision of French civilians, foremen, and interpreters of whom approximately 2000 were employed at both installations.

(6) Securing adequate rolling stock, switching and placing of empty cars; also, making up loaded trains for movement to final destination.

(7) Preparing and maintaining the necessary reports and documents for further reference.

In assembling the trains it was necessary that they be made up in blocks of cars, each block to contain a like type of supplies so that they could be adequately expedited after arriving at final destination.

The operation of these freight transfer points was under the jurisdiction of the Seine STO and was coordinated by the Chief of Operations.

During the period 3 October to 31 December 1944, a total of 251,021 tons of supplies were transferred from trucks and shipped by rail to the front.

Inland Waterways Branch

On 15 November 1944, the Inland Waterways Branch was established under the Operations Division of the Seine STO. Surveys of all offloading points in the Paris area were made, and the most convenient locations for the various depots were designated. Officers and enlisted personnel were assigned to these points, and liaison was established between the depots, the offloading installations, the French, and the Headquarters of Inland Waterways Branch.

Until 20 December 1944, activity in Inland Waterways Branch was practically at a standstill due to the abnormal height of the water level of the River Seine. Five barges containing newsprint, rations, and potatoes (total tonnage 745 tons) were offloaded during this period at Les Mureaux (approximately 25 miles outside of Paris), and trucked into the Paris area. The newsprint was needed for the publication of Yank Magazine, and the potatoes had to be offloaded to prevent spoilage.

By 20 December 1944, the water level had lowered sufficiently so that normal river traffic could be resumed, and on 27 December the first barges were berthed in the Paris area for offloading. These were the barges "Ancre" with 91 tons of Medical supplies for M-407 and "Manche" with 262 tons of maps for Enginner Depot 15. The number of barges berthed in the Paris area increased to 12 and, including barges offloaded at Les Mureaux, the total number of barges and tonnage offloaded for December 1944 was as follows:

No. of Barges	Tonnage	Commodity	Destination
5	745	QM, Newsprint	Les Mureaux
2	410	Diesel Oil	Q-343
4	1292	POL, Mt 100	Q-343
1	91	Med. Supplies	Pantin
2	603	Engrs Maps	Austerlitz
3	743	QM, P Ex, Newsprint	Aubervilliers
TOTAL 17	3584		

OISE SECTION

(Chapter VI)

Activation of Oise Section

As an Intermediate Section of Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Oise Section was established as of 0001 hours, 15 September 1944, with the mission of operating and maintaing Lines of Communication and Communications Zone installations in the area east of the Seine Section and in rear of Advance Section, and of taking over territory and installations from Advance Section, as the latter moved forward behind the Armies. Brigadier General CHARLES O. THRASHER was appointed Commanding General of Oise Section. The approximate boundaries of Oise Section as of 25 October are shown in Chart 1, Chapter I.

An account of the activities of the Transportation Corps in Oise Section, under the Section Transportation Office, follows in two sections: Section I covers the period 15 September through 30 November 1944, and Section II covers the period 1 December through 31 December 1944.

Section I

(15 September through 30 November 1944)

Organization and Duties of Section Transportation Office

Upon activation of Oise Section (OS), on 15 September 1944, the Section Transportation Office (STO), representing the Transportation Corps (TC), was established as a staff section of the Oise Section Headquarters with Lt. Colonel RICHARD W. BARKER as chief. Office space was obtained at No. 3, No. 3 Bis, and No. 5, Cours Anatole France, City of Reims; the buildings were vacated by the French Forces of the Interior.

The personnel which formed the nucleus for the STO operating staff was obtained from officers and enlisted men who had previously been assigned to Southern Base Section in the United Kingdom. This initial group was comprised of 12 officers, 12 enlisted men and 7 enlisted women. One officer was also obtained from Brittany Base Section. The balance of the personnel was obtained from the 14th Traffic Regulation Group, consisting of 46 officers and 328 enlisted men; they were assigned to Oise Section on 16 September 1944, shortly after their arrival on the Continent from the United States.

Organization

The Section Transportation Officer was responsible to the Oise Section Commanding General, and to the Chief of Transportation, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, for the technical control, regulation, and operation of all movements by rail, road, or inland waterways within Oise Section. To accomplish these missions, the Transportation Corps troops assigned to Oise Section included, in addition to the Traffic Regulation Groups and

Group Regulating Stations, certain Railway Operating Battalions, Grand Divisions, and QM Truck Battalions and Companies.

A functional chart indicating the organization of the Oise Section STO is shown on the opposite page, Chart No. 1. It will be noted that in order to perform its various duties, the staff section consisted of Administration and Planning & Control Divisions; operational divisions for Motor Transport, Inland Waterways, Road Movements, and Rail Movements. Two additional divisions were required for liaison with units assigned for operational purposes to Second Military Railways, Communications Zone, and the French authorities. All divisions worked directly with the field, the regulation and control of traffic being accomplished primarily through Road Traffic Officers and Railway Traffic Officers, commonly known as RTO's.

Coordination was of highest importance within this organizational arrangement and within Oise Section Headquarters. This was especially true in connection with the Service Sections of the Oise Section Headquarters, organized under G-4. Both at the beginning and end of every move, whether freight or passenger, contact had to be made by the Section Transportation Office with field organizations or units of the supply Services. Any failure to obtain the maximum of cooperation reduced the usage of transportation facilities accordingly.

Administration Division

The Administration Division performed the functions of S-1, S-2, and S-3 for the STO as outlined in Field Manual 101-5 and, in addition was responsible for all other matters not directly pertaining to operations. The branches of the Administration Division included: Miscellaneous, Files, Supply, Reproduction, Message Center, Reports and Statistics, Security and Training. The Miscellaneous Branch was charged with the processing of all correspondence for the Section Transportation Office and for all other functions not specifically included in the other branches. Since all messages passed through the Administration Division, it followed that a knowledge of the operations of each division was current in that office, and a measure of coordination among divisions was effected.

As of 30 November 1944, the Administration Division consisted of a Chief, 1st Lt. A. S. ROBERTS, 10 enlisted women, and 5 French civilians, of whom the latter were a permanent janitor detail for firing and cleaning.

Planning and Control Division

The Planning and Control Division was established on 4 November 1944. This division conducted surveys of field installations and recommended adjustments in policies, organization, procedures and methods in situations requiring corrective action, and followed up the execution of approved recommendations.

Motor Transport Division

The Motor Transport Division arrived on 18 September 1944, and consisted of one officer as Chief, Capt. R. S. McLELLAN, TC, one enlisted man, and one enlisted woman. This division and its liaison were responsible for the technical

FUNCTIONAL CHART - SECTION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

Prepared by:
Adm Div
8 Oct 44
A.S.R.



Chart No. 1

Chapter VI

and staff control of military and civilian transportation. After orientation, the Motor Transport Division assumed control from Advance Section and immediately thereafter it became evident that the office should act not only for staff control but also as an operations center. Consequently, the staff was increased to three officers and five enlisted personnel. As of 30 November 1944, one Quartermaster Battalion and ten truck companies were under its jurisdiction for staff and technical control.

Inland Waterways Division

The Inland Waterways Division, upon arrival in Reims 18 September 1944, was set up as a Division of the Section Transportation Office with an officer in charge, Major FRANK J. DOMBEK, TC, and one enlisted man as a clerk. The mission of the division was to assist the French in the rehabilitation of the canal system, to expedite the movement of military freight, and to foster the movement of French requirements via canal in order to reduce the demands on rail and truck facilities.

Road Movements Division

The Road Movements Division was charged with the responsibility for the planning and regulating of the Road Traffic Circulation Net in Oise Section area, on the basis of the Army's requirements. The staff consisted of two officers, eight enlisted men, and one enlisted woman; the Chief of the Division was 1st Lt. LEON KATER, TC.

The Operations Branch of the Road Movements Division was the Road Traffic Headquarters. Its responsibilities included the regulating of convoy traffic in the Oise Section area, and the dissemination of information to all Services concerned, for the purpose of arranging Traffic Control, Class I and III supplies, and bivouac sites.

Rail Movements Division

The Rail Movements Division was responsible to the STO for control and regulation of all traffic by rail within Oise Section. Its mission was accomplished in the field by RTO's. Actual operation of the railroads was the responsibility of Railway Operating Battalions and Railway Grand Divisions which were assigned to the Second Military Railway Service, Communications Zone. Close coordination with RTO's was essential for the regulation of traffic. As the railway units moved forward in support of the Armies, operations were turned over to the French Military Railways, Societe Nationale de Chemin de Fer Francaise (SNCF), as rapidly as possible. This Division was divided into two branches, namely, Rail Freight Branch and Rail Passenger Branch; their duties were as indicated by their names. As of 30 November 1944, the strength of the Division was 7 officers, 12 enlisted men, and one enlisted woman, with Major NORMAN S. SCHROEDER as Chief.

Military Railway Division

The Military Railway Division was included on the STO organization chart with the purpose in mind that a liaison branch would be required with Second Military Railway Service and Railway Operating units; however, the rapidity

with which the Railway units relinquished territory and turned operations over to the French made its establishment unnecessary.

SNCF

French Liaison officers, Lt. Colonel MAURICE POMMERET, Captain CHARLES WALLUT, and a civilian secretary were the medium through which authoritative decisions were accomplished and carried out with the SNCF. Primary contact with SNCF was made by RTO's and staff officers of the Section Transportation Office at the railway stations, but authority and enforcement of U.S. Army demands was effected through the French Liaison staff which was granted adequate authority in this respect.

14th Traffic Regulation Group (TC)

Background

The 14th Traffic Regulation Group was activated in the United States on 15 March 1944, and upon completion of its Basic Training, was alerted for overseas movement. The Group arrived in the United Kingdom on 22 August 1944 with a total strength of 46 officers and 328 enlisted men and after a short marshalling period, moved forward for the fulfillment of its mission on the Continent, arriving in France 31 August 1944. It was assigned to Oise Section upon activation of the latter.

Special Training Conducted in Oise Section

While a large percentage of the personnel had transportation experience from civilian life, particularly among the enlisted men, none had ever operated in field installations of Transportation Sections in a Theater of Operations. At the time of their assignment to Oise Section, as a result of their inexperience in RTO operations, an unfavorable impression was created upon the Oise Section Transportation Corps personnel, which had already been assigned to the STO from Southern Base Section in the United Kingdom and from the Office of the Chief of Transportation. Consequently, a school was organized under the direction of Lt. Colonel RICHARD W. BARKER and Major R. KIMBALL, the Deputy Section Transportation Officer, which was attended by all of the unassigned personnel of the 14th Traffic Regulation Group as well as by the officers and enlisted men who had already been assigned to installations still under the control of Advance Section. The members in attendance were given the benefit of the valuable experience gained by various staff officers who had actually operated in Transportation Sections in the United Kingdom.

The school, comprising a course of instruction concerning the duties of RTO's and their relationship to the functioning of the Section Transportation Office, was conducted for a period of three days from 21 October through 23 October 1944. The course of instruction covered the general duties of a Railway or Road Traffic Officer; the characteristics of an RTO; the requirements and duties of an RTO; the office duties of an RTO; the necessary duties of an RTO in connection with Troop Movements, including activities prior to entrainment, and supervision and assistance during entrainment and detrainment; the activities and documentation necessary in Supply Movements; the duties required of an RTO in arranging a Road Movement and the proper utilization of Motor Transport.

Following this course of instruction, and after an initial period of orientation in actual operation at RTO installations, a marked improvement was demonstrated in the capabilities of the 14th Traffic Regulation Group personnel. As control of the various installations of the Advance Section was assumed by the 14th Traffic Regulation Group personnel, the operations at these RTO's were ably continued in an excellent manner and new installations which were established were well staffed and produced creditable results.

Field Assignments

Between 22 and 24 September 1944, shortly after the Oise Section Transportation Office was activated, sections were organized for RTO installations and were sent to Laon, Reims, Soissons, Villers-Cotterets, Epernay, Sommesous, and St. Quentin, France, where similar installations of Advance Section were already in operation. Sections were also organized for Traffic Control Points for the control of Road Movements and sent to Chateau-Thierry, Soissons, Sommesous, and Rozay, where Advance Section installations were also ready in operation. The personnel for these sections was drawn from the 14th Traffic Regulation Group and were sent to these points to work in conjuction with the Advance Section installations for the purpose of orienting themselves in the procedure of operating an RTO installation and gradually taking over the work so that they would be in position to take complete charge of these installations when Oise Section assumed control of the territory which was at that time still under the jurisdiction of Advance Section.

On 22 October 1944, Detachment "A", 14th Traffic Regulation Group was activated with a strength of 23 officers and 162 enlisted men and assigned to Oise Section but attached to Advance Section, Communications Zone, ETO on temporary duty at RTO installations. On 22 November 1944, Detachment "A" was reduced by 4 officers and 19 enlisted men.

Effective 27 October 1944, 14th Traffic Regulation Group was reorganized under T/O & E 55-500T, 3 July 1944, with an authorized strength of 75 officers and 308 enlisted men. At that date, the unit had an overstrength of 24 enlisted men who were subsequently reported surplus and transferred to the Replacement System for reassignment. As of 30 November 1944, the officer strength had been increased to a total of 57.

RTO Installations

Development

To establish traffic control and regulation, RTO's (Railway and Road Traffic Offices) were maintained at strategic locations throughout the Oise Section area. RTO installations were the ears, eyes, and hands of the Section Transportation Office, and through them intelligence from the field was transmitted to the STO and subsequently the necessary operations at each point were accomplished.

Although Advance Section was still in control of Oise Section territory at the time that the Oise Section STO was organized, personnel was sent to the

various existing Advance Section RTO installations and Traffic Control Points to augment their personnel and work with them. Since the men thus assigned had no previous experience in RTO operations, such assignments gave them an excellent opportunity for orientation and training.

On 18 September 1944 the following sections were assigned on Temporary Duty with Advance Section installations:

Laon	1 Officer	6 Enlisted Men
Soissons	1 Officer	6 Enlisted Men
Sommesous	1 Officer	6 Enlisted Men
Reims	1 Officer	10 Enlisted Men

From this beginning, RTO's were established until, as of 30 November 1944, a total of sixteen were in operation at locations and of strength as shown in the table below:

Town	Officers	EM	Town	Officers	EM
Cambrai	0	7	Sezanne	1	5
Chalons	1	8	Soissons	5	28
Chateau Thierry	1	6	Sommesous	1	10
Compeigne	2	12	St. Quentin	1	8
Epernay	1	6	Tergnier	1	10
Laon	0	8	Troyes	1	5
Montdidier	0	1	Valenciennes	2	7
Reims	2	19	Wassigny	0	4

RTO Statements

From a few of the reports and correspondence from RTO's in Oise Section during this period, the following quotations are made:

RTO SEZANNE, FRANCE - Capt. ERNEST M. CHRISTL, TC:

"The Rail Transportation Office, Sezanne, France, was opened at the RR Station, 1200 hours, 9 October 1944 by three officers and fifteen enlisted men. This RTO was the first to be established, which was completely a Oise Section operation. Its first mission was to provide a WRL (Water, Rest, Latrine) stop for troop movements and during the period from 9 October to 30 November 1944, an estimated 27,000 troops passed through this station. Approximately 18,000 of these troops were provided with drinking water, hot water for coffee and shaving, and latrine facilities.

"On 26 October 1944, the personnel of this station was reduced to one officer and five enlisted men and also a new territory assignment was received. The new territory was surveyed as quickly as possible and on 28 October 1944 a dump of 22,000 empty jerry gas cans was discovered. These were ultimately put back into circulation. The Rest Stop was improved on 14 November 1944, adding box type latrines and electric lighting facilities.

"During one month, from 24 October to 24 November 1944, 540 American Freight trains passed through this station."

RTO CAMBRAI, FRANCE - T/Sgt. Harold C. Spickerman.

"The railroad station at Cambrai was almost completely destroyed by Allied bombing attacks. The RTO office at Cambrai had no ceiling and only three walls for an office which had to be set up. Through French cooperation, an office was set up and in operation by 30 October 1944.

"The railroad yards at Cambrai were also almost completely demolished, including three large roundhouses where locomotives were repaired. Now about nine tenths of all sidings have been put into service and all facilities for maintaining their locomotives have been put back into service by the French."

RTO SOISSONS, FRANCE - 1st Lt. GLEN G. MEARS, TC:

"Since taking over RTO duties in the Soissons District, several interesting events have taken place and certain war damage noted. The noted conditions and events are hereby handed on for those concerned.

"The condition of the Soissons railhead and terminal facilities were found to be good, but with a few exceptions. Noted exceptions were the destruction, by the Germans, of the Manual Control Interlocking System, several yard tracks, and the partial destruction of a French locomotive which had been dumped into a bomb crater in the vicinity of the roundhouse. This was in addition to some railroad depot damage.

"Acts of sabotage were experienced in the communities of Margival and Anizy-Pinion, sub RTO depots of this unit, and important railheads which have been servicing quite a large ammunition dump. These acts consisted of the scattering of nails on the main vehicle roads, resulting in numerous punctures to ammunition truck tires which caused a loss of man and truck-hours and throwing additional repair burdens on truck repair companies, tying up rail cars and causing general delay.

"Other acts were the destruction of several buildings by fire, and the severing of lines of communication in these localities.

"An elaborate system of underground caves between Soissons and Margival was discovered and contained considerable quantities of German ammunition. Caves were well concreted and camouflaged.

"It has been this unit's observation that, to a great extent, the French civilians in this section are fairly friendly; however, in some cases, belligerent attitudes have been noticed, no doubt due to the preliminary Allied air attacks which were necessary in order to dislodge the enemy.

"This detail is well aware of possible acts of sabotage and has protected itself by established security measures."

RTO WASSIGNY, France - S/Sgt. William H. Foss.

"Joy and Freedom returned to the little village of Wassigny, France on 2 September 1944 when the inhabitants were liberated at 1800 hours with the capture of 600 Germans in the nearby woods. Used as an ammunition dump, whic

was blown up with the arrival of the American forces, Wassigny was again placed on the strategical war map with the installation of an American ammunition dump.

"Wassigny is a comparatively small railhead with an efficient operating capacity of 225 cars, supplying 5 airstrips and frequent demands of others. One team track plus an unused portion of a civilian team track provide trackage for approximately 50 wagons for discharge. From the start of the present RTO management on 26 October until 6 November 1944, a 12-day period, 102 cars arrived for unloading; in the next 12-day period, 493 cars were received. During the same periods, 82 cars were unloaded as compared with 299 cars, in addition to some 210 trucks in convoys. Yards at Etruex and Minnervret were utilized both for storage and unloading.

"The FFI having demonstrated their efficiency by sabotaging the water tower for the Germans, left us with the problem of obtaining water for our switch engine, as we were losing 3 to 5 hours a day on account of the machine having to travel to Bussigny for water. Excellent cooperation was obtained from the MRS which furnished us with a gas engine and 24-hour operation, until permanent repairs could be made.

"In addition to the usual RTO duties, we have participated in the recapture of 2 German POW's, offered RTO cooperation to 4 members of the 8th Air Command who bailed out to safety when their bomber crashed in Wassigny, and discovered a German spy next door to the Le Gare with an ingenious 2-way radio, with which he had been accustomed to making nightly reports to Germany on the number of cars in the railhead."

RTO COMPIEGNE, FRANCE - Maj. WM. B. SHARP, JR., TC:

"This office is submitting report requested by Capt. KLUNDER on 30 November 1944, covering hospital trains, rations issued to troop trains short of rations, troops serviced at troop canteen, and troops detrained at this station:

"'There was a total of 44 northbound and 44 southbound hospital trains passing through this station during the period 19 November through 30 November 1944 inclusive.

"' A Total of 18,711 troop trains have been serviced at the Canteen since 18 November 1944, plus approximately 4,800 from convoys and causals coming through Compiegne.

"' There has been a total of 2,781 rations issued to troop trains passing this station short of rations, 19 November through 30 November 1944. The two trains which were furnished rations were Mains 1272-B and 1332-N. Main 1272-B was furnished 133 rations, and Main 1332-N was furnished 2,646 rations.

"' During the period 19 through 30 November 1944, we received a total of 2,438 troops for the 10th Replacement Depot at this station.

"'A grand total of 102,571 troops have been serviced from 26 October through 30 November 1944. The above figure indicates that there was an average of 2,849 troops serviced daily.'"

RTO TROYES, FRANCE - CAPT WALLACE D. WRIGHT; TC:

"This RTO opened up in Troyes, 28 October 1944. At that time 15 railroad bridges in the territory were damaged, of which, at the present time, 2 have been repaired, including opening of main line from Troyes east to Chaumont. It is anticipated that all important bridges will be repaired by the first of the year. During this time, construction of temporary highway bridges by U.S. Engineers and French have been generally completed, opening up all main routes.

"At the time the office was opened, French railroads were operating 2 scheduled passenger trains each way at Troyes per week. Now there are 12 each way per week, and when the main line to Paris is opened, it is anticipated that traffic will greatly increase.

"RTO has located and arranged to ship to proper depots, 200 cars containing captured German equipment, and has arranged to put into military service approximately 25 empty tank cars and 5 refrigerator cars.

"This office has handled 5 Main trains destined for Troyes area and has assisted in several highway convoy clearances.

"This office has located and reported to G-4, Oise Section, through channels, the existence of 2 German Ammunition Dumps containing thousands of tons of ammunition and 1 French Engineer Dump (used by the Germans), containing considerable Engineering material.

"Although no large depots are in this territory, office has been of material assistance in supplying information and furnishing use of our better telephone communications."

RTO LAON, FRANCE - T/Sgt. Chester M. Frazier.

"This office was taken over by the 14th Traffic Regulation Group on 18 October 1944. At that time there were only 2 tracks in partial operation and the yard tracks were all completely destroyed by allied bombing. The railroad at that time was operated by the 740th Railway Operating Battalion of the MRS. They turned the railroad back to French operation about 10 days after we took over. At that time trains were mostly operated from Cherbourg or Paris arriving here from Soissons.

"At the present time we have seven tracks in operation, plus two team tracks and about fifteen storage tracks. We now are receiving trains daily from Paris via Soissons, Paris via Reims, and also from Le Havre and Beauvais via Tergnier. The Paris trains are routed from here via either Tergnier or Hirson for Liege and points North-East and the trains from Beauvais and Le Havre via Reims to Verdun.

"Limited passenger service is available once daily by combination freight and passenger trains for civilians to Soissons, Hirson, Tergnier, Chappelle, and St. Quentin. These trains make one round trip daily. We also have two diesel trains which make one round trip daily from Paris to St. Quentin and Lille, respectively. These trains are run solely for Military personnel or civilians with special authorization given them by the French prefect.

"At the present time, equipment such as freight and passenger cars, and locomotives are very limited. Trains are still delayed in transit from one to seven or eight hours due to this shortage.

"Work is progressing slowly on the rehabilitation of the yard tracks and equipment now in use here at Laon. It is expected that within the near future, facilities here will be greatly improved."

RTO CHALONS, FRANCE - 2d LT. JOSEPH H. MCDUFF

"The Chalons RTO consisting of two officers and nine enlisted men was organized on 4 October 1944, under the command of Major A. H. WEINENBERG with Lt. JOSEPH H. MCDUFF as his assistant. Upon arrival in Chalon, a billet was established at 14 Allee Paul Doumier, and the offices occupied by the existing RTO were taken over by the new organization. After a period of approximately five days in which much valuable information was obtained by working in conjunction with the then existing RTO, the present group officially assumed control on 9 October and immediately began work to improve both office and operational procedure, on 23 October, Major WEINENBERG was transferred to another assignment and Lt. MCDUFF assumed command of the unit.

"At the present time the RTO offices are located on the station platform having been moved from the street side of the station where the previous RTO was located. This was a great improvement as our field of vision commands a view of the depots in the railroad yards and enables us to keep closer supervision, also all trains pass or either stop in close proximity to our office where anyone desiring our services can readily and easily gain access to it. The office is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, with personnel on duty at all times to cope with any problems that may arise at night.

"Upon arrival we found no RTO highway signs in use but through the cooperation of the railroad sign paint department, signs were immediately made and posted on all highways leading into the city. After great effort, luminous paint was procured and will be applied on all signs in the near future to aid visibility after nightfall.

"Since the very beginning of its existence, this office has worked in close harmony with the French, ad as a result, a strong mutual friendship and understanding exists. We have yet to present the French with a problem pertaining to operational procedure and not reach a satisfactory solution within a short period of time. We are proud of the fact that the same holds true in any problem that they have presented to us. A good example of this cooperative spirit may be found in the manner in which the railroad handled the switching problems created by the establishment of a Class I and Class III depot here. This office found that the railroad required too much time for the spotting and switching of cars; and as a result, the work of the depots was impeded. After a conference with the Chef De Gare, this RTO was assigned a switch engine to be used solely for work in connection with the two depots. As a result of this fine cooperation, we are able to efficiently handle the switching requirements of these depots.

"In addition to the regular duties of an RTO, and due to the large number of hospital trains passing thru our station with casualties from the front,

this particular organization, thru the cooperation of Special Service, and Stars and Stripes, has established the practice of accumulating reading matter to be given to the Train Commanders for distribution to their patients. A supply of the latest issues of Yank magazines, daily Stars and Stripes, and pocket sized overseas books are kept on hand at all times for distribution.

"The volume of traffic has increased from three trains per day at the time this section was organized to twenty four trains at the present time, with prospects of greatly increased traffic in the near future."

RTO SOMMESOUS, FRANCE - 2d LT. ROBERT N. LAVERTY.

"Daily incidents call upon the Railway Traffic Officer's initiative to meet new situations. He has received training in the technical operation of his unit but he must rely upon himself to perform the multifarious chores not peculiar to his assignment. Perhaps the RTO is judged more on his ability or inability to handle unusual occurrences than on the routine business which absorbs most of his time. Typical of the kind of thing for which he holds himself in readiness to help with are the following:

"A unit of 1400 men reported to pass through Sommesous needed additional rations due to delays enroute. On a few hours notice a mess was organized in conjunction with the Railway Operating Battalion on the spot and when the troops arrived hot coffee and sandwiches were issued. An additional difficulty arose when it was found that there were 2000 men on the train instead of the 1400 announced. Different breakdown of the rations had to be made and was managed to the satisfaction of the personnel. The train was held up for a total of 90 minutes to arrange for the messing of 2000 men.

"One morning at about 3 o'clock a train wreck occurred about 4 miles west of the railroad station. Within half an hour after the accident the RTO procured an ambulance. It was found that the engine of a troop train with more than fifty cars had plowed into a POL train, smashing to bits the caboose occupied by train guards and the French conductor. They were killed in the crash. The wreckage was removed from the mainline within 8 hours by the Railway Operating Battalion and traffic continued without further delay. Some of the POL Cars involved in the wreck could not be moved, and the RTO made the necessary contacts to have the tank cars emptied into jerricans which were then forwarded to their original destination.

"On 15 November 1944, the railroads at Sommesous entered Phase III operation. The Railway Operating Battalion moved out and the operation was taken over by the French Railroad. The confusion in the first few days was overcome after both parties, the SNCF and the RTO personnel, arrived at the conclusion that the work could be continued only through close cooperation and liaison. Knowledge of French by some members of the RTO was of considerable help. Being the only representative of the U. S. Army in the place included additional responsibilities. The RTO is called upon continually to furnish information to the SNCF and the MRS, to keep the STO advised of the local situation and act also as the "eye" for the MRS. French civilian and military authorities look toward the RTO U. S. Army unit for advice. The RTO serves as Message Center and has a telephone switchboard for U. S. Army units dispersed in adjacent territory.

Rail Transportation

Development

When the Rail Movements Division of the Section Transportation Office was organized on 20 September 1944, Advance Section was still in control of rail transportation in Oise Section. Liaison was immediately established with the corresponding Rail Division of Advance Section and the first Rail Movements Officer for Oise Section was assigned to Advance Section on Temporary Duty for orientation in the handling of rail movements in this territory. At the same time, RTO sections were organized and sent out to work in conjunction with existing Advance Section installations. All of this was arranged so that the Section Transportation Office would be in a position to assume control of rail movements as soon as Advance Section moved out of Oise Section territory, in order that there would be no interruption in rail operations. As of 28 September 1944, all of the railways in Oise Section were operated by U.S. Forces, and by 30 November 1944, the French had assumed operation of all excepting the Compiegne, Tergnier, St. Quentin, Cambrai, and Valenciennes line.

Operations

One of the major problems existing during the time that Advance Section was operating in Oise Section territory was the lack of proper information for the clearance and control of rail shipments, which resulted in congestion at many of the important points. This condition was caused mainly by the lack of good communications between the beaches and intermediate points, and Advance Section headquarters, so that in many cases information was not received at all, or arrived too late to be of any value. By the time Oise Section assumed control, communications had been materially improved. Furthermore, forms were prepared by the Rail Movements Division of Oise Section requesting the necessary information for the proper regulation and control of rail shipments from the originating points, so that congestion could be prevented and proper clearance maintained. This prevented unidentified cars from remaining in storage and classification yards for undue periods of time and effected a more efficient use of the rolling stock.

Train wrecks were a constant menance to railway operation. A report on one occurring in Reims 16 November 1944 is covered in Appendix No. 1. The transition from American to French operation accounted for some of the ~~accounted for some of the~~ accidents which occurred.

At the time the Rail Movements Division of the Oise Section Transportation Office assumed control of rail movements from Advance Section, three major obstacles still remained to be overcome before Main Line traffic could be maintained in its territory. At Chalons, and on the Main Line south of Chalons, bridges were out and had to be reconstructed before the line could be opened for operation. On the Main Line between Paris and Chalons, a tunnel had been bombed and had to be reconstructed before operation was possible. On 1 November the bridge south of Chalons had been repaired and on 6 November reconstruction of the bridge at Chalons was completed so that the Main Line between Reims and Chalons and points beyond could be reopened. By 28 November the tunnel on the Paris-Chalons line was repaired permitting traffic to be resumed on that line.

The method of handling rail shipments by Advance Section differed from that later employed by Oise Section Transportation Office, in that Advance Section was directly assigned to the Armies and arranged for the delivery of personnel and supplies to the Armies. On the other hand, after the Armies had advanced and the Oise Section Transportation Office assumed control of transportation in Oise Section territory, rail shipments assumed a "passing through" nature, with the exception of some depot shipments for delivery to points within the Oise Section area. Regulation and control of rail movements then became the mission of the Oise Section Rail Movements Division, in order to prevent congestion and to keep shipments moving through the Oise Section territory to its forward boundaries.

Movement of supplies by road assumed a position of primary importance as a means of providing transportation during the time that Advance Section was in control of the territory later assigned to Oise Section. At that time, the French railway system was undergoing reconstruction, following the severe bombing attacks to which these transportation facilities had been subjected as the Allied Armies moved across France to the borders of Belgium and Germany. Since rail lines from the beaches to the Armies at the front could not be employed to maintain a steady stream of personnel and supplies, the only alternative was to make use of the class I roads through France.

On 1 October, the Passenger Branch of the Office of the Chief of Transportation inaugurated the Main Number system to be used in the movement of troop trains, and the first Main Number train (1001-N) passed through this section and was serviced at Sezanne. Through 30 November, the Passenger Branch of the STO office handled 164 Main Trains moving a total of 145,920 troops. In addition, a total of 207 Hospital Trains were handled by this branch.

By 30 November 1944, rail freight tonnage, originating and passing through Oise Section built up to approximately 20,000 tons daily, moving directly to the Armies. A breakdown of this tonnage showing routes from Paris follows:

From	To	Tons of Supplies	Troop Movement	Remarks
Paris	Liege Area	8,700	3,000	via: Compiegne-St. Quentin-Valenciennes Charleroi.
Beauvais	Liege Area	3,000	-	via:same as above
Paris	Liege Area	2,500	-	Via: Soissons-Loan-Charleroi
Paris	Luxemborurg Area	3,000	100	via: Reims
Paris	Nancy Area	4,300	500	via: Sommesous

Road Movements in and through Oise Section.

Liaison with Advance Section

Immediately upon arrival in Reims on 17 September 1944, contact was made

with the Highway Branch, of Advance Section and from then until their departure, liaison was continuously maintained. During this period, a complete record was made of all the reconnaissance work prepared by their Highway Branch, Engineer Section, including the condition of roads and bridge classification. Overlays were made of the complete road net and the main supply routes to the Army areas. In anticipation of future service, 32 routes were developed throughout the Oise Section territory and strip maps were prepared. A supply of these strip maps was given to each RTO to be issued drivers and convoy commanders as required.

Operations

As in the case of Rail Movements, the major part of road convoy traffic through Oise Section was of the "passing through" type. Traffic moved from Cherbourg, the Normandy beaches, and the Channel Ports to the various Army areas. Other movements, which were destined for this area, were from depots and dumps.

After working in liaison with the corresponding branch of Advance Section, the Road Movements Division issued a Standard Operating Procedure for Road Traffic Headquarters. This SOP was prepared on the basis of experience gained from operations in the United Kingdom and the problems encountered while working with Advance Section.

In accordance with the Road Movements Division SOP, all units proposing to move a road convoy of 30 vehicles or more, applied to the STO, of the RTO who advised the STO, where the following action was taken:

(1) The routes were checked for condition of roads and the bridge classification.

(2) Timings were checked with the daily map to make certain that there was no conflict with other convoys. Timings were computed at critical points, entry and departure at the Oise Boundary, and at destination.

(3) If the convoy was to move through another section or Army area, clearance was obtained from those areas, and this information was sent forward by telephone or teleprint.

(4) When necessary, arrangements were made for a bivouac site and Class I and III supplies for use of convoys enroute, coordinating with other services.

(5) When the move was cleared satisfactorily, the route of the convoy was plotted on a daily map.

(6) A convoy number was then designated and movement instructions were issued to the convoy commander, which included description of the route and all timings. Whenever, possible, strip maps were given.

(7) A copy of the movement was immediately sent to the Traffic Control Provost Marshal with a request for traffic control and MP escorts when necessary.

The same procedure was used for convoys originating in other areas and moving into or through Oise Section.

During the first few weeks of operations, a number of difficulties arose, mainly caused by lack of advance information from the initiating agencies. This deficiency was similar to that in connection with the handling of rail shipments and was also due mainly to poor communication and to the lack of coordination between Sections and Base Sections. The problem was overcome by bringing this matter to the attention of the Chief of Transportation, giving specific examples and showing their effects.

Another problem was the lack of uniformity in procedure and the method of forwarding information. To solve this problem "Request for Road Convoy Clearance" and "Road Movement Instruction Forms" were prepared by the Road Movements Division and sent to the Transportation Officer of all Base Sections and to the Chief of Transportation. When, in some instances, proper information still was not coming forward, the difficulties were clarified through telephone conversations with these agencies. On 19 October 1944, Chief of Transportation Headquarters, Com Z, ETOUSA, issued Circular No. 13, directing all Base Sections to use the same forms and procedures initiated at Oise Section. Improvement was noted immediately in all Inter-Base road movement advance information, with the result that an efficient plan was evolved for the arrangement of Traffic Control, bivouac areas, and Class I and III supplies.

In the United Kingdom, most of the Road Intelligence data was supplied to the Road Movements Division by the British, which included maps showing bridge and road classification, main supply routes, condition of road network, road obstructions, and alternate routes. In Oise Section, however, the situation was entirely different . It was necessary to develop sources of information which would keep the STO fully informed with up-to-date Road Intelligence. To meet this requirement, requests were made to the Section Engineers, who had set up a Highway and Bridge Section and had initiated a survey of this area. To augment the efforts of the Engineers, a plan was evolved whereby all RTO's were alerted to the need of the latest road and bridge information and were required to keep the STO office advised of any changes to the roads and bridges taking place in their area. Road and bridge reconnaissance forms were prepared for this purpose and were sent to the RTO's whenever information was required regarding specific bridge or a certain stretch of road. The Provost Marshal was also very helpful in supplying road information. In this manner the STO was able to keep informed of the highway situation in the Oise Section, and had available the means of acquiring additional and specific information whenever required. From this cumulative information, a Road and Bridge classification map was developed, copies of which were sent to the Chief of Transportation and the Transportation Officers of all other Base Sections.

Another duty for the performance of which the Road Movements Division was responsible, was the selection of bivouac sites for convoys enroute. While Engineers assisted in selecting several permanent bivouac sites, the STO depended to a great extent upon the RTO's for the selection of suitable bivouac sites, and in many instances, even where short notice of an approaching convoy was given to the RTO, sites were quickly selected because the RTO had made a reconnaissance of the territory, and advance arrangements were made by the RTO with the Quartermaster for a supply of gasoline and oil, and rations for the troops.

During November 1944, flood waters reached the highest point since 1910. Several important road arteries were closed for a time and RTO's were immediately advised of alternate routes to be assigned. Other Base Sections were advised of flood conditions and the alternate routes to be used during this period. It was learned that from 15 December to 15 March each year heavy frosts and subsequent thaws may, from time to time, create a condition which makes even the best roads unusable to some extent, which would thus severely affect the mobility of all units located within or traveling through Oise Section. It was reported that during some winters this condition does not happen, while in others it occurs three or four times Road Movements Division made preparation to advise other Base Sections, units in Army areas, and RTO's when these conditions occurred.

Statistics

The following is a list of the number of vehicles recorded and cleared through the Road Movements Division of Oise Section during the period 15 September through 30 November 1944:

13898 to First Army
3438 to Third Army
2645 to Seventh Army
10637 to Ninth Army
9474 to Oise Section
40092 Total Vehicles
376 Total Convoys

Arrangements for 417,845 gallons of gasoline were made with the Quartermaster for refueling convoys enroute: 86 convoys bivouaced in Oise Section area. Sites were selected by the Engineers for large convoys and by the RTO's for smaller convoys.

The following is a list of large or Divisional Road Movements:

95th Infantry Division
9th Armored Division
102nd Infantry Division
10th Armored Division
44th Infantry Division
26th Infantry Division
104th Infantry Division
84th Infantry Division
99th Infantry Division
9th Armored Division
82nd Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division
78th Infantry Division
12th Armored Division

Motor Transportation

Operation and Control

Operation and control of motor transportation in Oise Section was the responsibility of the Motor Transport Division of the Section Transportation Office. Requests for motor transportation were submitted to the Motor Transport Division which "screened" them for priority moves and arranged for the necessary vehicles. Records were maintained to show the usage of each vehicle and to indicate the adequacy of the equipment available to the division. Reports were made regularly to G-4 on transportation supplies in Oise Section. A Standard Operating Procedure

was issued for the handling of motor transport within the Oise Section organization. The duties of each element were specified in this SOP.

Unit Assignments:

Motor transportation for movements of personnel and supplies in Oise Section was supplied by the 476th QM Battalion, Mobile (TC) and nine Quartermaster Truck Companies. The 147th QM Truck Company (TC), the 388th QM Truck Company (TC), and the 4032nd QM Truck Company (TC) were located in the vicinity of Reims and came under the control of the Motor Transport Office, for staff control and operations. The remaining six QM Truck Companies performed their duties at Depot O-609, as directed by the 476th QM Battalion, Mobile (TC). The operating truck companies in Reims were in use for general and priority hauling within Oise Section and to destinations in Advance Section territory and in other Base Sections. In order to supplement the number of U.S. Army vehicles available for hauling in Reims, civilian transportation was engaged. The 55th and the 64th QM Base Depots, handling Class I to IV Supplies, were given a total lift of 207 tons as of 30 November 1944. Immediately after commencing operations, it was noted that all of the units were below standard in technical proficiency. Four of them were considered as rating Unsatisfactory to barely Satisfactory. As of 30 November 1944, diligent efforts on the part of the Section Transportation Office had brought the three units operating in the vicinity of Reims almost up to standard. As an indication of the corrective measures undertaken to increase the efficiency of the Companies, the following is quoted from a Carrier Slip from the Section Transportation Office to G-4:

"1. Information has been received at this Office that the personnel in Units mentioned above are not satisfactory. G-1, this Headquarters, has been contacted as to policy, and permission has been received to screen this personnel and assistance in securing competent personnel has been promised.

"2. Ordnance Section, this Headquarters, has been contacted regarding the maintenance situation and every assistance is being received at this time in correcting the situation in Units listed above.

"3. Office of the Chief of Transportation has been informed as to the situation within these Units and has been requested to assign, to Oise Section, one (1) additional QM TC Truck Company for the purpose of carrying out the work which these Units should do and are not capable of in their present condition.

"4. Two Units within Oise Section are being equipped with heavy equipment. Permission has been obtained by the Office of the Chief of Transportation to retain the vehicles which would normally be turned in by these two Units long enough to give each standard Unit, within this Section, their full equipment as is now represented by Forms 221. It is felt that this action will bring these operational bankrupt Units up to a slightly better standard.

"5. The Commanding Officer, 476th QM Bn (Mobile) (TC) was questioned as to action the 476th QM Bn (Mobile) (TC) is taking to correct deficiencies. Reply is as follows:

"'Receipt acknowledged hereon of Inspection Reports pertaining to 3419th, 3991st, 4251st and 4255th QM Truck Companies (TC).

"'Reference par. 2, basic communication under 'accounting of corrective action taken', note has been made of all irregularities and discrepancies listed on the inspection reports, and positive corrective action under close supervision is being carried out. The deplorable condition in which the above companies arrived for assignment to this Headquarters precludes an immediate rise to a general rating of at least Excellent, which is the goal we are striving for. The deficiencies listed are not the only ones existing but are merely the most outstanding and do not give the complete problem requiring attention. Therefore, in view of the gigantic task ahead it is deemed impracticable at this time to try and account by item the corrective action being taken, except that it is vigorous, forceful and continual.

"'It is realized that your Headquarters is vitally interested in the operating efficiency of all T.C. units, and any constructive recommendations or assistance your Headquarters sees fit to give will be welcomed by this Headquarters. Personal investigation and observation of the problem by the Section Transportation Officer and key staff members is recommended, and would furnish you a more comprehensive picture of this situation, that was very sketchily described in our situation report to Chief of Transportation, dated 15 Nov 1944, thru your Headquarters.

"'It is intended to keep your Headquarters posted on the progress being made, and after completion of a survey now being made, to make certain recommendations to you for consideration. In this connection the Office Chief of Transportation has promised us a hundred percent co-operation in effecting any necessary changes required to increase the operational efficiency of the units concerned."

"6. The Commanding Officer, 4255th QM Truck Company (TC), has been relieved. After consultation with the Commanding Officer, 476th QM Bn (Mobile) (TC), and upon his recommendation, a former Motor Officer, 1st Lt. LESLIE C. YOST, was left in the Company as Commanding Officer."

Inland Waterways

When the personnel for the Inland Waterways Division arrived in Reims, there was no comparable division in Advance Section to which it could be attached for liaison and for information regarding the canal system in the Oise Section area. Consequently, this information had to be obtained from Engineers, French authorities, and through reconnaissance trips along the waterways.

The French canal network dates back to the Napoleonic era when the system was planned and construction was effected. Due to unfortunate political conditions, few improvements had been made on the canals. To add to an antiquated system, at the time this division was established, there were no canal systems in condition to be operated because of previous military operations. Through survey of the canals and consultations with French authorities, information was obtained which assisted the French materially in clearing and repairing the canal network.

Operations

By the end of November, two complete canal systems were operating in Oise Section; the Oise Canal from the Seine River to connections with Belgian canals and the Calais Canal; also the Aisne Canal from its junction with the Oise to the Meuse and as far as Liege, Belgium. Work was in progress towards clearing the Marne canal, Somme River and Sambre canal.

The movement schedule, provided for 12,000 tons of coal per day from the Douai area via Oise and Seine Rivers to Paris. Oise section coal requirements were to move from the Givet area over the Meuse River, Ardennes and Aisne canals to Reims at the rate of about 500 tons per day. Besides an indefinite tonnage for Oise Section depots in the Reims area, 1000 tons per day were planned for movement from Rouen to Liege, Belgium. Because of the fact that civilian use of the canal system reduced the demand on other methods of transportation, the French were encouraged to employ barge shipments, so that no barges would at any time be idle, but used continuously for transportation of either military or civilian cargo.

Section II

(1 December 1944 through 31 December 1944)

Expansion of Oise Section territory and Additional Personnel

Under Troop Assignment No. 31, Par 2, Hq. Oise Section, dated 8 December 1944, Detachment "B" of the 11th Traffic Regulation Group was attached to the 14th Traffic Regulation Group. The detachment consisted of 6 officers and 33 enlisted men, assigned to Oise Section, in order to provide additional RTO personnel. Subsequently, 4 officers and 19 enlisted men of Detachment "B" were attached to Advance Section, to augment their RTO personnel.

In accordance with Change No. 1, dated 8 December 1944 and Change No. 2, dated 10 December 1944, to Administrative Order No. 2, dated 2 December 1944, the Oise Section area was increased by the absorption of part of Advance Section territory and a portion of that originally assigned to Seine Section. The approximate boundaries of Oise Section, as of 10 December 1944, are shown in Chart 2, Chapter I. In order to be in position to furnish personnel for the additional area thus assigned to Oise Section, movement orders were issued transferring two additional detachments to Oise Section: Detachment "A", 6th Group Regulating Station, consisting of 3 officers and 15 enlisted men, then assigned to UK Base Section, and Detachment "A", 8th Traffic Regulating Group, consisting of 5 officers and 50 enlisted men, then assigned to Brittany Base Section. Both of these detachments were attached to the 14th Traffic Regulating Group.

New RTO's Established

On 20 December 1944 an RTO was established at Crepy-Couvron, with Capt. RUSSELL B. EDWARDS in command. The installation was located at an Air Strip (A-70) and was composed of one officer and six enlisted men.

An RTO installation was opened at Revigny, 23 December 1944, consisting of one officer and five enlisted men. Capt. ERNEST M. CHRISTI, TC, was placed in command.

The following RTO installations were opened 29 December 1944:

(1) Charleville, - Capt. GEORGE E. BETZ, TC, in command. Personnel consisted of one officer and seven enlisted men.

(2) Hirson, - 1st Lt. WALTER B. CARLSON, TC, in command. Personnel consisted of one officer and six enlisted men.

(3) St. Dizier, - 1st Lt. WILLIAM B. ADAMS, Jr., Inf., in command. Personnel consisted of one officer and six enlisted men.

The RTO at Air Strip A-83 was closed on 18 December and the RTO at Sezanne was closed on 22 December 1944.

Congestion at Railroad Yards

The beginning of the month of December brought on a severe problem in rail transportation in the form of an increasing number of loaded cars accumulating at various rails centers in the Oise Section area, congesting rail yards and preventing a smooth flow of supplies forward to proper destination. The following TWX dated 30 November 1944 was received from the Commanding General, Com Z, regarding the existence of this serious situation:

"PART ONE. PRESENT REPORTS INDICATE THAT AT 6 AM THIS MORNING THERE WERE 10996 RAIL CARS UNDER LOAD EAST OF THE SEINE WITH HEAVY MOVEMENT ENROUTE FROM NORMANDY IN ADDITION. PART TWO. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADILY INCREASING AMOUNT OF LOADED CARS ON HAND FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. PART THREE. ON THE LINES EAST FROM PARIS THERE ARE 4351 CARS IN SIDINGS OR MOVING. OF THE FOREGOING, 508 ARE AT VERDUN, 165 AT CHALONS, 301 AT REVIGNY, 265 AT SOMMESOUS, 253 AT AUDUM, 255 AT LANDERS, 465 AT BARISEY, 147 AT PAGNY, AND 110 AT TOUL. PART FOUR. SOISSONS HAS APPROXIMATELY 995 ON HAND AS OF 1800 HOURS YESTERDAY WITH 10 TRAINS IN BATIGNOLLE AND MALLOT YARDS PARIS. PART FIVE. IN THE NORTH EAST AREA THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 4813 CARS AT SIDINGS AWAITING UNLOADING OR MOVING BETWEEN TERGNIER AND DESTINATIONS. PART SIX. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IMMEDIATE AND DRASTIC ACTION BE TAKEN TO REDUCE MOUNTING NUMBERS OF LOADED CARS ON HAND IN VIEW OF THE OPENING OF ANTWERP, FROM WHICH PORT ADDED QUANTITIES OF SUPPLIES CAN BE MOVED PROVIDED COMMITMENTS ARE MET. REQUEST YOU PLEASE TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION AND NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS WHAT IMPROVEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED."

At a staff conference on 9 December 1944, General THRASHER again stressed the seriousness of the mounting number of cars awaiting unloading, with particular emphasis to those in the Reims area, and placed further responsibility upon each Service Chief to see that cars consigned to his Service were promptly unloaded. Delay in handling the discharge of cars at Reims was attributed in part to the clogging of available trackage with cars of captured German

equipment. Each Service was consequently requested to check the Reims area and issue consignment orders for captured material belonging to their Service. Following is a copy of a memorandum sent by AC of S, G-4, Oise Section, on 9 December :

Oise Section

SUBJECT: Unloading Rail Wagons

1. At the conference this morning, 9 Dec 44, the Commanding General pointed out the seriousness of any delay in unloading rail wagons arrived at destination and returning the empty wagons promptly to future use. It must be the responsibility of each Service Chief to carefully watch the status of cars consigned to his Service and see to it that these wagons are promptly unloaded. There will be many difficulties in this operation but it must be thoroughly understood that the wagons must be unloaded without undue delay and when the circumstances are such that the Service Chief cannot cope with his situation, the matter must be promptly reported to G-4 so that other Services and other means may be utilized to quickly clear the situation.

2. The situation is most acute at the moment in the REIMS area and it has been learned today that one cause of delay in handling wagons in the REIMS area is that of the available tracking being clogged with wagons loaded with captured German material which has not been given a destinatation and is moved from one siding to another, taking up valuable time of the railroad people and preventing the quick shunting of consigned cars to the proper unloading docks.

3. It is desired that each Service make, without delay, a careful check of the REIMS area and that any wagons found containing captured material of their Service be consigned for off-loading.

4. It is desired, further, that each Service report to G-4 not later than 1800 hours 10 December, the number of such loaded wagons belonging to their Service that are located in the REIMS area and the destination for off-loading for each of these wagons.

On 10 December 1944 the situation at Depot O-609 and railheads at Soissons, and intended corrective action, were reported to the Commanding General, Com Z, by TWX as follows:

"SUBJECT IS LOADED WAGONS AT DEPOT O-609 REFERENCE YOUR TWX E-72584. THE WAGON SITUATION AT DEPOT O-609 AS OF 1800 HOURS 9 DEC 1944 IS 754 WAGONS ON HAND. THE WAGONS ON HAND BROKEN DOWN INTO FOLLOWING CATEGORIES: CARS IN PLACE FOR OFFLOADING 167, EXPECTED COMPLETION BY 2400 HOURS 10 DEC 1944; CARS RELEASED TO RTO FOR PLACEMENT FOR OFFLOADING 30, EXPECTED TO BE IN OFFLOADING POSITION BY 1200 HOURS 10 DEC 1944; CARS CARRIED AS STOCK ON WHEELS 162, TO BE MOVED AS DEMANDED BY ARMIES: CARS RESERVED FOR PENDING ISSUES 211, CARS OF THIS FIGURE BEING RELEASED TO FIRST ARMY ONCURRENT DEMANDS TO BE MOVED IMMEDIATELY: CARS ON HAND NOT SCREENED FOR UNLOADING OR RECONSIGNMENT 184, ARE CURRENTLY BEING PROCESSED. THE 167 CARS IN POSITION FOR OFFLOADING

ARE LOCATED AS FOLLOWS: SOISSONS 16, MARGIVAL 110, AND PINON 41. THE WAGONS AWATING SCREENING LOCATED AS FOLLOWS; SOISSONS 81, CROUY 41, AND ST CHRISTOPHER 62, TOTAL 184. THE TOTAL CARS IN RAILHEADS: SOISSONS 338, BROKEN DOWN INTO 81 UNPROCESSED, 16 BEING UNLOADED, 30 RELEASED NOT YET PLACED FOR UNLOADING AT OTHER RAILHEADS AND 211 PENDING FORWARDING TO FIRST ARMY: MARGIVAL 110 ALL READY FOR UNLOADING: PINON 90, 49 STOCK ON WHEELS, 41 READY FOR UNLOADING: ABLENY 42 ALL STOCK ON WHEELS: CROUY 77, 36 STOCK ON WHEELS AND 41 UNPROCESSED: ST CHRISTOPHER 62 ALL UNPROCESSED. DEPOT O-609 AUTHORIZED VOOG, COM Z PER CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION TO CARRY 700 RAIL WAGONS FOR RECONSIGNMENT AND STOCK ON WHEELS FOR PERIOD OF 72 HOURS CURRENT FIGURE 373 WAGONS. NO TRAINS ARE STABLED IN REAR OF O-609 WHICH ARE UNDER CONTROL OF OISE SECTION AWAITING MOVEMENT INTO RAILHEADS OF DEPOT O-609. CURRENT WAGONS TO BE UNLOADED OR UNPROCESSED WILL BE CLEARED IN 48 HOURS. (SIGNED THRASHER)."

Capacity of Reims Yards

Congestion in the Reims Railway Yards was caused by an incoming tonnage in excess of the working capacity of the Reims yards. The following is quoted from a Carrier Slip sent to QM through G-4 by the Section Transportation Officer, on 16 December 1944, setting forth the reasons for the congestion and necessary corrective action:

"1. The present congestion of the Reims Railway Yards, plus ten (10) trains being held outside the Reims area, is due to the total incoming tonnage exceeding the working capacity of the Reims yards.

"2. The railway layout of Reims is not suitable for a General Depot and in the opinion of the Chef de Gare and other SNCF officials, the total working capacity of Reims, including the sidings and the marshalling yards, is 450 cars.

"3. As is being demonstrated during the last two days, the working capacity of the PV yards has been approximately 200 cars. Considering that the majority of these cars have contained class II supplies, it indicates approximately 2000 tons of supplies a day.

"4. By use of the Pigeon yards for daylight operations and provided that the Motor Transport Service, OCOT, Com Z, ETOUSA, can provide three (3) additional Truck Companies, it should be possible to work an additional 100 to 150 cars a day, indicating an additional 1000 to 1500 tons a day.

"5. With other Services using Reims and with other QM classes of supplies being handled to an approximate total of 500 tons a day, this shows a total tonnage in and out of approximately 4000 tons a day, which must be considered the maximum capacity of Reims Railway yards.

"6. In view of the class II in and out tonnages as indicated by the OCQM of 7200 tons a day for December, 7100 tons a day in January, and 6700 tons a day in February, it is requested that the capacity of the Reims yards be brought to the attention of the Chief of Quartermaster for necessary corrective action.

"7. Conclusion: It is the opinion of the STO and will be so reported to the COT that the maximum in and out total tonnage for Reims Railway yards is 4000 tons a day, with a possible additional 1000 tons a day to be delivered by inland waterways, again provided the TC can supply motor transportation from the canal quayside to storage."

Corrective Action Undertaken to Relieve Congestion at Railroad Yards

Soissons

(1) The RTO at Soissons, who was already alerted to the situation, immediately took steps to accomplish clearance of yards and railheads within the time specified and successfully accomplished their mission.

(2) At the same time, 150 empty cars were sent from Reims yard to Soissons to facilitate loading and moving of priority tonnage.

(3) On 13 December 1944 the following congratulatory teleprint was sent to the Commanding General, Oise Section, in view of the clearance of congestion in the Soissons area:

"FIGURES OBTAINED SECOND MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE INDICATE THAT OF A TOTAL OF 661 LOADED WAGONS REPORTED AS OF 1800 HOURS 11 DECEMBER AT SOISSONS ONLY 91 ARE REPORTED FOR OVER 48 HOURS 557 REPORTED ON HAND AT SOISSONS OVER 24 HOURS (SIGNED LEE) THIS INDICATES A VERY SATISFACTORY INCREASE IN THE RATE OF CAR UNLOADINGS AND RECONSIGNMENTS. MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE IS SATISFIED THAT THERE IS NO CONGESTION IN THE SOISSONS AREA. THIS HEADQUARTERS CONGRATULATES YOU ON PROGRESS MADE."

Reims

(1) The Bethany Marshalling Yards in Reims still carried the effects of bombing as there were no water points or electric lights in operation at the yards. Considerable delay was consequently being experienced and the switching of traffic was delayed. Although it was anticipated that the French authorities would themselves make the necessary repairs in due time, in order to assist clearance of the Reims congestion, Engineers were requested to give due consideration to the furnishing of the necessary supplies for the restoration of the Bethany Marshalling Yards, and agreed to render all assistance possible.

(2) In order to increase unloading facilities for the 55th QM Depot, the Section Transportation Office recommended that the yards at Gare du Tir aux Pigeons be opened. Approval was granted on 11 December 1944, and it was determined that 3 tracks could be utilized providing space for about 80 additional cars. The new facilities were only to be used when previous existing facilities were overtaxed.

(3) To carry out further plans and to assist in relieving congestion in the Reims yards, the Executive Officer of Section Transportation Office met with the RTO and Chef de Gare at the Pigeon Yards. Agreement was reached and personnel was made available to organize a night crew in the Bethany-Pigeon Yards. One French yardmaster and one U.S. Army officer with three enlisted men were assigned to commence work at 1800 hours 20 December 1944.

(4) A meeting was held at the Section Transportation Office 18 December 1944, with the following attending: Section Transportation Officer, Executive Officer, French Liaison, Chef de Gare-Reims, Chef d'Exploitation, Chalons District. The purpose of the meeting was to develop a procedure for immediate dispatch of empty cars from the Reims area, in order to avoid congestion in the marshalling yards. In addition, Principle Engineer, SNCF Reims, was consulted as to the possibility of constructing a cross-over in the Bethany yards in order to establish a new entrance to the Pigeon Yards which would not interfere with switching over the "Hump" serving the Bethany Yards, Chief Engineer, Chef de Gare, and Executive Officer surveyed the spot and agreed this construction would expedite switching and increase the loading and unloading capacity of the Reims yards.

(5) With the opening of the Chateau-Thierry-Epernay Lines for military traffic, the through-tonnage for the Third Army, which formerly routed via Reims, was subsequently routed through Epernay. The opening of the new route was another aid for the relief of congestion in the Reims area.

Oise Provisional Regulation Station

While terminal facilities at Reims were not intended for classification purposes, innumerable trains arrived with mixed contents, necessitating classification of carloads before dispatching them to destination. The need for classification aggravated the congestion in the Reims yards. In order to alleviate the situation, and in view of the additional territory of Oise Section and an ever increasing tonnage passing through Oise Section, the Section Transportation Office decided to establish a Provisional Regulation Station at Chalons, France. Accordingly, application for activation of a Provisional Regulation Station was submitted, and in the meantime, organization of the installation was begun. The Provisional Regulation Station was placed under the command of Major HAROLD S. COLEN, TC, with a unit strength of 7 officers and 23 enlisted men. The STO then requested that all traffic destined for Reims, originating in Normandy, Brittany, Channel Base Sections, and Seine Section be routed through the Provisional Regulation Station at Chalons

Air Supply Shipments

Large quantities of air supply shipments were sent regularly from the United Kingdom to continental air fields, but numerous shipments failed to arrive at the designated airfields. The Section Transportation Office required its RTO's at Cambrai, Compiegne, Epernay, St. Quentin, Sommesous,

Reims, and Tergnier to make weekly visits to air strips, other than authorized cargo fields within the boundaries of the RTO area, in order to determine whether any air shipments were depositied there for any reasons. Respective RTO's were required to report the following information each week on such arrivals:

a. Air Strip
b. Date of Arrival
c. Description of Supplies
d. Type and serial number of plane involved
e. Any action taken by Air Force Station to move property to proper destination.

Rail Transportation

In the Freight Branch, requests were received in increasing numbers from the Office Chief of Transportation and from Advance Section for information regarding the passing of freight trains and miscellaneous cars. In order to meet the demands for this information, car and train checking points were set up at suitable locations in Oise Section, selected as follows: Tergnier, Reims, Laon, Sommesous, and Chateau-Thierry. For the purpose of recording all rail activity at these points, special STO Form No. 19 was devised by the Rail Movements Division. On 7 December 1944, this form was revised to meet the growing demand for information from outside tracing agencies.

A Standard Operating Procedure was developed for guidance in gathering the necessary information to be "advised forward" when cars were set out in Oise Section because of bad order. Agreement was reached with the Advance Section Freight Branch that all information relating to bad order cars would be called forward to them when the c r was pulled, after having been repaired or transhipped.

Many cars arrived at depots and RTO installations without previous advice from ports, depots, or other military installations outside Oise Section. In an effort to correct this situation, STO Form No. 23 was specially developed. The report on this form covered a 24-hour period and was completed by the RTO concerned. One copy was sent through the STO to the Freight Branch, OCOT, for corrective action.

The Freight Branch developed a form to be filled out upon receipt of a telephone message. It was so devised that a complete log on various subjects could be maintained separately in file for ready reference. The forms gave ready access to the available information without reference to a cumbersome log book.

The improper loading of Engineer supplies during the first week in December resulted in the wreck of a west-bound Hospital Train No. 58 destined for Paris. The wreck occurred at Varennes-Jaulgonne at 2250 hours 7 December 1944, and was caused by landing mats falling onto the west-bound right-of-way from cars on an east-bound freight train. Patients in the hospital train were reloaded to Relief-Hospital Train No. 27, dispatched from Paris at 0350 hours, 8 December 1944. No American personnel were killed or injured,

but one French mechanic was killed and one French fireman was injured. On 9 December 1944, the Main line was reopened. As a preventive measure against future wrecks caused by improper loading of railroad cars, a directive was issued by the Commanding General, Oise Section, to all units under his command, to insure proper loading and inspection of all railroad cars. Reports on the wreck by the commander of the National Gendarmerie at Chateau-Thierry and by the Section Transportation officer who visited the scene of the accident, as well as a log from G-4, are given in Appendix Nos. 2, 3 and 4 this Chapter.

During December, difficulties were encountered in relieving train guards at the railway division points and returning them to their station. By the middle of December, the Oise Section Provost Marshal had over 300 train guards on duty from Oise Section, either on moving trains or acting as static guards on trains tied up in yards or sidings. Consequently, the supply of train guards was entirely depleted. Rather than delay trains until guards were available, the guards from the originating Base Sections continued to operate on the trains to Advance Section terminal points. As a result of this action, the supply of train guards from the Channel Base Section also dropped to almost entire depletion. The Section Transportation Office advised the Chief of Transportation that solid trains of Air Corps bombs were arriving in Oise Section with train guards. Since guards were not required for Air Corps bombs, it was suggested that this waste of personnel be pointed out to Channel Base Section. All RTO's in Oise Section were alerted to the depletion of train guards and did everything possible to insure the return of guards promptly, even to the extent of securing space for them in streamline auto-cars.

To meet a largely increased Com Z program of forwarding supplies to the Armies, an immediate need for additional rolling stock developed. Consequently, Headquarters, Com Z, ETOUSA, requested that each Section Commander conduct a physical inventory within their respective Sections to determine the number of cars not in operation in direct support of the supply program. Request was received by the Oise Section Transportation Office through the Oise Section G-4. Each RTO in Oise Section was accordingly directed on 19 December, to conduct a physical inventory in compliance with this request from higher authority. Each RTO was required to show specifically:

"a. Initial, number, type and location of all cars not presently being operated.
"b. Condition of cars, either operative or repairable.
"c. Description as to extent of repairs and material required.
"d. Track repairs or construction necessary to connect isolated cars to Main line.
"e. A map showing location of available cars and areas in which repair of tracks will be needed to connect with main lines."

A consolidated report on the above was submitted to Headquarters, Com Z, ETOUSA, on 26 December 1944.

Rail freight tonnage originating and passing through Oise Section during December averaged approximately 21,000 tons, moving directly to the Armies in the Liege, Luxembourg, and Nancy Areas.

SOP - Rail Movements Division, Passenger Branch

The mission of the Passenger Branch was to control and coordinate all movements of personnel by rail originating, terminating, or passing through Oise Section. All personnel moves of more than forty were assigned a Main Number, but if more than one unit was on one train going to the same destination, the entire movement was given one number which applied to all units on the train until it reached its destination. In case two units started their movement together, but at some intermediate point, they were separated and sent to two different destination, they retained the same Main Number until they reached the intermediate point at which they parted for the movement to their respective destinations. A new and separate Main Number was then assigned for the movement of each unit from the intermediate point.

Main Numbers ran consecutively, and were assigned by the Passenger Branch, Movements Division, Office of the Chief of Transportation. The letter which was added to the Main Number as a suffix denoted the Base Section or Section in which the movement originated. These letters were as follows:

A--Advance Section
B--Brittany Base Section
C--Channel Base Section
L--Loire Section
N--Normandy Base Section
O--Oise Section
S--Seine Section

In order to facilitate the handling of the movement of Main Numbers into, or through Oise Section, STO Form No. 27 was devised. (See Appendix No. 5). As of the end of December 1944 the procedure for using this form was as follows:

Immediately upon receipt of information, either by telephone or teleprint, on a Main Number, the form was filled out as completely as possible. If the authority was a teleprint, the reference number and Headquarters were entered under REFERENCES and the teleprint was attached to the back of the form. If the authority was a telephone call, the information was entered under HANDLING GIVEN showing time, date, name of caller, caller's unit, and initials of the person receiving the call. When the route of the Main Number was available, the PASSING STATIONS were entered in column (G), and Water, Rest, Latrine (WRL) or Rest, Latrine (RL) halts were entered in columns (L) and (M) when applicable. Immediately, each Oise Section RTO listed in column (G) was notified and notation was made in column headed RTO NOTIFIED, giving name of RTO to whom information was given, time, date, and initials of the person calling. If, for column (C), the breakdown of strength was not available, the total strength was entered under EA/EW. If in columns (E), (F), (H), (J), (K), (O), and (P), the exact time and date could not be given, the approximate time was entered and when the exact time was available, it was entered and the approximate time was crossed out. Immediately upon receipt of the exact figures for (E) and (F), or (H), (J), and (K), or (O) and (P), this information was telephoned to the RTO's concerned in Oise Section and telephoned and confirmed by teleprint to the following addresses:

(1) Destination Base Section (Action)
(2) Passenger Branch, Movements Division, OCOT, Com Z, APO 887, (Info)
(3) Origin Base Section (Info)
(4) Passing Base Sections (Info)

Movements originating in Oise Section were entered on Form No. 27 when the request was made, omitting the Main Number which was filled in as soon as it was obtained from OCOT. It was the responsibility of the RTO to obtain the equipment required for a personnel movement, from either the Military Railway Service or from the French Railways. As soon as the exact time of departure and the route were available, the RTO notified the STO, who in turn notified all concerned. All subsequent telephone calls and teleprints were entered on the form in the appropriate place, giving all the necessary information, and in the case of teleprints, they were attached to the back of the form. Hospital Ambulance Trains (HAT's) were also recorded on Form No. 27, and the word MAIN was deleted from Column (A) and the Word HAT substituted. Miscellaneous moves for which no Main Number was assigned were also recorded on Form No. 27 with the notation "NONE" in column (A).

By complying with the above, Form No. 27 carried all the information available on any particular Main Number. It was further required that all calls made concerning each movement be entered thereon. All current Main Numbers were separated into Base Sections of origin, and remained on the desk until the move was completed; when this was accomplished, Form No. 27, with the applicable teleprints, were stapled together and filed in a general file in numerical order without regard to letters designating Base Sections of origin. This file constituted the complete record of each Main Number for ready reference. Before the teleprints were filed away, the following information was entered in the Teleprint Index:

1. Teleprint Number
2. Headquarters of origin
3. Main Number concerned

All telephone conversations on subjects other than those covered above were entered in the General Telephone Log giving all the details.

Road Movements within and through Oise Section

During early December 1944, research was continued by the Engineers on the subject of Thaw Control for solving the problem of road movements during the freeze and thaw periods. On 5 December, the Engineers published the results of their study in a letter, Subject: Freeze and Thaw on Road Traffic. They reported that there are usually from one to three thaws per winter lasting from five to ten days, and that during these periods, road traffic should be restricted to:

(1) Maximum loads of 5 tons per vehicle.
(2) Spacing between vehicles of 60 yards.
(3) Traveling not over 10 miles per hour.
(4) Vehicles other than tracked.

On 15 December a letter was forwarded to all Section Transportation Officers at the Sections and Base Sections throughout the Communications Zone, for the attention of the Highway Branch, explaining procedures and alternate routes to be taken during thaw periods. This letter is quoted in part as follows:

"2. In order to alleviate the local traffic problem which will develop during a thaw period, the following recommendations are made with regard to proposed convoys initiated in all other Base Sections.

"3. This office will be in close liaison with the Section Engineer, who will be in the position to give information of a threatened thaw; this will usually be received in advance.

"4. Immediately upon receipt of the alert information, your office will be advised by telephone and confirmed by TWX. In the event that telephone communication fails directly with your office, the information will be called into OCOT, Highway Branch to be relayed.

"5. It is requested that, upon receipt of this alert, all convoys which are being arranged be routed over the alternate routes, as graphically shown on the attached map via routes North and South of the outer perimeter of the affected areas. Suggested alternate routes are: For convoys from Channel Base Section.

A. Amiens N-29 Albert, Bapaume, Cambrai, Valenciennes N-29 and N-22 Mons.
B. Amiens N-336 St.Quentin N-30 La Capelle N-39 Hirson N-39, N-51 Charleville, Mezieres N-64 Sedan N-381 Longuyon.
C. Breteuil N-50 Roye, Ham, St.Quentin, thence as in route B.
D. Beauvais N-31 Compiegne, Soissons, left on N-2, N-2 Laon, Vervins N-363 Hirson thence as in route B.

For convoys from the direction North of Paris:

E. Senlis N-17 Roye, Peronne, Cambrai thence as route A.
F. Dammartin N-2 Soissons thence as routes D and B

For convoys from the direction South of Paris:

G. Sens N-5 St. Florentin, Tonnerre N-65 Chatillon, Chaumont.

"6. When road traffic can resume normal routes, all Sections will be advised by telephone and confirming teleprint.

"7. [illegible] road traffic and convoys already enroute when the alert information is advised forward, MP traffic posts will be established at strategically located intersections outside the perimeter of the "thaw area", who will [illegible] traffic away from these areas.

"For the Section Transportation Officer:

LEON KATZ
1st Lt. T.C.
Road Mv'ts Div."

In order to provide permanent bivouac areas for large convoys passing through Oise Section, Engineers were requested to designate suitable sites for this purpose. On 4 December 1944, the following designated sites were established as permanent bivouac areas with Water Points:

Area #1 In the vicinity of Bergeres
Area #2 In the vicinity of Soissons
Area #3 In the vicinity of St. Quentin
Area #4 In the vicinity of Cambrais

These sites were surveyed and posted by the Section Provost Marshal and on 17 December 1944 the respective RTO's were notified of these areas and requested to familiarize themselves with the bivouac site in their territory for assistance to convoys utilizing this facility. On 10 December 1944 an additional bivouac area was selected in the vicinity of Reims at the junction of highways N-44 and N-31 Southeast of the city. The site was designated as Bivouac Area #5.

The additional territory absorbed by Oise Section on 10 December 1944 included 4 bivouac sites operated by Advance Section. Road Movements Division of Oise Section Transportation Office accepted the four sites and applied the following designations:

Area #6 In the vicinity of Laimont
Area #7 In the vicinity of Fumay
Area #8 In the vicinity of Tarzy
Area #9 In the vicinity of Vouziers

The Section Provost Marshal was requested to post the necessary signs at each of the areas.

On 14 December 1944, Circular No. 20, Office of the Chief of Transportation, dated 8 December 1944, was received by the Section Transportation Office. The circular described seven main arterial routes from "Red Horse" staging area, Channel Base Section, to Advance Section Regulating Areas behind the First, Third and Ninth Armies. The designated routes through Oise Section were checked and approved by the Road Movements Division and the plan was considered excellent and one which should greatly facilitate the movement and regulation of units by their own organic equipment. Overlays showing these routes were prepared for distribution to:

a. Provost Marshal, for traffic control.
b. Engineers, for priority of road maintenance and construction of road signs.
c. Ordnance, for vehicle maintenance.

A traffic circulation plan was prepared and submitted to the Provost Marshal by Road Movements Division. It included establishment of MP Traffic Posts at key intersections outside the city of Reims, and a system of by-passes. The plan was approved and placed in effect by the Provost Marshal who had, in addition to regularly assigned MP Companies, approximately 30 motorcyclists for use mainly in traffic control and convoy escort.

Timings of convoy arrivals at Reims and other critical junctions were based on advance information from the originating Base Section or Army Area; this included the time of departure from the IP, the route, and rate of march. From this information, the critical timings were computed and checked with existing information, in order to avoid congestion on heavily travelled roads and conflicts with other convoys. However, obtaining full advantage of the system depended upon the convoy commander's ability to maintain the schedule prescribed for his convoy. When convoys were delayed, the Section or Base Section of origin was requested to investigate and institute the corrective measures as needed. This did not solve the problem completely, as other considerations contributed to the lack of efficient coordination, such as, long distance convoys, sudden changes in the tactical situation while communication facilities for promptly advising of such changes were limited, vehicle breakdown enroute, and insufficient traffic control on the highways.

To aid in remedying the limitations pointed out above, MP Traffic Posts were established in Reims at critical points on the principal routes through the city. At these Traffic Posts convoys were directed to their destinations in Reims or, if passing through the city, they were directed to a system of by-passes. Signs were also posted. For long convoys, MP escorts were supplied.

Following is a list of the number of vehicles recorded and cleared through the Road Movements Division during December 1944:

From Normandy Base Section			
To:	1st ARMY	14 convoys	461 vehicles
	3rd ARMY	25 convoys	1100 vehicles
	7th ARMY	8 convoys	116 vehicles
	9th ARMY	40 convoys	1809 vehicles
	Oise Section	44 convoys	3014 vehicles
From Channel Base Section			
To:	1st ARMY	58 convoys	3733 vehicles
	3rd ARMY	38 convoys	3650 vehicles
	7th ARMY	16 convoys	681 vehicles
	9th ARMY	76 convoys	5183 vehicles
	Oise Section	54 convoys	2659 vehicles
From Seine Base Section			
To:	1st ARMY	5 convoys	167 vehicles
	3rd ARMY	8 convoys	413 vehicles
	9th ARMY	9 convoys	303 vehicles
	Oise Section	11 convoys	498 vehicles
From Brittany Base Section			
To:	1st ARMY	6 convoys	143 vehicles
	3rd ARMY	7 convoys	125 vehicles
	9th ARMY	4 convoys	116 vehicles
	Oise Section	14 convoys	666 vehicles
From Loire Base Section			
To:	Oise Section	4 convoys	68 vehicles

From Oise Section

To: 1st ARMY	5[illegible] convoys	4077 vehicles
3rd ARMY	[illegible] convoys	44[illegible] vehicles
9th ARMY	[illegible]	34[illegible] vehicles

Others

	[illegible] convoys	3280 vehicles
TOTALS	[illegible]26 convoys	330[illegible] vehicles

RECAPITULATION OF ABOVE FIGURES

9[illegible] convoys	[illegible] vehicles	to First Army
[illegible] convoys	[illegible] vehicles	to Third Army
[illegible] convoys	[illegible] vehicles	to Seventh Army
13[illegible] convoys	[illegible]754 vehicles	to Ninth Army
12[illegible] convoys	[illegible]905 vehicles	to Oise Section
50 convoys	[illegible]280 vehicles	to others
526 convoys	[illegible]046 vehicles	TOTALS

Arrangements were made with the Quartermaster for 25[illegible],[illegible] gallons of gasoline for refueling convoys during December 1944. During December 1944, 128 convoys bivouaced in the Oise Section area.

The following is a list of Large or Divisional Road Movements:

106th Inf Div	82nd Airborne Div
459th Amphibious Truck Co	101st Airborne Div
354th Engineer Regt	5th Port Det
393rd Engineer Regt	7[illegible]th Railway Operating Bn
9th Armored Gp	5[illegible]th Paratroop Combat Team
27[illegible]th Engineer Regt	[illegible]0th TD Gp
Com Z - Rear	[illegible]0th Armored Gp
Navy [illegible]	368th Fighter Gp
British AMES	7[illegible] Railway Operating Bn
1[illegible] Airborne Infantry Div	[illegible]th TD Gp
15[illegible] Eng. GS Regt	[illegible] Army Corps
7[illegible] Engineer Light Pontoon Regt	[illegible]th Infantry Div
[illegible] General Hospital	15th Army - Hq & Hq Co
87th Infantry Div	1[illegible]8th Infantry Div
[illegible]rd Engineer Combat Gp	178th General Hospital
[illegible] Gp Hq Det	1723rd Engineer GS Regt

Motor Transport

In order to maintain 24-hour operations, Motor Transport Division became [illegible] for personnel and equipment during December. This condition [illegible] under Organization Orders of 28 and 29 November 1944 [illegible] Com Z, ETOUSA reducing trucking company personnel and equipment. Consequently, additional trucking units had to be requested, particularly for use at [illegible] Q-609, where there was a daily commitment of 6,000 tons. The Office of the Chief of Transportation was advised of this requirement on [illegible] December 1944. Furthermore, in view of the necessity for opening

the Pigeon Yards in Reims, in order to accomodate the additional tonnage that was to be handled by Oise Section, the existing motor transportation facilities of the Section Transportation Office were inadequate. Although approximately 2,500 tons could be [illegible] daily, additional truck units were required to transport supplies from the rail yards to storage. Following are copies of telephone messages exchanged on this subject:

14 Dec 1944 From: Oise Base Section, Section Transportation Office
To : Chief of Transportation, CZ, ETOUSA:

"ADDITIONAL TONNAGE TO BE HANDLED BY OISE SECTION NECESSITATES OPENING PIGEON YARDS IN REIMS TO HANDLE APPROXIMATELY 2500 TONS DAILY. OPERATIONS CANNOT COMMENCE UNTIL THREE ADDITIONAL COMPANIES PLUS ONE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS ARE AVAILABLE TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS. ADVISE AVAILABILITY."

17 Dec 1944 From: Chief of Transportation, CZ, ETOUSA
To : Oise Base Section, Transportation Officer:

"REFERENCE YOUR TWX DATED FIFTEENTH DECEMBER THIS HEADQUARTERS FULLY REALIZES YOUR NEED FOR ADDITIONAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION, BUT DUE TO THE VERY ACUTE SHORTAGE OF QM TRUCK COMPANIES AND BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ALLOCATE ADDITIONAL UNITS YOU REQUEST AT THIS TIME (SIGNED ROSS) SHORTAGE NOW EXISTING IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR ARMIES FOR OPERATIONAL USE. CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION CAPT MCLELLAN AND MAJ VALENTINE, WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SECURE ADDITIONAL TRUCK COMPANIES AND ONE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS WITHIN NEXT SEVEN TO TEN DAYS."

On 18 December 1944, the Section Transportation Office was notified by the Office of the Chief of Transportation that the 111th QM Battalion (Mobile) TC, newly arrived on the Continent, was being assigned to Oise Section.

In accordance with Request for Movement Orders, dated 30 November 1944, and issued by the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the 3682nd QM Truck Company (TC) was assigned to the 476th QM Battalion under Par 2, Troop Assignment No. 36, Hq Oise Section, dated 16 December 1944. The unit was equipped with 2½-ton vehicles and was assigned to the Soissons area for depot operations. Upon its arrival in Oise Section, the unit was inspected and reported Very Satisfactory. As indicated in extract from Carrier Slip quoted below, however, the unit was not expected to become more than 50% effective for at least two months:

"1. A verbal Situation Report was received from the Commanding Officer, 1st Lt. J[illegible] R. SHINGLETON, of the 3682nd QM Truck Company (TC) upon the arrival of the Unit in Oise Section and is as follows:

a. Unit has had no maintenance for a period of approximately six weeks.
b. A minimum of twenty trucks were deadlined upon arrival in Oise Sectio
c. Unit has six WD Cases.
d. Unit has five Court-Martials pending.
e. Strength of Unit is 146 enlisted men and 5 officers.
f. Critical shortages within the Unit are:
(1) Inner-tubes 750 x 20.
(2) Tire patching materials.
g. This Unit has been operating under very adverse mud conditions. Vehicles are towed in and out of dumps by Caterpillar tractors.

"2. It is anticipated that this Unit will not become more than 5% effective for two months."

On 17 December 1944, operation at Air-Strip A-83 was moved to Air-Strip A-70. At the same time, Advance Section advised that vehicles operating at Air Strips A-83 and A-79 must be relieved for another assignment. The Office of the Chief of Transportation was therefore requested to assign a truck unit for Air-Strip operation. On 19 December 1944 the Section Transportation Office was advised that the 398th QM Truck Company (TC) had been assigned to Oise Section for Air-Strip operation. However, on 25 December 1944 advice was received by teleprint from the Office of the Chief of Transportation that the 398th QM Truck Company (TC) had been re-assigned to the 17th Airborne Division. The following QM Truck Companies (TC) were in turn assigned to Oise Section under jurisdiction of The Section Transportation Office for permanent duty in Reims:

4270th QM Truck Company (TC)
3438th QM Truck Company (TC)

The 4268th and 4269th QM Truck Companies (TC) were equipped with 5-ton tractors and 10-ton semi-trailers on 15 December 1944, and were made available for work as of the following day. It was anticipated that these units would be able to handle most of the work which they previously have been unable to carry on.

In order to obtain greater efficiency in truck operations, Motor Transport Division re-located the QM Truck Companies under the jurisdiction of the Section Transportation Office; the smaller 2½-ton equipment could be used to greater advantage for depot hauling while the larger 10-ton equipment was more suitable for long hauls from railroad terminals. Consequently, units with smaller equipment were sent to the Soissons area for depot operations, while the larger 10-ton equipment was re-located in the Reims area for long hauls out of Reims, thus resulting in a greater ton-mile factor for each unit.

The following re-location of truck companies was effected during the month of December:

4032nd QM Truck Co. - from Reims to Neuville
4255th QM Truck Co. - from Soissons to Crouy
4268th QM Truck Co. - from Soissons to Bucy Le Long
4269th QM Truck Co. - from Margival to Merfy

While the three truck units operating in the vicinity of Reims as of 30 November 1944 were brought up to standard in technical proficiency, through the work of the Section Transportation Office, the 4251st QM Truck Co. TC, staffed with colored personnel, still presented a problem during December (See Section I, report on period 15 September through 30 November 1944 under Motor Transportation). Although the Commanding Officer of the unit advised that necessary corrective action had been undertaken and that the unit was ready for re-inspection, this was done on 8 December 1944 and again resulted in a rating of "Unsatisfactory". It was therefore decided to reorganize the 4251st QM Truck Co, as a white unit. It was anticipated

that reorganization of white companies assigned to Oise Section would render as surplus, sufficient technically qualified personnel to form cadre for reorganization of the 425lst QM Truck Company.

On 12 December 1944, difficulties were encountered with the Prefecture Commissioner of the Republic at Chalons, and it was anticipated that additional civilian transportation could not be made available to U.S. Forces in the area controlled by the Prefecture at Chalons for several weeks. Cause for this condition was said to be the demands for civilian truck transportation in the Alsace area where the enemy had, to a great extent, exercised a scorched earth policy. Advice of the ultimatum of the Prefecture regarding civilian transportation was submitted to G-4 for discussion with the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General as to whether or not appropriate action could be taken.

Advice was received from Hq, Com Z, ETOUSA, on 11 December 1944, that the 5th Automobile Regiment was being activated in Paris for the operation of 600 8-ton Civil Affairs trucks then arriving on the Continent. Nine of the French Truck Companies, so activated, were ordered to La Fere in Oise Section for assignment to the 83rd QM Battalion (Mobile) (TC) for administration and operational control (under G-5 for staff control). Each Truck Company consisted of 5 officers and 110 enlisted men. The French units performed their mission of transporting Civil Affairs supplies and could only be assigned by the Section Transportation Office for other missions in case of an emergency. On 24 December 1944, following the enemy counter-offensive on the Western Front, a request was sent to the Commanding General, Oise Section, by Hq, Com Z, ETOUSA, to...six of these French Truck Companies for emergency army use to replace Army Transportation urgently needed for other missions.

Assurance was received from Ordnance in December that they would give priority to the repair of all units operating at C-309. It was anticipated that this action would release a large percentage of deadlined trucks and was in direct coordination with current efforts to clear congestion of traffic in the Soissons area.

Emergency Demands on Transportation
in Oise Section during German Counter-Offensive.

Immediately after the German Counter-offensive, which started 17 December 1944, all available motor transport in Oise Section was alerted to meet the emergency demands for transportation equipment, and truck units were recalled from depots and railheads, in preparation for the movement of personnel and supplies to the vital areas. Freight trains were diverted and routed to new destinations. Main lines were cleared immediately in order to speed up the movement of troops and supplies. With entire divisions and troops of all branches of the Army Ground Force on the move at the same time, control and regulation of road movements became of vital importance, particularly insofar as the time element was concerned.

Typical of a major operational move effected by the Section Transportation Office was the movement of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions of the XVIII Corps (Airborne) from their rest camps at Sissonne, Suippes and Mourmelon. The following extract from the Staff Report, dated 19 December

194.. indicates the speed with which the movement was executed, and the ... tricacies and planning involved.

"1. Re-movement of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions.
a. Routes selected and cleared thru Advance Section (Adsec).
b. Strip maps made up for the routes from Sissonne, Suippes and Mourmelon.

The following distribution was made:
500 to each unit at Sissone and Suippes.
1300 to Mourmelon.
300 of each route to the 18th Corps.
100 of each route to G-4, Oise Section.

"2. Owing to the tactical nature of this movement, instruction for each convoy could not be issued. A plan was set up whereby the units would send out serials of between 30 and 40 vehicles and notify this office of the time of departure. From this time, the arrival time at destination and at the Adsec border was computed and the information called into Adsec for traffic control purposes and advice forward to the Army. The complete plan was given to Traffic Control Officers, PM Oise Section and Adsec, so that traffic pointsmen would be established throughout the route to destination. Strip maps of the routes were also given them.

"3. Information was received from Seine Base Section of the routes and timings for the following QM Trucks Companies:

3625th QM Truck Co — 3619th QM Truck Co
4009th QM Truck Co — 3882nd QM Truck Co

Information from Adsec on the following QM Truck Companies

4263rd QM Truck Co — 3603rd QM Truck Co
3632nd QM Truck Co — 3578th QM Truck Co
4264th QM Truck Co

Timings and routes were given and traffic control and escorts arranged with PM. Further information was received from Executive Officer, Section Transportation Office of convoys from 13 truck companies from Channel Base Section. All efforts to check with Channel Base Section for routes and timings were unsuccessful as communications have broken down. The PM was alerted to this situation and was requested to send MPs to route N-31 at the entrance to Reims and stop every QM Truck Company, if the unit designation could not be seen on the truck, and if any were included in the list, to escort them to Mourmelon Camp. A complete report also to be submitted to this office.

"4. The first report of the outward movement from the camps came from Lt. [illegible] at Sissonne. The following is a schedule of how the serials left the camp:

Name		Time
Hq. Co.	82nd Airborne	1004
307th Eng	"	1010
[illegible] Eng. Co.	"	1004
MP	"	1015

Name		Time
504th - 1st serial	82nd Airborne	1017
504th - 2nd serial	"	1023
504th - 3rd serial	"	1045
325th - 1st serial	"	1100
325th - 2nd serial	"	1110
325th - 3rd serial	"	1115
407th QM	"	1200
508th - 1st serial	"	1120
508th - 2nd serial	"	1133
508th - 3rd serial	"	1143
Med. 307th	"	1152

For this purpose, 266 borrowed vehicles were used and the organizational equipment consisted of the following:

246 - 1/4 - ton Jeeps	3 - 3/4-ton Trucks
87 - 2½-ton Trucks	2 - Ambulances
95 - Weapon Carriers	2 - 1½-ton trucks

This completed the movement from the area. Attempts to reach the camp at Suippes failed due to communications failure. Further report will be rendered.

"6. Last report of the QM Truck Companies just received enroute to Mourmelon Camp:

3019th	36 vehicles	Arrived 1200
4009th	44 vehicles	Arrived 1500
3882nd	22 vehicles	Arrived 1230
3625th	31 vehicles	Arrived 1530

The following units have just been contacted by the MPs and are enroute to the camp:

3989th QM Truck Co	645th QM Truck Co
3398th QM Truck Co	3627th QM Truck Co

"7. In addition, the 3416th QM Truck Co., which has just arrived with supplies from Le Havre, is being used. Also 4268th Truck Co. - 10 Vehicles. Arrived at 1430."

The speed and efficiency with which the movement of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were executed by the Oise STO gave occassion for Major General M.B. RIDGWAY, U.S. Army, Commander VXIII Corps (Airborne) to send a letter of commendation to Brigadier General C.O. THRASHER, Commanding General, Oise Section, who in turn, sent a letter of congratulation to Lt. Col. Richard W. Barker, Section Transportation Officer, Oise Section, and his staff. Following is a copy of General RIDGWAY'S letter:

HEADQUARTERS XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE)
Office of the Corps Commander

APO 109-In the Field
211930 December 1944

"My dear Thrasher:

"I should like you and Wilsey to know that all of us feel that the manner in which you picked up and delivered our two divisions into the battle area was just about the finest job we have ever seen of its kind. You should all, in the Oise Section, take deep satisfaction in a contribution to our military effort which was very real, and which time may show was of far greater scope than any of us now realize.

"Hoping to serve with you again, and with warm best wishes, in which all the Staff and Command join, and which I should be grateful to have you convey to your associates.

Sincerely,

/S/T/ M. B. RIDGWAY
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding."

After the Germans began their counter-offensive in December 1944, they launched many air attacks against the railheads and depots in Oise Section. Since the RTO installations in this area were located at the railhead and depots, they experienced these attacks. Without damage to the RTO station at Revigny, Wassigny, Chalons, Tergnier, and A-70, aerial bombings and strafings were sustained, 25 and 26 December. At Laon on 26 December a plane strafed a troop train seven times. As a result, the engine was severely damaged and made unusable; two cars were damaged: the train was delayed approximately 20 hours. The casualties were: 7 killed and 25 injured; the wounded were removed to the 96th General Hospital in Reims and the 56th Field Hospital at Laon. The RTO at Soissons reported in part as follows:

"1. At approximately 2145 hours, 26 December 1944, we received an air alert due to the presence of an enemy plane in vicinity of Soissons. At 2215 hours an all-clear signal was given. A German plane passed from north to south over yards, circled and returned flying from south to north and dropped a bomb in north end of yards at approximately 2230 hours, between tracks 12 and 14. This was an incendiary type of bomb which set fire to five cars of ammunition.

"2. The French crews which were on duty on the locomotives of Soissons yards immediately disappeared.

"3. Representatives of Military Railway Service proceeded to take an engine and cut off the five burning cars and pulled the balance of cars

on that track, also the cars on next track to it and took them out on track of main line.

"4. Ammunition in five burning cars soon began to explode and set fire to other cars. The fire continued to spread throughout the entire yard.

"5. At south end of yard with one engine and with help of a tractor dozer, we were able to get 215 cars out of yard. Approximately 80 cars were pulled out of the north end of yard, by the Military Railway Service.

"6. At 1700 hours, the yard check showed 424 loaded cars, 101 empties, and 3 cars of Engineer equipment.

"7. Work endeavoring to salvage as much as possible was continued until there was no further available power.

"8. Freight sheds, the main depot were completely destroyed. All other railway buildings were damaged in various degrees. Also there was considerable damage to civilian property directly adjacent to station.

"9. Plans for reestablishing service was made so as to start work as soon as it was considered safe to do so. RTO set up temporary headquarters at 57 Avenue de la Gare.

"10. On afternoon of 28 December 1944, the RTO moved its office to a building in south end of Soissons yard to handle business.

"11. At 1930 hours, it was reported by MRS that there was one by-pass track ready to handle traffic through Soissons.

"12. It is expected that Team tracks 5 and 6 will be ready at 0800 hours 29 December 1944. Engineers expect to have two main tracks available within two days.

"13. Water for locomotives is available at Soissons as of 2030 hours, 28 December 1944."

The 724th Railway Operatinb Bn at Compiegne was contacted at 0055 hours to furnish train crews for emergency operation at Soissons. Capt. WAGNER of the 724th ROB advised that the following train crews and engine power would be immediately dispatched to the scene of the fire:

7[illegible]th Railway Operating Bn - Three crews and three engines from Laon.
732d Railway Operating Bn - Three crews and three engines from Tergnier.
716th Railway Operating Bn - Two crews and two engines from Tergnier.
724th Railway Operating Bn - Five crews from Tergnier by truck.

The OCOT was requested to alert all TC truck units and to request all possible assistance from the Second Military Railway Service. At 0245 Lt. CHARRIGER, OCOT Night Duty Officer, advised that twelve train crews from Paris were on

the way to Soissons by truck. At the same, Lt. DONELY, OCOT Motor Transportation Division advised that truck companies had been alerted. The three train crews of the three switching engines operating at Reims were alerted for possible movement to Soissons with engine power at 0145."

Inland Waterways

During the first two weeks in December, plans for operations on canals were curtailed considerably due to high waters in all localities. November rains were reported to have exceeded a 200-year record. Canal repairs were held up awaiting a drop in water levels. A delay of one month in the reconstruction program was estimated because of high waters. As the high water level began to recede in the Oise Section area, the Seine River caught the peak flow of traffic. Consequently traffic between Rouen and Paris was tied up and no shipments are expected prior to 1 January 1945.

The Office of the Chief of Transportation advised the Section Transportation Office on 28 December 1944 that all Engineer troops assigned to reconstruction of canals were to be withdrawn for other duties. Since little was being accomplished in repair work because of high water, the withdrawal of these troops had no momentary effect on canal reconstruction.

French authorities claimed that the Meuse River was not navigable because of obstructions at Anchamps, Mesziers, Le Theu, and Lumes; however, Advance Section Engineers, after a survey by their field units, advised that a passageway was clear at each of these four points, and would be navigable as soon as the waters had receded. Although Advance Section Engineers admitted the possibility of some underwater obstructions not presently discernable, they declared that to the best of their knowledge passage through one channel would be possible as soon as the waters had receded. Advice was received on 4 December 1944 that the Marne Canal was open to navigation from St. Dizier to Vitry-le-Francois.

Advice was received by Inland Waterways Division that 14 barges were to be nominated and sent to Givet to load approximately 15,000 tons of coal for Oise section. However, at the time the barges were ordered, it was learned that the stock pile of coal had decreased to 6,000 tons because the armies had been withdrawing from it. On 22 December 1944, the Office of the Chief of Transportation advised the Oise Section Transportation Office that because of present high water levels and other circumstances, all plans for transportation of coal from Givet to Reims via barges were cancelled.

In order to relieve congestion on the Oise Canal, where 93 barges were tied up at one point, and further North where 46 barges were apparently awaiting passage through the locks, it was recommended that the lock at Pinon on the Oise and Aisne Canal be repaired so that canal could be reopened to navigation. Recommendation was placed before the Section Transportation Office, through G-4. As an indication of the action undertaken and information supplied, the following is quoted from a Carrier Slip from the Section Transportation Office to G-4, dated 26 December 1944:

"1. The authority on American participation in repair and rehabilitation of the canal systems in France is in a Canal Committee in Hqs, Com Z. Committee is made up of representatives from Transportation, Engineers, and General Staff. Operations are by the French, but supervision is maintained by Inland Waterways Division, Office of Chief of Transportation, Communication Zone.

"2. Copies of correspondence regarding reconstruction of canal lock at Pinon are being submitted to this Committee through Inland Waterways Division, OCOT, for their final decision.

"3. It has been the policy of this Committee first to open through main routes rather than supplementary or secondary canals, and to avoid major reconstruction projects not vital to the war effort. Several engineer units have been assigned definite tasks on these main canals and will not be available for other projects for some time.

"4. Oise-Aisne Canal would, if it were open, save several days' time in transport to Reims, however, Reims is accessible from the north via Compiegne and the Aisne Canal.

"5. Dispatch of all barges is being made as quickly as water conditions permit. The accumulation of barges between Compiegne and Chauny were undoubtedly those on the Paris coal run and were tied up because of water conditions on the Oise River.

"6. Reply from the Canal Committee will be forwarded you as soon as received."

On 31 December 1944, the following decision of the Canal Committee was aubmitted to Section Transportation Offices

"1. Canal Committee advises of no military value at present.
2. All U. S. Army Engineers now assigned on canal work on high priority jobs of much more importance.
3. French technical side pressed through Canal Committee to hurry work.
4. By-Pass route now available."

...6th Section

APPENDIX NO. 1

(Chapter VI)

REIMS STATION — REIMS, 17 November 1944

SUMMARY REPORT
Of the Station at Reims

2 cop. addressed to the Regional Bureau of Information
6th Section—Movement Division - Paris

1 cop. to the Principal Inspector
Head of the 6th Arex at Charleville.

On 16 November 1944 a 21400, Engine No. 231F23 (double crew) of the Depot at Chapelle, having to replace engine on Hospital train 10158 - 2172 Etain - Paris

Scheduled time of arrival 1845 - Actual 1957
" " " departure 1910 " 2229

running on track II, line 2, broken at bridge of 54.018 Km., fell in the canal joining the Marne to the Aisne.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT

Train No. 10158-2172 was stationed on track 3C. Engine 231F23, waiting on track 9C, was originally to be sent alone to Soissons.

At 1930, the depot informed the Chef de Service that this engine was to be used to haul train 2172.

The Chef de Service had the schedule prepared to place it at the head, and delegated ganger TRIVET to pilot the engine from track 9 to track 3, by using the available part of principal track II.

At the time when the pilot arrived at the engine to accompany it, the engineer declared again that he was to be sent alone to Soissons.

TRIVET left the engine to report this to the Chef de Service, but during the absence, the schedule having been prepared, and the panel opened, the engineer started his engine without noticing that he was headed on the broken line. Arriving at the break, the engine was thrown into the canal.

CONSEQUENCES

Engine 231F23, tender and sleeping wagon derailed.

Engineer CHAPELIER (Charles) driving the engine, of the depot at Chapelle- 46 years old, married, 2 children, 22 and 20 years old, living at Paris, 54 Rue de l'Aqueduc, lightly wounded in the left hand, multiple contusions.

Firemen ANGROS, Rene (on the engine) 32 years old, married, 1 child living at Paris, 21 Rue Etienne Dolle; light burns on the wrist and face - multiple contusions.

Engineer MOGLIN, Georges, (in the sleeping wagon) 31 years old, married, 2 children, 3 and 4 years old, living at Paris, 15 Rue Goderoy Cavaignac: contusions on the right side.

Fireman CARBON, Michel (in the sleeping wagon), 42 years old, married , 1 child, 18 years old - living at Paris, 38 Rue des Bois: contusions, right leg.

RESPONSIBILITY

The investigation made by the representatives of the FX MT - VG services revealed that the engineer CHAPELIER started his engine as soon as the panel

Case section ...,

indicated "Warning" without order either of the Chef de Service or of the pilot.

CHAPPLIER declared that he had considered the effacing of the red light as a departure order - alone for Soissons.

The Service de la Traction has accepted the responsibility for the incident.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The position of the engine permits the moving of traffic on the part of the single track between stations 2 and 9.

On the other hand, navigation = on the canal of L'Aisne a La Marne is interrupted.

The Engineer of Bridges and Roads (Ponts et Chaussons) and the Sub-Prefect have been informed.

Deputy Chef de Gare

Translated by T/4 Bryant Buckingham 17 Nov 44

s/ Bryant Buckingham

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

A. S. ROBERTS
1st Lt. Ord
Administration

APPENDIX NO. 2

(Chapter VI)

National Gendarmerie
2nd Legion
Company of Aisne
Section of Chateau-Thierry
No. 12/4

Chateau-Thierry, 8 Dec 44

REPORT

of Lt. Phavorin, commander of Section of Chateua-Thierry, on a derailment of an American hospital train at kilometers 107-300 of Reims Paris line.

Reference: Article 53 of decree of 20 May 1903.

The 7 of December 44, at 2250 hours, an American hospital train going from Vitel to Paris was derailed at kilometer 107-300, 1 kilometer, 500 meters east of the gare of Varennes-Jaulgonne.

The commander of the section was informed by the station of Chateau-Thierry at 0100 hours and went to the place with three gendarmes as quickly as possible and informed the brigade of Conde en Brie, who cut from the telephone following the inundation, wasn't able to get news of the accident.

At the arrival around 0130 hours the commander of the section determined that the locomotive and 11 derailed cars had been pulled from the rails and gone around 150 meters. A wooden car of the SNCF used as resting quarters for the personnel had been completely torn to shreds. Only three cars had not left the tracks. The metal hospital cars which were for the most part turned over, did not seem to have suffered too much from the accident.

The victims are:

Second Mechanic - M. Charles Jaegy of the depot of Chalons sur Marne, living at 126 Ave du Gen. Sarrail at Chalons sur Marne, killed.

Second Fireman - M. Julien Arthur Lemain, of the depot of Chalons sur Marne, living at 1 Rue David Blondel at Chalons sur Marne, very gravely injured. The latter aided as soon as possible by personnel at the American hospital. The chief mechanic and the fireman on duty were slightly injured.

As soon as the commander of the section arrived he precribed a guard around the baggage car and the food cars. The MPs of Chateau-Thierry arrived a little after and relieved the gendarmes around 0400 hours.

The inquest was carried out at once with the technicians of the SNCF and the French captain of the regulation of Chalons sur Marne to permit to establish thatthe derailment was due to a collision, at the speed of 80 km/hr, with a large roll of trellis weighing around 400 kgs, which probably fell from a train traveling ahead of the train of the accident. This roll would have been destined for landing strips.

From a standpoint of the accident several rolls of this material had fallen from a train two days before and for another part, the tracks were free on the seventh (7th) at 1700 hours, the inquest tried to determine

1 - Since 1700, if a train carrying these rolls had passed the station of Varennes-Jaulgonne.

2 - Or if persons of malintentions had placed a roll across the tracks which had fallen two days before.

The delays would be adjusted in 48 hours.

Case Section .....

The section of information and the regular authorities were advised by message of the consequence of the accident as soon as first results of the inquest were known.

Translated by Cpl Liston F. Coon, 14 Dec 44

Incl 2

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

A.S. ROBERTS
1st Lt. Ord
Administration

APPENDIX NO. 3 ...Oise Section
(Chapter - VI)
HEADQUARTERS
OISE SECTION, CZ, ETOUSA
SECTION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

APO 513
8 December 1944

File: 370.11

SUBJECT: Report on Wreck - Hospital Train # 58

TO : Chief of Transportation, Com Z, APO 887, U.S. Army.
(Attn: Lt Col Mack, ACOT, Movements Division).

1. Confirming our telephone conversation, I have attached copy of the log of the Rail Movements Division, STO and the original waybills and wagon labels of wagon SNCF 432690 and wagon US 422330.

2. You undoubtedly have received a complete report of the wreck from Lt. Greenman, Passenger Branch, your Division.

3. Accompanied by Lt Col Jamison, C.O., 706th Railway Grand Division, Major McNaughton and I inspected the tracks of the Varennes to Epernay line and discovered all told, four (4) additional BRC landing mats along the right-of-way.

4. At Epernay we inspected wagons Nos. 432690 and US 422330 that the RTO Epernay, Lt Volonce, had had removed from train No. 1161 last evening upon discovering a hot box on wagon No. 432690, plus the fact that the bumpers of the wagons were coupled together and due to this coupling, right front wheel of wagon No. 432690 had been bound.

5. The wagon waybills from both wagons showed the consignor as US Depot E-504, date: 29-11-44, consignee: 9th Air Force Engineer Command, Batignolles Station, and Shipping Index Number: ST-4/EGN-153. The wagon waybill for wagon No. 432690 showed thirty (30) rolls of BRC landing mats, whereas there were only twenty-nine (29) on load. The bracing was completely gone and consisted of about three strands of wire supported by some sticks which were not, in my opinion, of sufficient strength to hold the matting. The matting had also been loaded about one foot out of balance to the left side of the wagon.

6. The wagon waybill for wagon No. US 422330 showed thirty (30) rolls of BRC landing mats, whereas only twenty-seven (27) were actually on load. There were no wooden braces, in evidence and the matting had been braced with three strands of wire, two strands being completely loose and almost off. One roll of matting was protruding toward the right approximately two feet, and it is reasonable to suspect that the rolls of matting that caused the wreck, fell off this particular wagon. Three other wagons of this consignment Nos. 102581, 280694 and US 425127 have been held by the RTO Chalons. It would appear that one or more rolls of matting have disappeared from wagon US 425127, but as no waybill is attached to the car or was attached to the consist, it is not known at this time how many mats were loaded in this particular wagon. A car check was made of train No. 1161 between its arrival at 2035 hours and departure at 2050 hours, 7 December, by the RTO Chateau Thierry and nothing irregular was noticed on the train at that time.

Oise Section ..... .

7. From the condition of the coupled wagons upon their arrival at Epernay, it would appear that some violent shock (a sudden stop, for example) may have broken the flimsy bracing on wagons 432690 and US 422330, and due to the coupled bumpers, it may for the remainder of the journey have created a bumping motion which shook loose and threw on the right-of-way, the landing mats.

8. Two cranes are at present working on the wreck, and it is hoped to have the eastbound track rebuilt and open sometime tomorrow.

RICHARD W. BARKER
Lt Colonel, T. C.
Section Transportation Officer

5 Incls
As above

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

A.S. ROBERTS
1st Lt, Ord
Administration

APPENDIX NO. 4
(Chapter VI)

1 STO G-4
Attn:
Col Squire

SUBJECT: Hospital Train Wreck.

1. Confirming telephone conversation (Col Squire - Lt Col Barker) the following is a complete log of the events relative to the hospital train wreck.

2310 hours, Lt Volonco, RTO, Epernay called and informed us that a hospital train had derailed between Dormans and Varennes. Chateau Thierry called and said engine was on its side. Asked for more information.

2320 hours, attempted to contact RTO at Chateau Thierry, unable to get thru, wires down.

2325 hours, Lt Volonco. Hospital train #58 engine and coaches derailed. Engine lying on its side, 13 out of 15 cars derailed, both mains blocked. Lt Frindly, MAC officer on train advises that patients have to be evacuated. A report of one Frenchman killed and one injured (later proved to be incorrect). Then correct.

2343 hours. RTO at Chalons called (Cpl Lowery) giving the information that it was a special hospital train, engine #241-A-15, which had departed Chalons at 1836 hours, 7th December. Origin was Lerouville, destination Paris

0009 hours, 8th Dec 1944. Col Woodhouse, Oise Surgeon's office was contacted (Sgt Rizzo) and given information.

0013 hours. Sgt Freidman, RTO Reims called verifying derailment at Jaulgonne.

0017 hours. Military police at Chateau Thierry advised and dispatching MP's (Sgt Williams). Also RTO Chateau Thierry.

0020 hours. Lt Kaplan, OCOT, given all previous information. Inquired if it were possible for him to secure another hospital train to proceed to Jaulgonne and evacuate train.

0030 hours. 99th General Hospital contacted on number of ambulances available.

0040 hours. Sgt Reynolds, OCOT, Passenger Br., called asking number of hospital train.

0040 hours. Sgt Freidman gave information thru Col Pommeret, French Liaison Officer, that French Railroad Commissioner at Paris and RTO Gare D'E Lest were arranging to secure a hospital train to evacuate personnel.

0042 hours. Sgt Reynolds, OCOT, advised of RTO Gare D'o Lest and French Railroad arranging for relief train.

0112 hours. Sgt Reynolds, OCOT, advised STO Oise that hospital train #27 would be the relief train and the extra medics were being dispatched.

0125 hours. Major Hart, Surgeon's office, Oise, was given the previous information.

0150 hours, 8th Dec 1944. Capt Schroeder, S.D.O. Oise, was informed of all previous information and notified that copy of report will be sent to Commanding General's office.

0410 hours. OCOT gave French Railway report "Time of wreck approximately 2230 hours, 7 Dec. Engine and tender went over. Engineer killed and fireman injured. May have been relief crew. Cause of wreck: Roll of heavy wire which fell off of train #1161. Car 1 resting on embankment. Cars 3 and 8 telescoped. Cars 9 and 10 derailed. Cars 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13 are on track. All wounded in bed being transferred to cars 11, 12 and 13" Also advised that hospital train #27 departed Paris at 0350 hours, 8 December with staff and 6 additional Medical officers and 12 additional EM, also Lt. Greenman of Passenger Branch, OCOT, for scene of wreck at Varennes.

0505 hours Lt Kaplan OCOT asked that TWX be sent to reach OCOT by 0800 hours confirming information given.

0540 hours Lt Volence, RTO Epernay reported as follows: "Time of wreck approximately 2250 hours, 7 Dec. No. of cars on train 13. No. of patients 167 and staff of 27. Speed at time of accident 48 miles per hour. Engine #141P92. 40 yards of double track ripped up . Cars derailed on left side of track going west. Possibility exists that accident occurred by roll of BRC landing mats. 1 Frenchman killed and 1 badly injured. No US personnel injured.

0610 hours. Gave report from RTO Epernay to Lt Kaplan, OCOT.

0700 hours. TWX sent OCOT confirming information already given.

Main lines are expected to be clear late afternoon

8 December. Copies of this report have been furnished to Commanding General, Oise Section and Surgeon's Office, Oise Section.

R. W. B.
8 Dec 44
#4728

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

A. S. ROBERTS
1st Lt, Ord
Administration

...,Oise Section

APPENDIX NO. 5
(Chapter VI)

STO FORM #27 RAILWAY NUMBERS: (A) MAIN NO_____

(B) UNIT	(C) STRENGTH			
	OFFICERS	NURSES	WO	EM/EW

(D) ENTRAINING STATION_____ (N) DETRAINING STATION_____

SECTION_____ SECTION_____

DEPARTURE: (E) TIME_____ ARRIVAL: (O) TIME_____

(F) DATE_____ (P) DATE_____

(G) PASSING STATION	TIME			(L) WRL	(M) RL	RTO NOTIFIED
	(H) ARRIVAL	(J) DATE	(K) DEPART			

REFERENCES:_____

TIME	DATE	HANDLING GIVEN

ADVANCE SECTION
(Chapter VI)

Due to unavoidable circumstances a report from the Transportation Office of Advance Section has been delayed. Transportation Corps activities in Advance Section will be covered in a separate appendix as soon as practical.

CHAPTER VII

SOUTHERN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

6th Major Port
1st Military Railway Service

SOUTHERN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

(6th Major Port and
1st Military Railway Service)
(Chapter VII)

D-Day for the invasion of Southern France by Allied forces was on 15 August 1944. The operation was referred to as DRAGOON and was mounted from bases in Africa, Corsica, and Italy. It was controlled initially by the North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA) which later became the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTOUSA). On 1 November 1944 control of the tactical forces passed to the European Theater of Operations and on 20 November the Southern Line of Communications was established under control of the European Theater of Operations.

The remainder of this chapter is quoted directly from the Historical Record of the Transportation Officer, Headquarters, Southern Line of Communications, covering the period from 15 August 1944 when the first Transportation Corps elements landed and began operations in Southern France, through 31 January 1945.

"1 - INTRODUCTION

"1. Officially SOLOC (Southern Line of Communications) was activated on 20 November 1944 but actually such a Headquarters was conceived far before this time.

"2. Undoubtedly the original plans for the invasion of North Africa also included follow-up plans for the invasion of the Continent, step by step through Sicily, Italy, Sardinia, Corsica and eventually through Southern France. Even the most nebulous plan for an invasion must also make provision for the support of the Armies and SOLOC eventually became the Headquarters charged with the supporting of the Armies in Southern France even though the actual name was not conceived until many months later. It was not until Sicily had been conquered and the battle of Italy was well under way that definite plans began to take shape for the eventual invasion of Southern France. As preliminary steps in order to secure adequate bases close enough to support this operation, it was necessary first to capture Sardinia and Corsica and build up a sufficient number of air bases to furnish the necessary aerial support. The U S 7th Army, together with the 1st French Army were assigned the job of making the invasion of Southern France under the command of Major General PATCH and a planning Headquarters called Force 163 was established to work out the maze of details necessary to carry out successfully the combined air and seaborne operation.

"3. At the same time these plans were being laid, plans were also being formulated for another invasion of the Continent from bases in the British Isles so that eventually there were to be two separate forces operating against the enemy in France, one controlled by the North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA) (later known as the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTOUSA)) and the other controlled by the European Theater of Operations(ETOUSA). This dual control functioned satisfactorily as long as the two forces were operating independently, but with the rapid advance of the 3rd Army in the European Theater and the 7th Army in Southern France, these forces soon met, forming

one continuous front so that it was necessary to place both forces under one command, which was the European Theater of Operations. The Commanding General of Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA (later the name was changed to Communication Zone (COM ZONE) MTOUSA was charged with furnishing the necessary support of the forces for the invasion of Southern France, but when these forces finally linked up with the forces of the European Theater of Operations the entire country of France was then placed under the control of the European Theater. However, higher Headquarters decided that the same organization, i.e., Commanding General of Communications Zone MTOUSA and his staff, should continue to furnish the necessary support for the Armies in Southern France and it was at this time that SOLOC officially came into being.

"4. A seaborne invasion is largely a logistical problem in transportation and the Office of the Chief of Transportation, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) Headquarters, NATOUSA and Headquarters SOS NATOUSA, worked directly with Force 163 during the entire planning of the operation in order to provide the necessary ships and set up schedules for the flow of men, materials and supplies into the ports so that each item of equipment could be loaded on the proper ship, in the proper place and at the proper time and in order that ships and craft could arrive at the beaches and supplies be unloaded at the time when required by the fighting forces.

"5. The invasion of Southern France progressed rapidly and it was only a matter of days until General PATCH'S armored forces had penetrated inland hundreds of miles from their initial landing beaches and the ports of Toulon, Marseille and Port De Bouc. In order to carry out its functions properly in supporting the Armies it was necessary for COM ZONE MTOUSA to establish an Advance Section in France. The initial contingent departed from Caserta, Italy 12 September and established Headquarters at Lyon. September 15 five officers and four enlisted men from the Transportation Section departed from Caserta, Italy and formed the initial detachment of Transportation Section for Headquarters, Advance COM ZONE MTOUSA. As the Armies pushed rapidly forward it was necessary for the Advance COM ZONE Headquarters to move on to Dijon, 5 October, to keep in contact with the forces which they were supporting. On 1 November control of the Armies and supporting forces passed to the ETOUSA but the supply responsibility continued to remain under the Mediterranean Theater until 20 November. To staff the Headquarters of Southern Line of Communications, personnel was selected from COM ZONE ETOUSA. Transportation being an integrated section between Headquarters AFHQ and COM ZONE MTOUSA, its personnel was drawn from both of these Headquarters.

"6. The invasion was mde initially over three beaches named ALPHA, DELTA and CAMEL between Toulon, and Nice and one of the first objectives of the combat forces was to push rapidly to the west and capture the ports of Toulon, Marseille and Port De Bouc. Actually they went around Toulon and Marseille and Port De Bouc was the first of the three captured. This advance was so rapid that comparatively little damage was done at Port De Bouc and the first ships were berthed there 1 September. The City of Marseille was not captured until 28 August and Toulon shortly thereafter. The destruction at these ports was beyond all powers of description and at that time to expect that they could ever again be used for discharge of cargo certainly required a vivid imagination. Not one berth, either Liberty or half berth, was open

and not one shore crane was operatable. Both northern and southern entrances of the port were blocked by sunken ships scuttled parallel rather than lengthwise to jam the entrances. Scuttled block ships, seventy-five in number and aggregating 200,000 tons of shipping, were scattered from one end of the port to the other. Not until 8 September was the first berth open. However, the Navy Salvage Crews, the Engineer Corps and the Engineer Port Rehabilitation Battalions had experienced this same thing before in the Ports of Bizerte, Palermo, Naples and Leghorn and they set to work immediately sweeping and removing debris and wreckage that filled the entire area. The first ships were brought into Marseille and offshore discharge of cargo began on 8 September.

"7. The advance through Southern France was so rapid that the retreating enemy did not have time to wreck completely all the rail lines but nearly all the principal bridges were destroyed. There were two main supply routes to the north, one up the Rhone Valley to Lyon and Dijon and the other to the east through Grenoble and on up to Dijon. There were double track rail lines on both banks of the Rhone River but all the bridges had been so completely demolished that it has been impossible to use the lines on the west bank of the Rhone. However, the Military Railway Service rapidly rehabilitated the line on the east bank of the river and it has been the main supply route. Also, a single track line to Grenoble was developed but its use has become extremely limited during the winter months.

"8. During the initial stages of the invasion the bulk of our supplies was moved by truck.

"9. Plans called for the construction of a 4" and a 6" pipeline up the Rhone Valley. POL storage capacities in Southern France were:

St Raphael	35,000 Bbls
Marseille	502,000 "
Port De Bouc	1,180,000 "
Toulon	334,000 "

"10. Coastal Base Section (changed on 10 September to Continental Base Section) was activated at Naples, Italy for the purpose of carrying out the Communication Zone supply responsibility for the invading Armies. This Headquarters was established at Marseille immediately after the capture of that city. With the rapid advance of the Armies and the lengthening of the supply routes it soon became necessary to establish an Advance Section. Continental Base Section became Continental Advance Section and transferred its Headquarters to Dijon and Delta Base Section was activated to take over the duties previously performed by Continental Base Section. The 6th Port (Mobile) which had been at the Port of Naples, Italy for the past ten months and prior to that at Casablanca Morocco, was assigned the task of operating the ports in Southern France and the First Military Railway Service, also from the Mediterranean Theater, took over the rehabilitation and operation of the rail lines.

"11. It was soon evident that the Ports of Marseille and Port De Bouc could be developed in sufficient capacity to care for Army needs so it was decided that the Port of Toulon would be turned over the Navy and also be used for civilian needs. The Port of Nice was also used to a limited extent for the discharge of coasters.

"II - ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES

"1. Southern Line of Communications was established by General Order No. 61, Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations dated 3 November 1944 and Major General THOMAS B. LARKIN, formerly Commanding General, Communications Zone Mediterranean Theater of Operations, was assigned as Commanding General. Attached Exhibit "A" are copies of General Order No. 61 and letters from Lt. General John C. H. Lee to General Larkin and to the Chiefs of the General and Special Staff Sections which set out the basic policies for the organization and responsibilities of Headquarters Southern Line of Communications. Attached Exhibit "B" is an organizational chart of the Headquarters Southern Line of Communications. Attached Exhibit "C" is Memorandum dated 1 December which gives the responsibilities of the sub-ordinate Major Commands."

(NOTE: Exhibits A, B, and C omitted. Appendix No. 1 is a copy of General order No. 61, establishing SOLOC and assigning its command to Major General THOMAS B. LARKIN. In the same order, General LARKIN was assigned the duties of Deputy Commander, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations).

"2. General Order No. 2, 20 November 1944 Headquarters Southern Line of Communications assigned Brigadier General GEORGE C. STEWART as Transportation Officer, Southern Line of Communications. The duties of the Transportation Officer were announced in a letter dated 20 November 1944 from which the following is quoted:

"'1. General Functions: As prescribed in paragraphs 18 and 19, Section III, Chapter I, Staff Doctrines and Functions, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual dated 19 August 1940.

"'2. Duties:

a. Act as adviser to the Commanding General and Staff on Transportation Matters.

b. Prepare and submit to the General Staff Directives and orders on Transportation matters recommended for publication.

c. Represent the Commanding General for Transportation matters on planning and executive staffs, committees, boards and at meetings involving Transportation interests.

d. Exercise technical supervision over Transportation Corps facilities, activities, installations and troops, except Military Railway Service and Military Railway Service Troops.

e. Coordinate Transportation Corps activities between the Advance and Base Sections of SOLOC to the extent necessary to insure the efficient use of facilities employed for the through movement of personnel, supplies and equipment.

f. Exercise control over requests placed on the Military Railway Service to insure that the capacity of the Military Railway Service is not exceeded.'"

"3. The organization of the Office of the Transportation Officer was along the same lines as those at AFHQ in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations...."

(NOTE: Following is a summary of the information given on the Organization Chart of the Transportation Section SOLOC, dated 15 December 1944:

Transportation Officer - ~~Major~~ Brigadier General GEORGE C. STEWART
Executive - Colonel THOMAS FULLER

Branches

Operations - Lt. Colonel E. L. BARGONES
Movements Group - Major G.L. BENNETT
Rail Group - Captain W. R. DeYOUNG
Water Group - Major R. K. LEWIS
Highway Group - Captain E. J. P. O'CONNOR
Air Group - Captain C. SCHLANGER

Planning - Colonel L.G. ZINNECKER

Administrative Branch - Colonel L. G. ZINNECKER
Office Administrative Group - CWO C. J. POTTHAST
Control Group - Major T. R. PALMERLEE
Supply Group - Captain V. LITCHFIELD
Troops Group - Lt. Colonel S. R. WOODRUFF
Baggage Group - 1st Lt. C. W. RICHARDS

(Summary: 23 officers and 39 enlisted personnel))

"4. The general policy of the Transportation Section has been to decentralize as much control as possible to the Bases and Advance Sections and control only such movements and matters as require coordination between the Bases and/or Advance Sections. The following is a statement of the general policy:

"'1. General Policy: Transportation facilities, installations an agencies whose operation is confined to one Section will be under command and control of the respective Section Commander. Transportation facilities, agencies and installations whose operations extend beyond the boundaries of a single Section will be controlled and coordinated by this Headquarters. Control and coordination exercised by this Headquarters will be accomplished by action through the Staff and Command Agencies of the Sections and other Commands.

"'2. Water

a - Port Operations: Discharge and loading of ocean shippin will be accomplished in the Marseille area. Consistent with security of carg and with the ability of the ports to periodically clear quays, the prompt discharge and turn around of ships will take precedence over daily port clearance.

b - Inland Waterways: The resumption of operation of the Inland Waterways system will be encouraged. To this end, cargo will be offered

by the Base and Advance Sections for movement. As operations progress, it is contemplated that this facility will be largely utilized to further French internal economy.

c - Procurement of Shipping: Allocation of shipping for delivery of supplies from the US to SOLOC is a function of ETOUSA. Procurement of shipping for inter-Mediterranean or coastal movements will be accomplished by this Headquarters.

d - Allocation of Port Facilities to the French: Port facilities not required for military purposes will be returned to French control. The port capacity returned to French control will be limited to that capacity which the French are able to clear without call upon U S Motor Transport or rail capacity required by U S military agencies. As required, action to carry out this policy will be taken by this Headquarters after consultation with Base Section Commander.

"13: Rail

a - Operation: Operation of Railways for military purposes will be under Director General, 1st Military Railway Service, who is directly responsible to the Commanding General, SOLOC. This Headquarters will make allocations of tonnage to the various users, and will exercise supervisory control over loading, discharge and determination of delivery points to the extent considered necessary to insure orderly and efficient use of available rail capacity.

b - Use

(1) Rail transportation will normally be utilized in lieu of motor transport for all hauls in excess of 50 miles. Rail transportation will be used for shorter hauls when such use is practicable and operationally sound.

(2) Prompt loading and discharge of railway cars being essential to the efficient use of available rail capacity, Section Commanders will insure that no undue delay of empty or loaded cars results from failure by agencies under their command to promptly load or discharge.

"14. Air

a - Personnel: Routine movements of personnel by air will be arranged between Section Commanders and local Air Transport officials.

b - Freight: This Headquarters retains authority for determining what freight shipped by SOLOC agencies shall move by air. Requests for authority to ship by air will be made on this Headquarters. This Headquarters will also handle all matters connected with air shipments out of SOLOC or into SOLOC territory.

"15. Motor

a - Use: Long hauls (in excess of 100 miles turn around) will be held to the minimum consistent with meeting SOLOC's supply obligations.

b - Operational Organization: Motor transport assigned or attached to Sections, except administrative vehicles, will be operated under centralized control in the Office of the Section Transportation Officer.

c - Control of Movements

(1) Definitions:

(a) Internal Movements - Movements initiated and executed within the boundaries of one Section; als movements initiated in CONAD or in the area of one of the Armies of the Sixth Army Group and executed within these respective areas.

(b) Through Movements - All movements not within classification of internal movements.

(2) Control:

(a) Internal movements will be controlled by Sectio Commanders.

(b) Through movements will be coordinated and controlled by this Headquarters. This control wil normally be exercised by the issuance of routin timing, fueling and bivouacing instructions to the Sections. When unusual conditions make ful centralized control over all road movements tempo.rarily desirable, this Headquarters will assume complete authority over all through move ments and to the extent such moves effect internal movements.

"6. Reports:

Reports on Transportation activities will be held to the minimum consistent with this and other Headquarters receiving information require for the orderly conduct of business. Reports now being forwarded by the Sections will be continued.'"

* * * * * *

"IV - ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUPS - OTO

"1. Control Group

The duties of the Head of the Control Group are given in Exhibit "H".* In general, most reports on operations were continued in the same form as in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Since SOLOC operates at least semi-independtly from Communications Zone ETOUSA, it was not necessary to adopt the same reporting procedures and reports as used by that Headquarters. In order to keep the OCOT COM ZONE ETOUSA promptly informed on port operations in Southern France a daily telephone report on operations is submitted directl from the Office of the Transportation Officer, DELTA BASE Section to the OCOT. Attached Exhibit "J"* is a list of all recurring reports required by this office. Exhibit "K"* is a list of all recurring reports required from this office. (*NOTE: Exhibits H, J, and K NOT included in extracts but available in file for documentation).

"2. Air Group

a - Under the Mediterranean Theater the Air Group was the official screening agency for all requests from the ground forces for air transportation. In ETOUSA this screening is done by the Air Transport Command.

b - To insure that a centralized control is maintained and that adequate records are available to ascertain tonnage of air shipments, Staff Memorandum No. 2, Hq SOLOC dated 4 January was published and a letter, subject: "Request for Air Transportation of Freight," was sent to DELTA BASE Section and Continental Advance Section.

"3. Personal Baggage Group

a - The purpose of this group is to carry on the functions of baggage as outlined in current War Department publications and to serve as a clearing agency for the collection of information relating to baggage scheduled to arrive, arriving, stored, forwarded, in transit, or shipped from the Theater with the exception of personal effects of deceased, missing in action, interned, or captured personnel which remains a Quartermaster function.

b - The work entails inquiries and claims of lost and unclaimed baggage relative to ship, convoy, vehicle, rail, truck or airplane which calls for an elaborate set of records of loading and discharging of vessels, force numbers, bills of lading, passenger lists, manifests and transportation cabin baggage lists, airway bills, railway express waybills to be used for reference and proper screening of baggage. Card indexes are maintained showing the movement of all incoming and outgoing baggage until it is delivered to owner or shipped to effects depot at Kansas City, Mo.

c - Base Sections have been contacted and a coordinating operating procedure established to forward baggage of individuals and units to owners to insure that baggage is received, forwarded, stored, inspected, processed, packed and crated, shipped in accordance with current Theater policies and that unauthorized matter of inflammable and explosive nature is not placed aboard ship. Supervision, preparation, execution of certificates, forms and tags are accomplished in compliance with letter this Headquarters, subject: "Baggage Forms," dated 28 December 1944.

d - Definite policy in the disposition of effects of deceased, missing in action, interned, or captured personnel has been set up in conjunction with the Quartermaster of the Seventh Army, Sixth Army Group and First Tactical Air Force in accordance with ETOUSA letter dated 27 November 1944, file AG 332.3 Pp Qm, Subject: "Personal Effects and Lost Baggage," and SOLOC cable reference LX-19938, Cite SSTPN 738, dated 6 January 1945.

e - Pursuant to NATOUSA Circular 121, dated 1 October 1944 and WD Letter AG 524 18 August 1944, OB-S-SPOT-M, subject: "Processing of Baggage from Overseas," dated 29 August 1944, procedure for disposition and hospitalization of baggage and personal effects for SOLOC territory

was outlined in cable this Headquarters reference LX 16417, SSTPN 151 SSGDS, dated 10 December 1944. Provision was made for baggage transported by air with restrictions to surplus amounts in SOLOC cable reference LX 18266, SSTPN 616 SSGDS, 23 December 1944. Head of Baggage Group had made inspections to field installations and in collaboration with Base Sections and Commands has assisted in the formulation of a standard operating procedure for baggage along with the establishment of a baggage transportation warehouse in DELTA BASE which is to be the center of debarkation of baggage from this territory to United States.

* * * * **

"4. Water Group

a – Actual control of shipping into and out of the Ports of Southern France continued under the control of MTOUSA and C in C Med after the activation of SCLOC under COM ZONE ETOUSA. After 1 November 1944 the duties of the Commanders of the Naval Detachments (COMNAVDETS) at Toulon and Marseille were undertaken by the French Naval Officers in Command (NOIC), under the Prefect Maritime (COMAR). The Prefect Maritime has assumed responsibility for those duties in the Southern French coast normally performed by the Flag Officer in charge, the French NOIC's (Naval Officer in Charge) are responsible for port duties and local patrols, sailing of French controlled coastal shipping and coastwise shipping as required by Prefect Maritime and Commodore Liaison, American and British (COMLAB) respectively, and the maintenance of swept channels. COMLAB maintains liaison with the Prefect Maritime, coordinating all shipping interests. The responsibility of the Flag Officer, Northern Area (FONA) is the direction of policy regarding activities of Southern France Ports through the Prefect Maritime and COMLAB and the direct operational control of naval forces.

b – With the opening of the Ports of De Bouc, Toulon and Marseille operations at the beaches were gradually closed down. ALPHA Beach closed on 11 September; DELTA Beach closed after completion of discharge of the cargo on 20 September; CAMEL Beach closed operations early in October.

c – The first Liberty ships completed discharge at Port De Bouc and at Toulon on 13 September. Three Liberties entered Marseille on the afternoon of 15 September. Rehabilitation of these ports progressed rapidly and by the end of September there were fifteen (15) full Liberty berths available in Marseille, seven (7) at Toulon and three (3) at Port De Bouc. In spite of the remarkable progress in making new berths available, ships continued to arrive at a faster rate than they could be discharged and by the end of September serious port congestion threatened. To alleviate this situation C in C Med cancelled several convoys from Africa and Italy during the period 4 October to 15 October. The berthing situation improved rapidly at Marseille and by 31 October there were thirty-one (31) full Liberty Berths; by 30 November forty-three (43) and by 31 December there were forty-five (45). With the increase in berthing facilities the discharge of cargo

increased more rapidly than it could be cleared from the quays and by the middle of October the backpile had increased to over 40,000 DWLT. The discharge rate was decreased on all but priority ammunition and other items which could be easily cleared and all means available concentrated on port clearance. By 25 October normal discharge was resumed. By the end of November and during December there have been many empty berths prior to the arrival of each new convoy. The discharge rate and turn-around time of ships has steadily improved. Convoy UGS-62 which completed discharge on 31 December was turned around in less than seven (7) days and the average discharge per ship per day was 823 DWLT.

d - Independent sailings in the Mediterranean for cargo ships commenced with Convoy UGS-60. Ships sailing independently may be interpreted as "out of convoy either with or without escort" as differentiated from "unescorted" which is "out of convoy without escort." This has also helped to speed up turn-around time of ships.

e - In peace time the Inland Waterways of France have formed "an important part of the transportation system. At first appearance it looked like a large lift could be obtained up the Rhone River and its tributaries. However, many obstacles have been encountered and to date very little use has been made of them outside of a few hundred tons a day for port clearance out of Marseille and De Bouc. First, most of the channels were blocked by demolished bridges; then extremely high water prevented navigation. This was followed by most of the barges from Lyon and north being frozen in the ice.

f - Inland Waterways are under control of the French Office of National Navigation. A French liaison officer has been attached to the SOLOC Transportation Section to work with local barge operators in handling Army shipments. It is expected that by Spring a considerable lift of both POL and coal can be made by barge.

g - Certain reports are required from the Base Section concerning shipping activities at the ports. (Appendix Nos. 2, 3, and 4 are copies of estimate of Supply Situation Reports Nos. 1 through 3 covering through 30 December 1944. Appendix No. 5 covers agreement with the French Civil Authorities regarding the use of the ports in Southern France for the handling of civil supplies).

"5. <u>Rail Group</u>

** ** **

a - The rehabilitation and operation of the railways for military purposed are under the Director General, 1st Military Railway Service, who is directly responsible to the Commanding General, SOLOC. The 1st Military Railway Service has been established as a separate command in much the same manner as a Base Section is organized and units are assigned and attached to the MRS in the same manner as to a Base Section.

b – Within two days after the landings in Southern France the 7th Army was using the narrow gauge rail line from Frejus to St. Maxime to haul ammunition from DELTA Beach. At first this was only a small Diesel powered car but by D-5 three trains a day were being moved from Frejus to St. Maxime.

c – The first standard gauge line put into operation was from St. Raphael to Carnoules to Aix en Provence which had a capacity of 3500 tons per day. The line from Aix north to Grenoble was open except for the bridges across the Durance River at Meyrargues and the Buech River at Sisteron. Supplies were hauled by rail to Meyrargues then trucked to Sisteron and then by rail to Grenoble. On 9 September a bridge was completed at Meyrargues which was strong enough for loaded railroad cars to be pushed across even though it could not carry an engine and on 15 September a similar bridge was completed at Sisteron. The capacity of this line was 1500 tons. By 25 September the line along the east bank of the Rhone had opened as far north as Lyon with a capacity of 3000 tons per day (TPD), and the line from Valence to Grenoble was open with a capacity of 3000 TPD.

d – The demands for rail tonnage exceeded the capacity of the lines and the first RCM meeting was held on 26 September at SOS Advance Hq at Lyon. The total bids were 8433 TPD while the bids accepted totalled only 4923 TPD. As the lines were rehabilitated and additional rolling stock and motive power were added the capacities increased rapidly. By 4 October the bids accepted totalled 8350 TPD; by 12 October 12,000 TPD; by 16 November 14,000 TPD; by 26 December 15,000 TPD.

"6. Supply Group

** ** **

a – When Project T-3-44 covering Transportation Corps supplies and equipment for the invasion and subsequent port operations in Southern France was approved early in 1944, it became the responsibility of the Supply Branch, Transportation Section, Headquarters, Services of Supply, North African Theater of Operations to obtain the required material and hold it in Theater stocks.

b – Procurement was effected by placing requisitions on the New York Port of Embarkation for the required items, and holding them frozen in depot stocks upon receipt until the date they were required for release for shipment to Southern France.

c – Transfer of supplies to Southern France was accomplished by phased requisitions on depots, insuring that each ship on initial convoys was fitted with sufficient Transportation Corps cargo handling gear to insure complete and efficient discharge under possible adverse conditions.

d – After the initial convoys, Transportation Corps supplies and equipment were phased into each following convoy to provide a sufficient amount of cargo handling equipment as the tonnage discharge capacity increased and to provide replacement for any losses incurred. Simultaneously requisitions were placed on the New York Port of Embarkation for material for direct delivery to Southern France in order to build up stocks of Transportation Corps material at that point.

e - When plans for the detachment of the Southern France area from the Mediterranean Theater of Operations were formulated, and the projected closing of the Mediterranean Base Section became firm, a large part of the Transportation Corps supplies and equipment in the depot at that location were shipped to Southern France to further build up the stock level.

f.- The Transportation Corps depot at Marseille was not established until after the port had been in operation for some time, and as a result of that situation, and the widespread area of activity and attendent confusion of the original and subsequent beach operations, a considerable amount of supplies was scattered about and not recovered. Material from the original phased shipments is still coming into the depot as it is discovered in depots of other services, or in the hands of organizations not authorized to possess such items.

g - As a result of the high recovery of items on phased requisitions, the very considerable shipments of material from the depot at Oran and the direct delivery of supplies from the United States, the Transportation Corps supply situation in regard to cargo handling gear became very satisfactory at an early date.

h - Upon the organization of the Supply Group at this Headquarters, it was necessary to put into operation a stock record system, and to procure immediately a library of technical data, both of which are primary requirements for the intelligent operation of a supply activity. In the main, this has been done.

i - It was then necessary to ascertain the Transportation Supply situation in Southern France as soon as possible, and stock record cards soon indicated that it was not necessary to place a maintenance requisition on the New York Port of Embarkation in January 1945 for delivery in April 1945.

j - Expanding port operations at Marseille indicated that medium tugs were necessary for use in berthing ships and to augment the available towing capacity at the port. A requisition has been placed on the New York Port of Embarkation for six medium tugs.

k - The planning for Military Railway operations for the invasion of Southern France was accomplished by Military Railway Service, North African Theater of Operations. Requisitions for locomotives, track material, bridging, water and fuel oil stations and communications equipment were initiated by Military Railway Service and processed through the Supply Branch, Transportation Section, Headquarters, Service of Supply, North African Theater of Operations. It was the responsibility of the Supply Branch to insure delivery of this material. Although Military Railway Service controls their own supplies, requisitions for their requirements are processed through the Supply Branch Transportation Section of this Headquarters. The Supply Branch, Transportation Section acts as liaison between Military Railway Service, PEMBARK and other Supply Services within the Theater covering railway requirements.

l - The Supply Branch, Transportation Section, edits all Military Railway Service requisitions before forwarding to EMBARK, extracts items that can be supplied by other Services from Theater Stocks, is responsible for procurement and follow-up of railway supply demands, prepares reports pertaining to these supplies, handles all correspondence for railway supplies and maintains files for same, maintains records of Military Railway Supplies, maintains record of shipments and forwards this information to Military Railway Service.

m - All supplies ordered by Military Railway Service for operations for the invasion have been received with exception of locomotives and track material. Of the original ten (10) sixty-five (65-ton) Diesel Electric and eighty-seven (87) 2-8-0 Steam Locomotives ordered, all Diesels have been received, forty-four (44) of the 2-8-0 Locomotives have been received and the remaining forty-three (43) 2-8-0 Locomotives are scheduled to arrive on the SEATRAIN LAKEHURST and SEATRAIN TEXAS for discharge at Cherbourg the later part of January 1945. As demolition to railway right-of-ways was found to be less extensive than first estimated it was decided to cancel all track material for Southern France; although some had been loaded for shipment, the bulk of track material was cancelled.

n - As demands for motive power increased, thirty-five (35) 2-8-0 Locomotives are being sent here from North Africa, and thirty (30) are being diverted from shipments from the United States destined for Italy. Twenty-two (22) have been received from North Africa and twenty (20) have been diverted to Southern France from Italy shipments.

"7. Highway Group

a - Upon the arrival of COM ZONE MTOUSA Advance Detachment at Lyon 15 September, truck operations were proceeding over an area stretching from the Southern coast of France to the Province of Haute Saone. At the lower end of the network trucks were loaded at the beaches and ports and dispatched in small groups immediately upon loading for Army destinations. Truck strength was based in two general areas at opposite ends of the liberated territory. Communications Zone and Army truck companies were stationed in the Marseille-St. Raphael area and Army Truck strength was centered at the northern terminus of the road net. Singly and in small groups of varying size 2-½ ton 6 x 6's speeded along the winding, tree-lined routes of France to the front. Meanwhile, as the Port of Marseille increased the tonnage being discharged, increasing truck strength was employed in port clearance at Marseille and Port De Bouc where POL increased daily in amount of discharge. A 24-hour truck shuttle operation was proceeding at Sisteron, picking up tonnage from the rail at Manosque and carrying it to the railhead at Sisteron around the demolished railroad bridges between these two points. The principal highway route from the coast north was through Aix, via Manosque, Vollone, Sisteron, Serres to Grenoble. From Grenoble the route lead through Voiron, Lancin, Bourg to Lons Le Saunier, to Poligny and forward to ASP's. The route, although mountainous south of Grenoble, handled the traffic adequately thanks to the speedy and efficient work of the Corps of Engineers in repairing strategic bridges.

b - With only two Movement Control organizations, the 6690th and 2643rd, present, movement control was largely centered in the coast area and Army area, with little coverage on the long, intermediate expanses of road. The Michelin road signs were of great value to convoy commanders and drivers in the absence of any considerable amount of military signing. The mild weather permitted bivouacing at almost any point, although motor fuels were available only at scattered points and in small amounts.

c - About the first of October action was taken to divert most U.S. Army traffic from the Grenoble route to the Rhone Valley route, north from Aix to Vienne, thence to Lancin and along the old route through Bourg, Lons Le Saunier, Poligny and Besancon and Vesoul. This new route eliminated the safety hazards encountered on the Grenoble route and separated the American and French traffic, French traffic continuing to utilize the Grenoble route.

d - The latter part of September all traffic was diverted around Lyon due to lack of bridges in that metropolitan center. Movement Control organization was begun at Marseille on 25 September. Traffic Posts were set up at Vienne, Aix, Lancin and Bourg. This layout agreed upon by Com Zone MTOUSA Advance, and Con Base representatives was operated by personnel of the 2643rd Movement Control Group newly arrived from Corsica. Reliable statistics at this period were practically impossible to obtain. However, a check of Traffic Control Posts at Sisteron on the Grenoble route on 20 September revealed that 800 trucks passed through bound north for Army dumps.

e - About the 4th of November, with the organization and installation of Continental Advance Section at Dijon, a Movement Control Office at Dijon and Traffic Control Posts at Dijon, Macon, Langres, Montigny, Pesmes and Gray began operation. The 6690th personnel who had been operating Traffic Control Posts in CONAD Area were then withdrawn for use by the Army. About the 15th October central Movement Control functions were exercised for the first time by COM ZONE MTOUSA Advance Detachment. All convoys were cleared by the Highway Group of Transportation Section.

f - Truck strength in the Communications Zone was centered in the Marseille area and reinforced to a great extent by Army truck companies. Equipment of the 897th, 536th, 437th, 450th and other AAA Battalions was accomplished and aided greatly in handling the truck commitments.

g - As of the 24th September rail capacity from the Marseille area to Vesoul was 1200 tons with all other Army tonnage arriving by truck and plane. In the area north of Grenoble 320,000 troops were being supported, of which 40,000 were Army, 25,000 Air Corps, 100,000 Division and Corps and 125,000 were French. Ammo was being delivered at the rate of 500 tons per day. Medical supplies were arriving at the rate of 5 tons per week per division. Of Signal Corps supplies, 100 tons were arriving daily for U.S troops and 100 tons for the French. Ordnance II and IV were coming in at the rate of 100 tons per day for the French and 100 tons for U.S.

h – COM ZONE truck strength as of the 20th September was principally concentrated in Marseille areas. Eighteen (18) truck companies were in operations, of which six (6) were DUKW. The 437th and 897th AAA were being equipped and activated as the 284th QM and 285th QM Battalions, with three companies each. In addition the 7040th Italian POW Battalion was in operation hauling ammo in convoy to the Army dump at Burgoing from Beaches.

i – On the 26th of October truck strength at Marseille consisted of eight (8) U S Truck Companies, ten (10) AAA Truck Companies, ten (10) Italian Truck Companies, five (5) French Truck Groups and a civilian driver pool of 213 vehicles and 131 civilian vehicles. This total truck strength of 2,535 vehicles, due to high deadlines and operating difficulties, resulted in an actual working truck strength of 1670 vehicles. Deadline rates were 30% for U S controlled vehicles and 40% for French military. At this time four (4) U S Truck Companies were operating in the 7th Army area. Seven (7) French groups with strength of 1,360 vehicles were operating in the First French Army area. About the 10th October the use of COM ZONE trucks for long hauls were embargoed by COM ZONE MTOUSA Advance Detachment and rail lines began to carry the bulk of Army requirements in increasing amounts.

j – On 1 December 1944 vehicle strength was distributed as follows:

At Marseille	2,659	vehicles
CONAD	535	"
6th Army Group	2,333	"

These figures include U.S. Military, French Military, civilian and Italian operated vehicles. About 10 December 1944 DELTA BASE truck strength at Marseille hit a peak of 3,200 vehicles and truck strength was then reduced at that point with diversions to the Sete-Angoulen operation, 7th Army, First French Army and CONAD. At present DELTA BASE truck strength is approximately 2200 vehicles and CONAD truck strength is approximately 765 vehicles.

k – Early in December 10-ton semi-trailers and 5-ton tractors for twelve (12) Truck Companies began arriving at Marseille. This equipment had been planned and requisitioned in August 1944 by Chief of Transportation, MATOUSA. Additional carrying capacity of this equipment as compared with the conventional 2-1/2 ton 6 x 6 is aiding greatly in clearance in Marseille. The arrival of 2-1/2 ton 6 x 6 COE, long wheel base trucks at Marseille in December was an added help in port clearance.

l – The 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions plus the 14th Division were moved from Marseille to Army Area in the second week of November. On the 16th of November the 1st DMI (French Infantry) moved to the Bordeaux Area from First French Army Territory. This same unit was moved back to First French Army Area on the 30th of December. Infantry elements of the 63rd, 42nd and 70th Infantry Divisions were moved from Marseille to Army Area on the 15th of December. These moves of large tactical units were completed successfully with security despite the great distances, poor communications and scarcity of regulating personnel.

m – On November 9th this Headquarters assumed functions of coordination of all highway moves with Headquarters COM ZONE ETOUSA, other COM ZONE ETOUSA Sections and 3rd Army.

n - Since the 10th of November driver strength of all units in SOLOC has been greatly increased under ETOUSA directives permitting forty-five (45) extra drivers in addition to strength specified in T/O & E 10-57. This program has been hindered by the low priority assigned to personnel requisition and the shortage of colored driver reinforcements.

o - On 30 January 1945 a pool of approximately 1000 vehicles began assembling at Dijon. Inability of rail lines to forward tonnage to Army made a large scale truck operation the only alternative means to discharge SOLOC responsibilities. Four (4) Truck Companies equipped with 10-ton semi-trailers and tractors were drawn from DELTA BASE. Six (6) Truck Companies equipped with 10-ton semi-trailers and tractors were drawn from other COM ZONE ETOUSA Sections. These vehicles will be reinforced with 200 to 300 trucks from CONAD strength and will shuttle supplies from Dijon, Langres and Is sur Tille to Army dumps north and west of Epinal. This operation will continue until rail capacity to Army dumps equals Army needs.

"8. Troops Group

* * * * * *

a - Original service troops, as set up on DRAGOON Troop List, proved inadequate to supply the increased responsibilities placed on COM ZONE MTOUSA Advance. ETOUSA provided 7412 T.C. Service Troops in November and 1944 in December to ease this situation.

b - Studies have been made and presented on Transportation Corps troops required to meet various situations, i.e.,

(1) To make 1st French Army self supporting

(2) To support additional French Troops

(3) To handle additional territory to be added to SOLOC

(4) To bring SOLOC to maximum capacity

"9. Administrative Branch

* * * * * *

a - Determined personnel to be brought from Italy to France.

b - Organized Transportation Section and assigned personnel to various Branches and Groups.

c - Prepared Office Memorandum outlining duties and responsibilities of Heads of Branches and functions of Groups.

d - Secured office space in new Headquarters building and organized move.

e - Determines and controls office functions and procedures.

"10. Planning Branch

* * * * * *

a - Since the invasion of Southern France activities of the Planning Branch have been limited to a study of territory to be covered with a particular emphasis upon existing transportation facilities and their state of repair. Estimates and forcasts of requirements and capacities of principal rail lines have been prepared.

"11. Movements Group

** * * * *

a - While it is the function of movements to accept, plan and process all bids for cargo, personnel, units and vehicles, the Movements Group has been more concerned with special moves of all kinds due to the conditions existing in the SOLOC area. This includes the planning, supervision and execution of these moves.

b - This includes movements of large units such as regiments or divisions from the States to their ultimate destination and special movements such as exchange of repatriates, displaced persons, refugees, etc. One such move involved approximately 9,000 individuals.

c - Since rail has been limited, normal high priority rail bids have been handled as a regular operating procedure. These moves have, in most cases, been very urgent and necessitated constant supervision. Cargo such as coal, POL, and other badly needed materials were controlled in a like manner by the Cargo Unit of Movements Group.

APPENDIX NO. 1

Chapter VII

HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

GO 61

3 Nov 1944

I - ESTABLISHMENT OF SOUTHERN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Effective 20 November 1944 the Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, is charged with the administrative and logistical support of the Sixth Army Group and attached Air Forces. To accomplish this mission, a Southern Line of Communications is established within the Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army.

II - ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT

For the purpose of administering the Southern Line of Communications, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Major General T.B. Larkin is assigned in command thereof, and for this purpose is appointed Deputy Commander, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army with station at APO 750.

By command of Lieutenant General LEE:

R.B. LORD,
Brigadier General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

(s) R.B. Lovett
(t) R.B. LOVETT
Brigadier General, USA, Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
"G"

HEADQUARTERS SOLOC
OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
APO 39 - U S ARMY

4 December 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-4 (P)

SUBJECT : Estimate of Supply Situation - Report No. 1.

I - PORT OPERATIONS

The average daily discharge for all port facilities for week ending 26 November was 19,187 long tons of general cargo; 2,320 long tons of wheeled vehicles; total of 21,507 long tons. Cargo back piled in ports at end of period (26 November) was 10,150 long tons; and 112,504 long tons of cargo remained aboard ships to be unloaded.

II - HIGHWAY

Present truck strength in SOLOC and Army areas is not adequate for present and expected requirements. However, the eight (8) new truck companies presently being equipped for SOLOC with 10-ton semi-trailers and 5-ton tractor trucks, the ten (10) companies presently enroute from the Zone of Interior to SOLOC, the ten (10) companies being loaned by ETOUSA to Sixth Army Group, together with French and American Truck companies presently operating, are expected to provide sufficient trucks to alleviate the present critical truck situation.

III - RAIL

The major supply channel for 6th Army Group, attached Air Forces and for build-up of stocks in CONAD is by rail north from Marseille. The total capacity of this rail connection is about 14,000 DWLT per day. Distribution to 7th Army and 1st French Army is from the vicinity of Dijon to railheads in the Epinal-Lunoville and Besancon areas respectively. Average daily deliveries by rail to 7th Army and 1st French Army during the period 20 November to 30 November inclusive were 3,600 DWLT per day and 2,000 DWLT per day respectively.

IV - TROOPS

The original DRAGOON Troop List provided a "Division Slice" of about 43,000 men. However, this was due to inclusion of a large proportion of supporting rather than service troops. In addition the scope of the operation was limited to capture of Marseille and Toulon and to an advance about 225 miles up the Rhone Valley. Due to the addition to date of seven (7) combat divisions without a proportionate increase in service troops, the division slice now stands at about 38,000 men. Extension of the line of communications by 200 miles over that originally contemplated has added a further load. This situation is now under study by G-3 and details of status and requirements will be given in subsequent reports after consultation with that Staff Section.

V - PIPELINE & INLAND WATERWAYS

To be covered in subsequent reports.

APPENDIX No. 3
(Chapter No. VII)

HEADQUARTERS SOLOC
OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
APO 39 - U S ARMY

19 December 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-4 (P)

SUBJECT : Estimate of Supply Situation - Report No. 2

I - PORT OPERATIONS

a.. Daily average discharge at ports of Southern France:

Week Ending	General Cargo	Wheeled Vehicles	Bulk POL	Total
3/12	15,017	1,443	1,761	18,221
10/12	19,151	1,073	2,548	22,772
17/12	17,644	1,155	2,884	21,683

b. Daily average port clearance for the same period:

Week Ending	General Cargo	Wheeled Vehicles	Bulk POL	Total
3/12	7,359	7,547	609	15,516
10/12	5,572	8,711	691	14,974
17/12	6,010	7,111	358	13,479

Cargo on quay 17 December - 18,795 DWLT

c. As of 1800 hours 17 December, 32 ships were discharging at ports of Marseille and De Bouc; two (2) were awaiting berth and three (3) were ready to sail.

II - HIGHWAY

a. Operations for the past two weeks have been confined to port and railhead clearance. Long distance vehicular moves have been confined to over SOLOC road nets and organizational moves, Ordnance stock transfers or supply moves by vehicles not under SOLOC control.

b. The following are figures of vehicles operating in SOLOC on the date indicated:

	Date	Total Vehicles	Working	Deadlined	Deadlined Acct No Drivers
DELTA BASE*	12/12	2,832	2,178	552	102
CONAD	13/12	303	182	104	17
		3,135	2,360	656	119

* Average of day and night shifts.

c. Equipment and training of 12 newly arrived truck companies

with ton-ton semi-trailers and tractor trucks is progressing as rapidly as possible. All new vehicle equipment is expected to be ready for issue by 10 January 1945.

d. Long hauls by truck are confined to isolated emergency shipments which are thoroughly screened.

III - RAIL

a. The capacity of Rhone Valley lines remains the same 14,000 TPD through to 31 December 1944. Full tonnage still not utilized.

b. POM Conference allocated full commitments for coming period 21-31 December inclusive, being necessary to cut 675 tons from total bids.

c. Tonnage capacity from Lunoville to Saarebourg now 3[illegible] net tons per day to be increased to 4500 TPD when double track into Emberm[illegible] completed about 20 December, and adequate dispatching circuits are established also about same date. Estimate for line from Sarrebourg to Strasbourg is two weeks, when tunnel between these two points is completed. Within 3 days after opening of tunnel now estimated on 25 December, MRS will be able to handle 4500 TPD through Epinal to Strasbourg or any portion of it to distances short of Strasbourg.

d. Cars under load remained a problem, particularly in 7th Army Area, averaging considerably about daily established average of 500 cars. Further, a backlog of over 1000 cars awaited movement into 7th Army Railheads. Cable issued to 6th Army Group and 7th Army directing action to be taken.

APPENDIX No. 4
(Chapter VII)

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
APO 39 - U S ARMY

1 January 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: G-4 (P)

SUBJECT : Estimate of Supply Situation - Report No. 3

I - PORT OPERATIONS

1. The daily average discharge for the 14-day period ending 1800 hours 30 December was:

Bulk POL	4,460	DWLT
Wheeled Vehicles	840	"
General Cargo	13,750	"
Total	19,050	"

Cargo afloat, remaining to be discharged at the close of the period 31,588 DWLT

Total average port clearance over same period -

Water (Inland Waterways)	464	DWLT
Highway	7,840	"
Rail	4,670	"
	12,974	

Cargo remaining to be cleared from quays 25,785 DWLT
(This is an increase of approximately 8000 tons over that remaining on the quays on 16 December)

2. During this period there has been a very marked improvement in the turn around time of ships. All vessels from UGS 61 completely discharged and sailed, except two which are under repairs, with an average turn around time of 7 days 17 hours. UGS 62, consisting of 16 ships was turned around in 6 days 18-¼ hours. The total cargo discharged in this convoy was 89,576 DWLT. The average discharge per ship was 828 DWLT. On the 28 December thirteen vessels discharged an average of 1,115 tons per vessel. This discharge was accomplished somewhat at the expense of backpiling cargo in the quays. Cargo remaining on the quays increased to approximately 19,000 DWLT during the discharge of UGS 61, but dropped to 4,000 DWLT just before the arrival of UGS 62 and increased to almost 28,000 DWLT at the time UGS 62 was completed. However, most of this cargo should be cleared before the arrival of the next convoy.

3. Commencing with UGS 66 Convoy cycle will be decreased to five days.

with ton-ton semi-trailers and tractor trucks is progressing as rapidly as possible. All new vehicle equipment is expected to be ready for issue by 10 January 1945.

d. Long hauls by truck are confined to isolated emergency shipments which are thoroughly screened.

III - RAIL

a. The capacity of Rhone Valley lines remains the same, 14,000 TPD through to 31 December 1944. Full tonnage still not utilized.

b. POM Conference allocated full commitments for coming period 21-31 December inclusive, being necessary to cut 675 tons from total bids.

c. Tonnage capacity from Lunéville to Saarebourg now 3300 net tons per day to be increased to 4500 TPD when double track into Emberménil completed about 20 December, and adequate dispatching circuits are established also about same date. Estimate for line from Sarrebourg to Strasbourg is two weeks, when tunnel between these two points is completed. Within 3 days after opening of tunnel now estimated on 25 December, MRS will be able to handle 4500 TPD through Epinal to Strasbourg or any portion of it to distances short of Strasbourg.

d. Cars under load remained a problem, particularly in 7th Army Area, averaging considerably about daily established average of 500 cars. Further, a backlog of over 1000 cars awaited movement into 7th Army Railheads. Cable issued to 6th Army Group and 7th Army directing action to be taken.

APPENDIX No. 4
(Chapter VII)

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
APO 39 - U S ARMY

1 January 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: G-4 (P)

SUBJECT : Estimate of Supply Situation - Report No. 3

I - PORT OPERATIONS

1. The daily average discharge for the 14-day period ending 1800 hours 30 December was:

Bulk POL	4,460	DWLT
Wheeled Vehicles	840	"
General Cargo	13,750	"
Total	19,050	"

Cargo afloat, remaining to be discharged at the close of the period 31,588 DWLT

Total average port clearance over same period -

Water (Inland Waterways)	464	DWLT
Highway	7,840	"
Rail	4,670	"
	12,974	

Cargo remaining to be cleared from quays 25,785 DWLT
(This is an increase of approximately 8000 tons over that remaining on the quays on 16 December)

2. During this period there has been a very marked improvement in the turn around time of ships. All vessels from UGS 61 completely discharged and sailed, except two which are under repairs, with an average turn around time of 7 days 17 hours. UGS 62, consisting of 16 ships was turned around in 6 days 18-¼ hours. The total cargo discharged in this convoy was 89,576 DWLT. The average discharge per ship was 828 DWLT. On the 28 December thirteen vessels discharged an average of 1,115 tons per vessel. This discharge was accomplished somewhat at the expense of backpiling cargo in the quays. Cargo remaining on the quays increased to approximately 19,000 DWLT during the discharge of UGS 61, but dropped to 4,000 DWLT just before the arrival of UGS 62 and increased to almost 28,000 DWLT at the time UGS 62 was completed. However, most of this cargo should be cleared before the arrival of the next convoy.

3. Commencing with UGS 66 Convoy cycle will be decreased to five days.

4. There has been practically no activity in inland waterways. At the close of the period only one barge loaded with gasoline was moving in the COMAD area and fifteen (15) barges loaded with coal were frozen in Montceau les Mines.

II - RAIL

1. Rail line capacities in net tons per day are revised as shown for period 1 - 10 January 1945 and bids were accepted on the revised basis:

Marseille - Valence	15,000	DWLT
Valence - Dijon	12,000	"
Dijon - Langres	9,000	"
Langres-Barisey La Coto	3,000*	"
Barisey La Coto-Toul-Nancy-Blainville	2,000*	"
Langres - Epinal	6,000	"
Epinal - Blainville	6,000	"
Blainville - Strasbourg	4,500#	"
St. Raphael - Aix	2,000	"
Aix - Grenoble	©	
Valence - Grenoble	3,000	"
Grenoble - Dole	3,000	"
Dole - Besancon	7,500	"
Dijon - Dole (Either Direction)	4,500	"
Besancon - Vesoul	3,000	"
Vesoul - Lure (via Aillervillers)	3,000	"

Note:-* The commitment of 2,000 net tons per day Neufchateau-Toul-Nancy-Blainville is contingent upon confirmation of tentative understanding with Hq 2nd MRS that they can handle this tonnage. The rail distance Langres-Blainville by way of Toul-Nancy is only 2 Kms, greater than by way of Epinal and on account of operating conditions and grades the S.N.C.F. state they can handle 1200 gross tons per train Neufchateau-Toul-Nancy as compared to 800 gross tons per train by way of Epinal.

Referring to second paragraph letter 17 December. Opening of line through tunnels between Sarrebourg and Saverne 22 December permits the handling of 4,500 tons Sarrebourg to Strasbourg area. With completion of double track and improvement in communications and other facilities will increase this to 6,000 tons when necessary.

© At request of S.N.C.F. account grades and power conditions, the 2,000 ton commitment for military tonnage Aix to Grenoble is withdrawn and this tonnage added to the Rhone River tonnage Marseille to Dijon. Will continue handling, however, by way of Aix-Grenoble, a train of Red Cross supplies and such other military movements as may be necessary via that route.

2. A considerable backlog of unloaded cars occurred during last portion of December. At 1200 hours 24 December a 48-hour embargo was put on all loadings for COMAD, 7th Army and First French Army from Marseille area. At regulating stations and forward railheads more than 8 days supplies were in railway cars awaiting unloading or movement into railheads for unloading. At this writing, no substantial reduction has been effected.

3. At the close of the period loaded cars at railheads in the forward area were as follows:

CAS	360
7th Army	762
Air Corps	248
1st French Army	630
Total	2,000

III - HIGHWAYS

1. Notable highway personnel moves in the last two weeks were:

1st DMI (French) from Angoulome to Lunoville
42nd Division from Marseille to Metz
70th Division from Marseille to Sarrebourg
63rd Division from Marseille to Sarrebourg

2. Previous instructions prohibiting cargo through Lyon have been rescinded this Headquarters. A traffic control station and bivouac area have been established at Lyon and most northbound traffic will now flow through that city. The following are daily average truck statistics for December 13th to December 26th:

	Total Vehicles	Working	Deadlined	Deadlined Acct No Drivers
DELTA BASE	2,955	2,213	585	157
CONAD	320	215	104	1
TOTAL	3,275	2,428	689	158

3. The following northbound traffic moved over SOLOC roads during two week period ending 29 December:

	EX DELTA BASE	EX CONAD
Number of cargo vehicles	3,549	840
Number of Personnel	10,256	1,799
Tonnage of U S Supplies	1,442	1,156.4
Tonnage of organizational equipment	3,504	968

VI - SUPPLY

1. Motive Power

a - The locomotive situation in Southern France is steadily being relieved with an increase in the number of locomotives loaded on each convoy. Twenty-four (24) 2-8-0 locomotives have been received up to and including UGS-62 convoy, with ten (10) more on UGS-63 against requisition A-194, covering Southern France requirements. PEMBARK advises that four (4) locomotives have been set up for floating on UGS-64 convoy and six (6) for UGS-65 convoy against this requisition. The remaining 2-8-0 locomotives on requisition A-194 will be floated on the SEATRAIN LAKEHURST and TEXAS along with other locomotives for ETOUSA. SEATRAIN LAKEHURST and TEXAS will discharge at Cherbourg, with the LAKEHURST scheduled to arrive 13 January 1945 and the TEXAS 21 January 1945.

b - In addition to the 2-8-0 locomotives requested on the requisition the remaining thirty-five (35) 2-8-0 locomotives in North Africa are being shipped here, of which sixteen (16) already have been received. Shipping Order MRS-70 covers the remaining nineteen (19) which will be floated as fast as shipping space becomes available. In this case each convoy out of Oran is lifting locomotives for Southern France.

c - Thirty (30) 2-8-0 locomotives are being diverted to Southern France from locomotives destined for Italy in Italy bound convoys against requisition A-180 covering Italy requirements. Sixteen (16) locomotives in connection with this diversion have been received, with four (4) more in UGS-63. It is expected that diversion of the remaining ten (10) can be accomplished by UGS-65 or 66 convoy complete the total of thirty (30) to be diverted.

d - Locomotive requirements for Southern France were estimated at ten (10) 65-ton Diesel electric and eighty-seven (87) 2-8-0 Steam locomotives covered by requisition A-194. Due to other Army cargo having priority for deck loading over locomotives EMBARK was unable to meet original phased schedule on locomotives for this Theater. Therefore, thirty (30) 2-8-0 locomotives are being diverted from shipments to Italy and thirty-five (35) brought in from North Africa to relieve the motive power shortage here.

e - There will be a total of 162 Diesel and Steam locomotives brought into Southern France as against the ninety-seven (97) originally requested. In view of this and at the rate they are being floated, unless the unforseen happens, it is reasonably certain that there will be no shortage of motive power in this area by the end of January.

f - ETOUSA has advised that upon discharge of SOLOC locomotives from the SEATRAIN LAKEHURST and TEXAS locomotives can be assembled at the rate of six (6) per day and forwarding to SOLOC will be expedited.

g - A request was placed on ETOUSA for fifteen (15) 650 H.P. Diesel locomotives to handle personnel and hospital trains through tunnel between Sarrebourg and Savorne. The ventilating system was completely demolished and MRS advised they could not handle these type trains through lengthy tunnel except with Diesel power. Eight (8) of these Diesels were made available immediately with the additional seven (7) to be furnished as needed. 1st Military Railway Service is to deliver to 2nd Military Railway Service one (1) Steam locomotive in exchange for each Diesel locomotive received.

h - On hand in Southern France are the following Diesel and Steam locomotives:

65-ton Diesel-Electric - 18
2-8-0 Steam Locomotives - 56

Locomotives due:

Item		Quantity
Req'n A-194	2-8-0 Steam	53
	*2-8-0 Steam	10
	**2-9-0 Steam	19

Note: * To be diverted from Italy requirements.
** To be shipped from North Africa.

2. Bridging - Railroad

a - All shipments of railroad bridging up to and including December requirements, for Southern France have been received.

b - Military Railway Service requisitions TRANS-IV-D-157 has been approved by PEMBARK and Washington for 2000 lineal feet of bridging and 700 tons of trestling to be delivered monthly beginning in January until the end of hostilities.

c - Shipments of this bridging are already set up for January, February until March delivery, with subsequent shipments to be set up for following months if required.

3. Car Assembly Plant

a - A car assembling plant is now under construction on Pier "R" at Marseille for the purpose of assembling approximately 18,000 various types of railway cars.

b - This program to be carried out by the 756th Railway Shop Battalion under the direction of the Director General, 1st Military Railway Service. The present program calls for the assembling of 100 cars per day.

c - Those KD cars were requisitioned by ETOUSA for requirements in Northern France and it is not known whether any of this equipment will remain in this area.

d - Latest information from PEMBARK indicates that the initial shipment of these KD is expected to come forward in two (2) vessels in UGS-64, followed by two (2) vessels in UGS-65. Additional ships will be assigned to handle full cargoes of Railway cars on a 2,2,1 basis commencing with UGS-67 convoy and continuing until all cars are shipped. It is expected that this process will require shipments over a period of six months for completion.

e - Cargoes set up currently for the first four railway car shops are identical and are as follows:

Type	Quantity
Cisterns	20
Refrigerators	20
Gondolas, LS, 40-ton	10

Type	Quantity
War Flats, 56-ton	20
Brake Vans, 80-ton	10
Gondolas, HS, 20-ton	100

Plus the required number of Box Cars, 20-ton, to fill ship to capacity. It is estimated that each ship will carry between 150 and 200 Box Cars.

4. Air Section

a - There is submitted herewith a report of air operations for the period 1 December to 31 December 1944:

(1) To meet warranted demands there was arranged air transportation for the following pounds of freight:

(a)	From points within MTO to SOLOC -	12,224
(b)	From points within SOLOC to MTO -	4,615
(c)	From U S to SOLOC -	12,002
(d)	From SOLOC to U S -	520
(e)	Intra SOLOC -	2,940
(f)	From points in ETO, outside SOLOC to SOLOC -	61,615*
	Total.....	93,916

Note: - * Includes a special lift of 45,000 lbs from UK to Nancy

b - Freight actually arrived in SOLOC from period covered as follows:

(1)	MTO to SOLOC -	39,004 lbs.
(2)	Marseille to Dijon -	21,516 "
(3)	Dijon to Marseille -	12 "
(4)	U S to SOLOC -	15,017 "
(5)	From points in ETO outside SOLOC to SOLOC -	68,329 "
	Total 143,878	"

c - At the present time there does not exist a tonnage allocation applicable to SOLOC for freight shipment from U.S. In fact, ETO total allocations has slightly decreased. Future requests from supply services for air transportation of freight from U.S. should be adequately ascertained to be of an operational and urgent nature so as to prevent possible overdraw against ETO tonnage and to insure that SOLOC requests are fully considered.

APPENDIX NO. 5
(Chapter VII)

1 December 1944

AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOUTHERN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND FRENCH CIVIL OFFICIALS AS TO IMPORT OF FRENCH CIVIL SUPPLIES INTO PORTS OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

1. At a meeting held in Transportation Officer's office, Marseille, on 1 December 1944, agreements as indicated in this paper were reached on the importing of French civil supplies into the ports of Southern France.

2. Those attending the meeting were:
Brig. Gen. G. S. Stewart, Transportation Officer, SOLOC
Col. R. H. Clarkson, Transportation Officer, DELTABASE Section
Mr. H. A. Chardon, Director of Transports Maritimes
Mr. A. E. Boucher, Office of the Director of Ports
Mr. G. LeBel, Chef d'Exploitation du Port de Marseille
Mr. A.P. Plinois, Director of Works of Chamber of Commerce

3. PORT DeBOUC AREA:

a. Port St. Louis du Rhone: It was agreed that cargo can be accepted at Port St. Louis du Rhone. Clearance of this cargo to be arranged entirely by French officials and to be accomplished through the use of trucks and river barges. French officials will not request rail clearance for this cargo at the present time or in the immediate future. Two barges required for storage purposes are now at Toulon and it was agreed that arrangements could be made locally for their transfer to Port St. Louis du Rhone.

b. Caronte: It was agreed that one berth, Quay Vernink would be allocated to the French civil officials for the discharge of grain and nuts. The quay allocated is the quay at which the Ville d'Alger is sunk. Clearance of this quay is possible by mechanical transporter from quay to factory which is located in the immediate vicinity. It was further agreed that the refined oil resulting from processing grain and nuts would be used by the population in Marseille area thereby obviating any necessity for distributing this product throughout France.

c. The Quay Kuhlman: It was agreed that the Quay Kuhlman would be allocated to French civil officials for the discharge of phosphates, pyrites and other cargo. This quay is located opposite the factory which processes these imports thereby presenting no clearance problem. The distribution of the acid resulting from the processing of these basic materials is a matter for future study, but it was agreed that their distribution would be accomplished by French means without interference with the transportation capacity (road and rail) required by the U.S. Army for military purposes. It will be necessary to move a crane from La Vera to Quay Kuhlman, but it was considered that arrangements could be made locally.

4. Toulon: It was agreed that no limitation would be placed by U.S. Military authorities on tonnage imported through Toulon by the French civil authorities insofar as port facilities are concerned. It was recognized by all present that the limitation at Toulon is set by the ability to clear the port and distribute the imports, and it was further understood that the transportation used for clearing and distributing products brought through Toulon must not in any way interfere with the movement of U.S. Military supplies. The total amount that can be cleared under these conditions is to be determined after further study by the French representatives. U.S. representatives stated that some rail capacity could be allocated for the clearance of Toulon within the area south of the Durance River and east of the Rhone River. French representatives agreed to place their request periodically for rail tonnage through the Transportation Officer, DELTABASE Section and to make no direct request on French civil railway officials.

5. Marseille:

a. Vieux Port has already been turned over to the French Navy and it was agreed that any use of this port for discharge of civil supplies was a matter for agreement between French Navy and French civil officials.

b. It was agreed that the Ville D'Ajaccio would be docked once a month at Marseille. This vessel will carry personnel and approximately 450 tons of supplies. French will furnish labor and transport for discharge and clearance. U.S. representatives agreed that if no other stevedores were available French stevedores now employed by the U.S. Army at Marseille would be released for handling this ship. It was further agreed that arrangements for coaling this vessel at Marseille could be made without difficulty and that she would be turned around within forty-eight hours of arrival. The docking of the Ville d'Ajaccio once a month at Marseille is the only use to be made at the present time of the Port of Marseille for the import of French civil supplies except that Berth No. 43 has been released to the French for rehabilitation and for their use on completion.

c. It was agreed that a deep water berth would be made available in Marseille for a period of 15 days to complete repairs to the PROVIDENCE. Date of arrival will be arranged between local officials.

6. Sete: It was agreed that military cargo forwarded at Sete would always receive first priority for discharge and that this obligation having been met the acceptance of other supplies was a matter for French decision in which the U.S. Army had no interest.

Signed G. C. STEWART
G. C. STEWART
Brig. General, Army of the United States
Transportation Officer, SOLOC
(Representing Commanding General, SOLOC)

Signed R. H. CLARKSON
R. H. CLARKSON
Colonel, Transportation Corps
Transportation Officer, DELTABASE Section
(Representing Commanding General, DELTABASE Section)

Signed R. A. CHARDON
R. A. CHARDON
Director of Transports Maritimes

Signed A. E. BOUCHER
A. E. BOUCHER
Representing Director of Ports

Signed G. LE BEL
G. LE BEL
Chef d'Exploitation du Port de Marseille
(Representing Civilian Director of the Port)

CHAPTER VIII

STATISTICS

TRANSPORTATION CORPS MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT

Chart 1 - Monthly Troop Debarkations
Chart 2 - Ship Arrivals - Weekly
Chart 3 - Ship Arrivals - Cumulative
Chart 4 - Army Cargo Arrived in E.T.O. - Long Tons
Chart 5 - Army Cargo Arrived in E.T.O. - Measurement Tons
Chart 6 - Army Cargo by Port Areas - Long Tons and Measurement Tons
Chart 7 - Army Cargo Discharged on Continent - Long Tons (See Chapt II, Marine Operations Division)
Chart 8 - Army Cargo Discharged on Continent by Port Area - Long Tons (" " ")
Chart 9 - Tonnage Discharged by Type of Vessel on Continent (" " ")
Chart 10 - Army Cargo Loaded out of U.K. for Continent
Chart 11 - Army Cargo Cleared from Continental Ports by Rail, Motor, and Water (See Chapter IV)
Chart 12 - Vehicles Discharged on Continent
Chart 13 - Personnel Debarked on Continent
Chart 14 - Comparative E.T.O. Port Discharge
Chart 15 - Average Vessel Unloading Time in E.T.O.
Chart 16 - Average Tonnage per Ship
Chart 17 - Percentage Composition of Army Cargo
Chart 18 - Army Cargo - Bulk to Weight Ratios
Chart 19 - Assembled Vehicles Landed in E.T.O.
Chart 20 - Aircraft Shipped to U.K.
Chart 21 - E.T.O. Rolling Stock on Continent (See Chapter IV)
Chart 22 - Port Operating Equipment, T.C., E.T.O. (See Chapter II, Marine Operations Division)
Chart 23 - Tons Forwarded by Motor Transport Service (See Chapter V)
Chart 24 - Ton Miles Forwarded by Motor Transport Service (See Chapter V)
Chart 25 - Tons Hauled on Lines of Communication by Motor Transport Service (See Chapter V)
Chart 26 - Number of Vehicles Used by Motor Transport Service (See Chapter V)
Chart 27 - Motor Transport Service Special Vehicle Requirements (See Chapter V)
Chart 28 - Rail, Motor, and Barge Movement - East of Seine River (See Chapter IV)

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

(NOTE: Charts and Tables removed from this Chapter will be found in other Chapters as indicated above)

THOUSANDS OF TROOPS DEBARKED IN E.T.O.



SECRET

STATISTICS BRANCH T. C.

Table 1

TROOPS DEBARKED IN E.T.O.

Month	Monthly United Kingdom	Monthly Continent	Monthly Total E.T.O.	Cumulative * United Kingdom	Cumulative * Continent	Cumulative * Total E.T.O.
January 1943	13,351	-	13,351	255,190	-	255,190
February	1,406	-	1,406	256,596	-	256,596
March	1,277	-	1,277	257,873	-	257,873
April	2,078	-	2,078	259,951	-	259,951
May	19,220	-	19,220	279,171	-	279,171
June	49,972	-	49,972	329,143	-	329,143
July	53,274	-	53,274	382,417	-	382,417
August	41,681	-	41,681	424,098	-	424,098
September	81,116	-	81,116	505,214	-	505,214
October	105,557	-	105,557	610,771	-	610,771
November	173,860	-	173,860	784,631	-	784,631
December	133,716	-	133,716	918,347	-	918,347
January 1944	166,405	-	166,405	1,084,752	-	1,084,752
February	136,684	-	136,684	1,221,436	-	1,221,436
March	124,412	-	124,412	1,345,848	-	1,345,848
April	216,699	-	216,699	1,562,547	-	1,562,547
May	108,463	-	108,463	1,671,010	-	1,671,010
June	121,503	8	121,511	1,792,513	8	1,792,521
July	152,669	59	152,728	1,945,182	67	1,945,249
August	152,776	63	152,839	2,097,958	130	2,098,088
September	99,617	74,628	174,245	2,197,575	74,758	2,272,333
October	154,090	77	154,167	2,351,665	74,835	2,426,500
November	170,148	589	170,737	2,521,813	75,424	2,597,237
December	129,163	198	129,361	2,650,976	75,622	2,726,598

* Cumulative from 1 January 1942.
Does not include Southern France

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

SHIP ARRIVALS IN E.T.O. - 1943-1944



Table 2

WEEKLY SHIP ARRIVALS IN E.T.O. 1943-44

WEEK ENDING	ALL SHIPS	SHIPS CARRYING 500 OR MORE TROOPS OR 1000 OR MORE LONG TONS OF CARGO
8 Jan.	52	30
15 Jan.	37	28
22 Jan.	35	17
29 Jan.	60	39
5 Feb.	42	21
12 Feb.	35	16
19 Feb.	65	27
26 Feb.	70	51
4 Mar.	40	20
11 Mar.	64	48
18 Mar.	66	37
25 Mar.	62	38
1 Apr.	62	29
8 Apr.	93	50
15 Apr.	60	35
22 Apr.	83	56
29 Apr.	61	42
6 May	69	39
13 May	21	13
20 May	98	68
27 May	61	43
3 June	60	36
10 June	62	50
17 June	55	35
24 June	60	40
1 July	68	38
8 July	76	36 53
15 July	73	41
22 July	77	56
29 July	79	57
5 Aug.	82	50
12 Aug.	87	56
19 Aug.	85	45
26 Aug.	66	38
2 Sept.	56	36
9 Sept.	67	48
16 Sept.	61	42
23 Sept.	84	54
30 Sept.	60	45
7 Oct.	72	43
14 Oct.	77	54
21 Oct.	79	42
28 Oct.	83	58
4 Nov.	91	63
11 Nov.	53	36
18 Nov.	62	38
25 Nov.	48	44
2 Dec.	98	78
9 Dec.	65	41
16 Dec.	55	42
23 Dec.	66	53
30 Dec.	73	56

Does not include Southern France

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

CUMULATED SHIP ARRIVALS IN E.T.O. - 1943-44



Table 3

CUMULATED* SHIPS ARRIVAL IN E.T.O. - 1943-44

WEEK ENDING	ALL SHIPS	SHIPS CARRYING 500 OR MARE TROOPS OR 1,000 OR MORE LONG TONS OF CARGO	WEEK ENDING	ALL SHIPS	SHIPS CARRYING 500 OR MORE TROOPS OR 1,000 OR MORE LONG TONS OF CARGO
8 Jan.	2,199	1,069	8 July	3,764	2,038
15 Jan.	2,236	1,097	15 July	3,837	2,079
22 Jan.	2,271	1,114	22 July	3,914	2,135
29 Jan.	2,331	1,153	29 July	3,993	2,192
5 Feb.	2,373	1,174	5 Aug.	4,075	2,242
12 Feb.	2,408	1,190	12 Aug.	4,162	2,298
19 Feb.	2,473	1,217	19 Aug.	4,247	2,343
26 Feb.	2,543	1,268	26 Aug.	4,313	2,381
4 Mar.	2,583	1,288	2 Sept.	4,369	2,417
11 Mar.	2,647	1,336	9 Sept.	4,436	2,465
18 Mar.	2,713	1,373	16 Sept.	4,497	2,507
25 Mar.	2,775	1,411	23 Sept.	4,581	2,561
1 Apr.	2,837	1,440	30 Sept.	4,641	2,606
8 Apr.	2,930	1,490	7 Oct.	4,713	2,649
15 Apr.	2,990	1,525	14 Oct.	4,790	2,703
22 Apr.	3,073	1,581	21 Oct.	4,869	2,745
29 Apr.	3,134	1,623	28 Oct.	4,952	2,803
6 May	3,203	1,662	4 Nov.	5,043	2,866
13 May	3,224	1,675	11 Nov.	5,096	2,902
20 May	3,322	1,743	18 Nov.	5,158	2,940
27 May	3,383	1,786	25 Nov.	5,206	2,984
3 June	3,443	1,822	2 Dec.	5,304	3,062
10 June	3,505	1,872	9 Dec.	5,369	3,103
17 June	3,560	1,907	16 Dec.	5,424	3,145
24 June	3,620	1,947	23 Dec.	5,490	3,198
1 July	3,688	1,985	30 Dec.	5,563	3,254

*Cumulated from 1 January 1942.

Does not include Southern France

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

Table 3 A

MONTHLY SHIP ARRIVALS IN E.T.O. - 1942-44

MONTH	ALL SHIPS	SHIPS CARRYING 500 OR MORE TROOPS OR 1,000 OR MORE LONG TONS OF CARGO	MONTH	ALL SHIPS	SHIPS CARRYING 500 OR MORE TROOPS OR 1,000 OR MORE LONG TONS OF CARGO
January 1942	2	2	July	155	84
February	3	3	August	176	78
March	8	8	September	191	92
April	2	2	October	203	118
May	33	16	November	202	126
June	60	16	December	229	134
July	72	26	January 1944	208	128
August	112	64	February	198	106
September	141	78	March	279	168
October	108	46	April	307	186
November	60	18	May	271	176
December	69	15	June	272	177
January 1943	46	14	July	342	233
February	49	8	August	322	192
March	30	6	September	296	202
April	44	17	October	338	217
May	47	14	November	296	211
June	104	53	December	297	228

Does not include Southern France

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

U.S. ARMY CARGO ARRIVED IN E.T.O. – LONG TONS



SECRET

STATISTICS BRANCH T.C.

Table 4

U.S. ARMY CARGO ARRIVED IN E.T.O. - LONG TONS

Month	Monthly United Kingdom	Monthly Continent	Monthly Total E.T.O.	Cumulative * United Kingdom	Cumulative * Continent	Cumulative * Total E.T.O.
January 1943	38,562	-	38,562	881,554	-	881,554
February	20,373	-	20,373	901,927	-	901,927
March	24,719	-	24,719	926,646	-	926,646
April	60,784	-	60,784	987,430	-	987,430
May	36,593	-	36,593	1,024,023	-	1,024,023
June	176,033	-	176,033	1,200,056	-	1,200,056
July	292,701	-	292,701	1,492,757	-	1,492,757
August	324,308	-	324,308	1,817,065	-	1,817,065
September	302,914	-	302,914	2,119,979	-	2,119,979
October	395,359	-	395,359	2,515,338	-	2,515,338
November	322,757	-	322,757	2,838,095	-	2,838,095
December	378,078	-	378,078	3,216,173	-	3,216,173
January 1944	281,588	-	281,588	3,497,761	-	3,497,761
February	233,722	-	233,722	3,731,483	-	3,731,483
March	467,824	-	467,824	4,199,307	-	4,199,307
April	496,384	-	496,384	4,695,691	-	4,695,691
May	601,615	-	601,615	5,297,306	-	5,297,306
June	635,866	50,207	686,073	5,933,172	50,207	5,983,379
July	541,223	391,023	932,246	6,474,395	441,230	6,915,625
August	353,772	439,860	793,632	6,828,167	881,090	7,709,257
September	251,568	514,835	766,403	7,079,735	1,395,925	8,475,660
October	331,332	528,104	859,436	7,411,067	1,924,029	9,335,096
November	306,905	481,827	788,732	7,717,972	2,405,856	10,123,828
December	203,880	768,923	972,803	7,921,852	3,174,779	11,096,631

* Cumulative from 1 January 1942

Does not include Southern France

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

U. S. ARMY CARGO ARRIVED IN E.T.O. – MEAS. TONS



SECRET

STATISTICS BRANCH T.C.

Table 5

U.S. ARMY CARGO ARRIVED IN E.T.O. - MEASUREMENT TONS

Month	Monthly: United Kingdom	Monthly: Continent	Monthly: Total E.T.O.	Cumulative *: United Kingdom	Cumulative *: Continent	Cumulative *: Total E.T.O.
January 1943	117,913	-	117,913	2,297,909	-	2,297,909
February	75,566	-	75,566	2,373,475	-	2,373,475
March	65,767	-	65,767	2,439,242	-	2,439,242
April	111,245	-	111,245	2,550,487	-	2,550,487
May	87,056	-	87,056	2,637,543	-	2,637,543
June	348,900	-	348,900	2,986,443	-	2,986,443
July	670,024	-	670,024	3,656,467	-	3,656,467
August	753,429	-	753,429	4,409,896	-	4,409,896
September	778,102	-	778,102	5,187,998	-	5,187,998
October	956,888	-	956,888	6,144,886	-	6,144,886
November	790,754	-	790,754	6,935,640	-	6,935,640
December	1,008,150	-	1,008,150	7,943,790	-	7,943,790
January 1944	886,359	-	886,359	8,830,149	-	8,830,149
February	815,948	-	815,948	9,646,097	-	9,646,097
March	1,443,248	-	1,443,248	11,089,345	-	11,089,345
April	1,478,651	-	1,478,651	12,567,996	-	12,567,996
May	1,482,294	-	1,482,294	14,050,290	-	14,050,290
June	1,534,871	74,698	1,609,569	15,585,161	74,698	15,659,859
July	1,462,445	630,326	2,092,771	17,047,606	705,024	17,752,630
August	920,565	773,219	1,693,784	17,968,171	1,478,243	19,446,414
September	688,028	952,405	1,640,433	18,656,199	2,430,648	21,086,847
October	930,717	864,733	1,795,450	19,586,916	3,295,381	22,882,297
November	936,057	814,553	1,750,610	20,522,973	4,109,934	24,632,907
December	567,942	1,327,704	1,895,646	21,090,915	5,437,638	26,528,553

* Cumulative from 1 January 1942

Does not include Southern France

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

ARMY CARGO ARRIVED IN E.T.O. BY PORT AREA



SECRET

1-31 DEC. 1944

STATISTICS BRANCH T. C.

SECRET

Table 6

ARMY CARGO ARRIVED IN E.T.O. BY PORT AREA

1 - 31 December 1944

Port Area	Long Tons	Measurement Tons
Continental Ports:		
Southern France	470,237	N.A.
Antwerp	374,975	719,868
Le Havre	209,586	331,127
Cherbourg	177,741	268,428
Morlaix-Roscoff	6,621	8,281
United Kingdom Ports:		
Bristol Channel	104,196	318,295
Mersey Area	30,254	118,961
Humber	61,395	83,687
Southern	4,384	16,400
Clyde	2,199	16,033
Thames	1,452	14,566
TOTAL	1,443,040	1,895,646

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

SECRET

U.S. ARMY CARGO LOADED OUT OF U.K. FOR CONTINENT

(EXCLUDES WHEELED VEHICLES, BULK POL, AND BULK COAL)



SECRET

1944

STATISTICS BRANCH T.C.

Table 10

CARGO LOADED OUT OF U.K. FOR CONTINENT

MONTH	AMMO.	PACKAGED POL	STORES	TOTAL
May 1944	44,416	30,380	37,106	111,902
June	94,303	62,513	144,340	301,156
July	93,940	92,463	263,131	449,534
August	42,902	55,927	257,224	356,053
September	31,596	38,083	150,903	220,582
October	21,189	13,000	149,011	183,200
November	11,239	19,800	115,548	146,587
December	12,101	10,236	109,960	132,297
TOTAL	351,686	322,402	1,227,223	1,901,311

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER, 1944

NUMBER OF VEHICLES DISCHARGED ON CONTINENT

BY BEACH OR PORT AREA



TOTAL 459,546 VEHICLES.

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL DEBARKED ON CONTINENT

BY BEACH OR PORT AREA



SECRET

6 JUN.-31 DEC. 1944

STATISTICS BRANCH T. C.

COMPARATIVE E.T.O. PORT DISCHARGE



SECRET

1 OCT. 1944 — 31 DEC. 1944

STATISTICS BRANCH T.C.

AVERAGE VESSEL UNLOADING TIME IN E.T.O.

PORT	NO. OF VESSELS USED IN COMPUTATION.	TIME DAYS-HRS.
U. K.		
LIVERPOOL	30	5 – 7
HULL	27	6 – 0
SWANSEA	24	7 – 2
NEWPORT	26	7 – 4
AVONMOUTH	16	7 – 9
BARRY	16	8 – 4
CARDIFF	23	8 – 17
CONTINENT		
ANTWERP	60	10 – 19
MORLAIX-ROSCOFF	26	12 – 5
LE HAVRE	44	12 – 8
CHERBOURG	170	12 – 10
ROUEN	3	12 – 14
UTAH	8	21 – 6
OMAHA	23	26 – 11



496 U.S. LOADED FULL CARGO VESSELS.

AVERAGE TONNAGE PER SHIP

195 FULL CARGO VESSELS
CARRYING ARMY CARGO
FROM U.S. TO E.T.O
1 – 31 DECEMBER 1944 .



SECRET

STATISTICS BRANCH T.C.

PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF ARMY CARGO

LONG TONS



BASED ON 297 VESSELS CARRYING 972,803 LONG TONS OF U.S. ARMY CARGO.

MEASUREMENT TONS



BASED ON 297 VESSELS CARRYING 1,895,646 MEAS. TONS OF U.S. ARMY CARGO.

Table 17A

PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF U.S. ARMY CARGO

December 1944

SUPPLY SERVICE CLASSIFICATION	LONG TONS	MEAS. TONS
Air Corps	1.5%	8.4%
Chemical Warfare	0.5	0.5
Engineer	11.9	8.8
Gas & Oil	5.7	4.0
Medical	0.8	1.2
Miscellaneous	3.3	6.0
Ordnance	34.8	24.7
PX	0.1	0.1
Quartermaster	26.8	24.4
Signal	3.5	3.0
Transportation Corps	1.0	1.3
Vehicles (Wheeled)	10.1	17.6
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Based on 297 vessels carrying 972,803 long tons and 1,895,646 measurement tons of U.S. Army Cargo.

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF ARMY CARGO



SECRET

1 JAN. 1942 – 31 DEC. 1944

STATISTICS BRANCH T. C.

Table 17B

PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF U.S. ARMY CARGO

1 January 1942 - 31 December 1944

SUPPLY SERVICE CLASSIFICATION	LONG TONS	MEAS. TONS
Air Corps	3.8%	17.6%
Chemical Warfare	1.9	1.4
Engineer	10.7	6.5
Gas & Oil	1.5	0.9
Medical	0.9	1.2
Miscellaneous	2.2	3.5
Ordnance	35.3	24.2
PX	0.3	0.3
Quartermaster	25.1	17.8
Signal	2.5	1.8
Transportation Corps	3.4	3.7
Vehicles (Wheeled)	12.4	21.1
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Based on 5,325 vessels carrying 10,999,663 long tons and 26,284,083 measurement tons of U.S. Army Cargo.

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

ARMY CARGO — BULK TO WEIGHT RATIOS

TYPE	CU. FT. PER LONG TON (40 CU. FT. OR 1 MEAS. TON)
AIR CORPS	442
VEHICLES (WHEELED)	162
NOT CLASSIFIED	151
MEDICAL	123
TRANSPORTATION	103
ORDNANCE-LESS AMM.	102
Q.M.-LESS SUBSISTENCE	101
AVERAGE	96
P. X.	87
CHEMICAL WARFARE	70
SIGNAL	70
ENGINEER	58
Q.M.-SUBSISTENCE	58
GAS & OIL	57
AMMUNITION	42



SHIP SPACE OCCUPIED BY ONE LONG TON.

CUBIC FEET PER LONG TON OF U.S. ARMY CARGO - 1 JANUARY 1942 TO 31 DECEMBER 1944

Type of Cargo	Cu. Ft. per Long Ton	Ratio of Meas. Tons to Long Tons
Air Corps	442	11.04
Vehicles (Wheeled)	162	4.06
Not Classified	151	3.78
Medical	123	3.07
Transportation	103	2.57
Ordnance - less Ammo.	102	2.56
Q.M. - less subsistence	101	2.53
PX	87	2.17
Chemical Warfare	70	1.74
Signal	70	1.74
Engineer	58	1.46
Q.M. Subsistence	58	1.45
Gas & Oil	57	1.43
Ammunition	42	1.06
Average	96	2.39

Total Monthly Cargo Arrivals - Overall Figures

January 1944	126	3.15
February	140	3.49
March	124	3.09
April	119	2.98
May	106	2.65
June	94	2.35
July	87	2.24
August	85	2.13
September	84	2.10
October	83	2.07
November	89	2.22
December	78	1.95

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

ASSEMBLED VEHICLES LANDED IN E.T.O.



SECRET

STATISTICS BRANCH T.C.

Table 19

U.S. ARMY VEHICLES* LANDED IN E.T.O.

Month	MONTHLY No. of Vehicles	CUMULATIVE No. of Vehicles
January 1943	621	26,447
February	462	26,909
March	296	27,205
April	574	27,779
May	740	28,519
June	1,599	30,118
July	2,687	32,805
August	4,606	37,411
September	5,338	42,749
October	5,692	48,441
November	4,636	53,077
December	5,888	58,965
January 1944	4,627	63,592
February	4,894	68,486
March	11,487	79,973
April	11,725	91,698
May	9,913	101,611
June	9,735	111,346
July	12,602	123,948
August	13,261	137,209
September	13,293	150,502
October	12,699	163,201
November	14,719	177,920
December	11,292	189,212

* Received on wheels (excludes boxed vehicles for assembly)

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944

U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT SHIPPED TO U.K.

SHOWING PAST 12 MONTHS



ALL U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT SHIPPED TO U.K.



SECRET

1944

STATISTICS BRANCH T.C.

Table 20

U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT SHIPPED TO E.T.O.

1943 - 44

Month	AT-6	P-40	P-61	P-38	P-47	P-51	A-20	C-45 C-61 C-64 C-78	L-4-B & L-5-B	Total Planes	Gliders	Total Aircraft
January 1943	-	-	-	56	46	10	14	-	-	126	-	126
February	-	15	-	28	61	25	4	-	18	151	-	151
March	-	-	-	11	33	-	-	-	-	44	10	54
April	-	-	-	-	78	-	1	12	7	98	-	98
May	-	-	-	-	54	-	1	39	3	97	-	97
June	-	-	-	1	39	-	-	8	-	48	113	161
July	-	-	-	-	116	-	-	6	-	122	553	675
August	-	-	-	10	250	16	-	-	-	276	391	667
September	-	-	-	84	197	40	-	23	22	366	54	420
October	-	-	-	14	211	109	-	1	10	345	129	474
November	-	-	-	90	164	85	-	5	18	362	158	520
December	-	-	-	281	124	25	25	10	80	545	212	757
January 1944	-	-	-	274	140	281	4	2	52	753	312	1,065
February	-	-	-	129	365	222	85	4	70	875	101	976
March	7	-	1	125	389	152	166	79	172	1,091	159	1,250
April	12	-	-	151	267	394	66	65	218	1,173	430	1,603
May	15	-	17	118	147	98	28	49	175	647	210	857
June	5	-	25	76	90	~~224~~ 244	1	36	125	602	403	1,005
July	-	-	5	122	313	434	-	58	188	1,120	173	1,293
August	-	-	4	25	282	347	-	7	58	723	349	1,072
September	-	-	1	49	345	385	-	-	64	844	298	1,142
October	-	-	1	67	289	387	-	45	200	989	436	1,425
November	-	-	1	18	158	382	-	1	117	677	202	879
December	-	-	-	3	145	137	-	3	117	405	350	755
Total	39	15	55	1,732	4,303	3,773	395	453	1,714	12,479	5,043	17,522

STATISTICS BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION CORPS, CZ, ETOUSA
31 DECEMBER 1944