Army Logistician to Army Sustainment: Continuity and Change

Sustainment Moves to the Next Level: Rethinking Our Life-Cycle Focus—General Ann E. Dunwoody

Army Logistician: Forty Years of Service to the Field—Major General James E. Chambers

Always There, Always Ready—Lieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

Ordnance Schools Move Into a New Era—Brigadier General Lynn A. Collyar

A Sustainer's Guide to Financial Management—Major Brian A. Smith

Human Resources Operations: A Force Enabler in the Sustainment Community—Lieutenant Colonel Darwin A. Frett

Culture Change in Recruiting—Donald D. Copley

Logistics, CSS, Sustainment: Evolving Definitions of Support—Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey C. Brlecic


Transforming While Preparing to Deploy—Major James J. Geishaker

A New Proponent for the Army Acquisition Corps—Sergeant Major Ethan A. Jones

Commentary: Army Logistician and the Rhymes of History—Dr. Christopher R. Paparone
Army Strategic Management System: Enhancing Logistics Readiness—David Lewis, Charles Glover, Rob Frye

Billeting Management in Theaters of Operations
—Keith A. Stepp

The Benefits of Participating in the Army Award for Maintenance Excellence Program
—Chief Warrant Officer (W–4) Richard C. Myers, Jr.

Commentary: The Problems With the Current Support Structure
—Lieutenant Colonel Vincent C. Nwafor

Tactical Convoy Planning for Sustainers
—Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Peterson

The Unit Movement Officer in the Redeployment Process
—Captain Paul L. Moeller, Jr.

Interactive Training for Property Accountability—Winston C. Mullins

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Army Logistician to Army Sustainment: Continuity and Change

When the first issue of Army Logistician was published 40 years ago in the fall of 1969, our Nation was engaged in a long war against an often elusive foe on the mainland of Asia and a new President was in office, elected in part to bring that war to a successful and honorable conclusion.

Four decades later, it might seem that history is repeating itself. But we recognize that the particulars of today’s conflicts differ from that war of 40 years ago and that the global situation in which our Armed Forces now operate has changed profoundly. In 1969, the United States was locked in a worldwide competition with another superpower—a competition that seemed to be a permanent fact of life. Now, with the wisdom of hindsight, we know that the Cold War would indeed end and that the United States would emerge from it as the only superpower on the planet. And yet the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War would prove fleeting, as we were all tragically reminded on 11 September 2001. The geopolitical environment has changed over 40 years, but the need for a vigilant defense and robust military capabilities remains.

Those capabilities have of course improved in often spectacular ways over 4 decades. It is interesting to leaf through the pages of past issues of Army Logistician and see how the Army has evolved to meet new challenges and incorporate new technologies. For example, in the inaugural issue of September–October 1969, the lead article was authored by the commander of the Army Materiel Command, General F.J. Chesarek. While discussing the challenges facing the Army during wartime, he spotlighted the computer’s increasingly important role and the hopes the Army was placing on automation as a transformative technology—

We are fortunate that this “era of challenge” to do more with less coincides with an era of management revolution based upon the use of high speed computers. . . . Logisticians of the 1970s must be ardent enthusiasts for automation in all its forms.

General Chesarek foresaw in 1969 one of the major trends of the last 40 years: the Army’s growing use of, and dependence on, information technology. Another major trend has been a drive toward integration, whether of systems, branches, organizations, or Soldiers. The latter trend is illustrated by the rise of the multifunctional logistician, culminating in the creation of the Logistics branch in 2008.

These changes can be seen in the magazine you hold, digitally designed and bearing a new name resulting from doctrinal and organizational integration. The new name, Army Sustainment, reflects our expanded mission as the Army’s professional bulletin for the sustainment warfare function. (See the article on page 19 for an interesting perspective on the Army’s use of the terms “logistics,” “combat service support,” and “sustainment” over the years.) That function, as defined in Field Manual 3–0, Operations, includes logistics, personnel services, and health service support (which in this magazine will be limited to medical logistics and evacuation). So in Army Sustainment you will see more articles concerning such functions as financial management and human resources support. You also will notice some design changes, although we have sought to maintain a look consistent with our past; we have tried to change only when change has been necessary.

We do not view Army Sustainment as a new publication. Instead, we see it as the next chapter in the story of a magazine that has served the Army for 4 decades. We will continue to perform our three basic missions: to provide information on Army and Department of Defense (DOD) sustainment plans, programs, policies, and operations; to serve as a journal of record for Army sustainment; and to offer a forum to Army and DOD military and civilian personnel to share their thoughts and experiences.

Providing information is an obvious function of any magazine, but other venues, including the ubiquitous Internet, can disseminate information more quickly than a bimonthly publication. As a result, the latter two functions have perhaps become more important in recent years. We like to think that Army Logistician/Sustainment, as a journal of record, will always allow the sustainer to discover what his predecessors did and why and thereby place his own challenges and endeavors in a broader context. Forty years of Army Logistician articles have created a unique resource on the history of Army sustainment. (See the article on page 30 for a broader discussion of this aspect of the magazine’s role.)

Yet providing a forum is probably our most important function. Army Sustainment is a place where sustainers can tell their stories—what problems they faced, what they tried to do, what worked and what didn’t, and what lessons they learned. In this sense, Army Sustainment belongs to its readers. We hope, at this time of change, that you will continue to feel a sense of ownership of this magazine. Here, we hope, you will see your stories, and we encourage you to join in adding to the ongoing story of Army sustainment.

—Robert D. Paulus, Editor
While these are demanding times for our Army, with more than 240,000 Soldiers executing missions in nearly 80 countries around the world, our path to restoring the Army’s balance is clear. By embracing an enterprise approach and creating four core enterprises—readiness, human capital, services and infrastructure, and materiel—our Army will more closely align its generating forces with its operational forces and will yield a more predictable and sustainable generation of forces, lighten the load for our Soldiers and their families, and better align resources to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) timelines as units prepare for worldwide missions.

Creating the Materiel Enterprise

Each of the four enterprises plays a key role in making this transformation a reality, with each one following a distinct path. For those of us in the critical business of developing, acquiring, and sustaining materiel, our role is to expand collaboration and synchronization among our research and development, acquisition, and logistics communities to better manage and sufficiently resource Army equipment throughout its entire life cycle. Together, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology formed the Army’s Materiel Enterprise. Our guiding principles include operating from a common operating picture, ensuring timely and accurate access to information, enabling collaborative decisionmaking, developing a commitment to continuous improvement, and maintaining a process focus. A natural outcome of improved collaboration and communication has been a renewed focus on the life-cycle management model, improving execution of the entire process from cradle to grave.

Renewed Focus on the Entire Life Cycle

The Army’s ability to quickly develop and provide new, state-of-the-art materiel solutions is unsurpassed in meeting Soldiers’ requirements and ensuring their safety. Thanks to our innovative and ongoing rapid acquisition and equipping initiatives, we are getting equipment into the hands of Soldiers faster than ever. These systems, which grew out of necessity during the early years of the Global War on Terrorism, provide high-quality equipment quickly; but when executed within insulated stovepipes, they are often very inefficient. By better integrating our research and development, acquisition, and logistics communities, we will more effectively and efficiently meet immediate needs in the field now and in the future, with efficient distribution and sustainment planned and resourced.

General Ann E. Dunwoody, commanding general of the Army Materiel Command (AMC), tours reset operations at AMC’s 2d Battalion, 405th Army Field Support Brigade, in Vilseck, Germany. (U.S. Army photo by Jennifer L. King)
Historically, we have focused much of our time, talent, and resources on the “first half” of the life cycle—the research, development, testing, acquiring, equipping, and supplying of essential equipment. While incredibly important, that typically only represents 30 percent of a program’s budget. We must now renew our focus on the “second half” of the life cycle—the maintenance, distribution, sustainment, and disposal of equipment. Applying the same rigor and attention to the back end of the life-cycle process will ensure that our systems are more sustainable, cost effective, and efficient throughout their entire life cycles. This ultimately will ensure the best support to the warfighter.

**Asset Visibility Is Still Key**

We are facing a dynamic period of time as we reshape one war, increase resourcing to a second war, and strive to reset the remaining forces that are cycling through ARFORGEN in preparation for deployment. At the heart of our collaboration within the acquisition and logistics communities is the need to better see and understand what we have, who has it, where it is needed, and what condition it is in. Asset visibility and accountability are enormously critical and have always been daunting challenges for our Army. We still remember the thousands of containers during Operation Desert Storm that lacked appropriate property accountability or were returned unopened because we didn’t know what they contained. Fast forward to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and it appeared to be déjà vu all over again.

We knew then, as we do today, that we must invest in enabling technologies that provide a 360-degree readiness perspective on everything we do. Our interactive information systems must provide a common operating picture that provides real-time visibility of all assets with dynamic status updates—not just for individual units but across our force. And those data must feed a more collaborative, rapid decisionmaking process for appropriate disposition of our equipment. Getting the right equipment to the right place quickly will pay huge dividends in the effort to rebalance our Army and can only be accomplished with a much greater understanding of our current materiel status, facilitating movement of equipment through reset processes worldwide.

**Resetting the Force**

The Army has aggressively reset and repaired more than 500,000 pieces of equipment in our industrial base over the last 6 years, a workload three times greater than during the Vietnam War. In 2009 alone, we will reset 180,000 pieces of equipment, including more than 400 aircraft, 2,700 tracked vehicles, and 150,000 weapons. It’s clear we must invest wisely in our depots, arsenals, ammunition plants, and forward repair facilities to ensure that we can continue to meet future challenges, adequately sustain and improve our equipment, and rebalance our Army. Through the Materiel Enterprise, we are developing the strategic investment plans needed to optimize the resources in our facilities, equipment, and workforce so we always meet the Army’s needs. This includes having adequate plans in place to maintain our current workload, rapidly and efficiently ramp up in times of war, and scale down when the demand slows.

**Disposing of Equipment**

Critical to the modernization and overall resourcing of our Army is making timely, informed decisions on end-of-life-cycle disposition. We must continue to modernize our force—even in periods of constrained budgets—by both sustaining the current fight and preparing for future conflicts across the spectrum of war. Whether it is leveraging foreign military sales, placing equipment in long-term storage, or modernizing enabling systems on the existing platform, we must make those decisions within a more transparent process informed by the enterprise perspective. By better integrating our disparate communities so we understand what is possible from a scientific and engineering perspective, the conditions set by programmatic processes, and the capabilities of our sustainment systems, we will be more prepared than we have ever been to make those decisions and ultimately focus limited resources where they provide the greatest effects for our warfighting forces.

As our collaborative materiel management systems evolve, we will continue to aggressively rebalance the materiel resourcing of our Army, renewing our focus on sustaining equipment through every phase of the life-cycle process. We will rely on strong relationships, greater transparency, and a secure stream of shared, readily accessible, and accountable information through the Materiel Enterprise. We will optimize our Nation’s industrial base to best meet the needs of our Soldiers. Our combined logistics and acquisition systems will be truly collaborative and structured to deliver the most innovative, effective, efficient, and sustainable equipment for our warfighters. And with the Materiel Enterprise, we have the blueprint in hand to get us there.

**General Ann E. Dunwoody is the Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command.**
Army Logistician:
Forty Years of Service to the Field

by Major General James E. Chambers

I t is with great pleasure that I note the 40th anniversary of the Army Logistician professional bulletin. Four decades of providing Army logisticians with their very own publication is truly something to celebrate. However, this anniversary issue is not only an occasion to look back over 40 years of Army logistics; it also marks a significant moment as the magazine transforms to become Army Sustainment, the Army’s magazine for the sustainment warfighting function.

Forty years ago, the first Army periodical written for and about experts in logistics—a publication designed to serve as the principal means of communication with the logistics community—rolled off the press. Today, Army Logistician continues to be the voice of logisticians throughout the Army, proactively addressing topics within the logistics field and publishing fresh viewpoints—many from deployed sustainment Soldiers. As Army Logistician marks its 40th anniversary, we can look back with no small measure of pride on the successes of military and civilian logisticians captured in its pages. From the Logistics Offensive in the 1970s to Division 86 Logistics and the Army of Excellence in the 1980s; from the Revolution in Military Logistics in the 1990s to the transformation to a modular force and expeditionary missions—Army Logistician has been there to chronicle these concepts every step of the journey.

The magazine’s fundamental mission has always been to support the professional development of Army logisticians. As such, it has been a significant resource for thousands of logisticians over the years, and that includes me. By reading Army Logistician over the course of my career, I have personally gained insights on issues and professional development opportunities, I have learned valuable strategies for resolving problems in the field, and I have benefited from the stimulating, forward-thinking ideas of my senior leaders, peers, and subordinates.

The forum that this publication offers has never been more important than it is right now. As we adapt our Army to the demands of the 21st century operating environment, it is critical that we foster communication across the sustainment community and the Army. That communication should not be only from the top down; sustainers at all levels must share their ideas and experiences to make us all better. Army Logistician, and now Army Sustainment, will continue to connect, develop, and maintain our community of professionals.

Sustaining our Army, especially in these times of persistent conflict, is a tremendous challenge. Army sustainers are trained and ready, supporting victories on the battlefields of today, and they will do so on the battlefields of tomorrow. In order to better support the full spectrum of operations, we took the historic step of establishing the Logistics Branch, which joined officers of the Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Transportation Corps into one unified branch that emphasizes the multifunctional nature of Army sustainment.

Another step supporting full-spectrum operations was the establishment of the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) as the Sustainment Center of Excellence (commonly referred to as the “SCoE”) at Fort Lee, Virginia. As mandated by Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 decisions, CASCOM, as the Army’s SCoE, will centralize sustainment education, technical training, and reachback for sustainment operators in the field. By 2011, all training developments and combat developments for Army logistics will take place at Fort Lee. CASCOM consolidates at one location the Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Transportation Schools. Although the Soldier Support Institute at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, is not moving to Fort Lee, it is also an integral part of CASCOM and the SCoE. CASCOM will also integrate across the medical, chaplain, and judge advocate general capabilities of the Army. CASCOM as the SCoE provides the force with sustainment Soldiers and leaders who are tactically and technically proficient to operate across the full spectrum of conflict. Support Starts Here—The Sustainment Center of Excellence!

Sir Winston Churchill once said, “This is not the end or even the beginning of the end, but it is, I believe, the end of the beginning.” That’s how I feel about Army Logistician. I believe the publication has reached the end of the beginning. Army Logistician has provided a very sound foundation on which to begin the new era of Army Sustainment. For all sustainment Soldiers—whether in maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, human resources support, financial management, or medical logistics—Army Sustainment will continue the remarkable and decades-old tradition of Army Logistician as your professional bulletin.

**Major General James E. Chambers is the Commanding General of the Army Combined Arms Support Command and Fort Lee, Virginia.**
I have been reading *Army Logistician* for many of its 40 years, and like an old, reliable friend, it hasn’t changed much. Sure, its content has changed to reflect how logisticians have transformed since Vietnam, when the magazine first appeared. In fact, it has been just 12 years since I wrote my first article, “Twelve Dirty Questions Leaders Should Ask Their Motor Pool Officers,” but technological advances since then have made some of those questions irrelevant.

Of course, the magazine’s look is new. Now, Soldiers read it over the Internet, not just the print version I’ve always read. And with this issue, the name changes to *Army Sustainment* to include coverage of human resource management and finance functions of which our sustainment units have oversight.

But the one constant in this sea of change has been the magazine itself. Just as it has done from day one, it’s still written by Soldiers and civilians on the ground, telling what’s going on in units so thousands of sustainers can benefit from their experiences. Future sustainers will be far different from those of today, just as we are light years from those in 1969—and I have no doubt that *Army Sustainment* will inform us how to meet the challenges of our new times.

Think about the changes *Army Logistician* covered. In Vietnam, logisticians were perceived as being in the rear with the gear and the weapon they carried was a radio. In Iraq, convoy ambushes, where cooks and other support Soldiers were taken captive, showed the new reality: Sustainers are now on the front lines. Logisticians must be warriors as well as logisticians. They must not only know tactical skills but also have appropriate force protection for all formations.

In 1969, man may have walked on the Moon, but a logisticians’s tools were a typewriter, carbon paper, and a stubby pencil. It was a surprise to the depot operator where supplies were and when they would show up, and shipping via containers was just getting started. It cost $2,000 to equip a Soldier with a uniform, M16A1, and flak vest—not the $17,000 we invest today in flame-resistant uniforms, night-vision devices, close combat optics, infrared lights, and other high-tech gear.

Today, our depots’ workload is three times higher than in the Vietnam War era. Back then, the Army had 40 divisions; today we have 18. And not only is the Army doing more with less, but the sustainment force structure is being aligned to better support our new brigade-based Army. We’re 86-percent complete with this transformation.

The future challenges confronting logisticians that will be chronicled in *Army Sustainment* will be even greater. Right now, we’re building a stronger presence in land-locked Afghanistan, one of the most difficult places in the world to move materiel and Soldiers into and out of. We have created a distribution network that moves containers through Pakistan to Afghanistan, and we have developed an alternate route that moves supplies from Europe using planes, trains, trucks, and even ships through all of the “stans” into Afghanistan.

We must confront in Iraq what might be the hardest sustainment task yet: safely and responsibly drawing down the large number of Soldiers, civilians, and contractors, along with billions of dollars of equipment. Right now, we’re analyzing what we do with all that materiel—do we move it to Afghanistan, use it to re-establish Army pre-positioned stocks, move it home to fill holes in units not deployed, or leave it in Iraq to be sold to help fill Iraqi Army requirements? By scouring for efficiencies, we have cut in half the time it takes to redeploy equipment from Iraq back home, which is crucial for our efforts to repair the equipment from the wear and tear of 8 years of war and get it ready for the next conflict.

If that weren’t enough, we are in the midst of moving more than half of the entire Active Force in some way as we comply with base realignment and closure plans and the global realignment of our Army.

We’re fortunate that today’s young sustainers are more tech savvy than their predecessors, because what is difficult to do now will become effortless when we tap into better technologies. We are working toward the day when we have total visibility of our assets; when everyone from the commander in the field to an analyst at the Pentagon has the same ability to track equipment and supplies worldwide, whether in transit or stationary; when computers will diagnose and tell us what maintenance actions to take before equipment fails; and when GPS-guided cargo is airdropped in the most remote locations with no damage.

We will use the same kind of creative thinking to turn the Army greener, reducing the amount of energy we consume while keeping our troops safer,
because every time we don’t have to put a fuel truck on the road in combat, we minimize Soldiers’ risk.

We’re streamlining how we distribute clothing and individual equipment, so we can see how much clothing is on shelves at each installation and redistribute it where it is needed. We’re changing how we develop new vehicles, so instead of enumerating a variety of specifications that say a truck must go this fast or carry this much, we also consider how much it will cost to maintain, fix, and upgrade.

Yet, as much headway as we’re making, we still need to do more, particularly in changing the sustainers’ mindsets. We still think too much in 80-card columns; too many management stovepipes still prevent technology from being implemented as quickly as it should; and we must get better at learning lessons when things don’t go as they should.

One-third of the Army, about 270,000 Soldiers, are sustainers, and last year we marked a new era when we created the Logistics Branch. In the 21st century, we need logisticians who are multifunctional, not simply focused on their particular branch, and who maintain a basic competence in all branches.

In the first Army Logistitian issue in 1969, General F. J. Chesarek, Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command, observed that “the prescription for our logistics ills contains nothing new or radical. It is similar to the call of a football coach for harder drills in the fundamentals of the game.”

As Army Logistician has done for the last 40 years, Army Sustainment will chronicle the harder drills and better charging needed to prevent any ills and ensure sustainers are: Always There, Always Ready.

Lieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, Department of the Army.
This past year has been a wonderfully rewarding journey for the Army Ordnance Center and Schools. On 8 May, after 92 years at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, the Ordnance Center and Schools cased its colors and began transitioning to its new home at Fort Lee, Virginia. The colors casing ceremony was a bittersweet experience for us and for the Aberdeen Proving Ground community as a whole.

While Aberdeen will always have a special place in the hearts of all Ordnance Soldiers and civilians, it is imperative that we provide the very best training for our troops. Therefore, we are looking forward to moving our headquarters to Fort Lee, where modern, state-of-the-art facilities and technologically advanced equipment are readily available to meet the skills-based training that our Soldiers need. The facilities and equipment at Fort Lee will also afford us opportunities to not only meet but also exceed the high standards we have always maintained.

Today, the Ordnance branch is the second largest branch in the Army and the Ordnance warrant officer branch ranks as the largest warrant officer technical branch. Ordnance Soldiers continue to provide support across the Army, with approximately 76 percent of Ordnance Soldiers working in units that are not designated Ordnance units.

We oversee three career management fields (CMFs) for 34 enlisted military occupational specialties (MOSs). The three CMFs are CMF 63, mechanical maintenance; CMF 89, ammunition; and CMF 94, electronic maintenance. In fiscal year 2010, CMF 63 will convert to CMF 91. This change was deemed necessary to align the mechanical maintenance field with the numeric designation of the officer area of concentration (AOC).

Warrant officers in 9 Ordnance warrant officer MOSs receive training at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Fort Gordon, Georgia; and Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Our warrant officers are leaders, trainers, advisers, and technical experts in their professions. Their diverse backgrounds, experience, and training enable them to support a wide range of Army missions and units throughout their careers.

The Ordnance Center and Schools also offer two officer AOCs: 89E for ammunition and 91A for maintenance. Upon completion of the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course at Fort Lee, these officers are assigned AOC 90A, which designates them as multifunctional logisticians. Fourteen additional skill identifiers are also available to officers. Training for Reserve component personnel is offered at 19 Regional Training Sites-Maintenance.

Though Ordnance Soldiers currently receive training in 9 locations, our transition to Fort Lee will reduce our training footprint. This change will be transparent to incoming personnel. Staffed with highly skilled instructors and featuring the best facilities and equipment, Fort Lee will provide a quality of training that will surpass most expectations. The benefit for all is that gaining units will receive the highest quality and best trained Ordnance Soldiers among their ranks. Go Ordnance!

Brigadier General Lynn A. Collyar is the Chief of Ordnance and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and Schools.
The Army organizes its forces into critical warfighting functions to generate combat power. These warfighting functions group Army capabilities into like functions that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. The sustainment warfighting function includes the tasks and systems that provide support and services that ensure Soldiers’ freedom of action, extend their operational reach, and prolong their endurance. This function includes financial management (FM) support.

Reorganizing the FM Structure

Over the last few years, the FM community has reorganized its brigade- and battalion-level command structures. On 1 October 2008, branch code 44 (finance) was merged with functional area 45 (comptroller) to form branch code 36 (financial management). FM is embedded in the sustainment warfighting function, and thus, FM tactical units operate under the command and control of theater support commands and sustainment brigades. Now that the Army is in its third theater rotation under this modular construct, the results demonstrate tremendous value in aligning FM operations with the other sustainment functions to provide an even more powerful and enduring capability to the warfighting force. Always looking for opportunities to improve, the FM community is identifying capability gaps that keep it from maximizing FM support and refining its structure based on lessons learned.

In melding FM operations into sustainment operations, the Army has re-created a marriage of logistics and FM that has a surprising precedent. In the early 20th century, the Army integrated the Finance Corps into the Quartermaster Corps for a short time. Although the two functions were later separated back into individual corps, today’s inclusion of finance in the sustainment warfighting function is built on that enduring foundation.

The Tactical FM Structure

The tactical FM structure includes three echelons: the FM center, FM company, and FM detachment. The FM center is the top-tier, tactical-level FM unit. Located at the theater level, the FM center is a 36-person organization that serves as an operational element of the theater support command. Its mission is to provide technical oversight of finance operations across the theater. Specifically, it provides central funding (in U.S. dollars or the local currency), financial planning and policy, internal control, and accounting support. To gain full visibility and support of FM operations, the FM center needs to form a close working relationship with the expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) or, in the absence of an ESC, the FM support operations (FM SPO) section of the sustainment brigade.

The FM center’s success depends on building and fostering strong relationships with sustainment brigade commanders and supporting them by accomplishing the FM mission. The FM center, in its technical oversight role, provides funding support for the FM units below the sustainment brigade and has a robust internal control capability to ensure that FM units are operating effectively and in accordance with theater policies, regulatory requirements, and statutory requirements.

FM company. The second-tier tactical FM unit is the FM company, a 27-person organization that is assigned to the sustainment brigade. As part of Army transformation, and to do its part in gleaning spaces to create the required number of brigade combat teams (BCTs), the Finance Corps reorganized finance battalions into FM companies.

Although it is called a company, the FM company performs the same mission and provides the same level of support as the former finance battalion. The company is responsible for managing three to seven FM detachments and providing the necessary internal controls that enable FM operators to accomplish their missions. The major organizational difference is that the command team consists of a major and a first sergeant in lieu of a lieutenant colonel and a command sergeant major. The FM company also has a sergeant major on staff who serves as the FM operations officer and senior technical subject-matter expert for FM operations in the unit.

Because the FM community is not resourced with enough FM companies to have one FM company for each sustainment brigade, the FM company, in most cases, has a farther reach than the sustainment brigade in which it is assigned. The FM company provides contracting, paying-agent, and banking and currency support, including disbursing and
cash-control operations. The company funds subordinate FM detachments and determines currency replenishment needs. The FM company also provides electronic commerce support (for the Eagle-Cash card) and conducts military pay support. The latter responsibility will eventually be assumed by the Army human resources community when the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) is implemented.

**FM detachment.** The lowest tier tactical FM unit is the FM detachment, which is a 26-person organization that is under the command and control of an FM company. Detachments are considered company-level assets and are commanded by a captain with full Uniform Code of Military Justice authority—just like any other company within the Army. The FM detachment’s mission is to provide area FM support to a BCT or brigade-sized unit or to provide FM support as directed by the FM company commander. The FM detachment commands and directs the operations of widely dispersed, assigned, or attached FM support teams and provides procurement and disbursing support as well as military pay support when required.

**Key Players in FM Operations**

The FM company and detachment commanders work for the sustainment brigade, but many other stakeholders influence their actions. The FM center provides the technical oversight of their finance operations, and the division G–8 and regional contracting command are key players that make up the other two critical pieces in the procurement process. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve System support these units’ daily missions at the national-provider level.

**DFAS.** In contingency operations, the FM company commander serves as a direct agent of the Treasury, which means that the unit has its own checking account with the Treasury. Theoretically, that commander brings the full monetary might of the U.S. Government to his sector of the battlefield merely by possessing a limitless checkbook. However, with great power comes great responsibility. The commander owns—and has pecuniary liability for—every penny that flows within that area. Each FM company maintains its own disbursing account through DFAS to conduct operations within its footprint and must balance the account daily and certify the account monthly.

**Defense military pay office.** FM operations, especially military pay services, are highly visible across the Army. In garrison, an FM company’s assets are typically used to augment the local Defense military pay office (DMPO) and provide military pay and travel support. The FM company commander may be dual-hatted as the DMPO chief, making...
him directly accountable to DFAS for local military pay support operations. Under DIMHRS, this function will migrate to the human resources community to be managed by the Army Installation Management Command. Until the migration is complete, where required, FM units must be permitted to assist in the military pay support mission while at home station.

**Inspector general’s office.** How well an FM unit performs its mission directly affects Soldiers in the most critical way: their paychecks. Soldiers are passionate about their financial entitlements and from time to time use the inspector general’s office to resolve paycheck problems. FM units regularly receive inspector general complaints and congressional inquiries from Soldiers outside of the unit. Every FM unit strives to address these issues quickly and resolve problems accurately. Sustainers should not be alarmed when inspector general inquiries occur because they are a component of an FM unit’s daily business. FM operations are the most self-cleansing operations in the Army. From customer feedback, pay inquiries, daily balancing of the cashbooks, and monthly certification of accounts, FM units know almost immediately if something is not working correctly.

**Roles and Responsibilities of FM Units**

Many people who are unfamiliar with the scope of the FM mission tend to think that FM units only cash checks and conduct military pay operations in support of Soldiers’ pay. But the most important mission of FM units is to ensure that warfighting commanders have what they need to sustain the fight. This comes in the way of support to the procurement process—the payment and accounting for contracts on the battlefield. To make the procurement process work, the FM company must work in close coordination with the division G–8 section, which has funding and certification authority, contracting officers, and the staff judge advocate.

FM units provide FM support to all units and personnel within their assigned areas. These units are small but highly specialized and have extremely limited self-support capabilities. Roughly 90 percent of an FM unit is made up of 36-series FM Soldiers. The remaining Soldiers are low-density military occupational specialty Soldiers, like mechanics, automation managers, and administrative support personnel. Parent or adjacent units must provide full life support and customer service to sustain FM operations on the battlefield.

FM units control a highly valued commodity: cash. Although currency does not fit into any true doctrinal class of supply, it is one of the most critical supplies on the battlefield and is viewed by many warfighting commanders as a weapon system. Currency as a commodity most closely mirrors class V (ammunition) regarding procedures and treatment. Currency must be properly safeguarded, regularly inventoried, handled and distributed by select and certified personnel, transported under tight security, and properly accounted for at all times. As this finite supply fluctuates at each location, it must be accurately forecasted and managed and reordered in a timely manner. If it is lost, stolen, or destroyed, detailed investigations must ensue, which can result in full pecuniary liability for negligent parties. If the supply runs out, contracts and supply deliveries stop, paying-agent activities halt, and rewards and information programs cease.

**Sustainment Brigade Commander’s Concerns**

Several FM issues ought to concern the sustainment brigade commander in a deployed environment: losses of funds, status of funds (days of supply), captured or destroyed currency, movement of funds, ability to properly safeguard funds, ongoing missions and operational trends (like paying-agent activities and funding programs), and movement of large units into or out of the FM company’s area of responsibility. These matters are critical to the FM unit’s ability to effectively plan for and accomplish its mission and should concern a sustainment brigade commander. The sustainment brigade’s FM SPO, in conjunction with the FM company commander, should develop, track, and report those critical metrics that allow sustainment leaders to properly gauge the effectiveness of FM operations. The FM SPO also assists the FM company with FM operations planning for its area of responsibility.

By incorporating FM as a part of sustainment operations, the Army adds another key commodity to the sustainment commander’s arsenal and a more robust support capability to the warfighting commander. FM units are small in number and size, but they provide enormous financial leverage on the battlefield. These units rely on the sustainment brigade to provide life support and assistance with future planning, mission analysis of emerging operations, intelligence estimates, FM support forecasting, logistics, and movement coordination. In return, FM units do their part in providing the warfighting commander with the ability to have freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.

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Human Resources Operations: A Force Enabler in the Sustainment Community

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL DARWIN A. FRET

Field Manual (FM) 5–0, Army Planning and Orders Production, states, “The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.” In the case of human resources (HR) in an operational environment, HR doctrine has not been executed as planned because of already established theater requirements. HR units were created, and then the doctrine was developed. When the 14th Human Resources Sustainment Center (HRSC) deployed to Kuwait in 2008, many of us who were new to theater HR doctrine and its purpose were challenged by the different constructs. Only time and knowledge gained from a deployed experience would change our perception of HR support to full-spectrum operations.

This article will—
- Acknowledge the challenges of transforming while providing support to combat operations.
- Highlight the importance of relationship building and how it affects success on the battlefield.
- Review human resources operations branch (HROB) employment trends.
- Examine the employment of select functions—postal operations, R5 (reception, replacement, return to duty, rest and recuperation, and redeployment) operations management, and HR companies.
- Provide recommendations for the future.

Doctrine is a guide to action, not a set of fixed rules.
—FM 3–0, Operations

Challenges With Transforming

Providing HR services to an ever-changing battlefield in support of full-spectrum operations has proven to be a challenge to the HR community. When modularity began over 4 years ago, the only HR personnel who could speak intelligently about the new theater-level HR support doctrine were those who wrote it. Many within the HR community were unfamiliar with the new doctrine and, in many cases, questioned the logic behind the changes. The changes removed us from our comfort zone and forced the HR community to step into the operational realm, working operational issues at every level as an HR enabler with logisticians in the sustainment community. This proved to be an especially daunting task for the HR community, which has employed many “itty bitty units” (or teams) throughout the theater.

For example, a casualty liaison team, which is composed of five Soldiers led by a sergeant (E–5), is often on its own away from its parent HR company and attached to a multinational task force’s level-III medical treatment facility or a two-star general officer headquarters. Another example of a typical HR “itty bitty unit” is the R5 personnel accounting team, which is composed of six Soldiers led by a staff sergeant (E–6), positioned at theater entry points, and tasked to perform personnel accounting at critical entry and exit nodes. HR “itty bitty units” generally operate at the tactical and operational levels and are critical to mission accomplishment. Although the units encountered some problems initially, providing theater HR operations in a modular environment works.

Relationships

Members of the 14th HRSC are building relationships and sharing experiences with expeditionary sustainment commands (ESCs), sustainment brigades, HR companies, military mail terminal directorates, and theater gateway directorates across all Army components. Although having direct command and control would be helpful and could make things easier, good relationships and a common purpose are beneficial to modular HR operations.

Currently, the 14th HRSC is adapting and creating new procedures and continuously assessing itself with every lesson learned. It is also developing new training plans and standards that will enable future deploying HR units to prepare for the changing operational environment. Finally and most importantly, the 14th HRSC continues to evolve, like any learning organization. The way ahead for HR operations must be understood from the lowest nodes all the way to the HRSC level.
Soldiers of the 14th HRSC must promote, educate, and infuse ourselves within the sustainment community because we are a part of the team.

**HR Operations Branch Employment Trends**

Over the first 5 months in theater, the HRSC staff observed many trends in the employment of HROBs at the ESC and sustainment brigade levels, some in accordance with doctrine and others based on operational needs. In the previous theater rotation, two sustainment brigades had put operational control of the HROBs under the brigade special troops battalion. In other cases, the HROB was completely disbanded or nonexistent, typically because of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

Ideally, the HROB should remain staffed under the support operations (SPO) section, as is the case with all the other support branches. Within the HROB, at both the ESC and sustainment brigade levels, the staff must be manned with experienced HR personnel who are trained and allowed to execute their mission. Although commanders can employ their personnel as they determine appropriate to accomplish the mission, they should gain an understanding of the capability HR planners bring to the fight in an expeditionary environment. Senior commanders need to become aware of the benefits of properly employing the HR services provided by HR units and branches within the sustainment community.

To fully appreciate the HR support mission, the commander must first understand HR capabilities. Thus, it is important for HR planners to convey all the HR services that theater HR units provide to the sustainment community. The top 11 reasons a commander and SPO need a functional HROB are that the HROB—

- Provides operational guidance to all subordinate HR units.
- Understands which HR systems are critical to mission success.
- Monitors and helps establish HR contracting efforts within the command’s battlespace (by writing performance work statement language and interacting with contractor management).
- Analyzes redeployment or reallocation of HR units within the battlespace.
- Develops the HR concept of support, to include courses of action (COAs) to support mission requirements.
- Analyzes COAs to determine the best method to support HR operations in an unpredictable environment.
- Conducts inspections of Army post offices, ensuring integrated, accurate, and timely mail processing.
- Provides current and future planning capabilities through the SPO to the commander (HR unit distribution management).
- Understands and coordinates HR unit force tracking to ensure that staffing has no gaps or excessive overlaps and develops mitigation strategies as required.
- Provides the commander’s HR subject-matter experts in all of the HR functional areas (postal operations, casualty operations, R5, and personnel accounting and strength reporting).
- Acts as the conduit through which commanders influence the HR concept of support in the battlespace.

**Organizational Changes**

In 1 year, all components of the Army deployed over 65 percent of the R5 plans and operations teams and personnel accounting teams in the HR force. The high employment of these teams was the result of inadequately evaluating the number of teams needed based on doctrinal missions in a changing operational environment. This mistake was exacerbated by a disagreement between the HR and logistics communities concerning how to employ HR elements. In the end, the HR accountability mission could have been accomplished with fewer HR teams, provided the gateway’s vital non-HR activities, such as convoy escort duties, were performed by other appropriate units. The mitigation strategy was as simple as determining the HR requirements and providing the right number of units capable of executing the mission.

HR units must become more interoperable in order to remain relevant in the future. The current modular HR system deploys “plug and play” HR units separately from their parent elements. HR companies must begin to train and deploy as consolidated units, not as separate, independent HR elements. The value of this type of training and utilization enables company commanders to practice receiving a mission and sourcing it with the necessary skill sets. Today, it is possible for an HR company commander to serve anywhere from 18 to 24 months and never see or know some of his Soldiers because of the current operating tempo.

**HR Operational Support Mission**

In the 14th HRSC, we are just starting to fully understand our responsibilities as theater HR planners.
By developing the same analytical skills associated with combat operations, we have learned to accomplish our HR operational support mission. We also must continue to educate the sustainment community on what we can do for them. The sustainment community has been receptive; however, more progress is needed. Some logisticians have embraced the modular transformation, inviting us to their meetings and seeking our input. This is a good start. We must continue efforts to educate not only those in the sustainment world but also those in the HR community. Too many of our HR Soldiers are not aggressively studying the changes to HR doctrine and still perceive the HR world to be centered only on G–1 and S–1 functions.

Although no formal training focuses on HROB functions yet, it will soon. Some HR personnel believe that the doctrine needs to change, but perhaps the doctrine needs to be fully implemented first. Doctrine is not perfect, as its purpose is to provide a common philosophy and language that enhance unity of effort. However, this is not an excuse for leaders within the HR community not to take the initiative in training HROBs now. Some general resources are available that will help HR staff prepare for their roles in an HROB, including FM 1–0.02, Theater Level Human Resources Support, FM 3–0, Operations, and FM 5–0, Army Planning and Orders Production. The modular operational HR structure is here to stay, with minor changes in the HR company structure expected in the future. HR operations play an integral part in the overall sustainment effort and will continue to remain relevant to this effort at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Postal Operations Mission

From a postal perspective, the HR operational impact on the sustainment community is maximized when the SPO understands the importance of command and control and contractor relationships, the SPO understands the importance of postal knowledge and adaptability to the deployed environment, and when ownership implies use of postal assets for appropriate HR missions. In postal operations, the guidance we provide is often directive in nature because it is based on statutes and regulations. However, based on experience, our effectiveness derives from the relationships we develop with the sustainment brigade and ESC HROBs, HR companies, and postal platoons. Because an HRSC has no direct command and control relationship with HROBs and subordinate HR elements, the 14th HRSC has worked diligently to establish a good rapport with its HR counterparts. This has worked so far, but we understand that it may prove difficult for others who do not recognize or value the importance of these working relationships.

While HROBs must take ownership of their postal assets and become subject-matter experts, the HRSC postal operations division provides tremendous technical expertise and support to HROBs and postal platoons. Nonetheless, having HROBs take ownership of postal assets creates a more efficient operation and fosters greater interest in ensuring mission success.

The relevance of HR relationships in the modular structure is clear. All involved must work toward incorporating the new theater HR doctrine, and the HR and logistics communities need to continue relevant communication. Only through our common purpose, expeditionary mindset, and will to succeed will this new structure work. Although HR units are relatively small, the impact of HR support on servicemembers’ morale and welfare is enormous. The way ahead will entail finding a way to transform HR units into the right fit for HR operations and support missions. To achieve this end, HR planners cannot afford to be intellectually complacent.

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As a part of the Army Combined Arms Support Command and the Army Sustainment Center of Excellence, the Army Recruiting and Retention School provides the human resources training needed to prepare Soldiers to serve in the Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), which is responsible for recruiting the Army’s military personnel. Doctrinal changes, marketing developments, geographically dispersed units, and the increased diversity of the U.S. population have provided USAREC with significant obstacles to overcome.

When the Army decides to grow, USAREC’s mission increases. When the Army decides to downsize, USAREC’s mission remains constant. During reductions in force and increases in end strength, USAREC maintains adaptive, innovative, and flexible business practices, allowing for continuous success.

The dynamic nature of recruiting for an all-volunteer Army during an extended period of conflict has USAREC changing rapidly. This article will address changes in recruiting doctrine, Army interviewing techniques, family well-being initiatives, and the use of technology in an era of reduced budgets and decreasing resources.

The Shift From Selling to Leading

The civilian sector defines the “art of selling” as knowing how to offer customers what you are selling in such a manner that they feel that buying it from you will solve their problems or fulfill their needs. Above all else, the seller should remember that people’s wants, needs, and problems are changing constantly. People are always learning, which allows Army recruiters to create sounder doctrinal theory. This means recruiting proficiency requires constant updates to the sales presentation. Tom Hopkins, an author known as the world’s leading sales trainer, says, “Selling is largely a process of leading the customer, using questions, to discover the product or service he or she wants and then having them make the decision to get it.”

As this applies to Army recruiting, the art of selling was showmanship. Previous doctrine was characterized by the development and practice of sophisticated and polished presentation skills that almost unfailingly dazzled, but did not always gain, a new recruit’s trust. The art of selling was the concealment of salesmanship. This was characterized by well-prepared interactive questions that elicited the “right responses” from the customer. The “find a need and sell the need” approach to recruiting was prevalent during the last 10 years.

The true art of selling is the absence of salesmanship. This delivery technique is characterized by a quiet, relaxed, well-prepared salesperson who forgets every aspect of technique and just listens and reacts in real time. This is not to be mistaken for the absence of sales fundamentals, just the absence of salesmanship typically associated with the feeling one gets when exposed to dishonest used-car salesmen.

Recruiting Doctrine

In 2003, USAREC conducted several doctrine review panels and determined that the current doctrine was too prescriptive and provided too many “you will” directives. The panel members concluded that they needed to revise the doctrine.

In early 2004, Colonel Gary Carlson, former Army Recruiting and Retention School commandant, was called from retirement to head a task force charged with revising recruiting doctrine. The task force had 18 months to complete the task. The USAREC commanding general’s vision was to design doctrine that encouraged the development of leaders rather than salespeople committed to a cumbersome process based on an outdated recruiting model.

In February 2005, the Army released completely new recruiting doctrine, and a transformation was set in motion. USAREC was to move from a sales-based approach to a leadership-based approach, with interviewing techniques that included counseling, coaching, and mentoring. Command planners wanted to grow bold, ambitious, and decisive recruiting leaders. They wanted doctrine grounded in Army values and built around flexible, agile, and responsive recruiting support systems.

The new doctrine is aligned with the operational Army. For the first time in history, a Soldier newly assigned to USAREC does not have to learn a new vocabulary. USAREC doctrine now mirrors existing Army doctrine to minimize the learning curve that Soldiers experienced previously, which reduces the time needed to adapt to a USAREC assignment.

Today’s society is technologically savvy, and information is a mouse click away. American culture has made people so leery of salespeople that they avoid being “sold.” Knowing these key points about our target market, USAREC has changed recruiting doctrine to allow the Army recruiter to become...
Leading—Not Selling

The new approach is based on the concept of leading people into the Army rather than selling it to them. The new doctrine encourages calculated risk taking and communication among the leaders and the led while relying on feedback from all echelons. The doctrine revision task force reviewed research on the millennial generation (those born roughly between the early 1980s and mid 1990s) and discovered that it is a generation of Americans who are embracing Army values. Research showed that this generation does not want to be sold; it wants be embraced by a values-based organization. The Army interview was changed to reflect more discussion regarding the Army story and the Army values, warrior ethos, and the Soldier’s Creed. A culmination of doctrine reviews, millennial generation study reviews, and the commanding general’s vision led to the most significant and successful change in doctrine that USAREC has ever experienced. The Soldiers newly assigned to the command are demonstrating an easier transition to the business of recruiting. New commanders and staff can share a common language with veterans of recruiting because the language gap has been filled.

The New Army Interview

“The ‘Art of Asking Questions’ is your greatest sales tool,” says Lee DuBois, another industry leader in sales training and coaching. In The 7 Powers of Questions: Secrets to successful Communication in Life and at Work, Dorothy Leeds wrote, “Questions can stimulate and persuade. They are signs of a curious mind, a caring heart—a confident personality. They are the essential tools of the seeker and the problem-solver. In our personal and professional lives, they can make the difference between getting what we want and going without.”

The biggest mistake typically made by recruiters is one of style: They talk too much. They tell rather than persuade. Telling is defined as one-way communication, while persuasion requires interaction between the recruiter and the applicant. Recruiters who immediately launch into a sales monologue air only their views and ignore the ideas, interests, problems, goals, and needs of their prospects. This is no way to convince prospects that the Army is interested in satisfying their needs and solving their problems. The habit of questioning does not come naturally to most people. It is a learned behavior that requires practice, patience, self-discipline, and active listening skills. The question being asked and how it is asked are critical to the process. One can act like a cross-examiner or a quiz show host, or he can act like a trusted friend and consultant. A recruiter’s attitude drives his actions and will determine the outcome of each day’s events. Too often, a recruiter believes he needs to talk his way into a sale, when the opposite is true. By using well-structured questions, asked in a friendly and consultative manner, he can identify the interests and desires of the prospect. The recruiter makes a far greater impact on the prospect by listening, which shows that he cares about the prospect’s problems and what he really wants. By asking questions, the recruiter can remain in control of any situation. Questions help him gain more information, handle objections, and prepare to field any possible concerns the prospect may have. Using good questioning techniques shows that the recruiter cares and is interested and willing to learn more in order to help address the prospect’s needs.

Well-Being Initiatives

The increased demand on the Soldier will always cause ripple effects to roll through the family at home. Many Soldiers are being deployed once every other year, while some are deploying more frequently because of the high demand for their military occupational specialties. Soldiers are working longer hours to accomplish missions that are more demanding. Families need multiple household incomes because of the struggling economy. With all of these requirements, it is crucial that all of our current and future Soldiers are educated and aware of the programs available to them. As new Soldiers receive their orientation briefing 3 to 10 business days following their enlistment, they receive the following three items: the “Welcome to the Army Family” handbook, a “New Spouse Orientation” DVD, and a “Soldier Visibility Kit.” These tools guide them through using the Military OneSource website—the Army’s main web-based resource for family programs and assistance.
Training at the Army Recruiting and Retention School has been modified, adding these three new publications to the recruiter’s toolkit. During the Army interview with a parent or spouse present, these tools are available to show influencers how they are fully included in the “Army Strong” family. These brochures, pamphlets, and videos are an outstanding addition to the recruiter’s Army interview and future Soldier orientation processes.

**Culture of Value**

The Culture of Value initiative was started by the USAREC commander, Major General Thomas P. Bostick, to bring about a paradigm shift in the Army’s recruiting culture. The goal is to create a command that Soldiers want to serve in because it values the contributions of its workforce. He identified a need to demonstrate the value of serving in the command to its Soldiers, families, and civilians. Advertising USAREC’s business to the Army is more critical than the current practice of advertising to the public. USAREC needs Soldiers to readily volunteer for recruiting duty. Getting the Army to know and support the recruiting command and see it as valuable to Soldiers’ careers is a daunting task.

USAREC contracted with a civilian firm to examine USAREC processes and recommend changes to those processes. During fiscal year 2009, the Culture of Value contractors conducted interviews and gathered research data, which allowed them to customize training for the recruiting command.

At an executive summit, hosted by the USAREC commanding general and attended by all leaders and primary staff members, the senior leaders reviewed the research results and identified the key elements of the recruiting culture that required change. These elements were used to structure and design a training program. USAREC began to use “activating change” techniques, allowing it to become a more change-capable organization. It can adapt to its own culture-change needs. This training created a true organizational efficacy review.

Trainers were certified by AchieveGlobal and Koniag Services, Inc., under the Culture of Value contract in April 2009. A team of 18 USAREC master trainers delivered the initial training to key personnel at the Master Trainer Academy. This training followed a blended learning “train-the-trainer”
methodology and was rolled out to the command in May and June 2009. USAREC had 93 master trainers who trained personnel using 5 phases:

- **Phase 1.** Brigade commanders, command sergeant majors, and staff.
- **Phase 2.** Battalion commanders, command sergeant majors, and staff.
- **Phase 3.** Company commanders and first sergeants.
- **Phase 4.** Station commanders.
- **Phase 5.** Recruiters.

The training consisted of four blended training elements. The first element was a short 10- to 15-minute distributed learning (dL) introduction. The second element was a 90-minute dL module for recruiters and a 180-minute dL module for all others. The third element was a 90-minute virtual classroom session that allowed for small-group instruction. The final element of training was a practical exercise covering the recruiting methods that were covered in the training. This exercise required students to write a paper on lessons learned while applying the activating change training. This document was submitted back to a virtual classroom as the final hurdle for course completion.

The activating change training expanded the students’ ability to become more capable of change. The training focused on transforming the command into a model for developing Army leaders. These leaders returned to Army units and claimed that their performance and contributions were valued, supported, and recognized within USAREC.

**Recruiting Technology**

USAREC has expanded its use of new technologies in an effort to reduce temporary duty costs, recruiter time, and training expenses. USAREC expanded its technical capabilities by adopting the following programs:

- **Army Learning Management System (ALMS).** The command used an interim learning management system (ILMS) for approximately 6 years. This system was developed during current budget and within-year program objective memorandum (POM) cycles. The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mandated that all ILMSs will be turned off or resourced internally starting in fiscal year 2009. USAREC immediately jumped on board with the TRADOC IBM pilot for migration to ALMS. All dL was turned over for migration to the TRADOC system. This will result in a cost savings for USAREC in the upcoming years.

- **Recruiter ProNet.** USAREC has combined efforts with the Battle Command Knowledge System and created the Recruiter ProNet, which allows recruiters to work collaboratively in real time. Recruiters in the field struggling with an issue can immediately post a question and get answers to some of their most troubling training concerns.

- **Graphical Accessions Mapping Analysis Tool (GAMAT).** This new technology was introduced in 2006. GAMAT is an interactive spatial intelligence application that allows recruiters to track the progress of recruits from first contact to basic training. A prospecting plan with market segmentation data and a market analysis can be extracted to show station and recruiter areas with increased potential.

- **Leader/Recruiter Zone and Report Management Zone.** These are the primary areas for recruiters and station commanders to access the systems they use on a daily basis. All reporting and data tracking is done automatically for analysis and trend identification.

- **Calendar Zone and Knowledge Zone.** These two areas reflect where plans are maintained and knowledge is shared. Calendar Zone is the automated tool used by all recruiters to manage daily, monthly, and yearly activities. Knowledge Zone is a tool used to gain answers to frequently asked questions.

- **Future Soldier Remote Reservation System.** This system allows a recruiter to pull a job from REQUEST live in the applicant’s living room. This tool has been one of the best developments for recruiters to date. No longer do parents have to go to a military entrance processing station with their children to ensure they get what they are promised. All contractual guarantees can be made in the living room of a recruit’s home.

USAREC, with support from the Army Recruiting and Retention School, has performed yeoman work in changing its culture. The change in recruiting doctrine and the Army’s heritage of growing not only leaders who lead and mentor current Soldiers but also leaders who lead and mentor those we hope to make a part of the Army’s future is the legacy we choose to leave behind. USAREC’s leaders are very proud of all the efforts and energy spent by Soldiers, civilians, family members, and contractors to achieve these many change initiatives. We take this moment in time and in this publication to say thank you for the untiring commitment and show appreciation for your service, sacrifice, leadership, and professionalism.

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Logistics, CSS, Sustainment: Evolving Definitions of Support

George C. Thorpe, in his 1917 book Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation, wrote, “There is something more than academic interest in correctly defining Logistics, for the purpose of the definition is to establish a division of labor, and if two divisions are properly drawn while the third is not, there will be either duplication of effort or some functions will be overlooked entirely, with the result that certain preparations for war will not be made.” As our Army transforms from the legacy force Army of Excellence to the full-spectrum, brigade-centric modular force, we must ensure that we heed Thorpe’s counsel and define our future sustainment organizations and concepts for the most effective division of labor.

During much of the 20th century, the definitions and concepts for the terms “logistics,” “combat service support (CSS),” and “sustainment” found in the Army’s capstone doctrinal manual for operations did not match the definitions and concepts for the same terms found in the keystone manual for support. This doctrinal disagreement left the definitions and concepts underlying support of Army forces open to interpretation and allowed anyone with a vested interest to selectively manipulate them in an effort to garner resources and power within the Army. The term “logistics,” after decades of skewed interpretation and misapplication, and despite possessing a vaguely distinct official definition, became conceptually synonymous with the terms “CSS” and “sustainment.” As a result, many nonlogistics support functions, such as personnel support, were commonly lumped under the concept of logistics and did not receive adequate attention during the design of organizations or the development of war plans.

Logistics, CSS, and sustainment actually are relatively recent additions to the official Army lexicon. Although the concept of providing support to armies is hardly new, the terminology currently used by the U.S. Army emerged only in the mid-20th century. Through the first half of the century, Soldiers in the field used the terms “administration” or “administrative support” to describe any military activity outside the realms of tactics and strategy. Before the term “logistics” was introduced to the field in 1949 (in the keystone manual for support, Field Manual [FM] 100–10, Field Service Regulations, Administration), use of logistics was fashionable primarily in academic and Department of War General Staff circles. Likewise, the term “CSS” received attention in General Staff circles but was not commonly used by ordinary Soldiers until it was introduced to the field in 1962. “Sustainment” first appeared in doctrine in 1986.

Since their introduction to the whole Army, the terms have become basically synonymous—distinguishable only slightly in definition but not at all in application. Fortunately, recent doctrine may put an end to this misunderstanding.

The Rise of “Logistics”

Before World War II, the Army narrowly defined logistics as the art of planning and carrying out military movement, evacuation, and supply. By war’s end, Army-wide acceptance of the term resulted in an expansion of the concept. This expanded usage was reflected in the 1949 version of FM 100–10, which defined logistics as “that branch of administration which embraces the management and provision of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, and services.” (FM 100–10 was renamed “Combat Service Support” in 1968 and was superseded by FM 4–0 in 2003.)

The last word in the definition, “services,” opened the door to applying the term “logistics” to all noncombatant military activities. Officially, “logistics services” activities were limited primarily to maintenance, labor, and construction; in practice, the whole concept of logistics, under the guise of “logistics services,” took on whatever meaning was convenient to a particular user.

James A. Huston, in his instructive survey The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953, expressed his consternation with this expansion of the concept of logistics when he wrote, “From that point [1944] various people, like Humpty Dumpty, began making it [logistics] mean whatever they wanted it to mean.” Huston saw in this expansion of the definition of logistics the usurping of the administrative support field, of which logistics was only a branch.

The movement toward defining all noncombatant military activity as logistics provided a pragmatic approach to managing the exponential growth of the Army support system during World War II but also an opportunity for those with ambition to build an empire. This trend reached its zenith with the consolidation of all administrative, personnel, and logistics functions under the command of one organization, the Army Service Forces (ASF), during the middle years of the war. The ASF became an unwieldy organization unable to provide efficient support across the entire spectrum of support functions and was disbanded shortly after the war ended. Although the ASF failed, its final report defined logistics largely in terms of its own functions; these were in essence the same functions assigned to
the term “administrative support,” of which logistics was actually a subordinate activity. This report gave unwarranted credibility to the idea that all support activities could be organized and managed in the same manner as logistics.

The disbanding of the colossal ASF did not curtail the expansion of the concept of logistics. Although the Army in 1946 reorganized the former ASF’s “administrative services” under the Adjutant General’s Department and the ASF’s “personnel services” under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1 (both of these organizations being supervised by the Director of Personnel and Administration on the War Department General Staff), this action did little to clear up actual lines of control and coordination. The reorganization proved to be only an interim solution at best since most of the ASF’s business practices were carried over, for over a decade, to the War Department General Staff.

In 1956, the Army, in yet another effort to clearly separate personnel support from logistics, created the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG) and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) and provided them with a mandate to not only develop policy and conduct planning within their respective spheres but also to operate and direct activities to ensure that orders were issued and carried out as intended.

Unfortunately, due to an institutional inability to break old habits, the idea that personnel support was a component of logistics was not completely expunged from the minds of many Soldiers. By 1962, the new ODCSLOG became so involved in directing all administrative support activities that it neglected its real mission of planning and directing only logistics support. The ODCSLOG justified its adherence to the old ways by pointing to the 1954 version of FM 100–10, which defined logistics as follows:

In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of matériel; (2) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services. It comprises both planning, including determination of requirements, and implementation.

Although, by definition, the “acquisition or furnishing of services” was limited in scope, in practice the phrase permitted the term “logistics” to be applied indiscriminately, and the meaning of logistics lost what little stability it had possessed before entering the common language of the Soldier. The ODCSLOG’s impulse to crowd all support activities under “logistics” implied a unity that did not exist, resulting in an unclear division of labor for Soldiers who had to organize and administer support in the field.

The Birth of “CSS”

To reduce this confusion, the Army in 1962 undertook a major reorganization of its support activities. Labeled COSTAR (Combat Support to the Army), the reorganization aimed to reestablish the pre-World War II distinction between logistics and personnel support by severely restricting the activities of the ODCSLOG and giving greater importance to the ODCSPER. Under this new structure, the ODCSLOG concentrated on logistics planning while the ODCSPER focused on personnel planning. Unfortunately, this department-level mandate was contradicted by the simultaneous creation of a Combat Development Command (CDC), which was under the command of and staffed mostly with logistics officers. CDC took up the old ASF mission of developing concepts and doctrine in the areas of logistics and administration. Although the implementation of COSTAR at the department level clearly betrayed the widespread myth that all support functions, particularly personnel support, could be technically and practically administered in the same fashion and in the same organization as logistics activities, the creation and staffing of the CDC continued to foster, albeit not necessarily intentionally, the myth that logistics trumped all support activities.

The Army, again attempting to clearly delineate support activities, introduced CSS as the overarching term to describe all assistance given troops outside the areas of tactics and strategy. Published in the same year that COSTAR was implemented and the CDC was established, the 1962 version of FM 54–1, Logistics Command, introduced CSS as follows:

[As] used in this manual the term “Combat Service Support” embraces the assistance given to troops in the management and execution of military matters not included in tactics and strategy. Such assistance consists of personnel management, interior management of units, logistics, and civil affairs.

Officially, this definition was aimed at subordinating all support activities to the broader field of CSS. In reality, this was the same definition given to the term “administrative support”—the one used by the Army for the first half of the 20th century. Use of CSS fell victim to a semantic shell game and had little impact on dispelling the one-size-fits-all use of logistics.

Underscoring the new term’s lack of impact, new versions of the Army’s manuals did nothing to establish CSS as a new overarching support concept. FM 100–5—the manual for operations, published in 1962—and FM 100–10, published in 1963, did not define, let alone recognize, CSS. (FM 100–5 originally was named Field Service Regulations, Operations, and became Operations of Army Forces in the Field in 1968 and Operations in 1976.) FM 100–5 grouped all support activities, including personnel services, as “functions of logistics” but did not define logistics. FM 100–10 grouped all support activities under the old term “administrative support.” While it did at least divide that term into “logistics” and “personnel,” it
maintained the definition of logistics introduced in the 1954 manual.

The failure of both doctrinal manuals to recognize CSS as introduced in FM 54–1, coupled with contradictions between the two manuals in how they defined logistics and grouped support activities, laid the groundwork for half a decade of confusion within the sustainment community and the Army at large.

Logistics and CSS: Doctrinal Confusion

After experiencing initial resistance, CSS did gain in popularity after the 1968 versions of FM 100–5 and FM 100–10 concurrently introduced the term to the Army at large. However, the two manuals differed in their definitions and in fundamental concepts of support. FM 100–10 described CSS as one of the three major subdivisions of military activity—combat, combat support, and combat service support—and defined it as “the assistance provided operating forces primarily in the fields of personnel and administrative services, civil affairs, construction, labor, maintenance, supply, transportation, and other logistical services.” FM 100–5 did not specifically define CSS, but it did provide a list of CSS activities different from that found in FM 100–10. While omitting personnel activities, FM 100–5 added chaplain, food, finance, legal, medical, and military police support.

The 1968 manuals also differed in their divisions of labor. Continuing in the tradition of its 1963 version, FM 100–10 divided the subordinate activities within CSS between logistics and personnel functions. By contrast, FM 100–5, following its 1962 version, grouped all support functions under the single heading of CSS, explaining the concept of CSS under the title “Concept for Modern Logistics.” This was the first indication that CSS and logistics would become synonymous in future operations manuals. Adding to the confusion of defining CSS, the manuals did not agree on a definition of logistics. FM 100–10 again carried forward its 1954 definition of logistics; FM 100–5 used the term abundantly but, as in previous versions, failed to define it.

The two manuals’ contradictory definitions of CSS and logistics overshadowed their simultaneous introduction of the term CSS. Repeating the lack of impact of its 1962 debut, the use of CSS in 1968 again did little to end the tendency to treat all support activities as logistics. Instead of clarifying the Army’s support concept, the two terms became embroiled in a long-running semantic dispute, with the operations and support manuals providing incoherent support doctrine and little concrete guidance on how to organize and administer CSS. This was just the thing Thorpe warned against in 1917.

As the disagreements unfolded, FM 100–10 stood fast through four versions over 20 years (1968 to 1988) in both its overarching concept of CSS with the subordinate activities of logistics and personnel and its long-standing definition of logistics. During the same period, FM 100–5 renamed and redefined its concept of support four times in as many versions. During the renamings in FM 100–5, two trends emerged. First, the 1976 manual inconspicuously began to use CSS and logistics interchangeably. Second, the 1976 manual introduced a system of separating support activities that by 1986 evolved into what became known as the “sustainment functions” of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting. The overwhelming acceptance of the revised AirLand Battle doctrine’s innovative operational concepts in the 1986 version of FM 100–5 led to the unquestioned acceptance, by association, of the manual’s newly introduced “sustainment” concepts.

In an unprecedented move, the authors of the 1988 version of FM 100–10 abandoned their 20-year history of separating CSS activities between logistics and personnel and adopted the 1986 operations manual’s “sustainment functions” (although FM 100–10 did rename them “CSS tasks”). And after having done so for 34 years, the 1988 support manual no longer provided a definition for logistics. Ostensibly, these moves were an effort at building consensus; in reality, they provided the final impetus for the operations manual to elevate logistics over CSS. Moreover, after 34 years of doing so, FM 100–10’s failure to define logistics created a void that the next version of FM 100–5 filled, to the detriment of CSS.

Ongoing Doctrinal Conflict

Capitalizing on FM 100–10’s acquiescence, it seemed that the authors of the Army’s 1993 version of FM 100–5 attempted to deliver CSS a coup de grace. The 1993 operations manual stressed that logistics was an overarching function embracing all support activities across the full range of military operations, defining logistics as—

... the process of planning and executing the sustainment of forces in support of military operations. It includes the design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, equipping, distribution, and evacuation functions of supply, field services, maintenance, health service support, personnel, and facilities. Accordingly, it is an overarching function that occurs across the range of military operations. At the tactical level it focuses on the traditional CSS functions of arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his equipment.

FM 100–5 described CSS as nothing more than the tactical application of logistics, in essence inverting the traditional support roles and making CSS subordinate to logistics. Undergirding this, the operations manual changed its label for support activities from “sustainment functions” to “tactical logistics functions,” thus reinforcing the notion that all support activities, including personnel support, fell within the purview of
logistics. As had occurred with the 1986 version, the overwhelming acceptance of the full-spectrum operational concepts in the 1993 FM 100–5 led to the widespread, unquestioned acceptance of that manual’s new logistics support concepts.

In an attempt to reassert the supremacy of CSS over logistics, the authors of the 1995 version of FM 100–10 defined CSS as the overarching function of support, encompassing all activities that sustain forces across all levels of war (the same definition used in Joint Publication 4–0). However, their effort was fruitless; the concepts of FM 100–5 prevailed, and the paradigm that logistics encompassed all support activities, including personnel, was well established in the minds of most Soldiers.

Adding credence to this thinking, the new FM 100–10 used nearly the same language to describe CSS as FM 100–5 used to describe logistics, thus sinking the terms and concepts of logistics and CSS into an indistinguishable quagmire. The continued inability of the doctrinal manuals to agree on a conceptual framework for organizing the Army’s support functions created a doctrinal defect that precluded a clear understanding of how the Army would organize and administer its sustainment functions.

Clarification at Last

The Army attempted to rectify the doctrinal defect by bringing both the 2001 FM 3–0, Operations (the old FM 100–5), and the 2003 FM 4–0, Combat Service Support (the old FM 100–10), into complete agreement on definitions and concepts. Setting aside nearly a half-century of disagreement, the authors of the new manuals endeavored to establish the supremacy of CSS over logistics by presenting a unified front that restored logistics to its subordinate role in support doctrine. FM 3–0 changed the name of its support chapter from “Logistics Support” to “Combat Service Support,” reflecting the same title given to the Army’s keystome support manual for over 30 years. Both manuals also agreed on support definitions.

More important than titles and definitions, both manuals agreed on division of labor, organization for support, and general orchestration of the CSS effort. The manuals divided CSS into various subordinate support functions, including logistics and personnel, thus presenting CSS as an umbrella concept embracing all aspects of all support functions from the industrial base to the Soldier in the foxhole. This new agreement between the two manuals returned logistics to its correct position as subordinate to CSS and equal with personnel support.

Solidifying this cooperative effort at defining operational support, the 2008 version of FM 3–0 reintroduced the 1993 term “sustainment” as a warfighting function and defined it as “the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.” This latest version of FM 3–0 subdivides the sustainment warfighting function into three distinct subfunctions of logistics, personnel services, and health service support. The draft version of the new FM 4–0 echoes the definition and subdivisions found in the new operations manual, leaving no room for misinterpretation. (In the draft FM 4–0, logistics is further categorized as supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, operational contract support, and general engineering support, while personnel services is categorized as human resources support, religious support, financial management operations, and legal support. Health service support is not further defined.)

This survey of the evolution of doctrinal terms reveals how a half-century of incoherent support doctrine led to the widespread and ill-conceived notion that personnel and human resources support are subfunctions of logistics. The latest versions of FM 3–0 and FM 4–0 provide hope that the newly introduced sustainment warfighting function finally will provide an umbrella concept under which logistics and personnel services will operate as equally important functions on the battlefield.

It is important to the success of sustainment as a synchronized warfighting function that the organizations developed to execute sustainment do not repeat the empire-building antics of the failed ASF and the original ODCSLOG. Clearly, certain areas of personnel services (such as postal operations and human resources) will benefit from being part of the command and control hierarchy of the operational sustainment community, but other areas (such as casualty operations, personnel accounting, strength reporting, and personnel management) will not benefit from being forced into a sustainment hierarchy. These latter functions must remain unencumbered by hierarchical organizational structures so they do not become mired in unresponsive bureaucracy; caution must be exercised to ensure that unity is not forced where unity does not in fact exist.

On the other hand, human resources professionals, as members of the operational sustainment community, must exercise mental flexibility and truly explore with confidence, competence, trust, and well-built relationships the possibilities opened by this new environment. This is particularly important at the Army service component command, corps, and division levels, where a synchronized sustainment effort is paramount to achieving agility in full-spectrum operations. This is a time of unprecedented change, and as professionals we owe our best effort to giving the emerging sustainment operations doctrine a chance for success.

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If U.S. forces are going to leave Iraq in the near future, the Iraqi Army must improve its long-term force sustainment operations. Coalition force assistance has significantly improved the Iraqi Army’s non-kinetic and kinetic operations. However, no metric exists to determine the level of U.S. logistics support during joint operations, so we do not have a true sense of the Iraqi Army’s sustainment abilities.

One noticeable challenge to the Iraqi Army logistics posture is that it lacks resources and technical expertise, which is usually provided by noncommissioned officers and warrant officers. The most efficient way for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) to overcome this shortfall is to create something similar to the U.S. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and contract a portion of its sustainment operations in the form of logistics support teams (LSTs). First used in 1992 to support operations in Somalia, LOGCAP employs civilian contractors to fill military sustainment capability shortfalls.

An example of a current initiative that supports the U.S. Army and benefits Iraqis is the Iraqi Trucking Network (ITN), which is sponsored theater wide by Multi-National Corps-Iraq. In this program, U.S. forces contract with local Iraqi contractors under the Iraqi First program to receive and deliver class I (subsistence), bottled water, and limited class VII (major end items) and class IX (repair parts) throughout the area of responsibility. ITN capabilities focus on strategic sustainment requirements that allow military assets to concentrate on tactical resupply missions. This initiative can be the backbone of Iraqi Army logistics of the future, providing a distribution capability for future economic development and increasing civil capacity.

Contractor Employment Within the Iraqi Army

LOGCAP-like operations could push LSTs to various Iraqi Army sustainment nodes. LSTs could provide strategic support to the Iraqi Army by transporting supplies and commodities, conducting second- and third-line maintenance, providing materiel management and accountability, and resetting Iraqi Army equipment. The LST should include mechanics, cooks, electronic and specialty maintenance technicians, water and fuel specialists, vehicle operators, and transportation movement coordinators.

LSTs at the motorized transportation regiment (MTR) should consist of 50 to 100 personnel who are trained and proficient in basic supply functions—receiving, storing, and issuing supplies and distribution planning and management. These contractors must also be familiar with the Iraqi Automated Maintenance Program.

LSTs must be embedded in the MTRs, repair and maintenance companies, and division G–4s to establish working relationships. An LST at each division would provide flexibility. A smaller group of logistics supervisory personnel should reside at the MOD in the Iraqi Logistics Operations Center and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, section of the Iraqi Joint Headquarters.

Better Employment of Iraqi Assets

The level of force protection required for LOGCAP personnel is dictated by the threat assessment. The likelihood of insurgents targeting host-nation contractors is low to medium. Yet, in the event that critical cargo needs protection, the Iraqi Security Forces could be available to provide convoy security. Lowering the potential threat to convoys and giving the Iraqi forces the maneuverability to provide better security to Iraqi assets boosts economy by providing more and safer logistics jobs that support the Iraqi mission to become self-sufficient.

In order for a LOGCAP-like course of action to be successful, two major actions must happen: MOD must delegate release authority of sustainment commodities, and payments to contractors must be on time. LOGCAP solutions can deliver the urgently needed supplies, services, and minor construction support that are not resident in the current Iraqi Army structure and that cannot be established without enduring organizational development. To promote this course of action, U.S. forces must approach the Iraqi government, specifically the MOD and Ministry of Interior, during key leader engagements to highlight the benefits of contracted logistics. Contractors can answer strategic logistics shortfalls within the Iraqi Army, enable economic development in Iraq, increase employment, and allow Iraqi Security Forces to focus on security operations.

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Army Sustainment Commanders today face a myriad of new challenges. Deployments, relocations, redesignations, modularity, redeployments, transitions, stop losses, stop movements, base closures, and many other factors combine to make commanding more difficult. This article provides some insight to current and future commanders on ways to meet and overcome these challenges.

Relocation and Transformation
On 15 July 2007, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), 191st Ordnance Battalion, was redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 391st Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB), and relocated from Miesau to Bamberg, Germany.

Before this relocation and redesignation, the 191st Ordnance Battalion provided command and control for 7 company-sized elements with more than 1,200 Soldiers and civilians. As part of the transformation in Europe, six of the companies were relinquished to other battalions just before the move to Bamberg. In Bamberg, the newly designated 391st CSSB assumed control of 2 additional companies, making its authorized strength 500 personnel.

When the CSSB received word of its pending deployment to Iraq, it decided that only the HHC would participate in the planning process. The HHC faced the challenges of transforming the unit into a CSSB, filling personnel shortages, assuming the logistics support mission in Bamberg and Schweinfurt, preparing a road-to-war training plan, and integrating into the newly transformed 16th Sustainment Brigade—all within the span of a month.

These events were like a rollercoaster ride for the unit’s leaders, Soldiers, and family members. The HHC commander’s initial focus revolved around the relocation and transformation order that the unit received within days of his assuming command. The unit was required to move 355 kilometers after 17 years in the region. The seven company-sized elements remained under the control of the HHD until 2 months before the move to Bamberg.

The command team sent all of the barracks personnel ahead to Bamberg with the first sergeant to receive equipment and personnel. This created a virtually seamless transition and enabled the staff to complete all tasks necessary for relinquishing command and control of the units in Rhineland-Pfalz. The reassignment of personnel to other units hindered the HHD’s ability to relocate and transform because it caused the unit to lack the manpower necessary for clean up, excess equipment turn-in, command and control, equipment and barracks pack out, and sensitive items movement.

The CSSB staff faced its own problems. It continued to provide command and control for units conducting transformation, relocation, and reassignment at Miesau Army Depot and Rhine Ordnance Barracks while it established a forward staff element to prepare for the HHC’s arrival. Although it was authorized 52 personnel, the HHC’s strength was 26. This shortage resulted in incredibly tight timelines for moving personnel and equipment out of Miesau and receiving it all in Bamberg. The new sustainment brigade added another degree of external pressure because it was a newly transformed unit that was still hashing out reporting requirements and processes.

Family Needs and Services
Relocation and transformation difficulties, which were compounded by moving within a foreign country, affected families. The family readiness group helped families deal with being uprooted, Exceptional Family Member Program issues, limited housing availability, financial challenges, Department of Defense Dependent Schools concerns, and early return of dependents. Unique circumstances and short notices while integrating into a new community complicated normal family routines.

Town hall and family readiness group meetings in Miesau and Bamberg provided the families with the opportunity to air concerns, ask questions, and dispel countless rumors. Operational security was paramount. Leaders were instructed not to release any information until it had been vetted through the appropriate authorities and officially released by the public affairs office. Subject-matter experts from Army Community Services spoke with families about finances, entitlements, Tricare, and Army Emergency Relief in order to provide Soldiers and dependents the support needed to alleviate the stress caused by relocating. Soldiers were given

Transforming While Preparing to Deploy

by Major James J. Geishaker
30 days to focus on moving equipment, personnel, and families.

Several families faced financial challenges and limited housing availability during the move to the Bamberg area. The leaders closely monitored this development and continued to work with housing, finance, garrison, and Army Emergency Relief to ensure that all Soldiers and their families were properly supported.

**Predeployment Training**

The first order of business was to increase efforts to bring the unit back to its authorized strength. Personnel were pulled from other organizations, and inbound Soldiers were notified to arrive early if possible.

Predeployment training came with an entirely new set of hurdles for the HHC leaders. The restrictive movement window created a training challenge that was exacerbated by the property book split and left-behind equipment (LBE) turn-in. Predeployment training was the highest priority. However, command and control and mission requirements continued to disrupt training right up until the certification exercise. The December holiday season brought its own pressures between fulfilling all mandatory pre-deployment training criteria and standing up a rear detachment. The training conducted and completed in the last 40 days before deployment made the hand receipt splits between the rear detachment and HHC-forward particularly difficult. The recently revised LBE program lengthened the normal property split process and demanded more manpower.

Concurrently, the HHC received and integrated new combat service support automation management office (CSSAMO) equipment and multiple Army Battle Command Systems during the last 60 days before deployment, requiring the HHC to schedule even more training. The HHC Soldiers either attended

*A team leader in the 70th Transportation Company, 391st Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 16th Sustainment Brigade, checks out one of his company’s new vehicles during driver’s training at Contingency Operating Base Speicher.*
training in Germany or the United States or received on-the-job training provided by the program managers during the certification exercise. This flexibility helped ease the considerable responsibilities involved in deploying a CSSB HHC. Soldiers arrived as late as 2 weeks before deployment. Equipment (specifically for CSSAMO) continued to come in until 4 days before deployment; these late equipment fills barely met the European theater transportation deadlines. A solid training plan with flexibility ensured the command team would meet each requirement despite last-minute changes, mandatory schools, and holidays along the way.

Although numerous video teleconferences (VTCs) were conducted with the CSSB’s sister battalion downrange, it was obvious that the unit’s saving grace would be the vast experience Soldiers were bringing with them. One major resource for all enlisted issues was the battalion command sergeant major. He conducted interviews and became personally involved in choosing individuals, especially the junior enlisted, from subordinate companies to fill slots. When the unit departed Germany, 44 of the 77 Soldiers had previous deployment experience.

**Deployment**

The command team was prepared to provide administrative and life support for the battalion staff but did not realize the true scope of the unit’s additional responsibilities. Deployed command team relationships immediately changed the company dynamics and capability when the CSSBs arrived in theater. On arrival in theater, the command team assumed administrative control of 156 additional Soldiers and the equipment needed to conduct a variety of missions, including test, measurement, and diagnosis, tactical water distribution, vehicle recovery, cargo transfer, mortuary affairs, and finance.

Predeployment site surveys were unauthorized at company or battalion level, so the company had to maximize use of VTCs, telephones, and email. It would have been beneficial for the HHC if the activities for which they would be providing administrative control had been present with their CSSBs at the various VTCs. However, all planning was conducted solely with the parent units, which left the HHC open to possible mission degradation because of equipment shortages not identified and filled as theater-provided equipment or minimal unit organizational property. The HHC deployed with 77 Soldiers, and it ended up with 232 Soldiers after the transfer of authority and memorandums of agreement were in place. The HHC provided adequately for this 205-percent increase in personnel using theater-provided equipment and additional home-station equipment. Motor pool activities were quadrupled overnight with the additional 156 wheeled and tracked vehicles, placing considerable strain on a motor pool that normally serviced and maintained 24 vehicles.

During the initial assessment, the company noted that most of the computer and vehicle shortages were at satellite sites. Most of the computer shortages were readily filled with the additional equipment HHC had brought into theater; however, the use of its additional equipment left the HHC without replacement options during the later stages of the deployment. Authorized vehicles from home station could not have covered vehicle shortages since the home-station vehicles were not up-armored.

**Rear Detachment Support**

The command team and the family readiness group leader dealt with a variety of family concerns for the deployment over a 7-month period. The inability to get approval for early return of dependents created a challenge for the rear detachment and family readiness group leader, with only one of five early return of dependent requests approved before the unit deployed. The family readiness group was validated on the first day of deployment when one Soldier received a Red Cross message in Kuwait. The family readiness group stepped in to assist the Soldier’s family with childcare, transportation, and care baskets in a seamless transition between the rear detachment and deployed leadership.

Normally, a company commander is faced with two challenges (deployment and redeployment) during his time in command. Relocation, transformation, predeployment training, and deployment pose four distinct, unique challenges. With today’s hurried operating tempo, company commanders need to be aware of and use all resources available. Communication is key, and an updated training plan, which is reviewed daily, ensures training is conducted correctly and no opportunities are wasted. Sending competent individuals to handle situations and empowering them to make on-the-spot decisions is a must. Preparation and flexibility allow the command team to overcome all obstacles, which continue to arise during predeployment training and initial entry into theater. Commanders must provide the direction, motivation, and resources to enable and honor their daily sacrifices.

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In response to the increase in requirements for military contracting support, in November 2008, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved the expansion of the Army’s contracting force structure to meet the demands of rapid deployments, troop sustainment, and nation building and to support the integration of a proponent office for military occupational specialty (MOS) 51C, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT) contracting noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

The expanded force structure was needed to provide institutional contracting training, compliance, doctrine, policies, guidance, and oversight and to leverage existing capabilities of other Department of the Army (DA) and Department of Defense (DOD) organizations involved in contracting processes. The creation of career management field 51 (acquisition) and MOS 51C was approved in December 2006 by the Army Human Resources Command (HRC) Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

The Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC)—a direct reporting unit to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for ALT (ASA[ALT])—is the personnel proponent for all military and DA civilians within the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) and ALT workforce. Many Army and DOD organizations and personnel are involved in fostering the professional development of MOS 51C Soldiers.

Assistant Secretary of the Army for ALT

The ASA(ALT) provides guidance for managing the positions and career development of the ALT workforce through the Army Acquisition Executive. The ASA(ALT) provides guidance for designating and identifying ALT positions; specifying position requirements; attaining and maintaining ALT competencies through education, training, and experience; managing the selection and placement of AAC personnel in ALT positions; and identifying workforce metrics.

The ASA(ALT)’s core mission is to effectively and efficiently lead the execution of the Army’s acquisition function and the acquisition management system. The ASA(ALT) provides oversight for the life-cycle management of Army weapon systems and equipment, from research and development through test and evaluation, acquisition, and fielding, to disposition. The ASA(ALT) oversees the chemical weapons elimination program and is responsible for appointing, managing, and evaluating program management and executive officers and managing the AAC and ALT workforce.

Director, Acquisition Career Management

The Army Acquisition Executive has designated the Principal Military Deputy (MILDEP) to the ASA(ALT) as the Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM). The DACM directs the AAC and assists the Army Acquisition Executive in carrying out the requirements of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA).

DAWIA requires DOD to establish defense acquisition education and training standards, requirements, and courses. The act focuses heavily on a systematic approach to making the ALT workforce more professional. DAWIA specifies requirements for work assignments, experience, education, and training. Within the Army, the DACM is responsible for implementing ALT workforce education, training, and career development. A major challenge for today’s Army is to focus on integrating military and civilian ALT workforce members’ education, training, and career development into the mission of the organization. Commanders and managers at all levels must possess a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities to meet this challenge.

The DACM appoints a deputy DACM (DDACM), who is responsible for the organization and daily management functions of the Army’s acquisition career management activities. The DDACM, as the ALT workforce proponent and single point of contact on all matters pertaining to DAWIA implementation, is responsible for developing and approving all Army policies and procedures established to implement DAWIA.

The DACM and DDACM approve the ALT contracting professional career development program. This program is designed to train the acquisition workforce, support professional growth, provide operational experience, and enhance leadership competence. These goals are met through professional certification, credentialing, and undergraduate and postsecondary degree programs.
To effectively administer comprehensive career management and development programs for the AAC, the Army Acquisition Executive appointed Lieutenant General N. Ross Thompson III as the DACM. As the DACM, he oversees the training management and support of more than 43,000 acquisition professionals. He is also responsible for the career and professional development programs of the acquisition NCO corps.

Army Acquisition Support Center


Under the DDCAM’s oversight, USAASC establishes DAWIA policies and procedures and is responsible for—

- Overseeing accession.
- Developing high-quality education, training, and experience opportunities.
- Establishing career paths.
- Providing for the overall career development of the military and civilian acquisition workforce.
- Determining the dispensation of waivers.
- Identifying and defending funding requirements for acquisition career management programs.
- Supporting the MILDEP in AAC transformation initiatives.

USAASC provides resource, personnel, program, and force structure guidance to the program executive offices, direct reporting program managers, and other acquisition elements on USAASC’s table of distribution and allowances. USAASC is also the AAC proponent for Total Army Analysis submissions.

MOS 51C Enlisted Proponent Office

The MOS 51C Enlisted Proponent Office is responsible for synchronizing the eight life-cycle management processes of career management field 51 and MOS 51C. The life-cycle management processes are recruitment, retention, individual training, education, distribution, sustainment, professional and career development, and separation.

To draw from the existing expertise and capabilities of other DA and DOD acquisition organizations involved in institutional contracting training, training support, and doctrine, the 51C proponent functions and personnel are located within various DOD agencies, including the USAASC headquarters, ASA(ALT) Integration Office, 37th Training Wing (U.S. Air Force), HRC, and TRADOC. The proponent office also coordinates with HRC’s Acquisition Career Management Branch and Quartermaster Enlisted Personnel Management Branch.

The 51C Enlisted Proponent Office reports to the DDACM and consists of a 51C proponent officer (in the rank of major), a chief NCO proponent (sergeant major), an ALT combat development NCO (master sergeant), a contracting basic NCO course and reclassification instructor (sergeant first class), and an HRC MOS 51C career manager and assignment officer (sergeant first class). The 51C proponent is unlike most Army proponent offices because its actions have congressional mandates and DAWIA policies govern life-cycle management functions and processes.

Proponent Officer and Chief NCO Proponent

The 51C proponent officer (major) and chief NCO proponent (sergeant major), with direction from the DACM and DDACM and in compliance with DAWIA, participate in a wide range of functions to support the military contracting workforce. Their responsibilities include—

- Conducting Army G–1 functional reviews and career management field reviews.
- Leading the Army’s personnel transformation efforts for current and future operations.
- Providing TRADOC with proponent updates pertaining to life-cycle management policies, procedures, and promotions.
- Facilitating proponent-related training and education workshops.
- Projecting, building, and monitoring DA training requirements in conjunction with Army G–1 structure and manning decision reviews.
- Recruiting highly-skilled NCOs from other enlisted career fields to MOS 51C to support the contracting force structures of the Active component, ASA(ALT), Army Contracting Command, Army Special Operations Command, Corps of Engineers, and special mission units.
- Reclassifying and training NCOs transferring from other career fields.
- Providing proponent input for updates to Army regulations and pamphlets.
- Initiating and fostering partnerships with the Air Force, Marine Corps, Defense Acquisition University, TRADOC, Army Combined Arms Center, Army Combined Arms Support Command, and Army Logistics University for career and professional development for 51-series officers and 51C NCOs.
- Assisting Army and DOD organizations with force structure and development and the Total Army
Analysis process, which affects current and future contracting force structure and operations.

- Advising and providing updates to the Army Acquisition Executive, DACM, USAASC director, and regimental acquisition NCO corps sergeant major on all programs and actions relating to ALT contracting NCO personnel.

The chief NCO proponent also serves as the senior enlisted advisor to the USAASC director.

**ALT Combat Development NCO**

The ALT combat development NCO (master sergeant) performs a variety of ALT-related analytical tasks, including—

- Analyzing, documenting, and obtaining approval for warfighting concepts, future operational capabilities, organizational requirements, and materiel requirements.
- Assisting with determining solutions for the needs of future operational capabilities.
- Assisting with revising existing manuals and developing new training tools and manuals, including joint contingency contracting and field ordering officer training publications.
- Assisting with mission training plans, military qualification standards, and training support packages.
- Serving in ad hoc groups and teams charged with specific acquisition and logistics projects as a subject-matter expert in the development of resident and exportable training products related to contracting on the battlefield.

**ALT Instructor**

The ALT instructor (sergeant first class) serves as a primary instructor and liaison for the Army and Air Force enlisted personnel attending the 51C reclassification training. The ALT instructor’s primary mission is to deploy and perform as a contingency contracting officer. This individual is responsible for—

- Training and mentoring Army and Air Force contracting NCOs.
- Training enlisted personnel in acquisition processes, procedures, policies, compliance, laws, regulations, and statutes and on equipment.
- Assisting with updating combat administrative data and programs of instruction as required.
- Providing operational experience and leadership in understanding lessons learned from contingency contracting operations and missions.
- Coordinating the planning and briefing of Army training requirements to the 345th Training Squadron staff.

**HRC Career Manager and Assignment Officer**

The HRC 51C career development and assignments officer (sergeant first class) is responsible for—

- Reclassifying, assigning, and training MOS 51C Soldiers.
- Processing assignment actions while considering professional development, stabilization, and reclassification.
- Reviewing and accepting or rejecting nominations.
- Filling open requisitions in the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System.
- Coordinating with the Army, other DOD agencies, and senior enlisted contracting advisers in the field on filling assignments and training requirements.
- Making final selections of NCOs for reassignment.
- Screening and selecting Soldiers for high-priority assignments and training.
- Coordinating with appropriate personnel on high-interest cases.
- Recommending final actions on joint domicile requests, overseas-service volunteers, foreign-service tour extensions and curtailments, deletion and deferment requests, and staff action memorandums.

The objective of the MOS 51C Enlisted Proponent is to work with TRADOC to develop viable professional development programs for 51C NCOs that create a professional, agile, and motivated NCO corps that consistently makes sound and informed business decisions, acts in an ethical manner, and delivers timely and affordable capabilities to the warfighter. The 51C Enlisted Proponent provides career guidance and opportunities that broaden NCOs’ experience and progression potential, provide program stability and accountability, and ensure effective use of training and civilian education programs.

Currently the majority of ALT contracting NCO positions are within the Army Expeditionary Contracting Command, a subordinate command of the Army Materiel Command. These deployable modification table of organization and equipment positions support the missions, training, and career development of 51C enlisted personnel.

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When I set out to write an article about the last 4 decades of Army Logistician magazine, I was struck by the immense amount of information contained in the magazine’s past issues. One can gain many significant insights while electronically thumbing through what is really a history of military logistics from 1969 to 2009. No history of modern military logistics published in any other form can compete with the collection of accounts published in Army Logistician, and the best part is that all past issues are available online.

Perhaps more remarkable, something else emerges from those 240 past issues: the institutionalization of a record of professional knowledge for the military logistician. Indeed, the magazine has helped to infuse military logisticians with a sense of identity, with values that set them apart from laymen, and (perhaps most importantly) with recurring themes (or as Mark Twain would put it, “rhymes”).

With regard to the latter, I have found three themes to be important in the last 40 years of military logistics history as reflected in Army Logistician: technology, efficiency, and temporality (or transitoriness). (In discussing these themes, I will offer some parenthetical opinions along the way.)

**Military Logistics Technology**

By the time the September–October 1969 inaugural issue of Army Logistician (or ALOG, as it quickly became known) appeared, the Nation was well into the Vietnam War. The Army realized that its modern wars were complex in both physical and social contexts and that its Soldiers and equipment demanded very sophisticated logistics systems and an enhanced logistics profession to steward them. The challenges of logistics during the Vietnam War were immense. It was novel for the modern U.S. Army to conduct noncontiguous conventional and counterinsurgency operations on such a large scale and over such an austere and vast environment.
Many distribution innovations were born out of necessity: the utility helicopter (the UH–1 Iroquois, or Huey), the medium-lift (CH–47 Chinook) and heavy-lift (CH–54 Skycrane) helicopters, convoy-escort “gun trucks,” Army-piloted intratheater fixed-wing cargo planes (like the CV2B Caribou), the low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES), and so on. Many of these technologies were described in the official announcements and articles published in the early issues of the magazine.

(What is rather startling—and you can pick up on this as you thumb through the 1974 to 1976 issues of ALOG, published after the war ended—is how professional discussions about technologies invented for noncontiguous operations abruptly halted as the Army immediately returned its focus to the defense of Western Europe, Korea, and other traditional Cold War theaters.)

During the mid-1970s, ALOG authors were paying attention to the lessons learned from the October 1973 Middle East War, where logistics seemed to be one of the deciding factors in the success of the Israelis. General Henry A. Miley, Jr., the commanding general of the Army Materiel Command, wrote in his article, “Mid-East War Logistics,” in the July–August 1974 issue, “I am sure that when our analyses are complete, we will develop concepts which will be applied in future designs or product improvements.” One can sense in ALOG articles that the Army concept development and acquisition communities were heavily influenced by this high-intensity, lightning-fast war, which shaped both operational AirLand Battle doctrine and the impetus to procure the Army’s “Big 5” weapon systems (the AH–64 Apache attack helicopter, M1 Abrams main battle tank, M2/3 Bradley infantry/cavalry fighting vehicle, Patriot air defense missile, and multiple launch rocket system). (It is interesting to see the pictures of the 1974 prototypes of these systems in the May–June 1974 issue; we now consider them “legacy systems.”)

As the decade closed, sadly, the Army announced (as reported in the Emphasis news column of the November–December 1979 issue) that the “Skycranes face extinction.” The Vietnam-era logistics workhorse, the CH–54 heavy-lift helicopter, was phased out—never to be replaced. (Whether its replacement could have been used today might be a tempting subject of inquiry.)

The idea of “just-in-time” (JIT) logistics, based on process technologies adapted from commercial business “best practices,” seemed promising for military logistics in the early 1990s. In a November–December 1992 commentary entitled “Past is Prologue,” retired Lieutenant General Joseph H. Heiser, Jr. (who had served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army [now the G–4 position], and commander of Army logistics efforts in Vietnam in the late 1960s), claimed that we should have learned more about JIT from our experience in Vietnam, specifically from the program he began called “inventory in motion.” “These [JIT] improvements do not result from reinitiated projects, sometimes with a new name, unrelated to progress achieved earlier in history,” complained Heiser, who called for more history lessons in Army logistics schools so logisticians would “not reinvent an old wheel.” (I think Heiser’s suggestion is pertinent today, but perhaps for a different reason: Military history teaches us just how unique every operation or war has been; hence, military logistics is perhaps less an evolving science than it is an artful, inventive, and even improvisational endeavor.)

Military Logistics Efficiency

In the first issue of Army Logisticiant, the commander of the Army Materiel Command, General F. J. Cheserek wrote:

There is considerable impetus toward national introversion and concern over our domestic policies and needs. Increased clamor to the effect that adequate national security can be obtained at a much reduced cost is heard on all sides.

This national attitude toward the defense establishment, and its logistic activities in particular, is occurring at a most difficult time.

By 1972, issues of the magazine seemed to turn to retrograde activities resulting from the “Vietnamization” of the war and the effects of the U.S. drawdown. As Captain Joseph A. Malcom and Gilbert A. Frisbee wrote, “When the drawdown of U.S. and allied forces in Vietnam accelerated in early 1971, supply managers were confronted with a series of new problems . . . tools that had been used were based on standard inventory theory and assumed a degree of stability which no longer existed” (“Drawdown Supply Management,” November–December 1972).

Later, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur T. Buswell noted in “Disposal Operations—Vietnam” (May–June 1973), “Army logisticians have recorded an impressive achievement with the retrograde and disposal of nearly two million tons of materiel from Vietnam. This is the first time that excess materiel has been identified, screened, and removed from a combat area while the fighting was still in progress.” (In light of current events, it will likely not be the last time.)

With the U.S. economy experiencing “stagflation” in the later 1970s, the logistics issues discussed in ALOG seemed to focus on “doing more with less” as a recurrent theme. For example, Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler (then the Joint Staff J–4) argued in his article, “Decade of Logistics,” in the January–February 1975 issue, “Logisticians must recognize that
budget realities often mean that combat-oriented and logistics-oriented operations cannot receive 100 percent of their required money.” He called for increased use of host-nation support, placing more capabilities in the Reserve components, buying “on-call” contracted capability (today the Army refers to that innovation as “LOGCAP” [Logistics Civil Augmentation Program]), increased subsidy of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the merchant marine, and the reduction-in-force of logistics personnel (which he claimed at that time to be 55 percent of all Department of Defense personnel).

Following these lines of reasoning, the Army purchased commercial, off-the-shelf Dodge Ram trucks and Chevy Blazers to serve as the Army’s light tactical utility vehicle fleet—performing as everything from contact maintenance trucks to field ambulances. Those purchases continued well into the late 1980s and early 1990s. (Can you imagine using such commercial vehicles to conduct combat sustainment in today’s environments? Maybe some of our currently serving logistics Soldiers can since the Army sent them to war with thin-skinned high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. That action signified that lessons learned about noncontiguous sustainment requirements in Vietnam had been lost; it also reflected the impact of Army efficiency decisions of the 1970s and early 1980s).

During the early 1990s, ALOG authors shifted readers’ attention toward the “real-world” major combat operations of Desert Shield and Desert Storm and multiple smaller-scale contingencies around the world. After the Persian Gulf War, ALOG published a controversial article in the November–December 1991 issue, “Sustaining Desert Storm: A Real Life Test of Flexible Readiness,” contributed by Carol R. Schuster, a General Accounting Office (GAO) staffer. That article called for moving more support forces into the Reserve components as a function of the peace dividend associated with the demise of the Soviet Union. Blinded by the expectations of huge defense savings in a U.S.-monopolized world, she reported on the GAO study that concluded, “The Army’s experience in mobilizing logistics units for Operation Desert Storm as well as the performance of these units in the operation should shed light on what types of units are the likeliest candidates to be kept at lower levels of readiness.” (The history lesson learned here may be that the past may hardly serve as a prologue and, in this case, may not be not very “pro-log”!).

Military Logistics Temporality

ALOG articles published in the “quiet 80s” reflected how the military logistics community turned introspectively, retrospectively, and even prospectively to the topics of logistics reorganization, training
and readiness, the Reagan-era buildup, major exercise support (such as Reforger [Redeployment of Forces to Germany]), and the futures concepts (such as AirLand Battle 2000 and Army 21).

Interestingly, I could find no article in ALOG that reported on the support aspects of the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury). With the exception of one article about the 1989 Operation Just Cause in Panama (“Operation Just Cause—Combat Service Support Soldiers Under Fire,” which Major John C. Jeong and I wrote for the May–June 1990 issue), ALOG was largely devoid of reports on operational sustainment activities (perhaps because there were so few in those years). Reflecting on the past, the magazine did begin publishing historical vignettes entitled “Army Logistics in Retrospect,” covering everything from the World War II “Redball Express” (July–August 1985) to the Vietnam War-era’s innovative “Floating Power” (September–October 1987).

Not wanting to get stuck in the problem of “fighting the last war,” “visioning” was introduced in Army force management circles as the new technique for long-range planning. By 1985, Army 21 and its supporting vision, Log 21, presented design-of-the-future prospects, with the Army beginning to invest heavily in these “futures concepts.” J. Russell Wiltshire, a long-range planner in the Army G–4 office, was hardly prescient when he wrote in his March–April 1985 article, “Logistics in the 21st Century”:

The “AirLand force support command” will be the primary logistics support organization in the AirLand force ... Like the battle task force, the headquarters of the support command will be small, with minimal personnel, and units will be attached or assigned as support requirements dictate. ... [Management] centers will have computers with artificial intelligence capabilities, able to respond to multiple support requirements and predict future replenishment schedules and distribution requirements. ... Electronically armored vehicles will move silently above the ground, protected from enemy projectiles by force fields, propelled and levitated by controlled gravity mechanisms.

During the later 1990s and into the first decade of the 21st century, ALOG authors began to write more and more about joint and multinational logistics technologies of integration. Lieutenant Colonel Gary R. Engle argued for a joint theater support command in his article, “Joint and Combined Theater Logistics—The Future Reality” (May–June 1999 issue), observing, “We no longer can afford a fragmented and compartmentalized logistics support structure that duplicates effort and generates waste.”

Strategic force projection also became a subject of growing interest in ALOG as the United States reframed its strategy around force projection and the Army followed suit in its quest for lighter and more deployable forces. Major Kenneth E. Hickins wrote in “Strategic Mobility: The U.S. Military’s Weakest Link” in November–December 2002, “The United States continues to be the world’s sole superpower and the world’s paramount source of political, economic, information, and military leadership. As such, it must be able to project forces quickly into trouble spots around the world without the restrictions of limited air transport and slow sealift.” After years of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the professional debate in ALOG seemed to center less on rapid expeditionary capability and more on improving logistics sustainment to extended operations.

Continuing through the 1990s and up to the present, ALOG published more articles on efforts at envisioning the future of military logistics, framed around political and biological metaphors like “Revolution in Military Logistics” and “Transformation.” In 2008, Major General Mitchell H. Stevenson (then commanding general of the Army Combined Arms Support Command) toned down these expectations when he wrote, “The result of the R–CAAT [reverse-collection and analysis team] process is an improved ability to make doctrinal manuals and platform instruction more effective and relevant to the rapidly changing wartime environment” (“R–CAATs: Bridging the Information Gap,” January–February 2008).

(In the wake of decades of Army infatuation with “futuring,” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently has forced the services to discount the efficacy of this visioning approach, actively reorienting them toward stewarding resources for the near-term fight. The emphasis on visioning beyond the future-year Defense plan that has dominated logistics force management over the last 30 years or so may now be diminishing even as the Army’s Future Combat Systems program is dissolving.)

I hope that, in this sampling of 40 years of Army Logistician reporting, the reader can recognize the three main themes of recent military logistics history I have identified—technology, efficiency, and temporality. Indeed, Mark Twain’s assertion seems to ring true about our military logistics endeavors: They sometimes do rhyme. In that regard, Army Logistician has become an institutional source of military logistics “poetry.”

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Army Strategic Management System: Enhancing Logistics Readiness

by David Lewis, Charles Glover, and Rob Frye

The Army’s Strategic Management System will enhance logistics readiness by more closely tying organizational performance and resource management to strategy execution.

Persistent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan and the uncertainty of adequate funding to meet the Army’s increasing needs underscore the importance of effectively and efficiently managing logistics readiness. The Army’s increased operating tempo over the past 6 years has consistently challenged logistics readiness and Army transformation. It has resulted in what has been characterized by General George W. Casey, Jr., the Chief of Staff of the Army, as an “Army out of balance.” This is a direct result of the demands of the operational force exceeding the capabilities of the generating force’s supply base.

Today’s Army and the Army of the future must develop policies and maintain logistics readiness to support multiple threats and theaters, either sequentially or simultaneously, on a larger scale than in the past. The accelerated operating tempo has resulted in battle losses, battle damage, and faster wear and tear on equipment. Equipment must be reset to execute future missions and operations. The Army simply cannot afford to leave a rusting “iron mountain” of discarded equipment on some distant postconflict battlefield. Newly fielded and operational equipment must be supported and accounted for from cradle to grave. Logistics readiness management, while always critical to accomplishing the Army’s mission, has now become paramount.

To readjust supply requirements to meet current operational needs, senior leaders must make critical decisions to support the National Security Strategy and related Army transformational strategies. Army leaders now have a tool to help them with those critical decisions: the Army Strategic Management System (SMS). SMS is an important tool that focuses on organizational priorities and goals to help restore the Army’s balance.

What Is SMS?

As an enterprise performance-management framework (with a supporting web-based system), SMS aggregates key performance indicators from all functional levels of the Army and delivers strategically focused presentations to the Army’s executive leaders and all subordinate command levels. It is accessible to anyone with an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) account and a computer (after SMS access is granted). SMS uses a hierarchical structure based on overarching strategies, strategic initiatives, tasks, and metrics.

SMS provides a crossfunctional snapshot of the Army’s strategic posture in a top-down, data-driven, performance-metric format. This automated tool facilitates an enterprise-level approach to Army decisionmaking and strategy management and serves as an enabler to bring the Army back in balance.

The predecessor to today’s SMS was the Army Strategic Readiness System (SRS), which was deployed in 2002. Although SRS was a useful tool, Army leadership management priorities began to evolve and eventually required a new system. In January 2006, at the direction of the Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, the Army SRS program was renamed the Army SMS program and its management was transferred to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Business Transformation. The name change from SRS to SMS implied that the program was not limited to readiness but had been broadened to include management and strategy execution plans from The Army Plan, the Army Campaign Plan, and other guidance from senior leaders.

How Does SMS Work?

SMS serves as the foundation for ensuring Armywide strategy execution, strategy management, organizational alignment (vertical and horizontal), and data synchronization. It consolidates input from various Army information technology systems or Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMISs) into a single dashboard to compare actual performance to stated targets or standards.

The SMS web-based tool generates a performance score and color indicators for individual activities. For example, green means “good to go,” amber means “a bit off track,” and red means “leaders should be informed that a goal has not been accomplished because either additional resources are required or the
SMS Benefits

SMS will provide an objective, quantifiable, synchronized portrait of Army strategy execution in accordance with The Army Plan, the Army Campaign Plan, and other Army senior-leader directives. Its intent is to enable Army leaders to make informed decisions concerning performance goals rather than basing their decisions on performance-management data that have been vetted or otherwise manipulated, either intentionally or accidentally. All SMS users (senior leaders,
commanders, or action officers) have the ability to quickly view goal performance indicators or “drill down” to the performance drivers to see individual task or metric indicators. Pertinent contact information is provided at each node within the system, resulting in greater accountability for strategy execution.

Data visibility and Army-wide format standardization will help to breakdown “stovepipes” and increase situational awareness. Source-data automation greatly reduces the time required for collecting data and developing briefings. The system can archive common briefing formats, such as AMC equipment updates, and populate charts, graphs, and tables that are exportable into Microsoft Office software applications (Word, Excel, and PowerPoint). Action officers will have more time to focus on analysis instead of re-creating important, but time-consuming, slides.

SMS directly supports senior leaders’ information needs. For example, each month, the HQDA G–4 briefs the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on the status of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS). Currently, AMC and the Army Sustainment Command (ASC) manage APS, collect data, build PowerPoint slides, and forward them to HQDA for presentation to the Vice Chief of Staff. SMS can simplify this process through its automated report generation capability and by making these reports accessible online.

SMS assists Army leaders and action officers in ensuring that the Army is properly positioned to execute the Chief of Staff of the Army’s four imperatives—sustain, prepare, reset, and transform—as defined in The Army Plan. SMS links performance to strategy execution and serves as the unifying framework for implementing Army strategic goals throughout the enterprise. This framework serves as a type of mission-essential task list at the Army strategic level and provides a common operational picture to help leaders and staffs see the Army’s posture in strategy execution.

SMS focuses and aligns the strategies and key strategic initiatives across the Army staffs, secretariats, ACOMs, DRUs, and eventually, Army service component commands. It is designed to provide information on performance, progress, resource availability, and other factors that help senior leaders make decisions, lead change, and ultimately, restore Army balance. SMS captures the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army’s priorities and strategic initiatives for enterprise-wide strategy execution.

SMS uses the underlying premise that strategic outcomes are derived from a series of carefully linked actionable initiatives and tasks to which resources are dedicated. An effective, attainable, and well-managed strategy is required for any organization to survive. Tasks are established and measured in terms of quantifiable cost, performance, and schedule, and these are the only ways performance is measured in SMS.

Leadership accountability for each outcome is clearly identified and monitored in SMS. SMS facilitates informed discussions about the performance of key priorities and available resources. It also promotes more frequent reviews of the organization’s strategy to ensure that it accommodates a mission change or a new operational environment. As the SMS program reaches Army-wide implementation, SMS will link resource allocation to key initiatives. The SMS program office has coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller to discuss resource management issues, and additional discussions will occur among senior Army leaders to outline a plan of action.

SRS at AMC

AMC was one of the first ACOMs to embrace and fully support quantitative assessment of its strategy execution and performance management—initially through SRS and now through SMS. AMC and the SMS program office have continued to maintain a close working relationship.

In the early SRS days, AMC was involved in working groups and user feedback coordination meetings to support SRS enhancements. As early as 2002, AMC con-
ducted SRS quarterly reviews, which assessed logistics readiness and functional performance goals against performance criteria defined in SRS. The assessments were briefed to the AMC command group using data maintained in SRS. To a lesser degree, SRS was also used by AMC subordinate commands and separate reporting activities to support their logistics readiness, functional performance assessments, and strategy execution.

The AMC SRS quarterly reviews were terminated after January 2006 in anticipation of the change to SMS. Today, AMC has replaced the former SRS quarterly reviews with a revised quarterly command review and analysis briefing, using SMS as the principal supporting automated analytical tool.

The SMS program office has consistently recognized AMC as one of the leading ACOM’s in implementing, supporting, and using SMS. Currently, AMC is the only ACOM that has initiated strategy map development in SMS. The SRS program office recognized AMC with the 2005 Army SRS Best Practices Award. This award recognized AMC for most effectively integrating SRS performance management and strategy execution into its functional review processes, performance-metrics evaluation, and strategy-execution analysis methodology.

A classified version of the AMC strategy map is currently under development. This AMC strategy map will be posted on the SIPRNET and will address classified performance-management data in the areas of APS, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), left-behind equipment, and Army reset.

Once AMC’s SMS deployment is complete, increased horizontal coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASAALT) will take on added importance, specifically in terms of management and coordination with the various program executive officers, equipment program managers, and original equipment manufacturers.

**SMS and AMC’s Subordinate Commands**

SMS has been successfully implemented in all 20 AMC subordinate commands and separate reporting activities. All of the AMC subordinate command and separate reporting activity strategy maps (with the notable exception of the Army Chemical Materials Agency [CMA] strategy map) are currently maintained in the SMS user workspace environment. This is an area of the SMS database reserved for classified data management. The assessments were transferred from the SMS user workspace to the SMS production environment, which is the area of the SMS database reserved for fully developed and functional strategy maps. These strategy maps can be viewed by all Army SMS users. Currently, all AMC and AMC subordinate organization strategy maps are projected to be transferred from the user workspace to the production environment by the end of calendar year 2009.

**A Classified Strategy Map**

Initially, AMC command group guidance stated that the AMC strategy map would not include classified components. In recent years, AMC has experienced a faster operating tempo, and its increased responsibilities for new equipment fielding to support Department of Defense and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it necessary to address the management of classified data.

As AMC’s role in the management of APS and ammunition readiness takes on even more importance at the strategic level, classified data management has become increasingly necessary. The development of a SIPRNET version of the AMC strategy map is ongoing. Once completed, the AMC command group will have an automated capability within SMS to address management and strategic planning across the entire spectrum of the AMC mission.

**SMS and Army Campaign Plan Execution**

The 2008 Army Campaign Plan documented the role of SMS in support of the plan. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, in coordination with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Business Transformation, directed the incorporation of Army Campaign Plan objectives and tasks into SMS and the development of an integrated assessment process to monitor the plan’s execution.

The Chief of Staff’s 4 imperatives to restore balance and the 2009 Army Campaign Plan’s 50 identified campaign and major objectives (which illustrate the top priorities of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff) may be the basis for the next iteration of the Army Strategy Map. A final decision by the Army’s leaders on the precise construct of the next Army Strategy Map is forthcoming.

**SMS Data Synchronization Demonstration**

Almost immediately after SMS was deployed Army-wide in September 2007, Army leaders decided to test its data synchronization capabilities. Planning and coordination began in December 2007, and the data synchronization demonstration was conducted on 15 January 2008. For this demonstration, data synchronization meant simply that performance-metric indicators seen in the SMS were the same regardless of the command level from which the SMS user was accessing the system.
Army leaders decided to test SMS data synchronization by reporting APS readiness status. After identifying the appropriate APS source database (the Army War Reserve Deployment System), dummy APS performance metrics and readiness data were entered in the ASC SMS data hierarchy. As the Army’s leaders had hoped, the APS performance metrics and readiness data were simultaneously displayed on the Army, HQDA G–4, AMC, and ASC strategy maps during the demonstration. The successful demonstration of the SMS data synchronization capability was the first of its kind conducted in the Army.

All levels of command have one common operational picture for APS status, and if any questions or issues arise, detailed point of contact information is available through SMS for each performance metric at each level of command. This capability will significantly speed up logistics support coordination and the decisionmaking process. The data synchronization capability is currently being incorporated into the AMC strategy map and SMS data hierarchy to support other critical AMC logistics management functional areas, including reset, left-behind equipment, and LOGCAP.

The Way Ahead for SMS
SMS is capable of supporting both the traditional logistics provisioning process and the expedited, often ad hoc provisioning process that has resulted from the rapid fielding of new equipment and technologies deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Requests for repair parts for newly fielded items that just a few months earlier were in the initial design and engineering stages (and that have not even been issued routine national item identification numbers) are a major challenge to the logistics supply chain. The AMC G–3/5 is pursuing SMS solutions to support such provisioning problems.

In July 2008, the SMS program office transferred from the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Business Transformation to the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army-Enterprise Task Force (OCSA–ETF), and it now reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army. As a complement to the SMS program, the Army’s LSS program also falls under the OCSA–ETF. The teaming of the SMS and LSS programs under the OCSA–ETF is a logical progression. SMS is designed to evaluate performance, identify potential problems, and gauge strategy execution, while LSS is designed to solve problems and increase efficiency.

In a recent offsite meeting, the OCSA–ETF director, Lieutenant General Robert Durbin, summed it up when he asked, “How do we make a change that creates new processes or changes to existing processes to enable the operational force to run efficiently and effectively?” SMS is being positioned as the platform for a new Army governance structure. The use of SMS throughout the Army enterprise will improve not only logistics readiness but also the campaign and major objectives detailed in The Army Plan and other senior-leader guidance documents.

As the needs of the Army have evolved, so has SMS. SMS development has been successful to date because, rather than simply replacing existing automated information systems, SMS is increasingly becoming a system that integrates the best available information from various Army databases. Effective SMS deployment and use will require some changes to the existing Army management culture, and the OCSA–ETF is planning steps to mitigate the challenges that will come with those changes.

The management of the SMS program continues to evolve to meet the needs and requirements of an Army that is undergoing the most significant internal transformation since the end of World War II. SMS continues to prove its value by enabling Army leaders to make performance-management assessments and strategy-execution evaluations based on the most accurate and complete data available.

Army decisionmaking and execution is shifting to an approach focused on four core enterprises: readiness, human capital, services and infrastructure, and materiel. AMC and ASAALT are closely coordinating and are now viewing research, acquisition, logistics, and technology through an enterprise lens, which offers a holistic view of the process. AMC has designated SMS as the system of record that will be used to support and assess execution of AMC’s mission, vision, strategy, goals, and objectives supporting the materiel enterprise.

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Billeting Management in Theaters of Operations

When a unit is preparing to enter a theater of operations, billeting often falls in the “we will cross that bridge when we come to it” category. In today’s military, billeting management is normally either detailed to the unit with the least pressing areas of interest or contracted to one of the many civilian service-support companies supporting military efforts in the theater.

A unit that is detailed to manage billeting normally assigns this duty to an officer and a noncommissioned officer. They gather all available regulations and service department pamphlets on billeting and, by trial and error, establish procedures and policies consistent with the area commander’s directives.

When billeting is provided by service-support contractors, the contractors normally begin by establishing their own living areas and creating policies and procedures consistent with Army regulations and the local commander’s directives, using examples of past policies and procedures and lessons learned from previous contracts. Contractors normally use an experienced billeting or housing manager, who establishes the foundation, work, and accountability procedures; standards of work; and administration.

Both the tasked unit and the civilian contractor need to remember that the policies and procedures established for billeting are living documents that must be reviewed frequently and revised as the command, clientele, and priorities change. Several phases of billeting must be considered when establishing and revising the policies and procedures. The most demanding and time consuming of these are the initial and buildup phases.

Initial Phase

Initially in a combat zone, Soldiers, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors often sleep in defensive fighting positions, tents, and (although it is against policy) the combat and commercial vehicles that the occupants fight and travel in. All of these provide shelter, a little comfort, and a sense of “my space” for the occupant. Everyone constantly looks for any available space and any available materials to improve their shelters. Unless it is specifically prohibited and enforced, nothing is considered off limits.

Space and materials are claimed by “right of possession” by individuals, groups, units, private contractor companies, and even by refugees following the trail of sympathy, food, and water provided to them by military and contract personnel. This claim of space and materials happens even though military units are assigned areas of responsibility and contractors are told where to set up shop.

The billeting function in this phase mainly consists of documenting the existing hard structures by location, serviceability, and occupant; documenting the assigned tents or logistics support areas; ensuring that trash pickup points are established; and ensuring that latrines and shower points are designated. A military unit in charge of billeting may contract local labor for police and cleaning.

Buildup Phase

In the buildup phase, changes occur every day. Logistics support areas, service support areas, and military units will probably be redesignated, relocated, renamed, and consolidated. Headquarters for units and contractors are established and often relocated. Offices begin moving from CONEXs (containers express) into buildings or improved tents, B-huts (semipermanent wooden structures built to last 3 to 4 years), or SEA (Southeast Asia) huts (16- by 32-foot wood-framed tents with metal roofs, extended rafters, and screened-in areas). Regular sewage and trash pickup is established, and containerized housing starts to arrive. During this time, military units and contractors submit many requests for furniture, cleaning supplies, facility maintenance supplies, and more space.

The organization in charge of billeting should establish the billeting office and appoint the billeting supervisor or manager but avoid establishing a housing committee. A competent supervisor, monitored by a military major or sergeant major, who can interpret the policy and intent of the commander, make decisions, and be held accountable for those decisions, is all that is needed and required.

The complainant will always push demands for priority and petty complaints up to the highest level possible. Managers should refer these to their sergeant major or the mayor. The commander should avoid getting involved in these issues; if he doesn’t, he should be prepared for numerous time-consuming meetings with units and contractors.

The billeting office should publish a billeting policy that covers fire and safety, security, force protection, cleanup, and individual, unit, and company responsibilities. An order-of-merit list should be established for contractors moving into any improved quarters (first-in-first-out by priority of the command); this is a living document.

Although billeting management is not an area of immediate importance at the beginning of an operation, it must be planned, trained for, and manned before deployment. Billeting must be managed as quickly as the military situation permits in order to ensure the responsibility, accountability, and control of all billeting assets and to ensure a smooth transition for growth or demobilization.

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The Benefits of Participating in the Army Award for Maintenance Excellence Program

By Chief Warrant Officer (W-4) Richard C. Myers, Jr.

One responsibility of leaders is to build and maintain an effective maintenance program. With frequent deployments, transformation, and dwindling budgets, this task can be overwhelming. In the post-deployment environment, you will probably find that your unit’s maintenance program needs a little attention. The good news is that programs such as the Army Award for Maintenance Excellence (AAME) competition will assist you as a leader in refining, or even building from the ground up, an organized, highly resourceful maintenance operation that ultimately enhances readiness.

As both a recent winner and runner-up of the AAME competition, I found myself in a good position to write about the critical steps necessary to participate in the competition. However, when I sat down to put my thoughts on paper, I quickly realized that participating in the AAME competition was never about winning an award. Of course, the recognition the maintenance team receives is nice, but truthfully, competing was mostly about validating our maintenance operation and our ability to provide the commander with the maximum amount of combat power. The benefits received from competing outweigh the satisfaction of winning.

Command Emphasis

Participation in the AAME competition demands command emphasis. When an organization’s senior leaders are involved, leaders at all levels will be involved. Command emphasis is a critical ingredient to establishing an organizational culture that highlights the necessity of a rock-solid maintenance program. The AAME competition allows you as an organization to place a great deal of emphasis on areas that typically do not gain your full attention.

A leader’s days are busy, filled with countless tasks. In fact, supervising maintenance and properly training our Soldiers require a significant investment of time by a leader. A chain of command that expects all leaders to ensure the complete readiness of all equipment and charges them to train subordinates in correct maintenance procedures is critical to sustaining a successful maintenance program that supports a high state of readiness. The AAME competition offers senior leaders an opportunity to validate the role that their junior leaders play in day-to-day maintenance activities.

Verifying Unit Efficiency

Participating in the AAME competition allows units to establish and verify processes that streamline operations and maintain efficiency. As my unit prepared to participate in the AAME competition, we strove to increase maintenance readiness by implementing innovative techniques, updating maintenance standing operating procedures (SOPs), and continuing the maintenance education of all Soldiers within the battalion.

To stay on the cutting edge, we employed the Balanced Scorecard—a strategic management tool that allows the unit to monitor present performance and capture information about how well the maintenance team is positioned to perform in the future. An underlying goal of incorporating the Balanced Scorecard was to turn the organizational vision, mission, and strategy into action. We were able to encompass four fundamental areas: the warfighter’s (customer’s) perspective, the financial perspective, our internal business processes, and the learning and growth perspective. By assigning performance measures to each perspective, we identified our maintenance program’s strengths and weaknesses. This, in turn, allowed us to institute processes that would improve our weaknesses while sustaining our strengths. Essentially, it was through our preparation for the AAME competition that we realized that some of our internal processes needed improvement.

Building a Maintenance Program

If you are in the beginning stages of building a maintenance program, use existing methods, such as the AAME competition, to validate your progress. Instruments like the one used to prepare for the AAME competition allow you take a closer look at your program, and they guide you through the process. I recommend that you allow the AAME process to serve as your foundation. You will establish a doctrinally correct maintenance program that meets regulatory guidance. Doing what is right from the beginning is always far easier than correcting significant wrongs that have existed for a long time. The process also will assist you in establishing SOPs, command maintenance operations, maintenance training programs, service schedules, and day-to-day maintenance procedures that sustain combat readiness.
A competent maintenance team is critical to a unit’s ability to accomplish a mission successfully. The Army has many units that excel at “fixing” things. The AAME competition does more than just validate that you can fix things. The units that stand out as the best of the best are the organizations that combine maintenance competence with improved operational readiness, using sound maintenance practices. Having a competent maintenance team that can repair equipment is critical. However, repairing equipment in an efficient manner that creates an environment that supports growth, innovation, acceptable use of resources, and mission accomplishment is far more important to the long-term success of an organization.

Soldiers are our greatest assets, and with frequent deployments resulting in increased time away from home, we seek to maximize our Soldiers’ skills while maintaining predictability.

Whether you participate in the AAME competition as a foundation to build a new program, to validate the current readiness posture of your maintenance program, or to win it all, I believe you cannot go wrong. The competition aspect of it alone will drive your unit’s maintenance program to achieve the highest level of success. As leaders, you should seek to develop your operations in a way that improves and sustains readiness, encourages innovation, and increases the quality of our program. The AAME program is a preexisting mechanism that can help you achieve all of those goals.

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significant amount of the logistics support in today’s combat zone is provided by contractors. The support that is not contracted is provided by modular tactical logistics support forces. Although this contemporary logistics support structure is beneficial, it is riddled with issues that beg attention.

Problems With Contractor-Based Support
Contractor-based support, as I observed it in Iraq, has serious issues that undermine responsive support to the warfighter. First, task orders—which execute performance work statements (PWSs)—tend to be very vague. They appear to have been written by lawyers for lawyers, which most Soldiers are not. The problem is not what a task order contains, but what is left out. If a contractor is asked to complete a task that he feels is not part of the PWS, he will demand a letter of technical direction (LOTD), which can be detrimental to responsive support.

Another problem is that the contracting officer’s representatives (CORs), whose job is to ensure contractors are in compliance with their PWSs, often are not adequately prepared and trained for the task. Other issues include the impact of the high turnover rate of contract employees and diminished professional development opportunities for the Soldiers whose jobs are contracted out. These problems significantly affect logistics support in the combat zone.

Contractor Command and Control
A task order says that the contractor receives guidance from the tasking authority. In my particular case in Iraq, the tasking authority was a modular logistics support unit, a combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB), under which I served. My CSSB was the tasking authority over a contractor providing corps logistics support services (CLSS) and executing theater transportation missions (TTM), but the command and control relationship with the contractor was nebulous, to say the least.

The contractor’s support was similar to what typical quartermaster, maintenance, and transportation companies subordinate to a CSSB would provide. In that regard, whether it is manned by Soldiers or by contractors, the expectation is that the support will be equally responsive at all times. But, in my experience, there were differences. If the required support was contractor provided and the task was not clearly specified in the PWS, the contractor often demanded an LOTD. An LOTD is an administrative contracting officer’s order to the contractor to perform a new task that is within the scope of the PWS at no additional cost. To start the LOTD process, the CSSB would submit a letter of justification (LOJ) outlining the work and the potential effects of inaction; the brigade would then forward the LOJ packet to the expeditionary sustainment command administrative contracting officer to secure the LOTD.

The approval times for many of the LOTDs ran into weeks, if not months. The contractor’s response time following the LOTD was usually slow, which further delayed the delivery of required support. Why can’t the LOTD process be shortened and completed within a few days, just like military fragmentary orders on similar new taskings? The answer lies in changing the legal basis for the vague tasking authority to a practical command and control relationship.

When a new requirement will have an added cost, the contractor asks the Government to request an administrative change letter (ACL). The process to obtain an ACL is more complicated than that of an LOTD. Technical evaluation, legal review, and funding hurdles are included in the ACL process. LOTDs and ACLs both tend to halt the execution of support plans for days or months. Since their processes move slowly, the urgency of the support takes a backseat to bureaucracy.

Inefficiency of Contracts
Battlefield requirements are not always standard and obvious. The following situations demonstrate some of the problems with contractor-based support.

To accommodate operational changes, a unit needed to extend its distribution node’s operational hours. When the contractor heard of the change, he declared that an ACL would be required. By the time the ACL was approved and implemented, 6 months had passed and the conditions had changed. Since no change in operational volume was expected, the work schedule could have been realigned without changing the number of hours the contractor personnel worked, but the CSSB’s tasking authority did not allow it to redirect the contractor’s effort in order to quickly respond to fluid battlefield requirements.

Sometimes support requirements are the same for all three major types of contracted logistics support:
base life support (BLS), TTM, and CLSS. During a busy time of unit rotations, many units on post needed materials-handling equipment. The TTM contractor’s personnel were using their materials-handling equipment nonstop, while the materials-handling equipment belonging to the BLS contractor stood idle. A request for the TTM contractor to use the BLS materials-handling equipment for backup got the usual response of “the requirement is not part of the PWS.”

In many situations, the requirement for an LOTD or ACL hinders support. Establishing a standard timeline for processing LOTDs and ACLs may help. I suggest a new type of command and control relationship for a unit’s control over its supporting contractors. It can be called “contractor control” and defined as a relationship in which the CSSB, with due command diligence, can optimally employ the contractor’s services based on the contractor’s capabilities and PWS.

Contracting officers can curb slow response by adding a clause in the contract that allows the tasking authority relationship to be replaced with contractor control. The CSSB can then optimize its use of contractors without losing time in bureaucracy. The Government may have to pay some fees to the contractor to exercise the contractor-control relationship, but the LOTD will become a thing of the past. Responsive support to the Soldiers in a fluid battlefield environment is worth the fees.

PWSs are generally too vague. What the customer is expecting and what the contractor can actually do are completely different because the PWS describes the contractor’s responsibilities in general terms, which allows room for misinterpretation. It should be known that task orders are not strictly based on Army regulations or field manuals. If the TTM drivers are not to work more than 16 hours in a workday, it should be spelled out in the PWS for all to see.

The PWS should require the publication of external standing operating procedures so that supported units understand the contractor’s support posture. Supported units are bewildered when a contractor refuses to complete an essential task because the task was not specifically noted on the PWS. A detailed task list and external standing operating procedures for whatever services the contractor provides must be a part of the task order. Properly delineating contractor responsibilities will help manage expectations and keep Soldiers from playing lawyer to interpret vague task orders.

Contractor Employee Problems

I have found that the turnover rate for contractor employees in Iraq is fairly high. Many of the employees jump ship for the highest bidder for their services, and others quit because they feel like it. Their high turnover rate and the difficulty of training new personnel make it difficult for contractors to sustain Soldiers. Shortfalls in critical personnel (such as foremen and supervisors) affect a contractor’s capability because some vacancies last for weeks or months. As far as I know, no formal procedure exists for reporting these shortfalls and their effect on Soldiers.

Imagine a transportation or maintenance company missing its platoon sergeants and squad leaders for a long time. That company’s personnel readiness would likely affect the overall unit status report. I recommend having the contractor complete a self-assessment each month and provide the report to the Government.

The Opportunity Cost of Contracting

Contracting out sustainment services can sometimes cost Soldiers their opportunities for job experience and professional development. The collective battlefield experience of maintenance and quartermaster Soldiers is diminishing because contractors are doing their jobs for them now. How does a warehouse supply specialist maintain proficiency to perform when a contractor conducts his tasks for him? How does a maintainer gain operational experience and rise in rank if he is being compared to another Soldier whose job was not contracted out?

It is time to re-evaluate the “opportunity cost” of contractor-based support. The contractor and military support structure should be balanced to give young Soldiers the opportunity to gain the operational experience needed to succeed as tomorrow’s leaders while maintaining a partnership with contractors.

COR Training

The CSSB appoints CORs with the approval of the administrative contracting officer. CORs serve as the eyes and ears of the Government and provide quality surveillance and assessments of a contractor’s performance in a given functional area. My experience was that CORs were not properly resourced or formally trained. Since contractor-based support is likely here to stay, I believe it will serve the Army well to have officers and senior noncommissioned officers trained and awarded an additional skill identifier (before assuming the COR position), just like the recognition given to noncommissioned officers’ battle staff training. A COR should be a person with good writing skills, great analytical ability, and technical expertise in his area of responsibility.

As important as the COR’s duties are, the position should not be an afterthought. Training on general COR responsibilities can be completed online at the Defense Acquisition University continuous learning website, https://learn.dau.mil. CORs are given orientation training during deployment integration; but frankly, these training opportunities are not enough to master the technical aspects of a contractor’s operations. A COR should be educated on the exact task
order for which he will be responsible. Unfortunately, a COR overseeing construction projects may not have any engineering knowledge at all.

CORs, like liaison officers, are not resourced. Even if the CSSB headquarters were completely filled according to the modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE), the number of personnel would still be inadequate to staff the required number of CORs and effectively perform the traditional battalion staff functions. I recommend that deploying CSSB headquarters companies be assigned an adequate number of CORs to meet the operational requirements.

Each month, the CORs write a program evaluation brief (PEB)—their most important document—about the contractor’s delivered services. The PEB must reference the PWS for any noted deficiencies, but the task order’s generic nature makes it very difficult to find specific paragraphs to cite for all nonsupport situations. Adding a detailed task list as a component of the PWS would help mitigate this challenge. Including a rating standards table using grades (A, B, C, D, and F) to evaluate the performance of the task list would also be beneficial.

In an effort to manage contractor challenges, my CSSB conducted a weekly meeting with contractor employees to discuss past PEB comments, current and future mission support, critical equipment, and personnel shortfalls.

**Modular Support Structure Problems**

In addition to contractor support, the other element in the contemporary logistics support structure is modular tactical logistics support. This type of support uses a plug-and-play method that unwittingly unravels the soul of a unit. Since 2004, the concept of a modular support force has been hailed as the wave of the future. In the modular force, the headquarters company of a CSSB is organic, but its subordinate units are interchangeable. It seems like a great concept, but unfortunately, the modular logistics support force...
detaches individual Soldiers from the unit they represent. Soldiers do not feel like they are really a part of a unit they are attached to only temporarily.

My CSSB had no transportation units at home station, but it did in the combat zone. The CSSB’s headquarters company deployed forward, leaving behind all of the subordinate units that were assigned to it at home station. While in theater, the CSSB absorbed new units coming from different brigades and different home stations. Synchronizing the CSSB headquarters company with higher and lower units was an ongoing challenge because the units were always transitioning—if not the brigade, then the companies; if not the platoons, then the teams.

In the modular structure, the relationship between the CSSB headquarters and subordinate units is difficult because the units are not used to working together; the headquarters’ relationship with a subordinate unit’s rear detachment is even worse. Total unit cohesion right off the bat is out of the question. If you strike up a conversation with someone who is wearing a higher headquarters’ combat patch about that unit’s illustrious history or traditions, you will probably get a blank look. That is a disturbing trend. When pride in the unit is not well-rooted, it evaporates under pressure.

Not too long ago, knowing your wartrace units was very important because units trained as they would fight; they went to war with their parent units and were led by the parent units that nurtured them and had a vested interest in them. But given the way modular support forces are currently deployed, wartrace units have become less important.

I saw a platoon and its parent company deploy separately. I saw a CSSB headquarters train various companies at home station and arrive in theater to lead different companies, platoons, and teams. I saw companies fall under unfamiliar CSSBs and CSSBs fall under unfamiliar sustainment brigades. None of these units trained or validated their training together before deployment. When in theater, platoons tried to adjust to new companies, companies tried to adjust to new battalions, and battalions tried to adjust to new brigades. The units had to learn on the fly how to tactically orient themselves to the mission.

Even during redeployment, the effects of the disjoinededness continue because the home-station subordinate elements of the CSSB are often deployed with another CSSB. Many CSSBs, including mine, cannot say they have really trained together with all of the units assigned to their home station because the units deployed and redeployed at different times.

Losing the Soul of the Unit

General William Tecumseh Sherman eloquently said, “There is a soul to an army as well as to the individual man, and no general can accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the souls of his men as well as their bodies and legs.” The modular support force structure, as it is, threatens the soul of the unit; it does not consider cultural differences among units or the preservation of unit integrity. It creates a new facet of Army culture: stepchild syndrome.

Since they are always receiving subordinate units or giving them away, CSSBs do not get to command the units they knew, trained, mentored, and nurtured. It is time to reclaim the units’ souls, or we risk watching our mighty Army deteriorate. Genuine efforts to keep CSSB headquarters and home-station subordinate units together should be the norm.

I believe the modular logistics support force deployment structure would work well only if it were sustainment brigade centered. A sustainment brigade—with all of its subordinate units attached—can deploy with a division, and that sustainment brigade may be augmented by another, as required. Using that approach, it would be simple to identify which sustainment brigades are training, ready, or deploying. The current practice of home-station elements of the sustainment brigade constantly rotating in and out of the combat zone with or without the parent headquarters is a cycle that never stops. The units, the Soldiers, and the families feel the quake. Imagine the enormity of its ripple effects.

The Army’s current support structure, using contractor-based support and the modular tactical logistics support formation, has layers of problems. Contractors’ PWSs are often vague, and the role of the CSSB as the tasking authority over the contractor is restrictive to a fault. PWSs are often misinterpreted. The COR position is treated like an additional duty and is not being properly resourced.

Recent experiences of modular tactical logistics units show the problems with combining units from different brigades and posts to work together for the first time in the combat zone. This practice is causing a loss of unit integrity, unit pride, and unit soul. Modularity would work better for sustainment units if it were brigade-centric to minimize the constant transitional friction seen when platoons, companies, and battalions deploy independently of habitual higher headquarters units. These problems in the contemporary support structure are ours to fix, so let’s fix them.

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Tactical Convoy Planning for Sustainers

by Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Petersen

Throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations, distribution is the key to keeping coalition forces sustained with supplies and equipment. To conduct distribution operations in these nonlinear and often noncontiguous battlefields, logisticians combine transportation assets and security escort forces into tactical convoys that are capable of defending themselves from ambushes and other threats.

Before the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Army transportation units trained for combat using doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) found in Army manuals that were written in a peacetime training environment. Once OIF was underway, it became obvious that the training and TTP available at that time were inadequate in the current combat environment. In his paper “Circle the Wagons: The History of US Army Convoy Security,” Richard E. Killbane wrote:

After the successful liberation of Iraq from the totalitarianism of Saddam Hussein, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) from 20 March to 1 May 2003, the former Iraqi army soldiers and Fedayeen militia loyal to the Hussein regime resurfaced as insurgents. They began attacking convoys in June 2003 with very simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or direct-fire weapons on single vehicles. From that time on, the American convoys came under an increasing number of attacks by guerrilla forces.

Many transportation units in Iraq soon realized the enemy selectively honed in on specific targets. While foreign terrorists had arrived in country fully prepared to die for their cause, the home-grown Iraqi insurgents preferred to live to fight another day. Hence, they selected targets that would enable them to escape. The units that armed their trucks discovered the enemy would let their convoys pass to attack the weaker-looking ones following behind. In time, transportation units realized the enemy tended to target unprotected convoys and isolated vehicles. Units then began to armor and arm their trucks with machine guns and MK-19 grenade launchers.

Based on the new tactical environment, the Army developed a theory that all logistics convoys should be treated as combat missions and have security escorts (gun trucks) embedded in them. This concept led to the birth of the term “combat logistics patrol” (CLP), but the Army Combined Arms Support Command recently stated that the term CLP is nondoctrinal and can cause confusion. Units, combat training centers, and Army Training and Doctrine Command schools should instead use the proper doctrinal term “convoy” to describe the movement of supplies and materiel across the battlefield, whether the convoy is accompanied by a security escort or not.

Convoy Definitions

Although “CLP” is out and “convoy” is back in, another term, “tactical convoy,” is currently used in a Department of the Army publication and describes in even better detail how the Army is moving supplies across a hostile battlefield. The newly released Field Manual (FM) 4–01.45, Tactical Convoy Ops: Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, defines a tactical convoy as “a deliberately planned combat operation to move personnel and or cargo via a group of ground transportation assets in a secure manner to or from a target destination under the control of a single commander in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.”

No doctrinal definitions exist for “nontactical convoy” or “administrative convoy.” But “administrative movement” is an actual doctrinal term defined in Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “a movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged to expedite their movement and conserve time and energy when no enemy interference, except by air, is anticipated.” The key difference between the terms tactical convoy and administrative movement is whether or not enemy contact is expected. If there is, then the cargo needs to be moved in a secure manner by tactical convoy.

Secure Movement

The technique used to move cargo in a secure manner can be best described as the “hardened convoy concept.” First developed and championed by the 8th Transportation Group in Vietnam, the hardened convoy concept rests on two tenets: the arming or up-armloring of vehicles to protect drivers and crew members and the use of dedicated firing platforms in the form of armored gun trucks embedded as part of the convoy.

Based on the requirement to move cargo in a secure manner, a tactical convoy can be organized into two basic components. The first is the transportation element, which carries the supplies and equipment and executes the actual distribution mission. The second is the
security escort, whose mission is to protect the transportation element.

Transportation assets are categorized as either green or white. Green transportation assets are military vehicles and personnel, and white transportation assets are civilian or contractor vehicles and personnel. White assets can also be divided into subcategories depending on who is driving the truck. For example, trucks driven by U.S. contractors can serve in different types of white convoys than those driven by foreign nationals.

The security escort accomplishes its mission by remaining focused on the transportation element at all times and not driving off in pursuit of attackers. According to FM 4–01.45, a gun truck is “a vehicle where the primary weapon system is a crew-served weapon with a 360-degree field of fire capability and usually hardened for protection of vehicle and crew.” Many types of vehicles can be used as gun trucks, but the most commonly used are the M1114 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle and the M1117 armored security vehicle. Up-armored M900-series 5-ton cargo trucks and light medium tactical vehicles have also been put into service as gun trucks.

Tactical Convoys in Doctrine

Since June 2003, the Army has conducted tens of thousands of tactical convoys, and units from all branches of the Army have executed tactical convoys at the company level. These operations have provided a large historical database of proven TTP for the planning and execution of tactical convoys, and the TTP have, in turn, been transformed into FM 4–01.45. This FM is an excellent unclassified source for TTP and troop-leading procedures for company- and platoon-sized formations of any branch tasked to conduct tactical convoys.

At the organizational level, brigade support battalions, combat sustainment support battalions, and sustainment brigades are the formations that plan tactical convoys to support distribution operations. But before FM 4–01.45 was developed, the only doctrinal publications that discussed convoy escort were published by combat arms or combat support proponents, such as FM 17–95, Cavalry Operations, and FM 3–19.1, Military Police Operations. In these manuals, convoy escort is addressed as simply another tactical combat mission that combat and combat support units are expected to plan and execute. But these publications do not address how to incorporate transportation assets into a tactical convoy.

Most sustainment FMs do not address the security escort mission for tactical convoys conducting distribution operations. For example, FM 55–50, Army Motor Transport Units and Operations, discusses in detail how to organize convoys and provides some TTP for various scenarios involving ambushes and indirect fire. But it does not address how to incorporate a security escort into a convoy, coordinate with other organizations to support tactical convoys, or incorporate the intelligence process as part of tactical convoy planning and operations. Before the recent release of FM 4–01.45, no approved doctrinal publications existed to provide guidance for the tactical planning of tactical convoys.

As a result, sustainment organizations have had difficulty training for this aspect of their missions. For the most part, they do not receive the required training until they are in theater conducting a relief in place with their predecessors. However, considering the data-
army sustainment

base of historical TTP of the tens of thousands of tactical convoys that have been conducted, we can assume that some best practices have been passed verbally among sustainment organizations.

**Tactical Convoy Enablers**

Sustainment organizations do not conduct tactical convoys in a vacuum; they rely on others to enable the successful execution of their convoys. Three major players at the brigade level and below enable a tactical convoy: the maneuver unit (most likely the brigade combat team) that owns the area of operations that the convoy transits, the engineer brigade, and the combat aviation brigade (CAB).

**Maneuver unit.** The maneuver unit provides support to tactical convoys by providing quick reaction forces and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to react when the tactical convoy has any contact with the enemy. The maneuver unit also conducts operations against those enemy forces to prevent attacks from occurring.

**Engineer brigade.** The engineer brigade enables a tactical convoy before the convoy’s execution by—

- Conducting route clearance to remove IEDs, mines, and other explosive hazards.
- Conducting route repair to maintain route traffic-ability.
- Executing route sanitation (such as clearing brush and garbage from the route) to prevent the enemy from having cover and concealment while launching attacks against tactical convoys.

**CAB.** The CAB provides four important enabling functions:

- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support (sometimes in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles).
- Increased security for critical or priority convoys in the form of air weapons teams (AWTs) flying overhead.
- Fire support from AWTs (close air support) for tactical convoys in contact with the enemy.
- Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

**Coordinating With Enabling Units**

When coordinating with the units that enable tactical convoys, sustainers need to provide them with the following information (at minimum):

- Radio frequencies.
- Call signs.
- Blue Force Tracker identification numbers.
- Mobile Transportation System identification numbers.
- Start point times.
- Routes.
- Identification of the cargo as critical or priority, if applicable.

Much of this information is already on the sustainment organization’s movement program. A recommended procedure is to send the movement program by email through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network to the tactical convoy’s enabling units.

**Coordinating With Maneuver Units**

When coordinating with a maneuver unit in particular, sustainers need to receive, as a minimum, the following information from the maneuver unit:

- Radio frequencies.
- Unit call signs.
- Quick reaction force availability and contact information.
- EOD support availability and contact information.
- Types of MEDEVAC and casualty evacuation available and contact information.
- Details of other simultaneous operations that could affect the tactical convoy.

Sustainers may want to look for this information first on the Command Post of the Future (a command and control software system that many units use to post this type of knowledge) and then at the maneuver unit’s battle desk to get any more specific information that is required. Posting this information to the sustainment organization’s battle book would also be an easy way to disseminate the information to other units that need it.

In addition to providing the standard information found on the movement program, sustainers need to keep the maneuver units informed of the specific times and locations of attacks on tactical convoys. This will provide intelligence to the maneuver units so they can conduct operations against the attackers.

A recommended procedure is to provide this knowledge in a “target package.” The package should include a storyboard outlining attack locations, dates, and times, groups of attacks, directions the convoys were traveling at the time of the attacks (such as northbound or southbound), and if any specific vehicles are continuously being targeted (such as fuel tankers or the fifth vehicle in the order of march). The target package should also include the results of an ISR request for Ground Moving Target Indicator support for the same date, time, group, and location as the attacks to help show the maneuver unit where the attackers are coming from.

**Coordinating With the Engineer Brigade**

When coordinating with engineers, sustainers need to receive the following information from them:

- Time and location of route clearance sweeps.
- Unit call signs, radio frequencies, and Blue Force Tracker and Movement Tracking System numbers for route clearance patrols.
- Locations of route repair and route sanitation projects.
To help the engineers enable tactical convoys, the sustainers need to provide them with the 8-digit grid coordinates of where route repair must occur (to maintain trafficability of supply routes and prevent IED emplacement in craters and potholes), where route sanitation must occur (to prevent convoy attackers from hiding along the route in brush, vegetation, or garbage), and where convoys are being attacked. Then the engineers can focus the route clearance efforts on those locations.

By providing the engineers its movement program, the sustainment unit allows the engineers to schedule route clearance around convoy times rather than vice versa. Tactical convoys may be restricted to movement windows, but route clearance patrols most likely will not.

**Coordinating With the CAB**

When coordinating with the CAB, sustainers require the following information from them:
- Schedules and locations of any air assets flying over the convoy route.
- Call signs and radio frequencies of those assets.
  (Some aviation units may request that sustainers contact the aircraft through their supported maneuver unit instead of directly. In this case, the sustainment unit must ask the CAB for the proper procedures.)
- The CAB’s ISR capabilities.
- Procedures for obtaining MEDEVAC support.

It is imperative for sustainers to learn the procedures for requesting air support. Air support is a huge enabler for tactical convoys, and it is a requirement for moving some critical and priority convoys.

**Intelligence and Tactical Convoy Operations**

When executing the intelligence process for tactical convoy operations, sustainers need to concentrate on five focus areas:
- Battlefield geometry.
- Enemy analysis.
- Friendly-force analysis.
- Mission-specific intelligence.
- Intelligence gathering.

The first three focus areas in the intelligence process provide the common operational picture (COP) for a sustainment organization. They are the backdrop and foundation for all planning for tactical convoys. **Battlefield geometry.** The battlefield geometry includes the physical environment (both natural and manmade), route intelligence, and the human environment. The battlefield geometry is found by gathering and analyzing intelligence to define the operational environment. Battlefield geometry is the cornerstone of the sustainment organization’s COP.

When analyzing the natural physical environment, the following information, as a minimum, should be gathered, analyzed (paying particular attention to the effect on convoy operations), and disseminated:
- Weather patterns.
- Types of terrain (such as mountainous, desert, or jungle).
- Locations of major terrain features (such as rivers, swamps, and mountain passes).

When analyzing the manmade physical environment, the sustainers need to provide the common operational picture (COP) for a sustainment organization. They are the backdrop and foundation for all planning for tactical convoys. **Route intelligence.** Route intelligence should include, but is not limited to, the following:
- Types of roads (such as four lanes or two lanes, raised road, shoulders or ditches, asphalt or dirt).
- Types of terrain immediately around the route (within small-arms fire distance).
- Locations of intersections, cloverleaf interchanges, overpasses, and bridges.

Sustainers must also be aware of the human environment of the areas of operation they transit. Knowing the human environment is essentially discerning the difference between transiting friendly areas and hostile areas. The sustainment unit must know the demographics and political leanings of the populations in the lands they traverse and understand what effect they have on operations.

**Enemy analysis.** Sustainers must know who the enemies are and where they reside. Enemies establish patterns in how they conduct operations. With proper analysis, sustainers can recognize trends, TTP, and areas of concentrated enemy activity, keeping in mind at all times what effects they have on operations.

**Friendly-force analysis.** Friendly-force analysis requires knowing the locations of friendly units and their capabilities, which is especially important when coordinating with tactical convoy enablers. It includes knowing what operations friendly forces are conducting and how they affect tactical convoy operations.

Part of friendly-force awareness must include knowing not only where the unit boundaries are drawn on the map but also the actual locations of unit areas of operation. In a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield, gaps and seams often exist in the operational environment as combat forces focus their efforts on areas where they wish to achieve an effect. This leaves other areas covered by limited assets or perhaps not covered at all. Sustainers must be aware of these areas because sometimes the tactical convoys will be the only U.S.
forces traversing them on a habitual basis. If an uncovered area is also an area where the local population is hostile or where convoys have been habitually attacked, the sustainer must plan mitigation measures.

**Mission-specific intelligence.** Mission-specific intelligence is the knowledge required to conduct a specific tactical convoy at a specific time on a specific route. To generate mission-specific intelligence, a planner starts with the knowledge from the COP, updates it for the mission, and condenses it into an easily understood, concise format that aids mission planning. Mission-specific intelligence should include the following as a minimum:

- Types of roads to be traveled.
- Conditions of roads, bridges, and cloverleaf interchanges.
- Locations and types of recent enemy activity.
- Recent trends of enemy activity along the route to be traveled.
- Recent activity of friendly forces along the route to be traveled.

**Intelligence gathering.** Sustainers must gather intelligence in order to maintain an updated COP. Sustainers cannot assume ISR assets and intelligence reports will automatically come their way; they must aggressively gather intelligence for their tactical convoy operations in the same way that maneuver units gather intelligence for their operations. Intelligence gathering has four components: identifying and activating named areas of interest (NAIs), using tactical convoys as ISR assets, requesting external ISR assets, and reading draft intelligence information reports.

Identifying and activating NAIs is an important part of intelligence gathering. No one knows the routes better than the units traversing them. When updating the COP, certain areas on routes will stand out as trouble spots warranting extra “eyes on.” Using NAIs allows sustainers to focus the intelligence-gathering process.

Tactical convoys should be used as ISR assets. As tactical convoys travel their routes, a sustainment organization can activate NAIs and have the tactical convoys report what they see as part of their after-action reviews. A recommended way to do this is to provide convoy personnel with a worksheet that asks questions about that specific NAI. Sustainers should also request external ISR assets. They should again use the NAIs to determine where and when external ISR assets are most needed.

Sustainers should read draft intelligence information reports. Learning from the drafts requires a lot of reading and sifting through many reports to find those that pertain to the sustainment organization, but it is an imperative task.

The intelligence process is ongoing and never-ending. If conducted properly, it will result in a constantly refreshed COP that provides situational awareness and understanding across the formation, which in turn provides timely and accurate intelligence in support of tactical convoy operations.

**Named Operations**

An effective way sustainers can help bring the whole tactical planning process together is to take the routes and missions their tactical convoys drive and turn them into named operations; this is similar to how maneuver units and other formations use naming conventions for their operations. When putting a named operation together, in addition to writing fragmentary or operation orders, the sustainer should build a storyboard for easy dissemination.

A named operation provides a few benefits for a sustainment organization. First, a named operation puts the sustainment unit in its enablers’ COPs. By notifying other units of the sustainment organization’s activity through a medium that the enablers themselves use, the sustainers are speaking the enablers’ language. The sustainers provide enablers with situational awareness and understanding of their tactical convoys by sending them their movement programs and storyboards of named operations.

The second benefit of named operations is that they provide a frame of reference and clarity to the sustainment organization’s COP by providing names for specific tactical convoys transiting specific routes on specific missions. Third, a named operation provides a frame of reference and clarity to the sustainment organization’s higher headquarters’ COP. Finally, named operations give a sustainment unit priority when requesting resources, especially ISR assets, in support of tactical convoys. In an always resource-constrained environment, priority of resource allocation normally goes first to named operations. By naming its tactical convoy operations, sustainers have a “foot in the door” for resources.

In today’s operational environment, sustainers must think tactically as well as technically when it comes to executing distribution operations. When planning tactical convoys, a sustainer must think not only like a transporter but also like a warfighter. This requires sustainers to understand the FM 3–0 (operations) series of manuals in addition to the FM 4–0 (sustainment) series. Sustainers must learn new skills and ways of thinking; the conditions on today’s battlefields demand it.

**Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Peterson is the commander of the Echelons-Above-Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies.**
The current redeployment process for a company, battalion, or brigade can be described as cumbersome at best. If you are a commander or a unit movement officer (UMO), you understand how many tasks you must complete for your unit to redeploy.

An example of the complexities of redeployment is the requirement for an additional container for shipment. Just to receive an additional container, a unit must first request it through a container yard; have someone complete the Ammo-43 Course to be able to certify it; order the Department of Defense Form DD2282, Reinspection Decal Convention for Safe Containers, certified stickers from their supply chain; in-gate the container; and submit a local transportation movement release (TMR) form in order to spot the container in the unit area. I propose that the mayor’s cell perform those functions for the unit. This would require fewer organizations to manage the functions associated with each task.

The current redeployment process has the UMO contacting many different agencies in order to accomplish redeployment tasks. To meet redeployment requirements, the UMO must repeat tasks that someone else has already completed. The redeployment process could be simplified for the user (the redeploying unit), making it less time consuming for unit leaders and preventing potential errors. Redeployment tasks should be accomplished by the organizations that have experience in those functions, the ability to expand as needed to take on the tasks, and the resources to accomplish the tasks.

Proposed Structure

The Army should consider a simpler structure that clearly defines the responsibilities, functions, and roles of the agencies that work with the unit. Once the unit receives its redeployment orders, it should only make three contacts about redeploying equipment: the mayor’s cell, the movement control team (MCT), and the liaison officer (LNO).

Mayor’s cell. The mayor’s cell should provide deploying units with seaworthy containers and pallets for packing and shipping. It should be the main point of contact for requisitioning containers. Under the current system, the procedure for obtaining a container to pack is extremely segmented. The chart below shows the current process versus the proposed one.

The proposed process consolidates container management functions under the mayor’s cell. The mayor’s cell deals with the management of containers as a part of its daily operations, so it would make sense for it to inherit these extra responsibilities. The UMO would save time under the proposed system by mak-

### Proposed New Roles of the Mayor’s Cell

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Current System</th>
<th>Proposed System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Container request</td>
<td>Container yard</td>
<td>Mayor’s cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container repair</td>
<td>Local maintenance company</td>
<td>Mayor’s cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide RFID tags</td>
<td>Unit supply</td>
<td>Mayor’s cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide MHE</td>
<td>Local MHE section</td>
<td>Mayor’s cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaworthiness inspection</td>
<td>Unit ammo-43</td>
<td>Mayor’s cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide BBPCT</td>
<td>Unit supply</td>
<td>Unit supply</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**
- BBPCT = Blocking, bracing, packing, crating, and tie-downs
- MHE = Materials-handling equipment
- RFID = Radio frequency identification
ing only one contact (not including unit supply) to get the containers he needs for redeployment.

**MCT.** The MCT should document and mark containers to keep shipments from becoming frustrated. The improved system would give the MCT more robust capabilities, allowing the MCT to ensure that units get redeployed. The MCT should be asking the UMO, “What do you want to move?” and “When?” Then the MCT should coordinate all the actions needed to ensure that the equipment is moved without problems or delays, which commonly appear in the form of frustrated cargo. Once these questions are answered, the MCT will be able to provide greater capability with little additional support. The advantage of this structure is that it gives ownership of these essential functions to the people with the most container redeployment knowledge.

**LNO.** The LNO should develop an early partnership with the UMO to reduce problems in the redeployment process. The current LNO structure has the unit pushing information up to the LNO. In the proposed structure, the LNO should pull information from the unit. The LNO ensures that the unit makes progress in completing redeployment tasks so that it will meet the available-to-load date.

A unit leaving a theater has clearance requirements in addition to movement requirements. Most of the clearance requirements deal with the unit’s many supply accounts. The final clearing memorandum and paperwork for redeploying the unit from theater require the completion of sequential tasks. It is important for LNOs to contact UMOs and inform them of these requirements. The last few weeks before the unit’s available-to-load date are fast paced. The UMO cannot get bogged down in issues such as who he needs to see to clear and where they are located.

These problems can be solved with a simple solution. The LNO should have his own redeployment packet that he can give to the UMO. This redeployment packet should include—

- Contact information.
- Reporting and documentation requirements.
- The names of UMOs from other units that are also redeploying.
- Lessons learned from other redeployments the LNO has handled.

Without this packet, Soldiers run the risk of losing valuable time trying to find their LNOs, missing important reports, and repeating the mistakes of other units. These things make the entire redeployment process more time consuming and more difficult than it needs to be. The biggest risk that the unit runs is that it could be delayed in entering the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle.

**Implementation**

As with all new policies and procedures, obstacles present themselves when considering how to implement this new procedure. However, the benefits of the change should outweigh the effort required to implement it.

The mayor’s cell will encounter problems with staffing and training for its additional duties, but the additional responsibilities should help the cell members with their own missions. The mayor’s cell already coordinates TMRs for found-on-installation containers. Coordinating the spotting of containers would increase the volume of TMRs submitted for the local materials-handling equipment assets. With the proper training, personnel supported by the mayor’s cell could perform this additional function.

The MCT will need additional personnel and resources to be able to perform the functions. These could be provided by the units being supported by the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Current Structure</th>
<th>Proposed Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Request additional ULNs</td>
<td>Transition cell</td>
<td>MCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMR management</td>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>MCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs inspections</td>
<td>Request from outside company</td>
<td>MCT reviews paperwork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAZMAT paperwork</td>
<td>Unit HAZMAT representative</td>
<td>MCT reviews paperwork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDL (tags and MSLs)</td>
<td>MCT or DST cell</td>
<td>MCT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- DST = Deployment support team
- TMR = Transportation movement release
- HAZMAT = Hazardous materials
- UDL = Unit designation list
- ULN = Unit line number
- MCT = Movement control team
- MSL = Military shipping labels
MCT. Their training could be completed by certifying the assigned Soldiers in customs inspection and hazardous materials handling under Code of Federal Regulation Title 49, Transportation.

The biggest barrier to overcome would be acquiring a Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movements System II to allow the local units to work with their unit deployment lists. This should be requested from the geographic divisional command since their implementation would require the G–6 to install the network.

The LNO’s responsibility in implementing this new structure would be minimal in comparison to the benefits. Additional work for the LNO would include making initial contact with the redeploying unit and creating a redeployment packet for each unit. The redeployment packet then could be updated as necessary and given to subsequent units.

Changing the redeployment process will not be an easy undertaking. However, the results would be well worth the effort. I invite those with comments about this subject to join me in a discussion on LOGNet at https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?id=397443&lang=en-US. It is essential for UMOs who have been through the redeployment process to discuss this possibility. Comments, suggestions, and best practices can help create a redeployment interaction model that reduces confusion, errors, and delays while increasing resources, conservation, and leader effectiveness.

Captain Paul L. Moeller, Jr., is attending the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. He was a platoon leader for the 57th Transportation Company, 548th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 10th Sustainment Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), at Fort Drum, New York, when he wrote this article. He holds a bachelor’s degree in business science from Indiana State University.
Interactive Training for Property Accountability

By Winston C. Mullins

In recent years, reports of millions of dollars of misplaced Army property have led to concerns over the enforcement of the Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP). In an effort to curtail property accountability problems, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, Department of the Army, has assembled a team of highly skilled and knowledgeable logisticians and military analysts to form a Property Accountability Task Force (PATF). Through surveying Soldiers in the field, PATF found that Soldiers tasked with maintaining property books and enforcing the CSDP were not aware that many property accountability courses are available through interactive multimedia instruction (IMI). This article provides readers with distance learning (DL) course information and links to websites where they can take or order these courses on line.

**92A Basic Supply Principles** trains Soldiers in supply policies and procedures and the role of military occupational specialty (MOS) 92A automated logistical specialists. The IMI covers procedures for prescribed load lists (PLLs), The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS), materiel management, and storage and supply automation. The 3-hour course is available on compact disc (CD) through the Army Training Information Architecture (ATIA) website at https://atiam.train.army.mil/. Once logged in, click the RDL [Reimer Digital Library] Services tab and type “basic supply” into the keyword box to find the product.

**92A10 Non-Automated Sustainment Training** provides guidance on unit-level PLL and TAMMS procedures that are not automated. The 54-hour course is available through the Army Learning Management System (ALMS) website at https://www.lms.army.mil/.

**Supply Management Training 92A30** is a 39-hour course that provides an overview of the basic supervisory supply tasks. The CD can be ordered through the learning resources tab at the Defense Imagery website at www.defenseimagery.mil.

**Unit Supply Specialist (DL) (92Y)** provides training in critical areas of unit supply. The 10-hour course can be accessed online at ATIA or ordered on CD through the Defense Imagery website.

**Intermediate Level Unit Supply Procedures** is a 92Y20-level course that provides training on unit-level relief from responsibility, absentee property accounting, and Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE). The 25-hour course is available on CD at the Defense Imagery website.

**Unit Supply Specialist IMI Sustainment Training** teaches procedures for supply, filing, hand-receipt, property-adjustment, and unit-budget tasks performed at the 92Y30 level. Students can enroll in this 40-hour course through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) website at https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrsc/. 

**Report of Survey Officer Orientation** provides individuals assigned as report of survey officers training on report of survey duties and procedures. The 1-hour course is for U.S. Government distribution only and can be found at the ATIA website.

**Financial Liability Officer Orientation** provides training on report of survey and financial liability officer duties and procedures. This training is approved for public release and can be provided to students from all requesting foreign countries. The 1-hour course is available at the ATIA website.

**Unit Armorer Training Program** trains personnel selected as unit armors. The 19-hour course consists of three modules and is available on CD through the Defense Imagery website.

**S–4 Staff Officer Course** trains officers who are slated for S–4 positions in the concepts, processes, procedures, roles, and responsibilities of S–4s. The 53-hour course is available through ALMS.

**Property Accountability for Leaders in the Contemporary Operating Environment** provides unit-level leaders with training on property accountability procedures before, during, and after deployment. Soldiers will receive instruction on command supply discipline, Standard Army Management Information Systems, and various areas of supply accountability. The 15-hour course is available through ALMS.

The Army Combined Arms Support Command and the Quartermaster Center and School will continue to develop and revise IMI training products. Comments and suggestions for current and future quartermaster IMI products are always welcome and can be emailed to leetdqm@conus.army.mil.

Winston C. “Chuck” Mullins is a training specialist with the Army Combined Arms Support Command Training and Development Directorate at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a B.I.S. degree with a specialization in business from Virginia State University.
AUSA Symposium Eyes Transformation and Plans for Withdrawal From Iraq

The Army Logistics Symposium and Exposition, held 16 to 18 June in Richmond, Virginia, brought logisticians together to discuss where, when, and how their jobs will be affected in the transformation and troop withdrawal processes in which the Army is currently engaged. The Association for the United States Army’s Institute of Land Warfare hosted the event at the Richmond Convention Center, bringing together Soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and partners from industry to discuss top logistics priorities.

Lieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, Department of the Army, explained that while 15 brigade combat teams are forward deployed or forward stationed, “some 26 BCTs’ worth plus 89,000 supporting Soldiers” are actually in this status. “It all adds up to well over 200,000 Soldiers,” said Stevenson. In addition to these overseas commitments, the Army is involved in base closure and realignment (BRAC) moves that will uproot about 250,000 Soldiers and family members in the next couple of years.

Stevenson said that the drawdown in Iraq falls in line with meeting the Army Chief of Staff’s goal of getting the Army “back in balance.” He noted that this is not like Operation Desert Storm, where the Army had little warning when the time came to withdraw. “We know now what we need to be to, in terms of the size of the force, and we have a year-plus to plan this, so we are going through a very deliberate process. One of the things that obviously we have got to do is that everything that we do not need there now we have to start moving again.”

Stevenson said this is not going to be a small task. Theater-provided equipment and contractors’ Government-furnished equipment will pose challenges. He said the goal is to be finished with the drawdown by August 2011, but upcoming Iraqi elections will play a role in the withdrawal timeline. “We are really not going to see significant amounts of drawdown probably until the March timeframe, but that goal of ours hasn’t changed, so that really has put us into high speed from about March to August.”

Lieutenant General James H. Pillsbury, deputy commanding general of the Army Materiel Command, observed, “It [the drawdown] is going to be Desert Stormish-like, and yet the difference is [that] it is going to be executed while we are still in contact in Iraq and certainly in Afghanistan and parts of the world unknown right now.”

During the symposium, the commanding general of the Army Combined Arms Support Command, Major General James E. Chambers, introduced the new key-stone doctrine that replaces FM 4–0, Combat Service Support. Field Manual (FM) 4–0, Sustainment, will aid the sustainment community in this move by providing guidance for full-spectrum sustainment operations “This affects everything else in the sustainment community,” said Chambers. “It sets out the principles of sustainment and gets at the philosophy of how we support large formations.” The new FM 4–0 encourages the use of more joint functions in the sustainment community. As Chambers pointed out, “that wasn’t only critical 25 years ago, but more so today as we draw down forces, as we look for economies and we look for efficiencies as we operate together.”

FM 4–0 will also help the sustainment community complete its transformation to a modular force. Stevenson said the transformation is 86-percent complete. All 4 theater sustainment commands are in place, and 11 of 14 expeditionary sustainment commands have been created. “We have another due to come on line next year and another two by FY 2012.” Sustainment brigade transformation also continues.

Pillsbury said that another way the Army and the other services will improve efficiency is through “joint basing,” where “the Services are going to start working together at the installation level.” For example, the Army will run both Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base in Washington.

Enhanced Night-Vision Goggles Improve Day and Night Awareness of Soldiers

Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier fielded 300 sets of AN/PSQ–20 enhanced night-vision goggles (ENVGs) to the 10th Mountain Division in February. The division is the first unit outside of the Special Forces to receive the new goggles. The ENVGs provide Soldiers clearer night and day vision and faster threat recognition, which reduces collateral damage and fratricide.

The ENVG weighs approximately 2 pounds and includes a 4- AA-battery pack, a helmet mount, and a wiring harness. It offers a better fit than its predecessor, the AN/PVS–14, because the helmet mount’s center of gravity is closer to the face. It is also more compact and easier to store. The ENVG is also compatible with aiming lasers used by the Army’s current weapons systems.

PEO Soldier has been working on a fused imaging system since 2000 and is still perfecting the ENVG. A digital update will soon use digital image processing to improve image clarity.
Excellence in Army Logistics Recognized by Chief of Staff

The Army Chief of Staff honored 95 outstanding Army units for their accomplishments in supply, maintenance, and deployment logistics at the 2009 Combined Logistics Excellence Awards ceremony on 2 June in Alexandria, Virginia.

The Deployment Excellence Award winners are—

**Operational Deployment**

**Small Unit.** Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 146th Field Artillery Regiment, Olympia, Washington.

**Large Unit.** 172d Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Grafenwoehr, Germany.

**Army Installation**

Fort Riley, Kansas.

**Active Army**

**Small Unit.** 317th Maintenance Company, 21st Theater Support Command, Bamberg, Germany.

**Large Unit.** 412th Aviation Support Battalion, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, Ansbach, Germany.

**Supporting Unit.** 838th Transportation Battalion, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

**Army National Guard**

**Small Unit.** 1132d Military Police Company, Rocky Mount, North Carolina.

**Large Unit.** 146th Expeditionary Signal Battalion, Jacksonville, Florida.

**Supporting Unit.** Joint Forces Headquarters-Ohio, Columbus, Ohio.

**Army Reserve**

**Small Unit.** Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 316th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Coraopolis, Pennsylvania.

**Large Unit.** 311th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Los Angeles, California.

**Supporting Unit.** U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The Maintenance Excellence Award winners are—

**Active Army**

**Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)**

**Small Category.** Forward Support Company, 54th Engineer Battalion, 18th Engineer Brigade, Forward Operating Base Stryker, Iraq.

**Medium Category.** Maintenance Troop, Regimental Support Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas.

**Large Category.** 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas.

**Active Army**

**Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)**

**Small Category.** Busan Storage Facility, U.S. Army

Soldiers from the Forward Support Company (FSC), 54th Engineer Battalion, load equipment and supplies for a logistics convoy while deployed to Iraq in June. The unit, now back in Bamberg, Germany, was the Army’s first deployed unit ever to receive a Chief of Staff of the Army Combined Logistics Excellence Award. In October, the unit will be one of two representing the Army in the 2009 Secretary of Defense Awards. (Photo by SSG Luke Koladish, 114th Public Affairs Detachment)
Materiel Support Center-Korea, Busan, Korea.
**Medium Category.** Maintenance Activity Vilseck, General Support Center-Europe, 21st Theater Support Command, Vilseck, Germany.
**Large Category.** Maintenance Activity Kaiserslautern, General Support Center-Europe, 21st Theater Support Command, Kaiserslautern, Germany.

**Army National Guard TOE**
**Small Category.** Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 751st Maintenance Battalion, Eastover, South Carolina.
**Medium Category.** 1344th Transportation Company, East Saint Louis, Illinois.

**Army National Guard TDA**
**Small Category.** Field Maintenance Shop 5, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico.
**Medium Category.** Combined Support Maintenance Shop, Eastover, South Carolina.

**Army Reserve TOE**
**Small Category.** 469th Medical Company, Wichita, Kansas.
**Medium Category.** 425th Transportation Company, Salina, Kansas.

**Army Reserve TDA**
**Small Category.** Area Maintenance Support Activity 57 (Ground), New Century, Kansas.

**Depot**
Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas.

**Installation Management Command**
**Small Category.** Installation Materiel Maintenance Activity, U.S. Army Garrison, Vicenza, Italy.
**Medium Category.** Directorate of Logistics, U.S. Army Garrison, Camp Humphries, Korea.
**Large Category.** U.S. Army Garrison-Red Cloud, Camp Red Cloud, Korea.

The **Supply Excellence Award** winners are—

**Active Army**
**Level I, Unit MTOE.** 118th Military Police Company (Airborne), 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
**Level I, Unit TDA.** 78th Aviation Battalion, Camp Zama, Japan.
**Level II, Property Book MTOE.** Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 30th Medical Command (Deployment Support), Heidelberg, Germany.
**Level II, Property Book TDA.** 21st Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), Fort Hood, Texas.
**Level III, Parent Level (Battalion or Squadron) MTOE.** 212th Combat Support Hospital, 30th Medical Command (Deployment Support), Miesau, Germany.
**Level III, Parent Level TDA.** Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command, Hohenfels, Germany.
**Level IV, Supply Support Activity MTOE.** 558th Transportation Company (Marine Maintenance), 6th Transportation Battalion, 7th Sustainment Brigade, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
**Level IV, Supply Support Activity TDA.** Aviation Center Logistics Command, Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

**Army National Guard**
**Level I, Unit MTOE.** 548th Transportation Company, Trenton, Missouri.
**Level I, Unit TDA.** Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Joint Forces Headquarters-Guam, Barrigada, Guam.
**Level II, Property Book MTOE.** Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 265th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (Avenger), 164th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Daytona Beach, Florida.
**Level II, Property Book TDA.** National Guard Marksmanship Training Unit, North Little Rock, Arkansas.
**Level III, Parent Level MTOE.** Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 135th Aviation Regiment, 35th Aviation Brigade, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.
**Level III, Parent Level TDA.** 83d Troop Command, Tallahassee, Florida.

**Army Reserve**
**Level I, Unit MTOE.** 406th Adjutant General Company, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
**Level I, Unit TDA.** 5th Battalion, 80th Regiment, Abingdon, Maryland.
**Level II, Property Book MTOE.** 311th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Los Angeles, California.
**Level II, Property Book TDA.** Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 158th Infantry Brigade, Daytona Beach, Florida.
**Level III, Parent Level TDA.** 4th Brigade (Combat Service Support), Indianapolis, Indiana.
**Level IV, Supply Support Activity MTOE.** 889th Quartermaster Company (Supply), Ogden, Utah.
Effective 1 October, career management field (CMF) 91 will be the new designator for all mechanical maintenance troops previously part of the Ordnance Corps’ CMF 63. At the same time, financial management Soldiers will change to CMF 36. The changes are part of a move across the Army to reduce the number of military occupational specialties (MOSs) used to identify Soldiers and to more closely align MOSs with officer designations.

The designation changes include the deletion of and the transfer of Soldiers from MOS—
- 44B (metal worker) to 91W.
- 44C (financial management technician) to 36B.
- 44E (machinist) to 91E.
- 45B (small arms/artillery repairer) to 91F.
- 45G (fire control repairer) to 91G.
- 45K (armament repairer) to 91K.
- 52C (utilities equipment repairer) to 91C.
- 52D (power-generation equipment repairer) to 91D.
- 62B (construction equipment repairer) to 91L.
- 63A (M1 Abrams tank system maintainer) to 91A.
- 63B (wheeled vehicle mechanic) to 91B.
- 63D (artillery mechanic Patriot system repairer) to 91P (artillery mechanic).
- 63H (track vehicle repairer) to 91H.
- 63J (quartermaster and chemical equipment repairer) to 91J.
- 63M (Bradley fighting vehicle system maintainer) to 91M.
- 63X (maintenance supervisor) to 91X.
- 63Z (mechanical maintenance supervisor) to 91Z.

All of these sustainment Soldiers remain in the same jobs, with the same titles, except for 63D Soldiers who will become 91P artillery mechanics and will maintain a wider range of artillery equipment.

Officers in area of concentration (AOC) 15D (aviation logistics) are transferring to AOC 15B (aviation combined arms operations).

Other changes include the creation of a new additional skill identifier (ASI) N8, which will be awarded to officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers (ranking from sergeant to sergeant first class) in certain medical, transportation, supply, and ordnance MOSs who have completed the Combat Service Support Automation Management Office Course at Fort Lee, Virginia. ASI 3C is being given to Soldiers ranking from staff sergeant through sergeant major who have completed the Operational Contract Support Course.

President Barack Obama’s proposed budget for the Army, submitted to Congress in May, asks for funds to support overseas contingency operations (OCO), continued modularization of the Army, and reset of forces and equipment. The President is seeking $225.212 billion for the Army for fiscal year (FY) 2010, which is a decrease of $5.78 billion, or 2.5 percent, from the $230.992 billion that Congress appropriated for FY 2009.

The FY 2009 appropriations total includes supplement appropriations approved for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This year, the President has requested $83.081 billion for OCO, a decrease of $7.725 billion, or 8.5 percent, from the FY 2009 OCO appropriation of $90.806 billion. However, the President is seeking a $1.994 billion increase in the Army’s base budget to $142.131 billion, or a 1.39-percent increase over the FY 2009 base appropriation of $140.187 billion.

Spending requests by major category are—
- Military personnel: $63.452 billion in FY 2010 (an increase of 5.96 percent from the FY 2009 appropriation).
- Operation and maintenance: $92.849 billion in FY 2010 (up .955 percent from FY 2009 spending).
- Procurement: $30.621 billion in FY 2010 (down 16.53 percent from FY 2009).
- Research, development, test, and evaluation: $10.496 billion in FY 2010 (a decrease of 13.21 percent from the FY 2009 appropriation).
- Military construction: $5.386 billion in FY 2010 (down 24.01 percent).
- Family housing: $796.7 million in FY 2010 (down 17.24 percent).

In FY 2010, the procurement request will support the acquisition of—
- 79 UH–60M Black Hawk helicopters with digitized cockpits, new engines, and wide-chord blades for $1.258 billion.
- 8,027 parachutes for $66.4 million. This includes 7,160 advanced tactical parachute delivery systems, 501 joint precision airdrop systems (2,000-pound variant), and 366 enhanced container delivery systems (which can carry a 10,000-pound load).
- 241 systems from the mine-protected vehicle family, including 52 Buffalo mine-protected vehicles, 93 medium mine-protected vehicles, and 96 vehicle mounted mine detection systems, for $402.5 million.
- 569 M915A5 line-haul tractor trucks for $137.4 million.
Family of heavy tactical vehicles equipment, including 1,743 heavy expanded-mobility tactical trucks (HEMMTs), 264 heavy equipment transporter system (HETS) tractors, 63 HETS trailers, 540 palletized load system (PLS) trucks, 130 PLS trailers, 5,725 container roll-in/out platforms, 85 enhanced container handling units, and 9,955 Movement Tracking Systems, totaling $1.436 billion.

Recapitalization of 504 HEMMTs through the HEMTT Extended Service Program for $180.8 million.

5,532 trucks and 2,720 trailers of the family of medium tactical vehicles for $1.62 billion.

10,214 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) for $1.532 billion.

8,222 light tactical trailers for $97.841 million.

121 rough-terrain container handlers for $95.6 million. These will support the movement of a large number of containers through overseas ports and the theater distribution system to forward support areas.

555 forklifts, including 480 all terrain lifter, Army system, and 75 5,000-pound light capability rough-terrain forklifts, for $94.2 million.

37 water purification systems for $10.2 million. The procurement is for two types of water purifiers: the 1,500-gallons-per-hour (GPH) tactical water purification system, which replaces the aged 600-GPH reverse osmosis water purification unit, and the lightweight water purifier, a portable purifier used during early entry, rapid tactical movement, and independent operations.

551 petroleum and water distribution systems for $142.6 million. These include 5 assault holoseline systems, 81 fuel system supply points, 3 advanced aviation forward area refueling systems, 2 modular fuel systems, 143 forward area water point supply systems, 255 hippos, 15 camels, and 47 tank and pump unit systems.

24 laundry advanced systems for $21.6 million.

Field feeding equipment for $61.9 million. This includes containerized kitchens, assault kitchens, refrigeration container systems, and sanitation centers needed to fill Army modular force requirements.

20 Force Provider modules for $245.4 million. Currently, the stock of these modular, containerized tent cities has been depleted within Army pre-positioned stocks, leaving only 2 modules on hand for emergency use.

273 combat service support medical systems for $45.1 million.

36 mobile integrated remains collection systems (MIRCSSs) for $16.6 million.

973 mobile maintenance equipment systems for $149.4 million. These systems include shop equipment contact maintenance trucks, shop equipment welding trailers, standard automotive tool sets, and forward repair systems for maintenance on the battlefield.

117 lightweight maintenance enclosures for $2 million. This is the first new maintenance tent to be fielded to the Army in over 40 years.

$208.3 million for generators and associated equipment to replace and modernize the Army’s generator inventory. This includes removing gasoline from the generator inventory, reducing generator noise levels, and improving battlefield survivability.

1 joint high-speed vessel for $183.7 million. This is the third of three joint high-speed vessels the Army will acquire to support logistics over-the-shore, in-theater port control, and riverine logistics operations.
New Convoy Planning Tools Provide a More Complete Picture to Soldiers

Patrol View, a new program to improve the planning and execution of logistics convoys, came on line 1 May through the Tactical Ground Reporting Network (TiGRNET).

TiGRNET is a secure program that provides a computerized map that convoy commanders use to outline the area where a convoy will operate, identify previous incidents (good and bad), and view reports of enemy activity in the area. TiGRNET obtains this information by providing convoy leaders with a platform to enter post-mission reports and attach digital photos and videos and by providing access for intelligence Soldiers to update data on recent construction and battle damage along convoy routes.

The goals of Patrol View are to reduce Soldier apprehension and improve decisionmaking tools for convoy commanders. While in its developmental stage, Patrol View was named Project Tourist. The initiative by ACGS, LLC, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency involved mapping over 4,000 miles of main and alternate supply routes in the Iraqi theater of operations. Aegis Corporation collected the 360-degree-video using a camera embedded with a Global Positioning System. The video will be used in conjunction with TiGRNET’s convoy planning software to provide a better picture of what convoys face.

The post-production process merges video taken from 11 camera lenses into a 360-degree product that allows convoy personnel to see a daylight view of the route prior to mission execution.

The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) funded and provided oversight of the Project Tourist program, which has been ongoing since October 2008.
The finished product, Patrol View, is being managed by the Topographic Engineering Center.

Half of Deseret’s Mustard Container Stockpile Destroyed at Toole Facility

More than 3,199 1-ton containers filled with mustard agent were destroyed at Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Utah, on 12 March, marking a 50-percent reduction of the mustard-filled containers stored at nearby Deseret Chemical Depot by the Army Chemical Materials Agency.

In October 2008, Deseret began using a heel transfer system process to remove and break up solidified mustard gas deposits that were too large to be processed by the Toole metal parts furnace.

Munitions and bulk containers known to have elevated mercury levels will not be destroyed until at least 2010.

Historians Gather Lessons From Sustainment Soldiers in Iraq

Dr. Steven Anders, the Quartermaster Historian at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Richard Killblane, the Transportation Historian from Fort Eustis, Virginia, made a 4-day tour of Joint Base Balad, Iraq, in February to collect interviews, data, and artifacts to ensure that the Transportation and Quartermaster Schools are teaching junior Soldiers the most current information available within their fields.

Anders interviewed key leaders from the 304th Sustainment Brigade, an Army Reserve unit from Los Angeles, California, and the 259th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, an Army Reserve unit from Denver, Colorado, and took a walking tour of the warehouses and yards around Joint Base Balad.

Killblane visited the “Skunk Werks” welding shop of Task Force 1st Battalion, 161st Infantry Regiment, 81st Heavy Brigade Combat Team (Washington Army National Guard). The shop is known for installing the first homemade armor on tactical vehicles in Iraq and was featured on the television show “Monster Garage.” Killblane plans to move this welding shop to the Army Transportation Museum for display once it is no longer in use.

Killblane interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Allen, the battalion commander, and Soldiers from C Company and H Company about convoy security and their deployment experiences.

The data about transportation and quartermaster operations will be turned into historical documentation that will help to improve convoy security and other aspects of conducting missions in the contemporary operationing environment.

DLA Moves Battery Management to Defense Supply Center Columbus

The Defense Logistics Agency changed the inventory control point of its battery program from Defense Supply Center Richmond, Virginia, to Defense Supply Center Columbus, Ohio, on 10 April. The move supports the alignment of items into the appropriate supply chain. The point of contract for the program is Dan McGrath, who can be reached by email at charles.mcgrath@dla.mil or by telephone at (614) 692–0658.