that they need to go out there and be successful.”

Addressing the grey areas. Senior Chief Davila said that the push for formal training was initiated because of the need to address the “gray areas” enlisted aides face. “When you have an enlisted aide show up at the door—step of a general or flag officer and they don’t have the proper training or they’re not qualified, then things happen,” said Senior Chief Davila. Though regulations exist to guide enlisted aides as to what they can and cannot do within the camps, some areas still require careful handling because clear-cut answers are not available. In order to better equip enlisted aides to deal with these grey areas, instructors provide them with DOD and service instruction on what duties are permissible and impermissible. Through role play, students are taught the skills needed to address tough situations.

Senior Chief Davila said that it is very important for everyone, including the general or flag officer, his spouse, the enlisted aide, the aide de camp, the flag aide, and all other personal staff, to be familiar with the instructions to refer to if there is a question about the officer’s likes and dislikes, dietary restrictions, medications, and any health issues the officer has that may require careful handling because clear-cut answers are not available. In order to better equip enlisted aides to deal with these grey areas, instructors provide them with DOD and service instruction on what duties are permissible and impermissible. Through role play, students are taught the skills needed to address tough situations.

Uniform assembly diagrams and a photo of the officer in uniform also are advisable to guide the enlisted aide in proper uniform setup. The book also needs to include essential phone numbers, officer’s rank, base clinic, laundry facilities, commissary, medical center, fire department, the headquarters (aide de camp, flag aide, and secretary), legal, and base police.

Guides for hosting formal events and a schedule of what areas of the house to clean on what days can also be helpful for enlisted aides. Students are asked to develop time management and schedule charts for their other tasks. Field trip. To give students an idea of the operation of single and multi-aide homes, classes take field trips, sometimes to the Washington, D.C., area and other times to Norfolk, Virginia, where current enlisted aides give them tours of the general or flag officer’s quarters and answer any questions they may have about their duties. This gives students the opportunity to observe the pace of operations in a home and to note any tasks that they may be required to perform that they may have over-looked.

Uniform assembly. Enlisted aides are responsible for setting up the uniforms, tons of their commanding officer. If an enlisted aide serves in many interservice assignments, sometimes on short notice, it is important for them to be familiar with the uniforms of all the services.

EATC instructors provide hands-on training and a practical exercise in uniform assembly to familiarize enlisted aides with officers’ uniforms. In the exercise, each student is required to set up a uniform from each service.

Financial management. Enlisted aides learn record-keeping and accounting procedures to help them manage the two types of funds that are accountable for: official representation funds (ORF) and personal household accounts (or petty cash funds). ORF are funds used for official events, and petty cash funds are used in the daily duties of maintaining the household. In the class, students are taught to use a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to execute basic accounting and financial management of the funds.

The enlisted aide will meet with the general or flag officer monthly to discuss how much money will be needed to cover household expenses, such as having the officer’s uniforms cleaned and buying groceries at the commissary. Enlisted aides must maintain receipts for all expenses. EATC students are taught that it is a requirement to meet with their boss at the end of each month to audit these records so that both parties know where the money went.

Meal preparation and planning. Culinary skills are also evaluated during the course. Students plan, prepare, and present a 4-course meal, usually in the JCOE laboratory.

“It’s not a graduation requirement, but we want to see their skill level—where are they in regards to their culinary skills—and then we help them along the way,” said Senior Chief Davila.

The Enlisted Aide Training Course is open to all military personnel. Those in and out of pending assignment to enlisted aide positions have first priority for the class, as they are the ones who need the information provided in EATC most immediately. Individuals interested in or who have questions about EATC should send an email to usarmy.lce.tradoc.mbx.qm-enlisted-aide-training@mail.mil or call (800) 734-3112.

—Janellene J. Cochran

The Impact of Logistics on the British
Defeat in the Revolutionary War

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the onset of hostilities between Great Britain and its 13 North American colonies in 1775, the British enjoyed significant advantages over the future United States of America. While logistics arrangements for both sides during the Revolutionary War were somewhat spartan, the British logistics system, compared to the logistics organization of the rebelling colonies, was, on the surface, the epitome of efficiency. Faced with a 3,000-mile line of communication across the Atlantic Ocean, Great Britain ensured that its major ports were reasonably well-equipped for war, and most of the others were diversely equipped and had never served. Great powers would not repeat a strategic logistics feat of this magnitude for more than 150 years, until Operation Torch in World War II. However, the British logistics architecture had significant shortcomings, and before British strategists and logisticians could identify and correct them, those deficiencies contributed significantly to the British Army’s defeat. The failure of the British to develop an effective supply chain operation; integrate their logistics, strategic, and tactical plans; and adapt their supply procedures resulted in their inability to execute a countersurprise campaign against the American colonies successfully. That failure eventually resulted in American victory.

Operating a Supply Chain

The first British logistics failure was an inability to develop and protect an effective supply chain operation for their campaigns. According to Injizer J. Chen and Anthony Paulraj, in their 2004 Journal of Operations Management article, “Towards a Theory of Supply Chain Management: The Constructs and Measurements,” a supply chain is a system of organizations, people, technology, activities, information, and resources involved in moving a product or service from supplier to customer. The problems of supplying the army from Great Britain were great, and the most serious challenge was that of shipping food over such a tremendous distance.

Cork, on the coast of Ireland, was the primary port for shipping foodstuffs to the British in North America. This was not only because of its large natural harbor and its relative closeness to English ports but also because of the farms of Ireland, which were a major source of food. Southern Ireland also was an important recruiting center for the British Army, thus making it easy for British quarrtermasters to put troops aboard food ships bound for America. However, a combination of inadequate packaging, corruption, poor quality control, and substandard inland-to-ports transport limited the stocks that made it from supply sources to the ships.

In one instance, one of the worst storms in years struck a major logistics convoy after it had departed Cork. Many of the ships were forced to turn back to England, others were diverted to ports such as Plymouth and Kins- bean, and still others spent weeks sailing up and down the eastern seaboard of North America waiting for the weather to break before they could sail.

American privateers authorized to intercept British cargo also took their toll. Only 13 of the convoy’s ships eventually made it to Boston, and very little of their cargo survived. Only the preserved food (such as sauerkraut, vinegar, and port) arrived intact. Most of the other provisions were rotten, damaged, or dead; only 148 of the livestock survived. Out of 856 horses shipped, only 532 survived the voyage. This convoy marked the last time that Britain attempted to ship fresh food and livestock to its army.

The demand for supplies was not too much for British shipping to accommodate. However, the supply chain broke down under the combined effects of weather, poor supply procedures, and profiteering. Long lead-times for resupply of goods, coupled with a less than reliable distribution system from England, hindered British operations on the North American continent, requiring their forces to forage for resources and base themselves out of key port cities in the colonies.

Moreover, logistics influenced the first significant British strategic judgment of the war, the decision to abandon Boston to the rebelling colonies. British military leaders realized that, even if British forces were successful in initiating a campaign from Boston, it would be very hard to maintain lines of communication with supply bases around the city. Not only were the rebels likely to attack the precarious supply lines, but they probably would sweep the surrounding area clean of any usable foodstuffs and other supplies.

General Thomas Gage, commander from 1768 to 1775, finally decided that the evacuation of Boston was unavoidable. In correspondence to Eng-
The second British mistake was their failure to integrate their logistics, strategic, and tactical plans. Major changes in the conduct of conventional warfare, which included changes that centralized logistics operations, were not adopted until the Napoleonic era of the early 19th century. The British officers’ pre-Napoleonic concept of war was not suitable for conducting counterinsurgency operations in which the bulk of their logistics support had to come from overseas.

When overseas resupply became less reliable, British forces were required to forage off the land. However, foraging was never entirely successful for several reasons. First, foraging was no longer part of conventional strategy. Second, it was time-consuming and tiring, and British generals tended to regard it as beneath them. Third, foraging parties required a covering force, which was a further drain on manpower and consumed even more supplies. Finally, many foraging expeditions produced little or nothing, which not only was demoralizing but also placed a further drain on supplies.

Conventional tacticians of the time did not trust living off the land, arguing that it was bad for morale and would lead to duplication of effort in some areas and inefficient performance in others. The British were unable to resupply its troops solely from Great Britain, and the British Government never seriously considered that possibility. The army could not be sustained strictly with what it obtained locally, either, but a proper balance was never achieved. The formidable logistics hurdles, coupled with the inconsistent and inefficient civilian hierarchy, ensured that whatever momentum British generals were able to generate would be extremely difficult to maintain.

Fighting on American Terms

The lack of sufficient reserve supplies, combined with cautious generalship, insufficient transportation, wide-spread corruption, and the lack of a coherent strategy to maximize the potential support of British loyalists in the colonies, ensured British failure.

These factors forced the British Army to fight a guerilla war—the only kind of war that the upstart United States could win. This allowed American forces to delay the British while gaining a series of smaller victories, which eventually opened the door for France to become involved. Once France began to provide aid to the Americans, the war became too costly for the British to continue to prosecute.

Many of the successes with American logistics, however, cannot be attributed to General Nathaniel Greene. A Quaker, he served in the Continental Army in numerous roles during the conflict: first as a 33-year-old major general; later, as Commanding General George Washington’s quartermaster general; and finally, as commanding army forage, and that New York seems to be the most proper to land in October 1775, he admitted, “It is manifest that at present the British rear that most necessary for the prosecution of the war to be in possession of some province where you can be secured, and from whence a draw supplies of provisions and forage, and that New York seems to be the most proper to

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